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2025 (6) TMI 925

Dishonour of Cheque - challenge to conviction and sentencing the accused - presumption that the cheque was issued in discharge of the legal liability for a valid consideration - accused failed to rebut presumption by leading any evidence - HELD THAT:- It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, [2022 (7) TMI 1455 - SUPREME COURT] that the revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law.

It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, [2018 (7) TMI 101 - SUPREME COURT] that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity.

The issuance of cheque is not disputed. It was asserted in the revision petition that a blank cheque was issued as security to raise the loan. Therefore, learned Courts below had rightly proceeded on the basis that the accused had issued a cheque in favour of the complainant and once the execution of the cheque was admitted, a presumption under Section 118 and Section 139 of the NI Act would arise. It was laid down by this Court in Naresh Verma vs. Narinder Chauhan [2019 (10) TMI 1578 - HIMACHAL PRADESH HIGH COURT] that where the accused had not disputed his signatures on the cheque, the Court has to presume that it was issued in discharge of legal liability and the burden would shift upon the accused to rebut the presumption.

The complainant was not required to prove the advancement of the loan, especially when the accused has not disputed the taking of the loan from the complainant - there is no infirmity in the findings recorded by the learned Courts below that the accused had issued a cheque to discharge his legal liability.

In the present case, no evidence was produced to rebut the presumption, and the learned Courts below had rightly held that the cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement ‘insufficient funds’.

The learned Trial Court sentenced the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for one year. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, [2019 (2) TMI 547 - SUPREME COURT] that the penal provisions of section 138 is deterrent in nature - Keeping in view the deterrent nature of the sentence to be awarded, the sentence of one year imprisonment cannot be said to be excessive, and no interference is required with it.

Learned Trial Court had ordered the accused to pay a compensation of ₹2,32000/-. The cheque was issued on 25.05.2019, whereas the sentence was imposed on 05.08.2024 after the lapse of 5 years. The complainant Bank lost interest on the amount, and it had to pay the litigation expenses for filing the complaint. It was entitled to be compensated for the same - It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kalamani Tex v. P. Balasubramanian, [2021 (2) TMI 505 - SUPREME COURT] that the Courts should uniformly levy a fine up to twice the cheque amount along with simple interest at the rate of 9% per annum - Therefore, the amount of ₹72,000/- awarded as compensation on the cheque amount of ₹1,60,000/- is not excessive.

Conclusion - The accused failed to rebut the statutory presumption of discharge of debt by the cheque. The plea of a blank cheque issued as security was unsupported by evidence and does not negate liability. The complainant was not required to prove the loan advancement or financial capacity absent a credible defence.

The present revision is dismissed.
2025 (6) TMI 924

Maintainability of petition - availability of alternate and efficacious remedy of appeal - challenge to assessment order - pendency of appeal - petitioner now accepts that the petitioner has also applied for the stay of the demands before the assessing officer - HELD THAT:- The petitioner stated that it had not withheld any material information from this Court. The fact that a stay was already applied before the assessing officer constituted 'material information'. This has been deliberately suppressed.

The delay in instituting this petition is also not explained. This petition is filed to take chances with the judicial process. Due to such petitions, the judicial time that could otherwise be utilised to deal with genuine and old matters is severely curtailed.

Petition dismissed.
2025 (6) TMI 838

Dishonour of Cheque - discharge of debt or not - acquittal of an accused in a complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act - applicability of presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act - rebuttal of presumption by raising a probable defence on a preponderance of probabilities - HELD THAT:- The present case relates to acquittal of an accused in a complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act. The restriction on the power of Appellate Court in a petition seeking leave to appeal against order of acquittal in regard to other offence does not apply with same vigor in the offence under NI Act which entails presumption against the accused. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Rohitbhai Jivanlal Patel v. State of Gujarat [2019 (3) TMI 769 - SUPREME COURT] upheld the High Court's conviction of the accused under Section 138 of the NI Act but modified the sentence to provide the accused an opportunity to pay the fine within two months, failing which he would face imprisonment.

It is well settled that once the execution of the cheque is admitted, the presumption under Section 118 of the NI Act that the cheque in question was drawn for consideration and the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act that the holder of the cheque/ respondent received the cheque in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability are raised against the accused.

It is relevant to note that the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act is not absolute, and may be controverted by the accused. In doing so, the accused only ought to raise a probable defence on a preponderance of probabilities to show that there existed no debt in the manner so pleaded by the complainant in his complaint/ demand notice or the evidence. Once the accused successfully raises a probable defence to the satisfaction of the Court, his burden is discharged, and the presumption ‘disappears.’ The burden then shifts upon the complainant, who then has to prove the existence of such debt as a matter of fact.

It is pertinent to note that the object of a legal demand notice is to afford an opportunity to the drawer of the cheque to rectify his omission and also to protect the interests of an honest drawer. For this reason, the service of demand notice under Section 138(b) of the NI Act is a condition precedent to the filing of complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act. Further, since Section 138 of the NI Act mandates the imposition of criminal liability and is penal in nature, the same ought to be strictly construed.

In the opinion of this Court, even if the petitioner’s case is taken at the highest, yet, since the respondents had already raised a probable defence to dislodge the presumptions raised against them, the onus was on the petitioner to show that there existed a debt/liability in the manner as pleaded by him. The respondents having already dislodged their burden, it was on the petitioner to show the existence of the debt, that too, as a matter of fact. For this reason, the petitioner having failed to do so, his contention that the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act was in his favour, does not bolster the case of the petitioner - It is pertinent to note that a decision of acquittal fortifies the presumption of innocence of the accused, and the said decision must not be upset until the appreciation of evidence is perverse.

Conclusion - This Court finds no such perversity in the impugned judgment so as to merit an interference in the finding of acquittal. Consequently, this Court finds no reason to entertain the present petition.

Petition dismissed.
2025 (6) TMI 837

Dishonour of Cheque - funds insufficient - complainant has not proved that the person representing the complainant company is a person duly authorized to represent it - witnesses who gave oral evidence had no direct knowledge regarding the transactions.

Complainant has not proved that the person representing the complainant company is a person duly authorized to represent it - HELD THAT:- In the present case, the complainant is the company itself. The company is represented by its Managing Director. The complainant specifically pleaded that the Articles of Association of the complainant company authorize and empower the Managing Director to represent all legal matters and to initiate legal proceedings on behalf of the company. The company further pleaded that the Board of Directors of the company held on 12.8.2016 empowered the Managing Director of the company to initiate legal proceedings against the accused. PW1 gave evidence in support of these pleadings in the complaints. The payee is the company itself.

In TRL Krosaki Refractories Ltd. [2022 (2) TMI 1112 - SUPREME COURT], the Supreme Court held that when a company is the payee of the cheque based on which a complaint is filed under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, the complainant necessarily should be the company, which would be represented by an employee who is authorized. In the present case, the complainant is the company itself. The company has been represented by the Managing Director, who is the authorized person. Therefore, the mandate of Section 142 of the N.I. Act has been satisfactorily complied with. Therefore, this challenge falls to the ground.

Witnesses who gave oral evidence had no direct knowledge regarding the transactions - HELD THAT:- The learned counsel for the accused highlighted another discrepancy in the pleadings and the evidence regarding the number of cheques executed. In the complaint, the complainant pleaded that the accused executed 17 cheques. While giving evidence, PWs 2 and 3 stated that the accused executed only 13 cheques. This discrepancy will not affect the merit of the case of the complainant as the complainant has successfully proved the liability and execution of the cheques.

The only question to be considered is whether the accused discharged his evidential burden to rebut the mandatory presumption. True that the standard of proof to discharge this evidential burden must meet only the standard of preponderance of probabilities, similar to a defendant in a civil proceeding. To rebut the presumption, the accused has to raise a probable defence - To discharge this evidential burden, the accused can rely on the evidence of the complainant and all other circumstances brought out in evidence. The evidence need not even be direct. It may comprise circumstantial evidence or presumption of law or fact. In the present case, the accused has not placed any material to the satisfaction of the court that on a preponderance of probabilities, there existed no debt or liability in the manner pleaded in the complaint, demand notice, affidavit, evidence, etc.

Nothing has been elicited in the cross-examination of PWs 1 to 3 to raise any suspicion in the case set up by the complainant other than a minor inconsistency regarding the number of cheques issued. The case of the complainant company has been consistent throughout as is evident from the pleadings in the complaint, demand notice, affidavit and the evidence adduced - The accused miserably failed to discharge his evidential burden. Therefore, the fact that the cheques issued in discharge of a debt or liability will have to be taken to be proved with the aid of the presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act without requiring anything more from the complainant.

The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power of the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 Cr.P.C is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.

Conclusion - The complainant company is duly represented; the execution of the cheques and existence of debt are proved; the accused failed to rebut the presumption under Section 139; the oral evidence is credible and sufficient; and the concurrent findings of conviction and sentence are legally sound and not liable to interference in revision.

This Court is of the view that the judgments impugned are not affected by any patent error of jurisdiction. All the challenges in these revision petitions, therefore, fail. This Court fails to find that the impugned orders are untenable in law or grossly erroneous or unreasonable - Criminal Revision Petitions stand dismissed.
2025 (6) TMI 836

Dishonour of Cheque - Seeking to invoke extraordinary and inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution read with Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita - seeking amendment of the complaint to implead the company and other directors as accused persons in the ongoing proceedings, after institution of a complaint under Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act against an individual director of a company - HELD THAT:- The Coordinate Bench in the case of M/S. Khizer Impex Pvt. Ltd. through Mohammed Hadi Karamhusian [2020 (9) TMI 106 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] has, after considering various decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court, held that the amendment of the nature sought for in the said petitions cannot be permitted and ultimately rejected both the petitions.

It is also found out from the record that the procedure adopted by the present petitioner is, prima facie, found to be against the settled principle of law. It is well settled that before institution of the complaint under the provisions of N.I.Act, complainant has to fulfill certain requisite requirements mentioned in the statute. However, admittedly, in the instant case, the complainant - petitioner has not followed those requisite requirements.

Before institution of the complaint a mandatory notice is required to be issued to the concerned accused persons. However, in the instant case, the petitioner has not issued said mandatory notice to the proposed persons, who were sought to be impleaded as accused persons in the ongoing proceedings. It is an admitted position of fact that after the institution of the complaint, petitioner realized that she has committed mistake by not joining certain persons, who were the Directors of the company and the company as accused and therefore an application is preferred for impleadment of those persons without making specific allegations that the said proposed accused persons were in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business at the time of offence.

Conclusion - The orders passed by the learned Courts concerned are just, fair and reasonable based upon sound principle of law which are not required to be interfered by this Court.

Petition dismissed.
2025 (6) TMI 835

Proof of transaction - Payment of Rs.2 lakh on the basis of Ext.B2 which was admitted by PW1, rather proved through the evidence of DW1 and Ext.B2 - defendant mainly contends that the trial court went wrong in not adjusting Rs.2 lakh, as per Ext.B2, from the principal sum while granting the decree.

Whether the trial court was justified in holding that the plaintiff proved the transaction for Rs.6,50,000/- that led to the execution of Ext.A1 cheque? - Whether the trial court went wrong in not considering the payment of Rs.2 lakh as adjustment towards the debt in view of Ext.B2 cheque, which was admitted by the plaintiff? - Whether the decree and judgment would require interference? - HELD THAT:- In the written statement, specific contention raised by the defendant is that he borrowed Rs.5 lakh on 24.03.2008 and repaid Rs.2 lakh through Ext.B2 on 02.04.2008. No replication filed disputing this contention at the instance of the plaintiff. In the chief affidavit also, this contention was not denied. However, during cross-examination, PW1 admitted receipt of Rs.2 lakh by encashing Ext.B2 cheque, but the case of PW1 during cross-examination is that Ext.B2 was issued for an earlier transaction on 10.02.2008. In fact, the evidence of DW2 in no way suggest that DW2 admitted another transaction for Rs.2 lakh in between the plaintiff and himself as contended by the learned counsel for the defendant; and his specific version is that this is the one and only transaction between the plaintiff and defendant though he used to obtain small sum to the tune of Rs.500/- from the plaintiff otherwise, being nearest shop owners.

In the instant case, the plaintiff never disclosed any other transaction between the plaintiff and defendant apart from the present one averred in the plaint, till the stage of his cross-examination. The case of the plaintiff is that defendant borrowed Rs.6,50,000/- on 24.03.2008 and he failed to return the same though he issued Ext.A1 cheque to discharge the said liability. As per Ext.B2 evidently and admittedly, the plaintiff received Rs.2 lakh on 02.04.2008 after the present transaction. Apart from answering a query during cross-examination that Ext.B2 cheque amount was received for a different transaction on 10.02.2008, such a previous transaction in no way either pleaded or proved. Therefore, the available evidence would suggest that the plaintiff received Rs.2 lakh out of Rs.6,50,000/- borrowed from the defendant on 24.03.2008 and the said amount to be adjusted and reduced for Rs.6,50,000/-. Therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to get Rs.4,50,000/- alone as the amount due to him in this transaction.

The decree and judgment of the trial court is interfered and modified to the tune of Rs.4,50,000/- instead of Rs.6,50,000/- along with interest on the date of the suit that would come to 29,000/-.

What is the rate of interest payable in a suit for money based on a negotiable instrument when the instrument doesn't specify the interest? - How Section 80 of the NI Act and Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure would operate? - HELD THAT:- In a suit based on negotiable instrument, grant of interest shall be at the rate of eighteen per centum per annum, as provided under Section 80 of the NI Act. In such view of the matter, in deviation from the general prescription regarding grant of interest in a decree for payment of money based on documents other than negotiable instrument, as provided under Section 34 of C.P.C., the court has the power to grant interest at eighteen per centum, in tune with the mandate of Section 80 of the NI Act. Thus the law is clear on the point that in a decree for payment of money based on documents other than a negotiable instrument, Section 34 would govern grant of interest and in decree for payment of money based on a negotiable instrument, the interest on the amount due shall be governed by Section 80 of the NI Act, notwithstanding any interest relating to the interest between any parties to the instrument.

In the instant case, the trial court granted only 9% interest and no challenge raised by the plaintiff in the matter of grant of interest. Therefore, there is no reason to interfere with 9% interest granted by the trial court for the decree amount.

Conclusion - i) The evidence is fully convincing to hold that the defendant borrowed Rs.6,50,000/- from the plaintiff and issued Ext.A1 cheque for the same. ii) The Rs.2 lakh received by the plaintiff on 02.04.2008 is to be adjusted and reduced from the principal sum of Rs.6,50,000/- as it pertains to the same transaction. iii) In a suit based on negotiable instrument, the interest on the amount due shall be governed by Section 80 of the NI Act, notwithstanding any agreement relating to interest between the parties. iv) There is no reason to interfere with 9% interest granted by the trial court for the decree amount.

This appeal is allowed in part interfering and modifying the decree granted by the trial court and thereby the defendant is directed to pay Rs.4,79,000/- along with interest at the rate of 9% per annum on the principal sum of Rs.4,50,000/- from the date of the suit till realisation from the defendant and his assets with proportionate cost of the plaintiff in the original suit.
2025 (6) TMI 752

Dishonour of Cheque - legaly enforceable debt - accused not adduced any evidence - complainant failed to prove the transaction led to execution of Ext.P2 cheque and Ext.P1 agreement - HELD THAT:- This is a case in which the complainant put up a case that, the accused, being his friend, in dare need of money, demanded some amount from him for the treatment of his father and to clear his debt on the assertion that otherwise he had no option other than to commit suicide. Accordingly, the accused borrowed Rs.2,75,000/- and executed Ext.P1 agreement acknowledging the same. Regarding Ext.P1, the only suggestion during cross-examination is that it was a forged document. Regarding Ext.P2 also the accused denied the liability as well as the execution of Ext.P2. Apart from that, no effective cross-examination carried out. It is relevant to note that the issuance of cheque is admitted by the accused for a transaction to the tune of Rs.1,15,000/-, and out of which, admittedly Rs.15,000/- yet to be discharged. Even though repayment of Rs.1 lakh out of the money admittedly borrowed by the accused had been alleged, no evidence forthcoming to substantiate the said plea of discharge.

In such a case, the appellate court approached the matter in a most hypertechnical manner by giving much emphasis on the evidence of PW1 on the premise that PW1 did not deny the suggestion as to his handwriting in the cheque, and also the entries in the cheque were put in black ink, and the signature is in blue ink.

Insofar as the legal position as regards to the issuance of blank cheque is concerned, the same is well settled and espoused in Bir Singh's case [2019 (2) TMI 547 - SUPREME COURT]. Thus, even a blank cheque leaf, voluntarily signed and handed over by the drawer/payer, which is towards some payment, would attract presumptions under S.118 and S.139 of the NI Act, in the absence of any cogent evidence to show that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt or legal liability. In fact, law does not mandate that a cheque shall be in the handwriting of the drawer/payer - mere omission to deny the suggestion that the cheque was written by the complainant also is not a reason to disbelieve the case of the complainant. In such cases also, when the transaction and execution of the cheque is proved by evidence, presumptions under Section 118 and Section 139 of the NI Act would squarely apply.

Conclusion - In the instant case, the evidence of PW1, which led to transaction to the tune of Rs.2,75,000/- and execution of Ext.P1 cheque and Ext.P2 agreement, were not even put to effective cross examination and in such a case the appellate court went wrong in holding that the evidence of PW1 was insufficient to prove the case of the complainant. In fact the trial court rightly appreciated the evidence and recorded the conviction. Since the reason given by the appellate court to set aside the conviction imposed by the trial court are not justifiable, it is necessary in the interest of justice to interfere with the judgment of the appellate court.

The accused is convicted for the offence punishable under S.138 of the NI Act and he is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one day till rising of the Court and to pay fine of Rs.3,25,000/- - the judgment of acquittal rendered by the Trial Court stands set aside - Appeal allowed.
2025 (6) TMI 751

Dishonour of Cheque - challenge to judgment of acquittal - issuance of cheque for the transaction of Rs.3 Lakh was not proved by the complainant - rebuttal of presumptions - burden to prove - source of money - HELD THAT:- The law is well settled that, an initial burden is cast upon the complainant to prove the transaction led to execution of the cheque, so as to canvas benefit of presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act.

In the instant case, the trial court found on evidence that the complainant proved the transaction and execution of the cheque and the presumptions in favour of the complainant was not rebutted by the accused. Therefore, the accused was convicted and sentenced by the trial court - The Appellate Court is of the view that a blank cheque leaf entrusted by the accused was misused by the complainant, accepting the case advanced by the accused and the Appellate Court believed the said version. Thereby, reversed the acquittal, finding fault with the evidence of PW1 regarding transaction and execution of Ext.P1 cheque.

In the instant case, source of money of the complainant to advance Rs.3,00,000/- to the accused, as contended by the complainant was seriously put under challenge. During cross-examination, PW1 deposed about the source on asserting that he sold properties during the year 2007 and 2008. It is true that PW1 did not produce any documents to substantiate sale of properties as stated by him. He also failed to remember the name of the purchaser/vendee - However, in the instant case, the accused who presumably knew the property sale, summoned and examined the vendee, who pruchased the properties of the complainant, as a defence witness to negate the evidence of PW1 regarding the sale of properties, as stated by him. But, the evidence of DW1, in fact, supported purchase of property from the complainant. When the witness produced by the defence itself supported sale of properties as spoken by PW1, who had no inclination to the complainant, the evidence of PW1 that he sold properties and out of the said amount, the money was given to the accused, is proved as admitted by DW1.

Conclusion - The verdict rendered by the first Appellate Court acquitting the accused on the finding that she did not commit the offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act is wrong and the same deserves interference.

The judgment of the trial court stands restored and the accused is convicted for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act and she is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one day till rising of the Court and to pay fine of Rs.3,50,000/-. Fine shall be given as compensation to the complainant under Section 357(1)(b) of Cr.P.C. - the judgment of the first Appellate Court stands set aside - Appeal allowed.
2025 (6) TMI 750

Dishonour of Cheque - insufficient funds - rebuttal of presumption through cross-examination and documentary evidence or not - appellate Court dismissed the appeal not on merits but on the ground that there is no representation for the Appellant/Accused - HELD THAT:- As per the reported ruling of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Krishna Janardhan Bhat vs. Dattatraya G. Hegde [2008 (1) TMI 827 - SUPREME COURT]; and in the case of Rangappa Vs. Sri Mohan [2010 (5) TMI 391 - SUPREME COURT], the Accused need not enter the witness box and examine himself to rebut the presumption. It is sufficient to the Accused to rely on the materials available during the evidence of the Complainant, either by cross-examination or by examination-in-chief. Here in this case, the Complainant was crossexamined and certain vital documents were marked under Ex.B-1 to Ex.B-4. Under those circumstances, it is found that the claim of the Complainant that the Accused owes him Rs.6,50,000/- which are covered by way of cheques drawn on different dates is not supported with documentary evidence. When the Complainant admits that the promissory note and cheques were returned to the Accused for the outstanding dues, the claim of the Complainant that he had drawn the amount from the Axis Bank, Periyar Nagar Branch to pay the loan amount to the Accused and her husband has not been substantiated.

It is not known as to how the Complainant arrived at a sum of Rs.6,50,000/- as the balance amount. This has not been substantiated by the Complainant/Respondent in any manner. The Complainant only claims that the Revision Petitioner/Accused is liable to pay Rs.6,50,000/-. However, as to how the sum of Rs.6,50,000/- was paid has not been substantiated by him. Merely based on cheques issued by the Revision Petitioner on various dates, the Court below have erroneously arrive at a conclusion that the Accused had committed offence under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Among the several grounds raised by the Revision Petitioner/Accused, this Court finds that the learned Counsel engaged by her did not appear before the Appellate Judge and she had even given a complaint against her Counsel before the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu and Puducherry alleging professional misconduct - This Court as Revisional Court shall not re-appreciate the evidence as the Appellate Court. But here is a case, where the Revision Petitioner/Accused blames the Counsel engaged by her did not appear before the Appellate Court and did not cooperate with the Revision Petitioner/Accused at the fag end of the appeal. Therefore, the filing of the case under Section 397 and 401 of Cr.P.C. is found justified.

The contents of the reply notice under Ex.P-15 along with the documents executed by the Complainant under Ex.D-1 to Ex.D-4 indicate that the claim of the Accused that the Complainant had filled up the duly signed blank cheques issued by her and filed this false case is found justified - the preponderance of probability is that the cheques available with him were filled up by him and presented to his Bank. Instead of handing over the cheques issued by the Accused, after having been settled the loans, the Complainant unlawfully retained those cheques, presented them in his Bank and filed the instant complaint under Section 138 of The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Conclusion - i) The presumption under Section 139 can be rebutted by cross-examination and documentary evidence without the accused entering the witness box; failure of the complainant to produce documentary proof of payment weakens the prosecution's case. ii) The conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, confirmed by the appellate court, is set aside as perverse.

This Criminal Revision is allowed.
2025 (6) TMI 749

Dishonour of Cheque - Reversal of order of acquittal - enforceability of the debt claimed by the complainant against the accused - validity of the presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act - HELD THAT:- Merely the Accused had signed the cheque and issued it, it will not help the Complainant to raise a presumption against the Accused. As per the notice issued by the Accused under Ex.D-3, Ex.D-4 and Ex.D-5 it indicates that there is no liability. The Accused had discharged the burden of proving the rebuttal evidence under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Therefore, the learned Judicial Magistrate had recorded acquittal against he Accused. The learned III Additional District and Sessions Judge had failed to appreciate the evidence, in the light of the document under Ex.D-1 to Ex.D-8 and merely on the basis of the presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, reversed the finding of acquittal and thereby recorded the finding of guilt against the Accused which is found perverse.

Since it is judgment of acquittal, the Appeal against the acquittal had to be preferred only before the High Court and not before the Sessions Court. Therefore, the learned I Additional District and Sessions Judge taking up the Appeal for consideration itself is an illegality. The Appeal itself was not maintainable. The Accused had preferred this Criminal Revision under Section 397 r/w. 401 of Cr.P.C. Therefore, this Court has to exercise the power of revision under Section 401 of Cr.P.C to re-assess the evidence. Accordingly, this Court had call for records and perused the records and found that the appreciation of evidence was proper by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Fast Track Court-I, Coimbatore in C.C.No.14 of 2014 whereas the learned Sessions Judge, without jurisdiction considered the argument of the learned Counsel for the Complainant/Appellant and reversed the finding of the learned Judicial Magistrate, Fast Track Court-I, Magisterial level, Coimbatore.

This Court exercising the powers of revision under Section 401 of Cr.P.C treated this revision as Appeal, perused the original records and re-assessed the evidence on the same set of evidence. On re-assessing the evidence, it is found that the Complainant had not approached the Court with clean hands.

Conclusion - i) The complainant failed to discharge the burden of proving the accused's liability and the existence of a legally enforceable debt. ii) The appeal against acquittal before the Sessions Court was not maintainable and was an illegality. iii) The conviction recorded by the learned I Additional District and Sessions Judge was perverse and is set aside.

The point for consideration is answered against the Complainant and in favour of the Accused - this Criminal Revision Case is allowed.
2025 (6) TMI 748

Dishonour of Cheque - insufficiency of funds - conviction and sentence of the petitioner for the commission of offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act - main challenge raised by the petitioner was that the impugned cheque was admittedly issued in discharge of a time barred debt, and hence the offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act will not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case.

HELD THAT:- There are no material irregularity or legal impropriety warranting the interference of this Court in revision.

The proposition of law upon the scope of interference in revision, is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

In State of Kerala v. Jathadevan Namboodiri [1999 (2) TMI 676 - SUPREME COURT], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that 'Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge in appeal unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice.'

As far as the present case is concerned, it is not possible to say that the findings of the Trial Court and the Appellate Court are untenable in law, glaringly unreasonable or grossly erroneous. Nor could it be said that the decisions of the courts below are based on unacceptable evidence, or that admissible evidence were ignored for arriving at the findings against the petitioner. The sentence awarded by the courts below is also perfectly in order.

Conclusion - There are no no material irregularity, illegality, or miscarriage of justice in the findings of the Trial Court and the Appellate Court. The evidence was properly considered, and the conclusions were neither perverse nor unreasonable. The sentence imposed was also appropriate and in accordance with law.

The revision petition stands dismissed.
2025 (6) TMI 677

Validity of demand notices post-delivery for misdeclaration of goods - whether the Courts below have rightly held that the Railway authorities could not have raised the demand notice after the delivery of goods? - HELD THAT:- A consignee/owner of goods/person having charge of goods who has brought goods for the purpose of carriage has to give the Railway authorities a written statement regarding the description of the goods, to enable them to charge the appropriate rate of carriage. Under sub-section (4), if the statement is found to be materially false, the Railway authority is empowered to charge the goods at the required rate. No reference is made to the stage at which such a charge can be made, i.e., either before or after delivery. Consequently, it can be seen that the legislative intent had to be, to permit levy of charge under this Section, at either stage and not at a specific one.

It is evident from the contents of demand notices annexed as Annexure P-1 dated 13th October, 2011, Annexure P-2 dated 29th October, 2011, Annexure P-3 dated 7th April, 2012 and Annexure P-4 dated 7th April, 2012 that the demand was raised for misdeclaration by the respondents. No reference has been made to the overloading of wagon, to which Section 73 applies. More so, even the claim petitions do not propose that the demand notices have been for the overloading of wagon. Therefore Section 66 applies to the present lis.

High Court has held that penal charges can only be applied prior to the delivery of goods on the basis of the exposition in Jagjit Cotton Textile [1998 (4) TMI 538 - SUPREME COURT] - when this Court observed “one such ‘condition’ could be by directing that penal charges could be collected before delivering the goods”, it was a suggestion, to explain the conditions that could be imposed by the Railway Administration under Section 54(1). Moreover, the above exposition in Jagjit Cotton Textile, was made in the context of Section 54 only, while the facts of this case pertain to Section 66 of the Act.

The impugned order is set aside - appeal allowed.
2025 (6) TMI 676

Seeking grant of pension with effect from the date of retirement - Entitlement of a retired employee to pension benefits under the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) Pension Regulations, 1990 - refund of the CPF amount with accrued interest as received from RBI on retirement and simple interest as may be decided by the RBI - principle of approbation and reprobation - violation of the Constitutional, Statutory or Common Law principles - HELD THAT:- The details and factum with regard to the various four options which were available to the Respondent during the period he was in employment with the RBI and that he did not opt for switching over to the Pension Scheme in the year 1990, 1992, 1995 and 2000 is not questioned rather admitted. Respondent joined the service on 14.09.1981 and retired as Manager on 30.11.2014. The details with regard to and the requirements under each administrative circular issued on these four occasions have not been disputed.

Similarly, the rate of interest applicable on the amount to be refunded also varied depending upon the targeted beneficiaries of the Scheme. What is apparent, therefore, is that on each occasion, there was a specific timeframe fixed for giving an option, and the benefit was similarly limiting it to the beneficiaries.

Fortunately for the Respondent he was eligible on four occasions to avail the benefits of the Pension Scheme, but he opted out each time and continued with the CPF Scheme. Having taken a considered and calculated decision with regard to non-joining of the Pension Scheme and continuing with the CPF Scheme, the claim of the Respondent has to be considered in the said light.

Another aspect which is apparent is that there has been a gap of 20 years, as the option which was given prior to the last one was in the year 2000, and the one which is in question before us is of the year 2020. During this period, on three separate occasions, as mentioned earlier, the Government did not agree with the proposal of the RBI to grant another option for switching over to the Pension Scheme. It is apparent from the documents placed on the record that the financial details regarding the liability and the calculations based thereon, as part of the proposal for a one-time last option to move to the Pension Scheme were put forth before the Government. As is evident from the said proposal, no liability with regard to arrears of pension was highlighted therein. This is logical as well as it was specifically provided that the pension would be payable with effect from 01.07.2000, and there would be no entitlement of arrears from the date of retirement or otherwise.

The financial burden and the liability were therefore, prominent aspects taken into consideration by the Government while granting its no objection to the proposed Scheme for switching to the Pension Scheme to the erstwhile CPF Scheme optee employees.

As per the pleadings, the retrospective financial burden would have resulted in an unjustified liability of over 900 crores for the RBI, which would have led to a financially unsustainable scenario. This aspect has also been pressed into service by the Counsel. The decision of the Government falls within the realm of policy decision, keeping in view of the considerations taken note of before ultimately approving the Scheme of switch-over as a last option to the persons who were eligible under it as laid down therein.

In State of Tripura[2022 (8) TMI 1577 - SUPREME COURT], the Supreme Court, in reaffirming its earlier rulings such as in Amar Nath Goyal [2005 (8) TMI 717 - SUPREME COURT] and T.N Electricity Board vs. R. Veerasamy and Others [1999 (3) TMI 677 - SUPREME COURT], held that financial constraints can constitute a valid and non-arbitrary basis for fixing a cut-off date for extending pensionary benefits or pay revisions. It emphasized that economic considerations are germane to governmental policy decisions, and distinguishing between retirees based on such a date does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution. Accordingly, in the present case, the cutoff date fixed under the Pension Rules was constitutionally valid, and the High Court’s judgment striking it down was found to be erroneous.

Therefore, it cannot be said that the cut off date, as fixed for grant of pension while refusing its retrospectivity, thereof would be arbitrary or illegal or discriminatory in nature.

Moreover, based on the facts of the case, the Respondent cannot be permitted to blow hot and cold in the same breath, as stated above. Each Circular had its own specific terms and conditions, entitling the retirees or in-service employees to the benefits as were laid down therein and that too subject to certain conditions.

The said scheme itself was a well-considered and thoroughly worked-out detailed financial liability aspect. The said Scheme therefore to be operational and effective and above all, a viable one was to operate as a whole. The present Scheme of the year 2020, was a conglomerate of various factors, with each factor working in tandem with the others making it an effective and workable Scheme which when tested on the principles laid down by this Court as referred to above would not fall foul of it.

The financial aspect, in itself, is a valid consideration, as stated above, and would be applicable in the present case. The Respondent, therefore, cannot be permitted to choose a particular aspect of the Scheme that makes it unworkable, and that too for his own financial benefit. Approbation and reprobation would not be permissible in such schemes. Respondent having once opted for the Scheme cannot be permitted to not accept a part thereof while intending to take the benefit of the Scheme as a whole.

The plea, therefore, as has been sought to be projected amounts to violation of the contractual terms because the Scheme in itself had to be given effect to as a whole.

There being no violation of the Constitutional, Statutory or Common Law principles, interference by the Division Bench vide the impugned judgment while setting aside the judgement of the Single Judge cannot sustain.

Thus, the impugned judgment dated 18.12.2023 passed by the Division Bench of High Court of Kerala, therefore, cannot sustain and is hereby set aside and the Judgment of the Learned Single Judge dated 04.04.2023 dismissing the writ petition preferred by the Respondent is restored. The appeal is allowed.

Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
2025 (6) TMI 675

Claim for ownership of the subject property (agricultural land) - Rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC - manifestly vexatious or does not disclose any right to sue - cause of action - Insufficient stamp duty - seeking reliefs of declaration, possession, and permanent injunction in respect of the subject property - HELD THAT:- Section 23 of the Registration Act mandates that any document required to be registered must be presented for registration within four months from the date of its execution. This requirement has not been fulfilled in the present case, as the power of attorney and the agreement to sell, both executed in 2014, remain unregistered. Despite the execution of the agreement to sell on 24.05.2014, no attempt was made by Respondent No.1 to have it registered within the stipulated period. This inaction further supports the appellant’s contention that the said agreement is not only inadmissible under Sections 17 and 49 of the Act, but also legally ineffective due to non-compliance with the mandatory requirement of timely registration.

The failure to seek specific performance or register the document within the period prescribed under Section 23 renders the foundational document unenforceable in law. That apart, the revocation of the Board Resolution and Power of Attorney prior to the execution of the impugned sale deeds vitiates the authority under which those deeds were executed by Respondent No.1. Accordingly, serious triable issues arise, which must be adjudicated by a competent civil court.

However, the High Court erred in treating the second cause of action – pertaining to the sale deeds registered on 19.07.2022 – as merely “academic”, and proceeded to reject the plaint in its entirety without undertaking a judicial examination of this distinct issue.

This approach is contrary to the well settled legal principle that a plaint may be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC only if, on a plain reading of the plaint, it discloses no cause of action or falls within the other narrowly defined grounds under the said provision, such as under-valuation, insufficient court fees, or bar by any law. In this context, we may place reliance on the judgment in Central Bank of India [2025 (2) TMI 1186 - SUPREME COURT], wherein, this Court while examining the jurisdiction of civil courts in disputes involving immovable property and proceedings under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, held that a plaint cannot be rejected in its entirety merely because one of the prayers or reliefs sought is legally untenable, so long as other reliefs are maintainable and based on independent causes of action.

Therefore, the High Court’s wholesale rejection of the plaint, without appreciating that the reliefs claimed flowed from multiple and distinct causes of action – particularly one arising after the revocation of the power of attorney – amounts to an improper application of Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Selective severance of reliefs is impermissible where different causes of action are independently pleaded and supported by distinct facts.

Although the private respondents contend that the power of attorney was notarized, a consent letter was executed, and the transaction was reflected in the income tax records – while also asserting possession over the subject property and alleging that the suit was instituted merely to harass and disturb such possession – these are all matters that require adjudication during trial. Such factual disputes cannot be resolved at the stage of considering an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Therefore, these contentions, even if raised, do not furnish a valid ground for rejection of the plaint at the threshold.

Furthermore, the contention of the private respondents that the appellant handed over the impounded documents, based on which the sale deeds were executed and mutation effected, are again factual matters to be examined at trial and not at the stage of Order VII Rule 11 CPC. That apart, the decisions relied upon by the respondents are of no assistance as they are factually distinguishable.

Thus, we find that the trial court rightly held that the issues are triable and that the application filed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC was without merit. In contrast, the High Court erred in overturning this finding and rejecting the plaint in its entirety.

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order of the High Court is set aside, and the order of the Additional District Judge is restored. Consequently, the plaint is directed to be taken on the file of the trial Court, which shall proceed with the suit in accordance with law, uninfluenced by any observations made in this judgment. The parties shall bear their own costs.
2025 (6) TMI 674

Motor accident claim - Seeking adequate compensation - determination of the income of the deceased - deceased was the only earning member of the family, being a Mechanical Engineer by profession - High Court incorrectly observed that Income Tax Returns cannot be accepted as proof of income - HELD THAT:- We are unable to agree with the view taken by the Tribunal and High Court on the income of the deceased. It has been clarified in Malarvizhi & Ors. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. [2019 (12) TMI 1692 - SUPREME COURT] that the determination of income must proceed on the basis of Income Tax Return when available, being a statutory document. More recently, this Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Sonigra Juhi Uttamchand [2025 (1) TMI 1562 - SUPREME COURT], while determining the income of the deceased

On a perusal of the Income Tax Return of the deceased for the Financial Year 2012-2013, annexed at Annexure P2, his gross total income is seen to be Rs. 1,98,192/- per annum. In the light of the above expositions of law, his income is, therefore, fixed at Rs. 1,98,192/- per annum.

Thus, the difference in compensation is as allowed.

The Civil Appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms. The impugned Award dated 14th August, 2015 passed in MVC No.1858/2012 by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and IInd Addl. Sr. Civil Judge, Mangalore, D.K., as affirmed vide the impugned order stands modified in terms of the above. Interest is to be paid as awarded by the Tribunal
2025 (6) TMI 673

Seeking claim for reimbursement of excise duty - interpretation of Clause 3.4.1.5 of the General Conditions of Contract (GCC) entered into between the parties for Pipeline Replacement Project on lump sum basis - applications under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - patently illegal - manifest disregard of the terms of the contract - scope of intervention under Section 37 - HELD THAT:- It is a settled position of law that the scope of Appeal under Section 37 of the Act is very limited and this Court cannot undertake an independent assessment of the evidence and merits of the award. The jurisdiction of this Court under Section 37 of the Act is circumscribed to only ascertaining whether the exercise of power under Section 34 of the Act has been within the scope of the provision. The appeal under Section 37 of the Act cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid down under Section 34 of the Act.

The impugned judgment has correctly held that when the terms of the contract were unambiguous, the negotiations between the parties in the contract should not have been looked into considering clause 1.2.5 of the GCC, which stated that the contract constitutes an entire agreement and supersedes all past negotiations, communications and agreements entered into between the parties prior to the execution of the contract. Ignoring an explicit clause of the contract or acting contrary to the terms of the contract amounts to patent illegality. The above law has been settled in the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Indian Oil Corporation Ltd [2022 (2) TMI 1450 - SUPREME COURT]

The Awards relied on the letter dated 27.08.2008 to hold that the Respondent was not entitled for reimbursement of the excise duty, whilst ignoring an explicit term of the contract. The law laid down in the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in South East Asia Marine Engg. & Constructions Ltd. [2020 (5) TMI 242 - SUPREME COURT] that a contract should be read as mutually explanatory to the extent possible has been ignored in the Awards to interpret clause 3.4.1.5 of the GCC. Accordingly, the conclusion arrived in the Awards is patently illegal, perverse and amounts to re-writing of the contract.

The impugned judgment has rightly set aside the Awards and the law laid down in the case of Raghunath Builders [2023 (11) TMI 1377 - DELHI HIGH COURT, relied on by the Appellant is not applicable in the present case as although the jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act is limited and the Court does not sit in appeal over the finding of the arbitral tribunal nor can they revisit the findings derived after the interpretation of the contract, in an appropriate case, the interference by the Court is required where the arbitral tribunal’s interpretation is clearly erroneous and patently illegal. If such an interpretation renders a clause of the agreement meaningless or redundant, it cannot be allowed to stand. Courts are not expected to overlook interpretations that defeat the purpose of the contract itself. The proposition has been settled by the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Patel Engineering [2020 (5) TMI 733 - SUPREME COURT], and DMRC Ltd [2024 (4) TMI 557 - SUPREME COURT (LB)] relied upon by the Respondent.

Thus, the impugned judgment has rightly set aside the Awards. Accordingly, the appeals are hereby dismissed as there is no infirmity with the impugned judgment. There shall be no orders as to the cost.
2025 (6) TMI 672

Conviction and sentence initiated under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - enhancement of the sentence and compensation - ex parte decision - violation of principle of natural justice as enshrined under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India - Right to legal representation - non-representation or default of the advocate - HELD THAT:- Considering the provisions and propositions laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Subhash Chand Vs. State (Delhi Administration) [2013 (1) TMI 943 - SUPREME COURT], it is clear that when the victim is aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment of acquittal, or convicting for a lesser offence or imposing inadequate compensation, victim shall have a right to prefer an appeal against any order passed by the Court and such appeal shall lie to the Court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of conviction of such Court. The answer of the first question is in negative. Therefore, revision is not maintainable.

In so far as to the second question is concerned, it is not disputed by the parties that the Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court – II, City Sessions Court, Calcutta dismissed the appeal on merits though no appellant was present or represented by any learned advocate on the date of hearing. The principle of natural justice has been ignored at the time of disposal of Appeal. It is settled principle of law that any criminal appeal should not be dismissed on merits or on the ground of default in absence of representation by learned advocate for the appellant (s).

In this regard, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, time and again, reiterates that a court cannot dismiss the appeal filed by an appellant/accused merely because of non-representation or default of the advocate for the appellant/accused. If the accused does not appear through counsel appointed by him/her, the Court is obliged to proceed with the hearing of the case only after appointing amicus curiae. This Court relies a judgment passed in the case of K. Muruganandam & Ors. Vs. State Rep. by the Deputy Superintendent of Police and Anr. [2021 (8) TMI 1438 - SUPREME COURT].

Thus, the Criminal Revisional application being CRR No. 2782 of 2018 is, thus, dismissed and CRR No. 3491 of 2019 is, thus, allowed. Consequently, connected applications, if any, are also, thus, disposed of.

Accordingly, the impugned judgment dated 19.09.2019 passed by the Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court – II, City Sessions Court, Calcutta in Criminal Appeal No. 79 of 2019 thereby affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 4th August, 2018 passed by the Learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 14th Court, Calcutta in connection with Case No. CS-0053954 of 2016 is hereby set aside.

Interim order, if any, stands vacated.

The Appeal being Criminal Appeal No. 79 of 2019 is remanded back to the Appellate Court below with a direction to dispose of on its own merits independently and in accordance with law after affording an opportunity of hearing to the parties. In the event none represent the appellant/convict, the same may be disposed of after appointing amicus curiae. I also make it clear that this court does not get an opportunity to enter into the merits of the instant case as such Appellate Court shall not influence by any of the observation, whatsoever, made herein above.

The petitioner/complainant may also take recourse of his grievances by filing appeal in accordance with law if so advised.
2025 (6) TMI 671

Seeking to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of this Court u/s 482 - dismissal for want of prosecution - Dishonour of cheque(s) - repeated absence of the complainant or his counsel - Legality of Dismissal of Complaint for Want of Prosecution under Section 256 CrPC - Legal maxims - HELD THAT:- It is not in dispute that the applicant/complainant had instituted a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, which was duly registered and proceeded to the stage of issuance of summons. The respondent eventually entered an appearance and was granted bail. The matter was fixed for framing of notice under Section 251 CrPC.

Furthermore, it is well settled that inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC cannot be exercised to circumvent specific statutory provisions or to revive proceedings already concluded by an order of acquittal passed under Section 256 CrPC. In PadmabenAjit bhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that inherent jurisdiction must be sparingly exercised and not in cases where specific remedies are available.

The repeated absence of the complainant, the failure to avail statutory remedy, and the unexplained delay, together, do not present a case of procedural irregularity or miscarriage of justice warranting exercise of this Court’s extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC.

While the applicant may have perceived hardship, such hardship flows from his own conduct in failing to appear and prosecute the complaint. The legal maxim actus curiae neminemgravabit cannot be invoked where the default is entirely attributable to the party. Moreover, the maxim interest reipublicaeut sit finislitium also guides that litigation must attain finality.

Additionally, the court takes note of the legal maxim vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt—the law aids the vigilant and not those who sleep over their rights—is fully applicable in the present case. The applicant, having been negligent and indolent in pursuing his case, is now estopped from claiming equitable relief under the garb of inherent powers.

The present application, if allowed, would amount to nullifying the effect of an acquittal granted under a valid statutory provision and would undermine the legislative intent behind Section 256 CrPC, which seeks to balance the complainant’s right of prosecution with the accused’s protection against harassment and undue delay.
2025 (6) TMI 587

Challenge to review petition - Limited scope of review jurisdiction as prescribed under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) and Section 114 CPC - apparent error on the face of record or not - HELD THAT:- It would be proper for this Court to discuss the object and ambit of Section 114 C.P.C. as the same is a substantive provision for review. When a person considering himself aggrieved either by a decree or by an order of Court from which appeal is allowed but no appeal is preferred or where there is no provision for appeal against an order and decree, may apply for review of the decree or order as the case may be in the Court, which may order or pass the decree.

From the bare reading of Section 114 C.P.C., it appears that the said substantive power of review under Section 114 CPC has not laid down any condition as the condition precedent in exercise of power of review nor the said Section imposed any prohibition on the Court for exercising its power to review its decision. However, an order can be reviewed by a Court only on the prescribed grounds mentioned in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. An application for review is more restricted than that of an appeal and the Court of review has limited jurisdiction as to the definite limit mentioned in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC itself. The powers of review cannot be exercised as an inherent power nor can an appellate power can be exercised in the guise of power of review.

The power of a Civil Court to review its judgment and decision is very much limited and it may be exercised on the discovery of a new and important matter or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made. It may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found and it may also be exercised on any analogues ground. But it may not be exercised on the ground the decision was erroneous on merits because it would be the province of a Court of an appeal. So, a mere error whether factual or legal is not sufficient to invoke review jurisdiction.

It is observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Asharafi Devi (D) Thr. Lrs.-vs- State of U.P. [2019 (2) TMI 1816 - SUPREME COURT] wherein it is said that it is a settled law that every error whether factual or legal cannot be made subject matter of review under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code, though it can be made subject matter of appeal arising out of such order. In other wards in order to attract provision of Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code, the error/mistake must be apparent on the face of the record of the case. So, a mistake or error which the party pleads for seeking review must be one which is self-evident. If a matter is required to be first reheard and then corrected, it would be an appeal under the guise of review.

Review is an exception to the Rule that once the court has pronounced the judgement and signed it, it has no jurisdiction to alter it and it ceases to have control over it. However, an error can be reviewed by a Court only on the prescribed grounds mentioned in Order 47 Rule 1 C.P.C. An application for review is more restricted than that of an appeal and the Court of review has limited jurisdiction and defined limit mentioned in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC itself. The powers of review cannot be exercised as an inherent power nor can an appellate power be exercised in the guise of power of review.

Conclusion - The petitioner has been unable to make out any ground in exercise of jurisdiction for review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. This petitioner is seeking to reopen the merits of the case by way of the instant application and if one goes through the grounds of review, one will immediately see that the application is an effect and substantive seeking to have the revision reheard on the merit in the review application, which is not permissible under the law.

There are no reason to review the order dated 30.01.2024. There is no error apparent on the face of the record nor have any other grounds been made out by the petitioner which would persuade to review the order - review petition dismissed.
2025 (6) TMI 529

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Write of employer intending to close an industrial undertaking - Letter can be construed to be an order or not - entitlement to the relief of deemed closure, as on 27th October 2019 by virtue of the deeming fiction present in Section 25-O(3) of the Act - meaning of the phrase ‘appropriate Government’ - HELD THAT:- In the instant facts, the application for closure was duly addressed to the authority, which was acknowledged to be on 28 August 2019. The Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Labour Government of Maharashtra, responded on 25 September 2019 stating that no sufficient reasons had been provided for closure. The letter read- “it will be possible to take action only if you can submit the application again by providing explanation regarding other efforts initiated by you for not closing down the Division, providing justifiable as well as consummate rationale for this action.” Hereby, it was informed that action could not be taken on the application as it stood and that they would have to resubmit with better particulars.

The necessary conclusion is that the letter dated 25 September 2019 addressed by the Deputy Secretary to HSML cannot be constituted to be an order since such order to resubmit the application was without any authority since it was not the appropriate Government acting in that regard and not an order rejecting or accepting the application. The same conclusion can be reached on a second count - the ‘order’ suffered from the vice of non-application of mind by the competent authority.

Section 25-O provides that the appropriate Government may, after making an enquiry and hearing all the concerned parties, pass an order in writing accepting or rejecting the application for closure. It also provides that if the appropriate Government does not communicate and order within 60 days of the date of application, there shall be deemed closure - the appropriate Government had not acted in respect of the application made by HSML since the Minister, who was the competent authority, had not applied his mind to the administrative ‘order’ nor, did the Deputy Secretary have the authority to do so. In other words, the appropriate Government failed to make and communicate any order on the application for closure. The deemed closure would, therefore, come into effect.

Conclusion - The High Court erred in placing reliance on Form XXIV-B, instead of XXIV-C which, resulted into an erroneous appreciation of statutory provisions.

Appeal allowed.