|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 141 to 160 of 172 Records
-
1982 (6) TMI 32 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... its, we do not consider it necessary to go into the question of the application of the principle of res judicata and to decide whether the Revenue was debarred from taking a different view in regard to the asseseee s one-half share in the 31 share in the partnership firm even though in the earlier years the assessee s stand in this regard was accepted. We, therefore, do not answer question No. 1. However, assuming for the sake of argument that the principle of res judicata has no application, so far as question No. 2 is concerned, for reasons which we have stated earlier, we answer the question in the negative. For the same reasons we do not consider it necessary to answer question No. 3 but in the view that we have taken, we must answer question No. 4 in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue and questions Nos. 5 and 6 also in the negative, that is, against the Revenue. The result is that the reference is answered accordingly with costs.
-
1982 (6) TMI 31 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Export Market Development Allowance, Precedents, Weighted Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... of law and legal certainty necessitates implicit reliance by the authorities, including tax authorities within the State of Maharashtra, on judgments of this High Court whose writ runs throughout the State and so long as these hold the field unaffected by any decision of a court higher in the judicial hierarchy, namely, the Supreme Court, or unless rendered obsolete through statutory changes. This petition thus succeeds and is allowed. The petitioners various assessment proceedings, vide Ex. D to the petition and pending at different stages, will now be heard and decided expeditiously but in the light of this judgment and in accordance with law. Stay of recovery proceedings by virtue of this court s order at the time of admission will stand vacated with effect from 18th September, 1982. Rule earlier issued on this petition is made absolute in terms aforesaid. In the circumstances of this case, however, parties are directed to bear their own respective costs of this petition.
-
1982 (6) TMI 30 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Appeal To AAC ... ... ... ... ..... ted from the payment of tax under the various provisions of the Indian I.T. Act of 1922, and are not included in the total income of an assessee by s. 16 of that Act should be excluded in computing the total income of the assessee for ascertaining the rate of tax. It is beyond dispute that this principle, which was laid down in connection with the Indian I.T. Act, 1922, would also apply to the said Act. This decision also supports the contention of Mr. Mehta, which we have set out above. In view of the aforesaid, question No. 1 referred to us is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. As far as question No. 2 is concerned, it is common ground that the said question has also to be answered in favour of the assessee in view of the decision of the Full Bench of this court in CIT v. Daimler Benz A. G. 1977 108 ITR 961. Hence, the said question is also answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The Commissioner to pay the costs of the reference.
-
1982 (6) TMI 29 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... . However, the reasons given by him, though quite valid for the purpose of assessing the amount as the assessee s unexplained income, are not good enough for establishing a charge of concealment of income to this extent. In our view, the Revenue has not discharged the onus of proving concealment of income and, therefore, the assessee s case is fully covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Anwar Ali 1970 76 ITR 696. In this view of the matter, we cancel the penalty order of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner. In view of the fact that the order in question is before the addition of the Explanation to s. 271(1)(c) and in view of the findings recorded by the Tribunal and in view of the nature of the question referred to us, we must hold that the Tribunal was justified in arriving at its conclusion. The question is, therefore, answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The parties will pay and bear their own costs. SUHAS CHANDRA SEN J.-I agree.
-
1982 (6) TMI 28 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Charitable Purpose, Exemptions ... ... ... ... ..... to a contract and that the covenantors would continue to have the advantage of membership at lower subscription rate than other persons and that they would be immune from the possibility of increase of subscription rates during the whole period of the covenant. It is obvious, therefore, that the amounts inquestion in that case were consideration for those privileges and that is how the sums paid were not held entitled to exemption. The conditions in the instant case, as already pointed out, are merely to see that the funds are properly applied and accounted for. There is no element of any consideration anywhere for the grant. It is clear, therefore, that the finding recorded by the AAC and the Tribunal that the grants-in-aid were voluntary contributions was clearly justified in law. In that view of the matter, the question referred has to be answered in the affirmative and against the Revenue. The question is accordingly answered. The assessee to get costs of this reference.
-
1982 (6) TMI 27 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Deduction, Interest On Borrowed Money ... ... ... ... ..... f this court in Kishinchand Chellaram v. CIT 1978 114 ITR 654 at p. 665. We cannot also lose sight of the fact that, as held by the Supreme Court in CIT v. Malayalam Plantations Ltd. 1964 53 ITR 140, this expression is wider and it may take into account not only the day to day running of a business but several other matters. In view of this, we see no reason to take a view different from the one taken by the Calcutta High Court in the aforesaid case. In the result, question No. 1 referred to above is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. As far as question No. 2 is concerned, it is the accepted position that, as far as this court is concerned, this question is concluded against the assessee by the decision of this court in Kishinchand Chellaram v. CIT 1978 114 ITR 654. In view of the aforesaid, the said question is answered in the negative and against the assessee. Looking to the divided success achieved by the parties, there will be no order as to costs.
-
1982 (6) TMI 26 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Appeal To AAC, Delay In Filing Return ... ... ... ... ..... ll the unregistered firms are equally treated under the said section. In my opinion, the same view was taken by the Madras High Court in the case of Mahendrakumar Iswarlal and Co. v. Union of India 1974 94 ITR 65. It has been held by the Madras High Court that it is only in cases where the returns have been withheld without sufficient cause, that the interest contemplated under s. 139(1) is levied. Therefore, the prov. to cl. (iii)(a) of s. 139(l) cannot be said to be unreasonable or discriminatory. In the circumstances, therefore, the rule is made absolute to the extent indicated above. The AAC will re-hear the appeal in so far as the interest is concerned and dispose of the same in accordance with law. hereby affirm the other portion of the appellate order. There will be no order as to costs. The same order was passed in respect of the other two appeals filed for the assessment years 1969-70 and 1970-71. Let the operation of this order be stayed for four weeks from to-day.
-
1982 (6) TMI 25 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... her those are necessary materials for assessment. We are of the view that the non-disclosure of the factum of acquisition and the amount awarded as compensation in the return submitted before the assessing authority will amount to non-disclosure of the material facts necessary for making the assessment for the year 1962-63. In this case, we have to say that there was not only non-disclosure of the income chargeable to tax in the assessment year, but also non-disclosure of all material facts necessary for completing the assessment for that year. We entirely 4 agree with the view taken by the Tribunal in this case that the proper provision applicable is s. 147(a) read with s. 149(a)(ii). Since reassessment has been initiated within 16 years contemplated by s. 149(a)(ii), reassessment was held in time. In this view of the matter, we have to answer the question in the affirmative and against the assessee. The Revenue will have the costs from the assessee. Counsel s fee, Rs. 500.
-
1982 (6) TMI 24 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Insurance Business ... ... ... ... ..... deal with the question as to whether these amounts should be excluded from the profits of the assessee-company. We do not know what view the Tribunal would have taken on the question and it was not permissible for the assessee now to agitate the question that the assets were blocked or frozen in Burma and Ceylon and they had ceased to be stock-in-trade. The second and more substantial ground on which this contention will have to be rejected is the view which we have taken earlier that once certain amounts have been shown as profits in the annual accounts it is not open to the ITO to go behind those figures. We are not, therefore, in a position to accept the alternative submission that at least the amount of appreciation of assets in Burma and Ceylon should be excluded from the profits of Rs. 21,26,932. Consequently, in the view which we have taken, question No. 1 has to be answered in the negative and question No. 2 does not arise. The assessee to pay costs of the reference.
-
1982 (6) TMI 23 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... nd circumstances subsequent to the stage of writing off which are not irrelevant also amply justify the action of the assessee-company. The assessee-company has satisfied us that the conclusion reached by the Tribunal is vitiated by a gross error or refusal to take into consideration material evidence. In the light of what is discussed in the foregoing paragraphs, we hold that the assessee-company has succeeded in showing that the finding recorded by the Tribunal is unreasonable. Under the circumstances, the court is entitled to answer the question in favour of the assessee, although there may be a clear conclusion of the Tribunal against the assessee-company. As held by us the amount had become irrecoverable and consequently the assessee was justified in writing it off in the year of account relevant to the assessment year under reference. In the result, we answer the question referred to us in the negative and against the Revenue. Reference answered accordingly with costs.
-
1982 (6) TMI 22 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Company ... ... ... ... ..... ad of employing persons having knowledge of techniques and utilising their knowledge, technical know-how is acquired. Technical know-how made available by a party to such an agreement does not stand on the same footing as protected rights under a registered patent. It was held in that case that, in essence, the agreements were for acquiring technical knowledge regarding methods of production, and in the case of Benz for use of the trade name. The assessee had not acquired any asset or advantage of an enduring nature for the benefit of its business. The amounts paid for provision of know-how and licence to use the trade name were revenue expenditure. Following that decision, we must decide the aforesaid question in favour of the assessee. In the result, the questions referred are answered as follows Question No. 1 In the affirmative. Question No. 2 In the affirmative. Both the questions are answered in favour of the assessee. The Commissioner to pay the costs of the reference.
-
1982 (6) TMI 21 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... years under s. 10(3) as it stood in the relevant assessment years. Since the income was not taxable, the losses arising from such activity could not also be set off against income from a different source or under a different bead In view of the language used under s. 10(27) of the I.T. Act, 1961, as it stood in the relevant year and in view of the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Karamchand Premchand Ltd. 1960 40 ITR 106, with great respect, we are unable to agree. In that view of the matter, it appears to us that the Tribunal was in error in coming to its conclusion that the losses on account of breeding of horses and pigs amounting to Rs. 74,065 and Rs. 19,918 respectively were not entitled to set off in the facts and circumstances of the case which we have set out hereinbefore. In the premises, the question is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The parties will pay and bear their own costs. SUHAS CHANDRA SEN J.-I agree.
-
1982 (6) TMI 20 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Depreciation, Plant ... ... ... ... ..... ll within the meaning of a plant . All these cases turned mainly in the nature of assets and the role they played in the business of the assessee. These cases are, therefore, of no assistance to the assessee in the instant case. In the view which we have taken, the roads within the factory premises cannot be treated as something with which the business of the assessee is carried on or as a tool of the trade. They can properly be described as a setting in which the business of the assessee is carried on and being an adjunct to the factory buildings, they cannot be treated as plant for the purpose of s. 32 read with s. 43(3) of the I.T. Act. The question referred is, therefore, answered by holding that the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the roads constructed by the assessee-company in the premises of the factory would constitute plant as defined in s. 43(3) and that they must be treated a building for the purpose of s. 32. The assessee to pay costs of the reference.
-
1982 (6) TMI 19 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Appeal To AAC, Delay In Filing Return ... ... ... ... ..... erved that the decided cases had, from time to time, evolved various tests for distinguishing between capital and revenue expenditure, but no test was paramount or conclusive. There was no all embracing formula which could provide a ready solution to the problem no touchstone had been devised. The Supreme Court further observed that every case had to be decided on its own facts, keeping in mind, the broad picture of the whole operation in respect of which the expenditure had been incurred. Indeed, several tests were involved. Bearing these tests in mind and in the background of the facts as found by the Tribunal, we are of the opinion that in this case, the Tribunal arrived at the correct conclusion in allowing this expenditure as revenue expenditure. In that view of the matter, the question is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, parties will pay and bear their own costs. SUHAS CHANDRA SEN J.-I agree.
-
1982 (6) TMI 18 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... by the ITO under s. 271 (1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, but the penalty was levied by the IAC not on the conclusion of the ITO but on a different conclusion arrived at by the AAC. In the case before us, as we have already pointed out, there is no change of basis of suppression of sales between the order of the ITO and the order of the AAC. Hence, the principle laid down in this decision has no application to the case before us. We may mention that Mr. Dastur also cited a decision of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Niemla Textile Finishing Mills (P.) Ltd. v. CIT 1974 97 ITR 329, and the decision of the Allahabad High Court in CIT v. Shadiram Balmukand 1972 84 ITR 183 (All). We are, however, not inclined to discuss these two cases as, in our view, they are of no relevance to the question before us. In the result, the question referred to us is answered in the affirmative and against the assessee. The assessee to pay to the Commissioner the costs of this reference.
-
1982 (6) TMI 17 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... an appeal is preferred against a judgment of civil court, it loses its finality and, therefore, the date of judgment under appeal cannot be treated as the date of accrual. The date of accrual would be the date on which the final judgment is rendered. The same view appears to have been taken by this court in CWT v. Amatul Kareem 1981 127 ITR 549 no doubt a case arising under the W.T. Act. In view of these decisions it must be held that the date of accrual cannot be treated as September 29, 1956, namely, the date on which the civil court rendered its judgment enhancing the compensation. It must accordingly be held that the said amount could not have been taxed in the assessment year 1957-58. Accordingly, the question referred to us is answered in the following manner While the amount of Rs. 33,094 representing the interest on the compensation awarded to the respective assessees is taxable as income, it cannot be taxed or included in the income for the assessment year 1957-58.
-
1982 (6) TMI 16 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Burden Of Proof, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... e has established that the failure to return the correct value of some of the assets did not arise from any fraud or any gross or wilful neglect on the part of the assessee. Consequently, the burden shifted to the Department to prove that the assessee intentionally made these entries and thus it was guilty of an offence under s. 18(1)(c). In our view, it has failed to discharge the same. Mr. Ashok Bhan made a reference to CIT v. J. K. A. Subramania Chettiar 1977 110 ITR 602 (Mad) and F. C. Agarwal v. CIT 1976 102 ITR 408 (Gauhati). Both the cases are under the I.T. Act, in which there is no provision like Expln. 2. These are also distinguishable. In our view, he cannot derive any benefit from the observations therein. We, therefore, answer question No. 1 in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Department. In view of the answer to question No. 1, question No. 2 does not arise and need not be answered. No order as to costs. SURINDER SINGH J.-I agree.
-
1982 (6) TMI 15 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Omission To Disclose Fully And Truly, Reassessment, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... oper investigation was not carried out though all the primary facts which the assessee was required to place before him had been so placed. This is the considered view of the Supreme Court in Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. ITO 1961 41 ITR 191, Gemini Leather Stores v. ITO 1975 100 ITR I and ITO v. Madnani Engineering Works Ltd. 1979 118 ITR 1. As the assessee had placed all the primary facts before the WTO for the assessment years in question with regard to the value of the agricultural land, there was no failure on her part which would entitle the WTO to take recourse to s. 17(1)(a) of the Act for reopening the assessments. The petition is, therefore, allowed and notices issued by the WTO under s. 17(1)(a) of the W.T. Act for assessment years 1972-73, 1973-74 and 1974-75 (annexs H, H-1 and H-2 of the petition) are quashed. Costs of this petition will be borne by the respondents. Advocate s fee Rs. 150. The outstanding amount of security deposit be refunded to the petitioners.
-
1982 (6) TMI 14 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Penalty, Penalty Proceedings ... ... ... ... ..... ly refer to the following observation in Addl. CIT v. Dr. V. V. Shrivastava 1980 122 ITR 908, 912 (MP). It is true that in penalty proceedings it may be open on the question of concealment of income to accept an explanation which may have been rejected in the assessment or to reject an item as not amounting to income which may have been accepted as income in the assessment. We respectfully agree with the aforesaid observation. The Tribunal had thus jurisdiction to ascertain in the penalty proceedings, the amount of income concealed in the assessment. There was material before the Tribunal on the basis of which it came to the conclusion that the income concealed was Rs. 10,440. This is a finding of fact. In view of this finding, the Tribunal was justified in reducing the quantum of penalty. Our answer to the question referred to us, is therefore, in the affirmative and against the Revenue. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs of this reference.
-
1982 (6) TMI 13 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Actual Cost, Depreciation, Reference ... ... ... ... ..... usiness loss. This conclusion is supported by the decision of a Division Bench of this court in Income-tax Reference No. 98 of 1973 (CIT v. Chemicals and Fibres of India Ltd.) rendered on 7th April, 1982- 1983 142 ITR 413. Mr. Shetty referred us to the decision of this court in CIT v. Great Eastern Shipping Company Ltd. 1979 118 ITR 772. We may point out that in this case the Bombay High Court has followed the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court in Challapalli Sugars Ltd. v. CIT 1975 98 ITR 167 (SC). The question which arose before the Bombay High Court in the aforesaid case relied upon by the assessee was altogether of different type. Hence, it was of no assistance to him. In our view, the Tribunal has not taken this point into account at all and hence has come to an erroneous conclusion. In the result, question No. 1 is answered in the negative and against the assessee. In view of all the facts and circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs.
....
|
