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Case Laws
Showing 141 to 160 of 280 Records
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1951 (6) TMI 18 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he acquisition of an agency which was hoped to be profitable. This adventure was part of the business of the company. The main purpose of the adventure was not realised, and when its realisation became impossible the assessee company withdrew, realising the shares, the purchase of which had been an essential incident of the adventure. They realised a profit which may well have been unexpected, but this profit, I think, must be regarded as a profit of the adventure, and therefore of the business of the company. I think therefore that the conclusion should be that there was material on which the Income-tax Officer was entitled to hold the two receipts of ₹ 20,000 and ₹ 2,26,700 were arising from business, and I consider the two questions formulated by the Tribunal should be answered in the affirmative. The assessee company must pay the costs of the department before us which I would assess at ₹ 150. FALSHAW, J.--I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1951 (6) TMI 17 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... siness of Nattukottai Chetties. A well reasoned exposition of the principle upon which a bad debt can be allowed as a deduction will be found in the later case. It appears from the statement of case submitted by the Tribunal that when at the hearing of the application for a reference the later case of the Madras High Court was cited on behalf of the Commissioner of Income Tax the Tribunal felt pressed by its reasoning and authority. I have said enough to indicate the reasons on which the claim of deduction made by the assessee in the present case must be disallowed. In my opinion the question referred to this Court must be answered in the negative. The assessee had not entered appearance and did not appear at the hearing. We do not think that the non-appearance of the assessee is any reason for departing from the ordinary rule that costs will follow the event. The Commissioner of Income Tax is entitled to the costs of this reference and will have them. Das Gupta, J. - agree.
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1951 (6) TMI 16 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... finally asked for a reference of the only question that has actually been referred. As I have explained in an earlier part of this judgment, the High Court can direct a reference of only such questions as were formulated before the Tribunal for reference to this Court and which the Tribunal declined to refer. The questions that were formulated before the Tribunal did not comprise the new point sought to be raised by Dr. Pal, nor was its inclusion asked for before this Court at the time of the application under Section 66(2), nor is it included, either expressly or by implication, in the question as actually framed by this Court and referred by the Tribunal. The second point sought to, be raised by Dr. Pal is therefore not open to the assessee. For the reasons given above, the answer to the question referred must be in the affirmative. The Commissioner is entitled to the costs of this reference and will have them. DAS GUPTA, J.--I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1951 (6) TMI 15 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Income-Tax Reference No. 60 of 1950 ... ... ... ... ..... se (supra), the expenditure in the present case is capital expenditure. It is to use the words of, Dixon, J., an expenditure for maintaining the strength of the capital structure of the company, the organisation set up for the earning of profits and not an expenditure connected with the process by which the organisation operates to obtain regular returns for regular outlay. It is an expenditure for the benefit of the business as a whole and not an expenditure for meeting any of the wide variety of working needs which have to be met out of the returns of the trade. The benefit it confers on the business is enduring and it is made under a provision which was made finally and once for all for the continuance of the benefit during the period of the lease. The answer to the question referred, as re-cast by us, must accordingly be in the affirmative. The Commissioner is entitled to the costs of this Reference and will have them. Certified for two counsel. DAS GUPTA, J. -- I agree.
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1951 (6) TMI 14 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... alone we think the Income-tax Officer should have rejected the assessee's books of account and made an estimate under the proviso to Section 13." From what was said by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal it follows that there was material before the Tribunal justifying the add back of ₹ 30,000. In the appeal under Section 33 of the Act the Department claimed the add back of ₹ 40,000 and in deciding the appeal the Tribunal allowed the add back of ₹ 30,000. No other point was argued in these proceedings. Finding as I do that on the facts and circumstances of the case the Tribunal was competent in law to compute the income of the assessee under the proviso to Section 13 of the Act and that there was material on the record justifying the add back of ₹ 30,000, I dismiss with costs Civil Miscellaneous No. 96 of 1950. Counsel's fee in Civil Miscellaneous No. 96 of 1950 is assessed at Rupees one hundred. KHOSLA, J.--I agree. Application dismissed.
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1951 (6) TMI 13 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... have been based. As pointed out above, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal has proceeded upon the circumstances of the case and has come to the conclusion that the increase in the salaries of Miss Florence Hotz and Mr. Edwin Hotz from ₹ 1,200 to ₹ 2,000 was not justified by business considerations. In other words, the Tribunal has found that the allowance claimed cannot be said to be an expenditure laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes of business. The claim of the assessee being a claim for exemption of an amount under Section 10(2)(xv) of the Act, the burden of proving the necessary facts in that connection was on the assessee. That burden has not been discharged. Finding as I do that the finding of the Tribunal is supported by material on the record, the question referred to this Court for decision must be answered in the affirmative. In these proceedings we assess costs at ₹ 200. KHOSLA, J.--I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1951 (6) TMI 12 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... notice under Section 38(1) was served the question whether or not it was valid as a best judgment assessment does not arise. In the result the question as re-framed should be answered as follows - (a) The return was not a return under Section 24(1), nor a return under Section 24(3) but a return under Section 24(2). It was not a "no return at all" and was a return within the meaning of the Act in the sense of conforming to the statutory form of a return. (b) (i) No. (b) (ii) Does not arise. No question was raised as to the correctness of the amount assessed either before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or before the Tribunal. Indeed, the grounds relating to the matter taken in the memorandum of appeal to the Assistant Commissioner were abandoned at the hearing. As the assessee escapes a substantial amount of tax for a technical defect in the proceedings, there will be no order for costs in this reference. DAS GUPTA, J.--I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1951 (6) TMI 11 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... und that he did. The definite material need not necessarily be in the form of legal evidence but there must be something which at the first stage should be brought to the notice of the assessee and if the Income-tax Officer in default of any response from the assessee adds something more the additional material also should appear in the order. I desire to add that if the question had been one of estimating the assessee's income from the admitted sources very different considerations would apply but this was a case where the Income-tax Officer was importing an item from a source outside the assessee's own business and attributing it to him without indicating where he found a link between that source and the assessee. As the tests indicated above are not satisfied in this case, I hold that the answer to the question referred to this Court must be in the negative. There will be no order for costs in this Reference. DAS GUPTA, J.--I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1951 (6) TMI 10 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... case of an assessee of the type in this case. We therefore think that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's approach was very defective and the finding given by him, which has resulted in this heavy reduction in the appellant's assessment, is not justified." Shri Gauri Dayal concedes that the initial onus of explaining cash credits lay on the assessee. That is all what the Tribunal has said. From the decision of the Tribunal that on the facts and the circumstances of the case the assessee has failed to discharge that onus, question No. (5) set out above does not arise. Indeed it is assumed in question No. (5) that the initial onus of proving the genuineness of the credits in the various accounts challenged by the Income-tax Officer lay on the assessee. No other point was raised in these proceedings. For the foregoing reasons, I dismiss Civil Miscellaneous No. 86 of 1950 with costs which I assess at rupees one hundred. KHOSLA, J.-I agree. Application dismissed.
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1951 (6) TMI 9 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... culty. Again Sub-section (7) of Section 37 A is clearly ancillary to Sub-section (5). It begins "For the purpose of an award made under Sub-section (5) (a) the debt shall be deemed....... " Thereafter it gives the method of calculating the debt, which method incidentally may obviously in certain cases lead to the debt being ascertained to be zero or a negative amount In other words, the calculation may show that the original debt has been either extinguished, or overpaid. If a valid award can be made under Sub-section (5) where it is known that the debt has been extinguished or overpaid, there is nothing whatever in the terms of Sub-section (7), in my opinion, which will wipe out the effect of such an award for the purposes of Sub-section (8). 6. The result is that this appeal must be allowed. The order of the appeal Court is set aside & that of the trial Court restored. 7. The appellant is entitled to costs throughout. No order is necessary on the application.
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1951 (6) TMI 8 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... at is done, the material on which the conviction is based is considerably weakened. I have considered anxiously whether this is a case in which we should direct a retrial de novo or whether the retrial should be from the stage at which the irregularity occurred or whether we should refuse to allow a retrial and acquit the appellant. Having given my anxious thought to this matter, I am of opinion that there should be a retrial de novo in the Sessions Court either by the same or by some. other Sessions Judge. I consider it inexpedient to say more than this, lest I prejudice the issue one way or the other. The conviction and sentence are set aside and the case is sent back to the High Court with a direction that that Court will order a retrial de novo in the Sessions Court, treating the committal as good. FAZL AI.I J.--I agree and have nothing to add. PATANJALI SASTRI J.--I agree and have nothing further to add. DAs J. --I agree to the order proposed by my learned brother Bose.
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1951 (6) TMI 7 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... amount. It merely says that necessary steps will be taken for the offences committed. As we have already said the letter merely amounts to an offer to drop criminal proceedings in case the amount was paid. We cannot construe it as an order appealable under Section 21 of the Act. If the Collector sanctions the prosecution of the appellant there would be an order under Section 24(2) of the Act and an appeal can lie to this Tribunal against it. The Sales Tax Officer who appears for the respondent is not prepared to accept this view, but reading the pertinent provision of the Act, we think that is the position. If the appellant so wants he can decline the Collector s offer. He (the Collector) will then have to pass an order under Section 24(2) sanctioning the prose- cution and then the appellant can appeal to this Tribunal, if so advised. 3.. For the reasons given above we think that this appeal is pre- mature and must be rejected. ORDER. The appeal is rejected. Appeal rejected.
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1951 (6) TMI 6 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB
Company – Incorporation of ... ... ... ... ..... ed above on behalf of the respondent to the contrary, I do not think that there is any doubt that the view taken in the second of the Rangoon decisions and in the Calcutta decision was correct. The wording of section 3 of the General Clauses Act clearly indicates that the definitions and explanations which form the rest of the section are not universally applicable, and that in spite of these definitions and explanations the meaning of the words has to be construed in the light of the subject of the statute and the context in which the words or used, and to my mind the provisions of Order XXXIII leave no doubt that the word person in this part of the Civil Procedure Code means only an indivual person. I accordingly accept the revision petition with costs and set aside the order of the lower court permitting the respondent company to sue in forma pauperis. The parties have been directed to appear in the lower court on the 16th of July, 1951. I assess the costs at fifty rupees.
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1951 (5) TMI 24 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ds seem to have come into existence, and the particular property which the petitioner now claims, has been the subject matter of sale and/or mortgage. In my opinion, there is no excuse for the laches of the petitioner in the circumstances of this case. It is alleged by the petitioners that no particulars have been given of the mortgage or sale of the disputed property. If I was in favour of the petitioners on the other points, I might have directed further particulars to be given, but inasmuch as I am against the petitioners on the main question whether it was a fit case for intervention under section 152 of the Code, I do not think that I should be justified in prolonging the proceedings. 22. The application, therefore, fails and must be dismissed with costs. 23. Nothing that I have said herein is to prejudice either of the parties in a properly instituted action. Nor will it affect any application made to carry out the terms of the consent decree, strictly in terms thereof.
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1951 (5) TMI 23 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... General Clauses Act (Act 10 of 1897). 34. The word "Prosecution" in Article 20(2) means judicial proceedings before a Court or a legal tribunal. It cannot have reference to departmental or disciplinary proceedings taken for inflicting departmental penalty or punishment on an officer belonging to the department for any misconduct. 35. Rule 863 of the Police Regulations clearly provides that "An order of discharge or acquittal of a police officer by a Court shall not be a bar to the award of departmental punishment to that officer in respect of the same cause or matter." 36. This contention of Mr. Chaudhuri must fail. 37. In view of my finding, however, that the order of dismissal of 6-5-1950 was made without jurisdiction, being made by a person not competent to make it this petition must succeed. The Rule is made absolute and the Order of dismissal dated 6-5-1950 is quashed and can celled. The petitioner is entitled to the costs of the present proceedings.
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1951 (5) TMI 22 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... dot think that the evidence of witnesses is of such a character as to be inconsistent with the medical evidence". The test rather is whether it is inconsistent with the medical evidence and, if not, whether the accused should not get the benefit. 7. Interference with an order of acquittal made by a Judge who had the advantage of hearing the witnesses and observing their demeanour can only be for compelling reasons and not on a nice balancing of probabilities and improbabilities, and certainly not because a different view could be taken of the evidence or the facts. As stated already, we feel that the grounds which have been given by the High Court for setting aside the order of acquittal are not such as to show that the conclusion arrived at by the Sessions Judge was not the proper one to reach. 8. We allow the appeal and restore the order of the Sessions Judge, which means that the appellants will stand acquitted of the charges against them. They will be set at liberty.
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1951 (5) TMI 21 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o prohibition also must fail. 92. As regards the application by the Amin Agency Limited (writ Application NO. 288 of 1950) we have pointed out that under the Evacuee Property Act it is possible under certain circumstances to declare an incorporated Company an evacuee. Whether such circumstances exist which would entitle the Custodian to take charge of the property of the Amin Agency Limited is a matter for decision by the Deputy Custodian Judicial, It is not necessary at this stage for us to go into the matter when the applicant can have his rights determined by another Tribunal. Lack of jurisdiction, if any, cannot be said to be patent, but it may be a latent defect on the proof of facts and circumstances into which it is not possible for us to go. 93. We, therefore, dismiss both the applications, but in the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs. 94. We certify that the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution.
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1951 (5) TMI 20 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s not owned by Government, but is on the other hand owned by the Carlsbad Mineral Water Manufacturing Company Limited. It is carried on their behalf and for their benefit and any control of Government only arises because of the terms of the contract which this company has entered into with Government a contract which gives them an exclusive right to sell certain articles on railway property. The business or industry is carried on by the appellants and therefore there was an industrial dispute between the appellants who are a limited company in Calcutta and their employees. This could clearly be referred for adjudication by the State Government of West Bengal under Section 10(l)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 13. That being so the petition for a writ of 'mandamus' or 'certiorari' was bound to fail and the petition was rightly dismissed by Banerjee J. 14. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs. Certified for two Counsel. Das, J. 15. I agree.
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1951 (5) TMI 19 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the contractor is precluded by the said clause from claiming any damage on that account. The award is, therefore, bad on the face of it. It is accordingly set aside. 'Claim No. 8.' 23. This claim corresponds to claim No. 4 in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 252 of 1950 which I have disallowed. For the reasons given therein, the award in respect of this claim is set aside. 'Claim No. 17.' 24. Claim No. 17 of this appeal corresponds to claim No. 17 of Miscellaneous Appeal No. 252 of 1950, which has been disallowed for the reasons given there in. For the same reasons the award in respect of this claim is disallowed. 25. In the result, the appeals are allowed in part. In appeal No. 252 the decree of the lower court will be modified by excluding claims Nos. 4 and 17, and in appeal No. 253 the decree of the lower court will be modified by excluding claims Nos. 5, 8 and 17. In the circumstances, the parties will bear their own costs in each case. Chatterji, J. 26. I agree.
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1951 (5) TMI 18 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ioner being produced before that Magistrate once a fortnight for remand. Therefore this case is distinguishable from the Bombay case reported in on which Mr. P.V.B. Rao, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied. 24. The Board is going to deal with the case of the petitioner very soon and it is likely that further materials regarding the antecedents and other activities of the petitioner may be available before it which are not before us now. Under these circumstances I would, in agreement, with my learned brother, hold that this is not a case for interference at this stage. 25. On the bigger question as to whether an order under the Preventive Detention Act can be passed against a person on the basis of those acts in respect of which a regular prosecution for a substantive offence is pending against him which has been discussed elaborately by my learned brother, I would reserve my opinion. That question does not arise for consideration at this stage in the present case.
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