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Case Laws
Showing 81 to 100 of 996 Records
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1973 (11) TMI 99 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the respondent-company that the rights and obligations of the parties must, notwithstanding the winding-up order, continue to be determined by the provisions of the scheme of arrangement. 87. In the result this Letters Patent Appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree of the learned single Judge in Second Appeal No. 1162 of 1963 is set aside and the order of. the execution Court dated November 13, 1961 is modified. We direct that the judgment-creditor be paid the decretal amount together with interest upto the date of payment from out of ₹ 3,701.15 deposited in Court by the garnishee. 88. The respondent-company will pay the costs of the judgment-creditor throughout and the same will come out of the assets of the company. 89. The judgment-creditor shall be entitled to withdraw the money, i.e. the decretal amount, from the Court on or after January 10, 1974. 90. Rule and interim stay granted in Civil Application No. 467 of 1971 is discharged with no order as to costs.
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1973 (11) TMI 98 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ders, generally speaking, and they had taken preference shares on definite terms, as a matter of bargain, in a company registered under the Companies Act, the protection so given to them by the Article, cannot be either ignored or curtailed in any manner adverse to them, unless there is any provision in the Companies Act necessitating such a course. (27) There being nothing in the Companies Act to invalidate Article 7 as it has been framed the preference shareholders have right of repayment of capital (which is not disputed) and arrears of dividend (whether the same has been earned declared or not) up to the commencement of the winding up in priority to the equity shareholders. The reference by the Liquidator is answered against the Company and in favor of the preference shareholders, in the above said manner. (28) The costs of this reference alone would come out of the Company's funds. The other parties will, in the circumstances, bear their own costs of this proceeding.
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1973 (11) TMI 97 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... rding fares can be inclusive of tax. 45. The arguments advanced on behalf of the operators fail in view of the cardinal fact that tax was an element included in the fare structure. The retrospective validation cannot be said to be unjust because the operators collected the entire amount. The tax has always been paid by passengers and owners of goods. The tax is not on the income of the operators. There was and is no lack of machinery for collection of these taxes. The operators collected tax as well as fare. The directions regarding fare were validated by Act 34 of 1971 by reason of the litigation between the operators and the State. 46. For these reasons, the contentions of the operators fail. The petitions and appeals are dismissed. The decision of the Kerala High Court in Civil appeal No. 1875 of 1972 and other appeals is upheld. In view of the fact that the High Court directed the parties to bear their respective costs, parties will bear their own costs in these matters.
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1973 (11) TMI 96 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... llant be tried by another learned judge of the High Court who may be assigned for the purpose by the Chief Justice of that Court. It seems indeed desirable that election petitions should ordinarily, if possible, be. entrusted for trial to a permanent judge of the High Court, even though we find that additional or acting judges or those requested under article 224A of the Constitution to,, sit and act as judges of the High Court, if assigned for the purpose by the Chief Justice, are legally competent to hear those matters. 'We, therefore, set aside the order dated August 10, 1973. The election petition filed by the appellant shall now be heard by a permanent judge who may be assigned for the purpose by the learned Chief Justice. The case may, therefore, J be placed before the learned Chief Justice for necessary orders. The appeal is accepted accordingly. The parties in the circumstances shall bear their own costs of this Court and in the High Court. P.B.R. Appeal allowed.
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1973 (11) TMI 95 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s authority in his intemperate averments in both petitions. But having regard to the fact that he is a senior judicial officer who has at some stage in his career displayed zeal and industry and is now in the sombre evening of an official career, a punishment short of imprisonment would have met the ends of justice and inspired in the public mind confidence in the justice administration by showing that even delinquent judges will be punished if they play with or pervert the due course of justice, as the contemnor here has done. A heavy hand is wasted severity where a lighter sentence may serve as well. A fine of ₹ 1000/- with three months' imprisonment in default of payment will meet the ends of justice and we impose this sentence in substitution of the infliction of imprisonment by the High Court. With this modification Civil Appeal No. 41 of 1973 is dismissed. On the appeal by the State the course adopted in the leading judgment of Palekar J. has our concurrence.
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1973 (11) TMI 94 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e Constitution of the Rating Committee merely on the ground that there is a dispute or difference between the Board and the licensee as to whether the provisions of the Sixth Schedule had been complied with or not and such a dispute was referred to the Authority. Nor are we referred to any provision in the Act which makes such a dispute between the Board and the licensee referable to the Authority. 24. We have, therefore, to conclude that the finding of the High Court on which relief was given to respondent No. 1 cannot be sustained in law. It appears that some other issues had been also raised before the High Court but they were not dealt with in view of the finding recorded. The parties, therefore, are agreed that the case will have to go back to the High Court for disposal in accordance with law after considering the other issues raised in the Special Civil Application. Accordingly the case is remanded to the High Court for disposal. The costs shall be costs in the cause.
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1973 (11) TMI 93 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hers AIR1961MP322 ,. The Court in this case held that the filling of a reply to the application of the plaintiff for securing temporary injunction and arguing the said application did not amount to taking steps in the proceedings within the meaning of section 34. Facts of this case, however, show that in the reply that the defendants filed they had expressly mentioned the subsistence of an arbitration agreement and had urged that reference to arbitration was the correct remedy for the plaintiff to follow. It was in this background that it was held that the mere filing of the application was not a step in the proceedings. (20) We are, Therefore, of the view that the defendants had taken steps in the proceedings of the suit filed by the plaintiff and the learned single Judge, for this reason also, was right in holding that the suit could not be stayed under section 34. (21) In the result F.A.O. (O.S.) 49 of 1971 fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 200.
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1973 (11) TMI 92 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... were living as husband and wife to the knowledge of the respondent; (2) the appellant took the lease of the shop premises from the respondent in 1959; (3) from the time of the letting a Chemist's business was carried in the shop by Sohan Singh with the occasional help of the appellant. The question to be determined was whether in the above circumstances it was likely that the appellant had sub-let the premises to Sohan Singh. The negative answer given to it by the Rent Courts is merely the factual common sense inference which did not call for the application of any principle of law. In out view, no question of law-much less, a substantial question of law-was involved in the second appeal and the learned Judge was in error in disturbing the concurrent findings of fact of the rent control authorities. The appeal is, therefore, allowed, the order passed by the High Court is set aside and that of the Rent Control Authorities is restored with costs throughout. Appeal allowed.
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1973 (11) TMI 91 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Court took a clue from the statement made by the appellant under Section 342 of the CrPC admitting the particular signature to be his. It must not, however; be over looked that the admission made by the appellant must be read as a whole, for what he has stated is that he had made his signature in the account books of the branch office after an audit objection was raised that he ought to have signed the books at the end of every day in his managerial capacity. The statement of the appellant on this aspect is not capable of dissection because the particular part thereof on which the High Court relies is inextricably connected with the other part which the High Court has not taken into consideration. 9. This is thus a case in which there is no credible evidence in support of the charge leveled against the accused. We therefore allow the appeal and set aside the order of conviction and sentence passed against the appellant. The bail bond furnished by the appellant is discharged.
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1973 (11) TMI 90 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... hould be treated in this manner by his superior officers. We hope that, although the claim of the appellant has been found to be barred by limitation, the Union of India will consider the equities of the case and see its way to giving such relief to the appellant as we are precluded under the law from granting to him due to the operation of the law of limitation. The result is that we modify the decree passed by the High Court to the extent that we hold that the amount which falls due to be paid to the appellant within three years of the filing of the suit (i.e. within the period of limitation) in accordance with the above mentioned statement of the learned Counsel for the North Eastern Railway will be calculated on the correct basis now stated to us by the learned Counsel. To this extent we allow the appeal, but we dismiss the rest of the appellant's claim. In the circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their own costs throughout. P.B.R. Appeal allowed in part.
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1973 (11) TMI 89 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... jurisdiction to pass the decree it did. The moment it finds that prima facie such material existed, its task is complete. It is not necessary for it to go further and question the presumed or expressed finding, of the trial court on the basis of that material. All that it has to see is whether there was some material on the basis of which the Rent Court could have-as distinguished from must have-been satisfied as to the statutory ground for eviction. To allow the Executing Court to go beyond that limit, would be to exalt it to the status of a super Court sitting in appeal over the decision of the Rent Court. Since in the instant case, there was a clear admission in the compromise, incorporated in the decree, of the fundamental facts that could constitute a ground for eviction under. s. 12 (3) (a), the Executing Court was not competent to go behind the decree and question its validity. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1973 (11) TMI 88 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... lved that a positive and wholesome policy of cutting back on the volume of law suits by the twin methods of not being tempted into forensic show-downs where a reasonable adjustment is feasible and ever offering to extinguish a pending proceeding on just terms, giving the legal mentors of government some initiative and authority in this behalf. I am not indulging in any judicial homily but only echoing the dynamic national policy on State litigation evolved at a Conference of Law Ministers of India way back in 1957. This second appeal strikes me as an instance of disregard of that policy." All these words from the Bench, hopefully addressed to a responsive Government, may, if seasonable reactions follow, go a long way to avoidance of governmental litigiousness and affirmance of the image of the State as deeply concerned only in Justic-Social Justice. The phyrric victory of the poor appellant in this case is a sad justification, for the above observations. Appeal allowed-
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1973 (11) TMI 87 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the order requiring the petitioner to deposit ₹ 15,000/- wag made after hearing him and on merits. It cannot, therefore, be said that he was deprived of the right of being heard in appeal. For the aforesaid reasons the arguments on this score cannot be accepted. The result is that the rule issued on this petition is discharged with costs. 8. Mr. Shethna seeks leave to appeal under Article 133 of the Constitution but he is unable to point out that this case involves a substantial question of law of general importance and that in the opinion of this Court such a question requires to be decided by the Supreme Court. As a matter of fact while deciding the case, we have followed the decision of the Supreme Court in Assistant Collector of Customs (supra). This case in our opinion does not involve any substantial question of law of general importance which requires determination by the Supreme Court. Hence the oral application for certificate for leave to appeal is rejected.
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1973 (11) TMI 86 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... fecting the fundamental rights in Article 19 without any legislative authority or in purported exercise of power conferred by any pre-emergency law which was invalid when enacted". Therefore, if it can be shown that the executive action taken during the emergency has no authority as a valid law its constitutionality can be challenged. The Cotton Textiles Order 1948 was continued by Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The, impugned orders are made under pre-emergency Cotton Textiles Control Order. The validity of the impugned orders is challenged under Article 19(1) (f) and (g) of the Constitution on the ground that it is a pre-emergency executive order which could have been challenged under Article 19(1) (f) and (g) before the, proclamation of emergency. From that point of view the petitions are competent though the challenge is insupportable on all grounds. For these reasons, the petitions are dismissed., The parties will pay and bear their own costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1973 (11) TMI 85 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... llant be tried by another learned judge of the High Court who may be assigned for the purpose by the Chief Justice of that Court. It seems indeed desirable that election petitions should ordinarily, if possible, be. entrusted for trial to a permanent judge of the High Court, even though we find that additional or acting judges or those requested under article 224A of the Constitution to,, sit and act as judges of the High Court, if assigned for the purpose by the Chief Justice, are legally competent to hear those matters. 'We, therefore, set aside the order dated August 10, 1973. The election petition filed by the appellant shall now be heard by a permanent judge who may be assigned for the purpose by the learned Chief Justice. The case may, therefore, J be placed before the learned Chief Justice for necessary orders. The appeal is accepted accordingly. The parties in the circumstances shall bear their own costs of this Court and in the High Court. P.B.R. Appeal allowed.
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1973 (11) TMI 84 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e governed by mere departmental resolutions and executive instructions. These cannot take the place of statutory rules which alone can impart stability and security and ensure observance of the rule of law. Legal rules must govern the recruitment and conditions of public servants so that there is no arbitrariness or inequality in State action in regard to them and the rule of law is not eroded. And such rules should preferably be framed without avoidable delay and after consultation with groups which apprehend discriminatory treatment as that would go a long way to produce a sense of contentment and satisfaction. We make these observations not with a view to casting any reflection on the administration but to highlight a problem which has come to our notice quite often, in the hope that it will help the social dimensions of the problem and the damage to public interest which may be likely to result if the problem is not promptly and satisfactorily resolved. Petition allowed.
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1973 (11) TMI 83 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... umed or oil extracted. Therefore, unless the notice under Section 9(1) of the Act as prescribed by Rule 5 contains those particulars, the petitioner will not be in a position to challenge the correctness of the same, if he is so advised, by filing an appeal. In the present case, admittedly no notice in the form prescribed by Rule 5 has been issued to the petitioner herein and the only notice which has been sent to the petitioner is one containing the total amount referable to the different periods by way of cess said to be payable by the petitioner-mills. Consequently, the notice actually issued to the petitioner does not satisfy the requirements of Rule 5 and therefore cannot be sustained. On this short ground, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned demand notice issued by the first respondent is quashed. However, the allowing of this writ petition will not prevent the first respondent from proceeding afresh in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs.
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1973 (11) TMI 82 - SUPREME COURT
Contraction of a contract - why the Legislature can and often does, avoid such an anomalous consequence by enacting in the temporary statute a saving provision, the effect of which is in some res- pects similar to that of s. 6 of the General Clauses Act?
Held that:- The argument of any vested right in the defendant being taken away does not hold good; nor is there any foundation for the contention that the later Act is being applied retrospectively. All that we hold is (a) that a disability of the plaintiff to enforce his cause of action under the ordinary law may not necessarily be transmuted into a substantive right in the defendant, (b) that rights of a statutory tenant created under a temporary statute, as in this case, go to the extent of merely preventing the eviction so long as the temporary statute lasts, (c) that the provisions of s. 43 do not preserve, subsequent to repeal, any right to rebuff the plaintiff's claim for, eviction and (d) that S. 6 of the General Clauses Act does not justify anything longer or for any time longer than s. 2 of the Act confers or lasts.
It-is appropriate for a Court to do justice between parties to the litigation and in moulding the relief in the light of the subsequent developments, to take note of legislative changes. A court of justice should, if it could, adjudicate finally and not leave the door ajar for parties to litigate again. In the present case, it is not seriously disputed that if the plaintiff were to sue for recovery of possession today, the Rent Control Law does not stand in the way. Therefore, it is manifestly a measure of doing justice between the parties and ending litigation which has seen two decades pass, to conclude it here by taking cognizance and adjusting the relief in the light of the later Act and repeal of the earlier Act. Nevertheless, it is contended that the present suit cannot be decreed in view of the provisions of the U. P Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972. This statute 'which provides for summary eviction of unauthorised occupants cannot obstruct the suit for eviction of a tenant. The far-fetched submission has hardly any substance and we reject it.
In the result, C.A. 1727 of 1968 is dismissed and C.A. No. 1728 of 1968 is allowed.
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1973 (11) TMI 81 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ief against defendant No. 3; and he has invoked the power of this court under the provision of Order 6, rule 17, Civil Procedure Code. In my opinion, the power of the court under this provision of law is discretionary. An amendment under this rule should normally be refused where it would introduce a totally different, new and inconsistent case or its affect would be to substitute one distinct cause of action for another or change the character of the suit. In my opinion, the amendment, as prayed for by Mr. Senapati, would certainly change the entire character of the suit by modifying the cause of action as well. In my opinion, therefore, this prayer at this stage has no merit. 12. In the result, I find that this appeal must succeed, since the plaintiff has not been able to satisfy me that he has any enforceable claim against defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2. The appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the court below are set aside. I make no order as to costs.
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1973 (11) TMI 80 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the petitioner was appointed to the substantive post of Chief Secretary to the state ate of Tamil Nadu?
Held that:- In the present case, it appears that the petitioner gave advice in course of duty. The Government practically in all cases accepted the advice of the petitioner. There does not appear any instance of acrimony or disagreement between the Government and the petitioner. There are no records to suggest that the petitioner advised one way and the Government acted in an opposite manner. The events alleged at the time of the elections are in aid of the petitioner's contention that his dealing of the law and order situation was so firm that the Chief Minister and other members of his party became alienated. The petitioner suggested that the Chief Minister and the members of his party were responsible for introducing violence and intimidation. The further suggestion of the petitioner is that the petitioner exposed the activities of the D.M.K. Party. Complaints against the D.M.K. Party were like complaints against other political parties. The affidavit evidence, indicates that the law and order situation was kept under normal'control. All the officers of the State including the police service discharged, their duty in the best interest of administration 'as also 'in public interest. The petitioner did not achieve anything extraordinary. As the Chief Secretary it was the duty of the petitioner to see that situation nowhere went out of control. The Chief Minister and the members of his party cannot be said on the affidavit evidence to have committed acts of violence or intimidation. The entire affidavit evidence establishes beyond any measure of doubt that the petitioner's allegations imputing malafides against the Chief Minister are baseless. The petitioner's allegations were in aid of suggesting vindictiveness and vengeance on part of the Chief 'Minister Facts' and circumstances repel any such insinuation and innuendo.
For these reasons the contentions of the petitioner fail. The petition is dismissed.
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