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Case Laws
Showing 121 to 140 of 1466 Records
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1976 (12) TMI 9 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Business Loss, Carrying On Business, Managing Agent, Trading Loss ... ... ... ... ..... es of any different kind. Advances having been made as a part of or incidental to the carrying on of the business by the assessee-company as managing agents, that character continued to obtain notwithstanding the change in the management of Palanpur Co. If that be so, if as a result of the managed-company having gone into liquidation, the advances became irrecoverable, the loss will have to be regarded as a trading loss and the same will have to be allowed as a deduction while computing the income of the assessee-company. Having regard to the above discussion, in our view, the Tribunal was right in coming to the conclusion that the amount of Rs. 1,86,000 outstanding in the account of Palanpur Co. could be allowed in determining the assessee s business profit for the relevant assessment year. In this view of the matter, the question referred to us is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee-company. Revenue will pay the costs of the reference to the assessee.
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1976 (12) TMI 8 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Appeal To AAC, Cash Credits, Finding Of Fact, Income Tax Act, Power To Admit Additional Evidence
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1976 (12) TMI 7 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Deduction, Donation To Charitable Institution ... ... ... ... ..... ch constituted the Tiruppani Trust in question to the statement of the case nor has it referred to the other objects of the trust. Before us, copies of the trust deed were produced by both sides and in those copies, other objects which are not for the benefit of any particular religious community or caste, also find a place. It is not disputed before us that the question has to be decided having regard to all the terms of the trust deed including all the objects for which the trust was created in view of the provisions contained in s. 80G(5)(iii) read with Expln. 3 thereto. In view of the failure on the part of the Tribunal to consider the entire trust deed it has become impossible for us to answer the questions referred to this court one way or the other. Therefore, leaving the Tribunal to go into the entire controversy again so far as it has got a bearing on s. 80G(5)(iii), we return the reference without answering the questions referred to this court. No order as to costs.
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1976 (12) TMI 6 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Minor Admitted To Benefits Of Partnership ... ... ... ... ..... hree assessees concerned was without any basis whatsoever. The relevant observations of the Tribunal in this behalf are to be found extracted in para 7 of the statement of the case. It is unnecessary to set out in this judgment the provisions of section 16(3)(a), but when they are perused properly, it is perceived that none of the four clauses of section 16(3)(a) can be brought into use by the Department. As the assessees had ceased to be partners, the case clearly falls outside clauses (i) and (ii). Further, there is no warrant for applying clauses (iii) and (iv) in view of the clear finding by the Tribunal that there were no assets of the assessees transferred to the two minor sons or to the wife. In view of this clear finding, it must be held that the conclusion of the Tribunal is correct and unexceptionable. In the result, the question referred to us is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessees. There will, however, be no order as to costs of this reference.
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1976 (12) TMI 5 - SUPREME COURT
Debt Owed - Date of Valuation - Whether the provision of Rs. 49 19,520 made by the assessee for its tax liability less the amount of the last installment of advance tax constituted a debt owed by the assessee within the meaning of clause (m) of section 2 of the Wealth-tax Act on the relevant valuation date - question is answered ion favour of assessee - assessee's appeal is allowed
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1976 (12) TMI 4 - SUPREME COURT
Whether assessment can be made on the deity - deity was the legal owner of the entire estate. Therefore, the deity was liable to be assessed - surplus income after meeting the expenses were not held in trust for charitable purposes. Therefore, they were not exempt from tax under s. 4(3)(i) - court directed that the amounts spent for religious and charitable activities like poor feeding which were in accordance with s. 4(3)(i) should be excluded from the total income
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1976 (12) TMI 3 - SUPREME COURT
When the assessee was prevented from appearing before the High Court on account of sufficient reasons, the High Court has inherent power to recall its earlier order and dispose off the reference on merit
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1976 (12) TMI 2 - SUPREME COURT
When there is an automatic rise in the dearness allowance linked to a cost of levying index, the automatic payment after the appointed day should be deemed to be additional dearness allowance liable to compulsory deposit provisions of the Act - revenue's appeal is allowed
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1976 (12) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT
when the sanction for the additional dearness allowance either by unilateral decision or by bilateral settlement has taken place after the appointed day that the question of additional dearness allowance as provided in s. 2(b) of the act will arise
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1976 (11) TMI 217 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ease and the other for the recovery of possession of the premises. There may be suits for recovery of Immovable property between co-sharers, or mortgagor and motgagee, or the true owner and the trespasser and so on. It would be academic to discuss the applicability of the provisions of Rules 2 and 4 of Order II, Code of Civil Procedure to these types of cases, and in fact it would be beyond the scope of the reference made to this Full Bench, I have, therefore, not referred to the catena of cases cited at the Bar and to the different views held by the various High Courts of the country expressed in those cases for the simple reason that most of those cases do not relate to a suit for recovery of immovable property by a landlord against the tenant 60. For the reasons stated above, my answer to the question referred to this Full Bench is in the affirmative. Prem Prakash Tiwari, J. 61. I agree with brother Misra. The question referred to this Bench is answered in the affirmative.
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1976 (11) TMI 216 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ary Committee for further inquiry to enable them to examine some other witnesses, if the material on record is not sufficient to prove the guilt of the respondent. We may add that the inconvenience and the trouble experienced by the respondent till now would be sufficient punishment to make him more conscious of his duties and obligations to the articled clerks during the period of training for not evincing sufficient caution, care and interest. Taking into account his past record and the other circumstances, we do not think this to be a fit case for us to exercise our power under Section 21(6)(d) of the Act, as such power should be exercised only in furtherance of real and substantial justice but not to fill up the lacuna in the evidence at a belated stage. 28. For all the reasons stated, our answer to the question is in the negative and in favour of the respondent-chartered accountant. We, therefore, direct the complaint to be dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1976 (11) TMI 215 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ly directed against her. As is obvious, she could have no opportunity to challenge it after the making of the final order, and such a belated challenge would have been purposeless for it would have given her no relief. So insofar as the appellant is concerned, the order of the Magistrate could not be said to be an interlocutory order and the revisional courts erred in raising the bar of Sub-section (2) of Section 397 against it. 9. We have gone through Dhola v. State and The Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Gokal Chand 1967 1 SCR 310 cited by Mr. Vohra. Dhola's case related to the grant of bail, and Gokal Chand's case related to a right of appeal under Section 38(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act against an order made inter partes. They cannot, therefore avail the respondent in this case. 10. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed and the impugned orders of the High Court dated April 22, 1975 and of the Metropolitan Magistrate dated August 8, 1974 are set aside.
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1976 (11) TMI 214 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... on over it, but there is no evidence to establish that he dishonestly misappropriated the receipt book or converted it to his own use or dishonestly used or disposed of the receipt book. It is quite possible that the appellant might have lost or mislaid the receipt book and hence he might have been unable to return it to the superior authorities. What the section requires is something much more than mere failure or omission to return the receipt book. The prosecution has to go further and show that the appellant dishonestly misappropriated or converted the receipt book to his own use or dishonestly used or disposed of it. That, we are afraid, the prosecution has not been able to do in the present case. We are, therefore, of the view that the appellant was wrongly convicted under Section 409. 3. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order of conviction and sentence recorded against the appellant and acquit him of the offence under Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code.
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1976 (11) TMI 213 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tituted by law cannot act in such a manner as to set aside the Civil Court's judgment and decree. In this view, the Revenue Divisional Officer and the District Revenue Officer erred in ignoring the civil Court's judgment and decree. The question as to the rights of parties and also the question as to the jurisdiction of the civil Court will all have to be argued when the appeal is heard by the appellate Judge. The order of the Revenue Divisional Officer and the District Revenue Officer, when the decree of the civil Court is in operation, cannot be sustained. 7. In the result, the writ appeal is allowed and the orders of the Revenue Divisional Officer and the District Revenue Officer are set aside. After the decision of the civil Court in the appeal, the Revenue Divisional Officer will proceed according to law. Respondents 1 to 3 before us i.e., the appellants in the civil appeal would be at liberty to raise all legal contentions that are open to them in law. No costs.
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1976 (11) TMI 212 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rement on the part of the purchaser to take reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had power to make the transfer. The requirements of the provision in the Specific Relief Act are only twofold, viz., (1) that the transferee has paid money in good faith and (2) he should have done so without notice of the original contract. In my opinion, the statement which the defendant No. 4 made in the witness-box clearly established these ingredients and nothing was done on behalf of the plaintiff to show that the defendant No. 4 had any prior notice of the agreement in favour of the plaintiff or that the said defendant did not act in good faith. In this situation, I do not think that the judgment of the lower appellate court can be said to be bad in law even though reference to Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act was misconceived and the said court should have relied on Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act. 5. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1976 (11) TMI 211 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... crutinize how far the perfunctoriness of the Public Analyst has affected the substance of his conclusions. It is not enough to give a few mechanical data. It is more pertinent to help the court with something more of the process by which the conclusion has been arrived at. We need not probe the matter further, notwithstanding the decisions reported in two English cases (cited before us)(1) because the plea of 'guilty' silences the accused. We accordingly dismiss the appeal, although we leave it to the State Government, having regard to the fact that the trade is petty, that the adulteration has not been shown to be by any noxious substance and that the harm done has not been of any magnitude, to consider whether it should exercise the power of clemency to remit the sentence by three months so that it may be in tune with the provisions of the Act as recently amended. These observations notwithstanding, as aforesaid, the appeal stands dismissed. V.P.S. Appeal dismissed.
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1976 (11) TMI 210 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... word 'appurtenances' includes all the incorporeal hereditaments attached to the land granted or demised, such as rights of way, of common . . .but it does not include lands in addition to that .granted'. (Words and Phrase, supra). 33. In short, the touchstone of 'appurtenance' is dependence of the building on what appertains to it for its use as a building. Obviously, the hat, bazar or mela is not an appurtenance to the building. The law thus leads to the clear conclusion that even if the buildings were used and enjoyed in the past with the whole stretch of vacant space for a hat or mela, the land is not appurtenant to the principal subject granted by Section 9, viz., buildings. 34. This conclusion is inevitable, although the contrary argument may be ingenious. What the High Court has granted, viz., 5 yards of surrounding space, is sound in law although based on guess-work in fact. The appeal fails and is dismissed but, in the circumstances, without costs.
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1976 (11) TMI 209 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rly good prima-facie case is made out for interference with the internal affairs of educational institutions. 13. We presume that the plaintiff-respondent has been working as a result of the injunction granted to him. We, however, see no justification for continuing the injunction. We, therefore, allow this appeal to the extent that we withdraw the injunction. This means that the parties are left free to adjust their differences. If, upon the strength of any facts subsequent to the institution of the suit now before us, the plaintiff has acquitted any new rights which have been infringed he is free to seek relief. We make this observation as it was stated on his behalf that he claims some rights on the strength of subsequent facts too. As those are not before us, we can say nothing about them. 14. The result is that we allow this appeal and set aside the decree and order of the High Court and restore those of the Trial Court. The parties will bear their own costs throughout.
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1976 (11) TMI 208 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the grant of an interim injunction. 11. In Meckdlec Engineers and Manufacturers v. Basic Equipment Corporation C.A. No. 508 of 1976 decided on 1.11.1976 also we found very recently that, as in the case before us now, a learned Judge of the Delhi High Court had overlooked the principles governing interference under Section 115 Civil Procedure Code laid down by this Court in Baldevdas Shivlal and Anr. v. Fdmistan Distributors (India)(P) Ltd. and Ors. D.L.P. Housing and Conslmction Co. Pvt. Ltd. New Delhi v. Samp Singh and Ors. The Managing Director (MIG) Hindustan Aeronaulica Ltd. Balanagar, Hyderabad and Anr. v. Ajit Prasad Tarwy, Manager (Purchase and Stores) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd., Balanagar, Hyderabad. We direct the attention of the learned Judges concerned to the law declared by this Court. 12. We allow this appeal and set aside the judgment and order of the Delhi High Court and restore that of the Appellate Court. The parties will bear their own costs In this Court.
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1976 (11) TMI 207 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the view adopted by my learned brother Jaswant Singh. I am unable to accept an interpretation of the relevant provision prescribing limitation which would confine the accrual of a cause of action only to cases of direct proof of death, on a particular date. Such a view implies that suits based on a presumption of death are devoid a cause of action which could support a suit by a reversioner. I do not think that the provision we have to interpret was meant to define or restrict a right of suit or a cause of action in this fashion at all. The object of a "statute of repose" is only to extinguish rights of the indolent but not to demolish the causes of action of those who have not been shewn lacking in vigilance in any way whatsoever. Consequently, I would allow these appeals, set aside the judgment and decrees of the Division Bench of the High Court and restore those of the learned Single Judge and leave parties to bear their own costs throughout. Appeals dismissed.
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