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2007 (12) TMI 462
Issues:
Anticipatory bail application for alleged violation of Section 9 (A) (A) of the Central Excise Act; Responsibility of an individual for evasion of duty by a company; Interpretation of provisions of Section 9 and Section 9 (A) (A); Necessity of custodial interrogation for reaching the truth; Applicability of Section 9 to individuals involved in company affairs; Consideration of documentary evidence over oral statements; Grant of anticipatory bail based on lack of evidence of individual's involvement.
Analysis:
The judgment revolves around an anticipatory bail application concerning the alleged violation of Section 9 (A) (A) of the Central Excise Act by a petitioner linked to a company accused of evading excise duty. The petitioner, not a director or employee of the company in question, argued against personal liability under Section 9. The Additional Solicitor General contended that the petitioner, though not a director, was responsible for the company's affairs and liable under the wider scope of Section 9. Reference was made to legal provisions and authorities to support both arguments, emphasizing the petitioner's role in managing the company's conduct.
The court considered the petitioner's lack of directorship or direct involvement in the company's operations, relying on documentary evidence over oral statements implicating the petitioner. Noting the absence of proof linking the petitioner to the company's conduct or directorship, the court highlighted a notice addressing the petitioner in a different company's context, indicating no direct responsibility. Previous cases involving co-accused who resigned as directors before the alleged evasion were distinguished from the petitioner's situation, reinforcing the lack of evidence against the petitioner.
Given the absence of concrete evidence implicating the petitioner in the evasion of duty and his non-director status, the court granted anticipatory bail. The bail conditions required a personal bond and surety, with a mandate for the petitioner to cooperate with the investigation when required. The judgment emphasized the lack of evidence linking the petitioner to the company's affairs, leading to the grant of anticipatory bail based on the principle of parity and the petitioner's non-director status.
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2007 (12) TMI 461
Whether the termination of the services of the applicant/workman Shri Vinod Kumar S/o Shri Ravi Ram Singh, Conductor by the employers from 31.07.1999 is unjustified and/or illegal? If so, to which benefit/compensation the applicant/workman is entitled and to what extent?"
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2007 (12) TMI 460
Issues Involved:
1. Deletion of penalty levied under section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act.
2. Genuineness of gifts received by the assessee.
3. Filing of revised returns and its implications on penalty.
4. Application of Explanation 5 to section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act.
5. Arguments and evidence presented by both parties.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Deletion of Penalty Levied Under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act:
The revenue appealed against the deletion of the penalty levied under section 271(1)(c) by the CIT(A). The CIT(A) had deleted the penalty on the grounds that the gifts were disclosed in the returns filed before the date of the search, and the revised returns were filed to buy peace and avoid litigation. The CIT(A) relied on Supreme Court and MP High Court judgments, which held that penalty could not be levied if the revised returns were accepted and filed to purchase peace.
2. Genuineness of Gifts Received by the Assessee:
During the search, it was established that the gifts received by the assessee were not genuine. The assessee admitted that the gifts were arranged to convert unaccounted money into accounted income. The Assessing Officer (AO) concluded that the gifts were fictitious, as evidenced by the pattern of transactions, the involvement of intermediaries, and the lack of creditworthiness of the donors. The AO imposed a penalty under section 271(1)(c) for concealment of income.
3. Filing of Revised Returns and Its Implications on Penalty:
The assessee filed revised returns after the search, declaring additional income and paying taxes. The CIT(A) accepted the revised returns and deleted the penalty, arguing that the revised returns were filed to end the proceedings and avoid harassment. The CIT(A) held that the particulars were already available in the original returns, and the revised returns were filed to buy peace with the department, thus penalty should not be levied.
4. Application of Explanation 5 to Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act:
Explanation 5 to section 271(1)(c) provides immunity from penalty if the assessee, during the course of a search, admits to the undisclosed income, specifies the manner in which it was derived, and pays the tax along with interest. The Tribunal found that the assessee had complied with these conditions by admitting the non-genuine nature of the gifts, filing revised returns, and paying the taxes. Therefore, the Tribunal held that Explanation 5 was applicable, and the penalty on the gifts was deleted.
However, the Tribunal noted that the commission paid for arranging the gifts was an outgoing expense and not represented by any assets or valuable articles. Therefore, Explanation 5 did not provide immunity for the commission paid, and the penalty on this amount was confirmed.
5. Arguments and Evidence Presented by Both Parties:
The revenue argued that the assessee had independent sources of income and that the gifts were arranged to evade taxes. They relied on the statements of the assessee and intermediaries, which confirmed the fictitious nature of the gifts. The revenue also cited various judgments to support their case for levying the penalty.
The assessee argued that the gifts were genuine and that the revised returns were filed to buy peace. They cited Supreme Court and High Court judgments to argue that penalty should not be levied if the revised returns were accepted. The assessee also contended that the penalty proceedings should be based on the returns filed under section 153A and not the original returns.
Conclusion:
The Tribunal concluded that the penalty under section 271(1)(c) on the gifts was not justified as the assessee had complied with the conditions of Explanation 5 by admitting the non-genuine nature of the gifts, filing revised returns, and paying the taxes. However, the penalty on the commission paid for arranging the gifts was confirmed as Explanation 5 did not provide immunity for such expenses. The appeals were partly allowed, deleting the penalty on the gifts but confirming the penalty on the commission paid.
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2007 (12) TMI 459
Issues:
1. Interpretation of Section 31A of the Wakf Act, 1995 regarding disqualification for membership of the Legislative Assembly of NCT of Delhi.
2. Examination of the retrospective application of Section 31A to elections held before 2006.
3. Consideration of legal fictions in interpreting statutes.
4. Analysis of the High Court's judgment on points raised in the election petition beyond the issue of office of profit.
Interpretation of Section 31A:
The case involved a challenge to the disqualification of a candidate for holding an office of profit while contesting an election to the Delhi Legislative Assembly. The central issue revolved around the interpretation of Section 31A of the Wakf Act, 1995, as amended by The Wakf (Delhi Amendment) Act, 2006. The provision stated that the Chairperson or Members of the Board for the Union Territory of Delhi shall not be disqualified for being chosen as a member of the Legislative Assembly. The appellant argued that since the election took place in 2003 and the amendment came into force in 2006, it should not apply retrospectively. However, the Court held that the provision, by stating "shall be deemed never to have been disqualified," created a legal fiction indicating retrospective application.
Retrospective Application of Section 31A:
The Court emphasized that while the Amendment Act did not expressly mention retrospective effect, the language used implied such an intention. Citing legal precedents, the Court explained that legal fictions are recognized in law and must be given effect as if the imagined state of affairs were real. Therefore, even if the candidate was disqualified in 2003, the insertion of Section 31A in 2006 deemed him not to have been disqualified, leading to his eligibility for the election.
Legal Fictions in Statutory Interpretation:
The judgment delved into the concept of legal fictions, quoting Lord Asquith and highlighting their acceptance in legal principles. The Court noted that legal fictions, like the one in Section 31A, require imagining a certain state of affairs as real, including its consequences and incidents. By applying this principle, the Court affirmed the retrospective application of the provision to resolve the disqualification issue.
High Court's Judgment on Election Petition Points:
The appellant raised concerns about the High Court's failure to address various points in the election petition beyond the office of profit issue. However, the Court clarified that a Judge is presumed to consider all points pressed during arguments unless explicitly given up. It explained that if a point is not mentioned in the judgment, it is presumed to have been abandoned. The appellant was advised to approach the same Court for review if points were overlooked. As the High Court's judgment focused solely on the office of profit matter, the Court declined to entertain other points raised in the petition, leading to the dismissal of the appeals without costs.
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2007 (12) TMI 458
The Appellate Tribunal CESTAT NEW DELHI ruled in favor of the applicant, waiving the pre-deposit amount of service tax and penalties as the applicant had already deposited 50% of the demand as directed by the Tribunal. The remaining amount was deemed sufficient for the appeal hearing. Stay petition was allowed. (Citation: 2007 (12) TMI 458 - CESTAT NEW DELHI)
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2007 (12) TMI 457
Whether the action of the Development Authority in levying 20% surcharge from the registrants of the South Delhi is justified ?
Whether demand for payment of current cost as calculated by the Delhi Development Authority from the defaulter registrants could be said to be justified?
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2007 (12) TMI 456
Issues Involved:
1. Justification of the High Court in allowing Review Application Nos. 8 & 9 of 1997 under Order XLVII Rule 1 C.P.C.
2. Determination of whether the Palani Roman Catholic Mission is a "religious institution" within the meaning of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act, 1921 as amended by Act 2 of 1996.
3. Applicability of the amended provisions of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act, 1921 to the ongoing proceedings.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Justification of the High Court in allowing Review Application Nos. 8 & 9 of 1997 under Order XLVII Rule 1 C.P.C.:
The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court was justified in allowing the review applications under Order XLVII Rule 1 C.P.C. The provision allows for a review based on the discovery of new and important evidence, mistake, error apparent on the face of the record, or any other sufficient reason. The Court emphasized that an error must be apparent on the face of the record and not require further investigation. The review is not intended for re-hearing the same issue but correcting manifest errors. The Supreme Court found that the High Court correctly applied these principles, as the review was necessitated by the amended Act and the factual determination that the respondent was a "religious institution."
2. Determination of whether the Palani Roman Catholic Mission is a "religious institution":
The High Court and the trial Court both concluded that the Palani Roman Catholic Mission is a "religious institution" based on extensive oral and documentary evidence. The Supreme Court upheld this finding, noting that the Mission conducted religious ceremonies, prayers, and masses, qualifying it as a place of worship under Section 1(f) of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act, 1921, as amended by Act 2 of 1996. The trial Court's report, which was based on evidence from both parties, supported this conclusion, and the Supreme Court agreed with the High Court's acceptance of this report.
3. Applicability of the amended provisions of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act, 1921 to the ongoing proceedings:
The amended Act, which came into force on 11.1.1996, excluded lands owned by religious institutions from the benefits conferred to tenants under Section 9 of the principal Act. The Supreme Court noted that the tenant's application under Section 9 was still pending when the amended Act came into force. The High Court correctly held that the proceedings abated with the enactment of the amended Act, as the sale deed was executed only on 28.10.1996, after the amendment. The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the proceedings had reached finality before the amendment, agreeing with the High Court that the decree became a nullity from 11.1.1996. The Court also dismissed the reliance on the Full Bench decision in Arulmigu Kasi Viswanathaswamy Devasthanam vs. Kasthuriammal, clarifying that proceedings are pending until the execution of the sale deed.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court concluded that the High Court was justified in allowing the review applications and that the Palani Roman Catholic Mission was correctly identified as a "religious institution." The amended Act 2 of 1996 applied to the ongoing proceedings, resulting in the abatement of the tenant's application under Section 9. The appeals were dismissed, and the High Court's judgment was upheld.
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2007 (12) TMI 455
Whether the recommendations of the Selection Committee to fill up 8 vacancies belonging to the non-State Civil Service Officers of Government of Karnataka to the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) of Karnataka cadre are mala fides, arbitrary and also the Selection Committee without application of mind had awarded marks to the selected candidates in a discriminatory manner?
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2007 (12) TMI 454
Issues: Priority of dues between Department of Customs and Central Excise and secured creditors, validity of temporary injunction against defendant no.2.
Analysis:
1. Priority of Dues: The case involved a dispute over the priority of dues between the Department of Customs and Central Excise and a secured creditor, defendant no.2. The Department sought to recover a sum from defendant no.1, who had mortgaged plots to defendant no.2 for a loan. Defendant no.2 had attached the plots under the State Financial Corporation Act, intending to sell them to recover the loan amount. The Department claimed precedence over the dues that defendant no.2 would receive from selling the plots. The court referred to legal precedents, including Sicom Ltd. v. Union of India and Syndicate Bank v. The Official Liquidator, to establish that the State does not have priority over secured creditors but only over non-secured creditors. As defendant no.2 had acted within the provisions of the Act, the Department had no grounds to obtain a temporary injunction against defendant no.2.
2. Validity of Temporary Injunction: The court found that the Department of Customs and Central Excise had not sought any relief against defendant no.2 in their plaint. As defendant no.2 was entitled to deal with the plots in accordance with the law to recover their dues, the court set aside the impugned order dated 30-6-2007. Consequently, defendant no.2 was granted the right to manage the plots, including the factory premises and machinery, as per the provisions of the State Financial Corporation Act. The appeal was allowed in favor of defendant no.2 based on these findings.
In conclusion, the judgment clarified the priority of dues between the Department of Customs and Central Excise and secured creditors, emphasizing the rights of the latter under the State Financial Corporation Act. It also highlighted the importance of seeking appropriate relief in legal proceedings and upheld the rights of defendant no.2 to deal with the mortgaged plots for the recovery of their dues.
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2007 (12) TMI 453
Issues:
Extent of Superior Courts' jurisdiction to dismiss a writ petition for alleged suppression of material fact.
Analysis:
The case involves a cooperative society that applied for loans and allegedly defaulted on payments, leading to recovery proceedings and multiple writ petitions. The main issue is whether the Superior Courts have the jurisdiction to dismiss a writ petition for suppressing material facts. The High Court dismissed a fresh writ petition, stating that the appellants had suppressed the fact of filing four previous writ petitions on the same cause of action. The appellants argued that the previous writ petitions were based on different causes of action. The respondents contended that despite different prayers in the writ applications, the core issue remained the same, revolving around the recovery of the loan amount. The Supreme Court noted that even a public interest litigation challenged the recovery proceedings, emphasizing that the appellants must approach the court with clean hands and not abuse the legal process.
In a counter-affidavit, the respondents highlighted the history of writ petitions against the recovery proceedings and accused the appellants of abusing the legal process. The court observed that repeated filing of writ petitions amounted to an abuse of the process of law and could even lead to criminal contempt, as established in previous judgments. The court emphasized that a writ remedy is equitable, requiring parties to disclose all material facts and refrain from repeatedly approaching the court on the same issue. Ultimately, the Supreme Court found no merit in the appeal and dismissed it with costs, quantifying the counsel's fee.
The judgment underscores the importance of transparency in legal proceedings, emphasizing that parties must not suppress material facts or abuse the legal process by filing repetitive writ petitions. It upholds the principle that a person seeking relief from a superior court must approach with clean hands and respect the integrity of the legal system. The decision serves as a reminder that the court will not tolerate the misuse of legal remedies and will penalize such behavior to uphold the sanctity of the judicial process.
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2007 (12) TMI 452
Issues involved:
Dismissal from service, falsification of accounts, misappropriation of bank's money, jurisdiction of Co-operative Arbitration Court, violation of principles of natural justice, reconsideration of matter, retirement from service, pension from Kerala State Co-operative Pension Fund.
Dismissal from service:
The petitioner, an employee of the 4th respondent Society, was dismissed from service u/s Rule 176 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules due to allegations of falsification of accounts and misappropriation of bank's money. Despite remitting the entire amount upon detection of irregularities, she was found guilty in an enquiry and dismissed. Various appeals and judgments followed, leading to a reinstatement order by the Registrar, which was later overturned by the Government through Ext.P14 order dated 29.03.2005. The petitioner challenged this order through a Writ Petition, arguing that further action against her was unwarranted since she had already rectified the loss. She also contended that the finding of misappropriation against her was unsustainable in law.
Jurisdiction of Co-operative Arbitration Court:
The petitioner argued that post-02.01.2003, only the Co-operative Arbitration Court had jurisdiction to handle her case as per Section 70B of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act. She claimed that the orders of the Joint Registrar and the Government were without jurisdiction and requested the matter to be reconsidered by the Co-operative Arbitration Court. However, the Government and other respondents defended the jurisdiction of the Registrar and the Government, stating that the findings against the petitioner were factual and could not be disturbed by the Court.
Violation of principles of natural justice:
The petitioner alleged a violation of the principles of natural justice in the proceedings, particularly regarding the submission of an argument note by the bank after the closure of arguments in the appeal. The Government relied on this note, which the petitioner argued was against the principles of natural justice. However, the Court held that the submission of an argument note did not equate to submitting adverse materials and that the petitioner could challenge the arguments raised in the note before the Court.
Retirement from service and pension consideration:
Considering that the petitioner had already retired from service, the Court directed the 5th respondent to assess whether the punishment imposed on her could be converted into compulsory retirement, enabling her to draw a pension from the Kerala State Co-operative Pension Fund. This direction was given within two months from the date of the Court's judgment.
Conclusion:
The Court dismissed the Writ Petition, upholding the Government's order and decisions made in the case. The Court emphasized the importance of jurisdiction, the findings of fact, and the principles of natural justice in the proceedings. It also considered the petitioner's retirement status and directed the assessment of converting the punishment into compulsory retirement for pension benefits.
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2007 (12) TMI 451
The judgment concerns the valuation of lipsticks of 10 gms or less under Section 4 or 4A of the Central Excise Act, 1944. The issue has been settled in favor of the appellants based on previous decisions, leading to the impugned order being set aside and the appeals being allowed.
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2007 (12) TMI 450
Issues:
1. Interpretation of whether Animal Driven Vehicles (ADV carts) qualify as agricultural implements for subsidy eligibility.
Analysis:
The case involved an appeal against a judgment of the Allahabad High Court regarding the purchase of ADV carts by a Union of cane growers for transporting sugarcane. The State Government mandated purchases of agricultural implements only from a specific entity, raising the question of whether ADV carts were considered agricultural implements for subsidy eligibility. The court delved into the definition of "implement" from various dictionaries and legal sources to determine the common parlance understanding. It was established that implements are tools used by humans or animals for specific purposes. The court emphasized the importance of popular meaning over etymological meaning in interpretation to facilitate effective communication. Applying this principle, the court concluded that ADV carts, primarily used for transportation, do not qualify as agricultural implements in common parlance.
The respondent cited a previous case where sugarcane crushers were deemed not to be agricultural implements as they were not part of the agricultural operation. However, the court clarified that the primary reason for not considering ADV carts as agricultural implements was their lack of being tools. As ADV carts were used post-agricultural operations for transportation, they did not meet the criteria of agricultural implements. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal, stating that ADV carts were not eligible for the subsidy as they did not fall under the definition of agricultural implements.
In a noteworthy departure, the judges expressed regret over the neglect of Mimansa Principles of Interpretation in legal discourse, highlighting its significance in resolving ambiguities. They emphasized the intellectual heritage of ancient principles and advocated for their utilization alongside modern interpretations. The judges underscored the value of incorporating diverse interpretative systems, such as Mimansa principles, to enhance legal analysis and decision-making. This acknowledgment aimed to promote a more comprehensive approach to legal interpretation, acknowledging the richness of traditional principles alongside contemporary methodologies.
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2007 (12) TMI 449
Issues:
1. Prayer for expediting the release of imported vehicles pending adjudication.
2. Change in adjudicating authority and issuance of fresh summons.
3. Retraction from the statement given by the petitioner.
4. Request for being accompanied by a counsel during adjudication.
Analysis:
1. The petitioners, claiming employment in the Middle East, sought the release of their imported vehicles held by Customs pending adjudication. The court directed the adjudicating authority to complete the adjudication and issue orders within four weeks from the judgment's receipt for one petition, and within eight weeks for the other petition.
2. In one petition, the respondent informed the court about the petitioner's appearance before the adjudicating authority where a statement was recorded. Due to a change in the adjudicating authority, a fresh summons was issued. The petitioner's counsel stated that the first client had no further statements to make, allowing the adjudication to proceed with the recorded statement.
3. In the second petition, the car imported by the petitioner awaited clearance. The counsel for the respondents mentioned that the petitioner had retracted from the initial statement given. Consequently, fresh summons had to be issued. The petitioner requested to be accompanied by a counsel due to a previous bitter experience, which was not opposed by the respondents.
4. Considering the submissions from both sides, the court directed the completion of adjudication within eight weeks from the judgment's receipt for the second petition. The petitioner was instructed to cooperate with the adjudication process and allowed to be accompanied by a lawyer when summoned to appear before the respondents. Both writ petitions were disposed of accordingly.
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2007 (12) TMI 448
Whether Section 30 of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914 prohibiting employment of "any man under the age of 25 years" or "any woman" in any part of such premises in which liquor or intoxicating drug is consumed by the public is constitutionally valid?
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2007 (12) TMI 447
Issues:
Challenge to judgment allowing appeal on recovery of tree value based on conditional permission and ownership of reserved trees.
Analysis:
The plaintiffs filed a suit for recovery of tree value, claiming ownership of trees cut and transported to a government godown based on permission granted by the defendants. The trial judge dismissed the suit, stating that without challenging the conditional permission, the plaintiffs couldn't claim tree value. The High Court allowed the appeal, relying on judgments stating ownership of reserved trees lies with the landowner, not the government.
The appellant argued that permission was granted under the Karnataka Preservation of Trees Act, subject to conditions, including transporting reserved trees to a government warehouse. They contended that since the conditions weren't challenged, the High Court erred in granting relief. The respondents argued that ownership of trees, except sandalwood, isn't with the government as per the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963.
The High Court's judgment was deemed unsustainable as it didn't consider the effect of the admission that the trees were reserved. The court emphasized that precedents should be followed only to ensure justice and not blindly. It highlighted that each case's unique facts must be considered, and decisions shouldn't be based solely on similarities with past cases.
The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, noting the lack of challenge to the conditions and the acceptance that the trees were reserved. The decision emphasized the importance of analyzing admissions and facts in each case rather than relying solely on past judgments. The appeal was allowed without costs, emphasizing the need to clear obstructions to justice.
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2007 (12) TMI 446
Issues involved: Appeal against conviction and sentence under Section 15 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.
Judgment Summary:
The appeal was directed against the judgment of conviction and sentence rendered by the Additional Sessions Judge, Hissar, where the accused was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment and a fine for possession of narcotic substances. The prosecution's case was based on the discovery of Poppy straw in bags on a vehicle, leading to the accused being charged under Section 15 of the Act.
The appellant contested that he was not informed of his right to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or Magistrate, alleging non-compliance with Section 15. However, the State argued that the accused was indeed informed of this right, as evidenced by the consent memo Ex.PA, where the accused agreed to be searched before the Investigator.
Regarding the witnesses, the defense counsel contended that the independent witness did not support the prosecution's case, and a defense witness contradicted it. The prosecution countered by suggesting that these witnesses may have been influenced by the accused.
The Court analyzed the evidence and found that the official witnesses' testimonies were reliable, despite challenges to their credibility. The Court cited legal precedents emphasizing the presumption of honesty in favor of police officers and the prosecution's discretion in choosing which witnesses to present.
Ultimately, the Court found no merit in the appeal and upheld the conviction and sentence, concluding that there were no infirmities or illegalities in the trial court's judgment. The appeal was dismissed accordingly.
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2007 (12) TMI 445
Issues Involved:
1. Legitimacy of the Public Interest Litigation (PIL).
2. Alleged irregularities and malafides in the allotment of land to respondent No.5.
3. Compliance with principles of natural justice by the High Court.
Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Legitimacy of the Public Interest Litigation (PIL):
The Supreme Court scrutinized the legitimacy of the PIL filed by the respondent, who described himself as the Chief Spokesperson of the Indian National Congress. The Court emphasized that PIL should not be used for "publicity interest litigation," "private interest litigation," or "politics interest litigation." The PIL must involve genuine public interest and not be a tool for personal vendetta or political motives. The Court cited several precedents, including *The Janta Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary* and *Kazi Lhendup Dorji v. Central Bureau of Investigation*, to underline that only a person acting bona fide with sufficient interest in the proceedings of PIL can approach the Court. The Court also noted that frivolous petitions waste valuable judicial time and should be dismissed with costs to deter misuse.
2. Alleged Irregularities and Malafides in the Allotment of Land to Respondent No.5:
The writ petition alleged that the Bihar Industrial Area Development Authority allotted land to respondent No.5 at throwaway prices without issuing any notice or inviting competitive bids, causing heavy loss to the State. It was claimed that the allotments were politically motivated and malafide. The High Court found the allotments to be "thoroughly irregular" and "completely untenable," but rejected the allegation of malafides, giving the State the "benefit of doubt." The High Court directed the Authority to resume possession of the lands and allowed respondent No.5 to make fresh applications with proper Project Reports for consideration.
3. Compliance with Principles of Natural Justice by the High Court:
The Supreme Court observed that the High Court's conclusions were based on a reading of the files without providing an opportunity for the parties to clarify doubts. The appellant argued that the High Court's observations were contrary to the materials on record and that there was a complete violation of principles of natural justice. The Supreme Court agreed that the High Court should have given the parties an opportunity to explain the fact situation and address any doubts. The Court emphasized that the High Court's conclusions about irregularity/illegality in allotment were drawn without adequate clarification from the parties involved.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court set aside the order of the High Court and remitted the matter for fresh consideration. The High Court was directed to allow the parties to place additional material in support of their respective stands and take a decision within four weeks. The Supreme Court made it clear that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case. The appeal was allowed to the extent of remitting the matter back to the High Court for a fresh decision.
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2007 (12) TMI 444
Whether an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act which is a special law can be compounded?
Held that:- Taking into consideration even the provision of Section 147 and the primary object underlying Section 138, in our judgment, there is no reason to refuse compromise between the parties. We, therefore, dispose of the appeal on the basis of the settlement arrived at between the appellant and the respondent.
For the foregoing reasons the appeal deserves to be allowed and is accordingly allowed by holding that since the matter has been compromised between the parties and the amount of ₹ 45,000/- has been paid by the appellant towards full and final settlement to the respondent-bank towards its dues, the appellant is entitled to acquittal.
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2007 (12) TMI 443
Whether the concession in the consumption of energy which has been given to the writ petitioners for establishing the industries in the hill areas can be revoked or modified by the appellant- Corporation or not?
Held that:- Government offers certain benefits to attract the entrepreneurs and the entrepreneurs act on those beneficial offers. Thereafter, the Government withdraws those benefits. This will seriously affect the credibility of the Government and would show the shortsightedness of the governance. Therefore, in order to keep the faith of the people, the Government or its instrumentality should abide by their commitments. In this context, the action taken by the appellant-Corporation in revoking the benefits given to the entrepreneurs in the hill areas will sadly reflect their credibility and people will not take the word of the Government. That will shake the faith of the people in the governance. Therefore, in order to keep the faith and maintain good governance it is necessary that whatever representation is made by the Government or its instrumentality which induces the other party to act, the Government should not be permitted to withdraw from that. This is a matter of faith.
Therefore, as a result view taken by the Allahabad High Court on revoking the principle of promissory estoppel is correct and the respondent- units will be entitled to such benefits till the U.P. Electricity Reforms Act, 1999 came in to force. Since after coming into force the Act of 1999 no such concession has been granted, therefore, the concession shall survive till the Act of 1999 came into force. The appeals are accordingly disposed of with no order as to costs.
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