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Showing 121 to 140 of 583 Records
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2006 (9) TMI 504 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t be used for all purposes for which edible oil is used. In fact, the Tribunal has allowed the respondent 39 s claim on the ground that the circular clarifying the notification uses the words such as and so much so, the list is not exhaustive. However, we find from the circular that the use of words such as after including hydrogenated oil is followed by specific items, namely, ground nut oil, gingelly oil and vanaspathi. This only means that those items also are covered by notification. However, margarine referred above is not similar to those items, is what we found. Therefore, we are of the view that bakery margarine is not edible oil covered by the notification and clarified in the circular and therefore, the decision of the Tribunal holding otherwise is liable to be reversed. We therefore allow the revision by reversing the order of the Tribunal and upholding the assessment of bakery margarine at eight per cent under entry 90 of the First Schedule to the KGST Act, 1957.
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2006 (9) TMI 503 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to accept the contention of the appellant that the State is bound by the principle of promissory estoppel. The decision, as contended by the appellant, may not be correct but that would not be a reason for review of the judgment. At best the appellant is at liberty to challenge the order passed by the Division Bench of this court by filing appeal to the higher court. In that view of the matter the review application is dismissed. In view of the above premises, this writ appellate court finds no convincing or compelling reasons calling for interference with the impugned judgments passed by the writ court and it is, thus, unhesitatingly held that the cardinal issue raised herein is squarely covered by the Doson Chemicals 39 case 2001 124 STC 305 (Gauhati) 2001 2 GLT 481. For the forgoing reasons, observations and discussions, this batch of writ appeals fails and stands dismissed. Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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2006 (9) TMI 502 - SUPREME COURT
Whether judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court dismissing the Habeas Corpus Writ Petition filed by A. Geetha wife of Anandaraj @ Anand @Anandan,('Detenu') was correct?
Held that:- It has to be noted that whether prayer for bail would be accepted depends on circumstances of each case and no hard and fast rule can be applied. The only requirement is that the detaining authority should be aware that the detenu is already in custody and is likely to be released on bail. The conclusion that the detenu may be released on bail cannot be ipse-dixit of the detaining authority. On the basis of materials before him, the detaining authority came to the conclusion that there is likelihood of detenu being released on bail. That is his subjective satisfaction based on materials. Normally, such satisfaction is not to be interfered with. On the facts of the case, the detaining authority has indicated as to why he was of the opinion that there is likelihood of detenu being released on bail. It has been clearly stated that in similar cases orders granting bail are passed by various courts. Appellant has not disputed correctness of this statement.
As the second respondent has filed an additional affidavit indicating that on verification of the registered post register for central zone, it has been noticed that no representation either from the detenu or on his behalf was received through registered post between 25.9.2005 and 30.9.2005. In view of the aforesaid, we find no substance in this appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed.
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2006 (9) TMI 500 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... covered by an earlier judgment of the High Court is a matter to be decided by the Assistant Collector. He will have to decide all questions of fact and law. He has to make whatever enquiries he thinks necessary for determination of the value of excisable goods. The High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction cannot give guidance to Assistant Collector about the manner and mode in which the assessment should be made. So, the challenge to the order of assessment cannot be entertained by this court at this point of time as an effective alternative remedy is available to the petitioner by way of a statutory appeal. Without exhausting such alternative remedy, the assessee has rushed to this court. This court finds no merit in the writ petition and accordingly the writ petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected W.P. (MD) No.1 of 2006 is closed. The registry is directed to return the original assessment order so as to enable the petitioner to pursue the appeal remedy.
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2006 (9) TMI 499 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... process of manufacture and without use thereof, the production itself is not possible. Further that deduction was available on account of purchase value of the goods, which have already been subjected to tax, having been used or consumed in the manufacture of goods is quite wide in its application, as interpreted by the honourable Supreme Court in Burmah-Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Co.of India Ltd. 39 s case 1963 Supp. 2 SCR 216 AIR 1963 SC 906 and Kathiawar Industries Ltd. 39 s case AIR 1979 SC 1721. Still further, there being no dispute that the goods so purchased by the assessee had been subjected to tax and were used in the manufacture of goods other than tax-free goods in the State of Punjab, we are of the view that the assessee is entitled to deduction on account of purchase value of furnace oil used in the manufacture of iron and steel goods under rule 29(xii) of the Rules. Accordingly, the question is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
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2006 (9) TMI 498 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Determination of Arms Length Price Held that:- The assessee shared profit in the ratio of 50:50 both on the payments made by it and the receipts of freight from its AEs - Revenue could not controvert finding that the functions performed, assets employed and risk undertaken in both the AEs is same - The assessee paid certain sum to its AEs abroad for doing the work similar to which it did for which it received freight revenue from its AEs thus, in both the situations the total receipts are taken on one hand, from which all the expenses incurred in connection with the transportation of cargo in both the countries are excluded - The remaining amount is distributed between the entity of origin country and the entity of destination country in equal share - the assessee has earned/paid revenue from/to its AEs in the same proportion, thus, the transactions have been recorded at arm's length price and there was no justification for making such addition Relying upon ACIT vs. M/s Agility Logistics Pvt. Ltd. [2013 (9) TMI 645 - ITAT MUMBAI] - there is no reason to interfere in the order Decided against Revenue.
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2006 (9) TMI 497 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... be allowed as per requirement of section 15(c) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 provided that the rice is sold within the State or is used for manufacture of taxable goods in the State for sale or is sold in the course of inter-State trade or commerce or in the course of export. In view of the legal position already noticed above and the stand taken by the State of Punjab, we are of the view that section 15(c) of the Central Act has to be given effect to for the period in dispute, that is, from the date of enforcement of PVAT Act on April 1, 2005. The petitioner will be at liberty to seek the benefit of the said provision in accordance with law before the appropriate authority. It is made clear that if any order has been passed which is inconsistent with the abovesaid order, the said order will be treated as non est and the authority concerned will pass fresh orders in consonance with the order of this court. The writ petition is disposed of in the manner indicated above.
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2006 (9) TMI 496 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the application for subsidy. So as long as they discharged their duties within the framework of the scheme their order would not be available for judicial review. In the instant case, the authority did not exercise their discretion in terms of the said scheme of 1994 as we find on scrutiny of the said order as discussed above. Hence, such order of the authority in our view was available to this court for challenge and the writ petition was maintainable on that score. The appeal succeeds. The order impugned in the writ petition appearing at page Nos. 51-53 of the paper book dated April 11, 2006 is quashed and set aside. The concerned authority is directed to consider the application for subsidy made by the petitioner afresh in the light of the observations made by us herein. Such exercise must be done within a period of four weeks from the date of communication of this order. Appeal is disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs. Tapan Mukherjee J. - I agree.
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2006 (9) TMI 495 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Sales tax created u/s 24 - Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 - charge for payment of arrears - binding on the bona fide purchaser for value or not - whether the appellant is a bona fide purchaser without notice of the charge u/s 24(1) - HELD THAT:- In this case there is absolutely no evidence on the side of the plaintiffs to discharge the initial burden. That being so the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the plaintiffs have discharged their initial burden cannot be accepted. But on the other hand P.W. 1 in his cross examination has categorically admitted that he did not enquire T. P. Narayanasamy about the sales tax arrears. Therefore, the omission on the part of the plaintiffs to enquire with their vendors regarding their sales tax arrears amounts to negligence on their part and also it will amount to willful abstention. In this case the plaintiffs had the means of obtaining the necessary information and the plaintiffs with prudent caution might have obtained knowledge of the charge and therefore the failure on their part to make necessary enquiries with their vendors will amount to willful abstention or gross negligence and therefore it could be held that the plaintiffs have constructive notice.
We have to point out that the fact that the plaintiffs marked exhibit A-46 through D.W. 7 will itself show that they had knowledge about the sales tax arrears of their vendors. It is not the case of the plaintiffs anywhere that exhibit A-46 was obtained by them from their vendors or from some other source after filing of the suit. Therefore, we have to hold that the plaintiffs are not bona fide purchasers without notice.
The learned single Judge after considering at length the contents of exhibits A-46, B-15, B-24, B-25, B-26, B-27 and B-36 has rightly observed that the conclusion of the Trial Court that S.V. Traders was proprietory concern cannot be sustained and the Trial Court failed to consider the material portions and the documents placed by the defendants in the form of documents. The learned single Judge has also rightly observed that a perusal of the pleadings of both the parties as well as the evidence clearly shows that the plaintiffs were very well aware of the sales tax arrears from 1973-74 and knowing fully well they have purchased the property from T.P. Narayanasamy.
The learned Judge on a perusal of the entire oral and documentary evidence has further held that T.P. Narayanasamy and his son T.N. Subash in order to escape from the tax liability after knowing that there was a default committed by them and a charge has been created as per section 24 of the Act, with the fraudulent intention sold the only property in favour of the plaintiffs. Therefore, we see no reason to interfere with the findings recorded by the learned single Judge and we concur with the findings.
In the result, the letters patent appeal fails and the same is dismissed.
However, there will be no order as to costs. Consequently, the connected CMP is closed.
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2006 (9) TMI 494 - SUPREME COURT
Whether High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Indore was correct in affirming the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 3.4.2001 passed by the Special Judge, Indore under Section 8 of the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short "the NDPS Act")?
Held that:- Why everything was left to be done by PW-5 alone is a mystery. Why Shri Bajpai and Inspectors attached to the Bureau had not been examined has not been explained. The genesis of the occurrence was obtaining of secret information from the informer. Concededly the informer gave full particulars thereof only to Ms. Sabiha Khatun. She was, therefore, the only competent witness to prove the contents of Ex. P/16. A document as, is well known, does not prove itself. The contents are required to be proved by the maker thereof. Ms. Sabiha Khatun alone could have proved the correctness or otherwise of the contents of the said document. It was all the more necessary as PW-5 conceded that all conversations between Ms. Sabiha Khatun and the informer did not take place in his presence.
Appellant is entitled to benefit of doubt. The appeal is allowed. He is directed to be set at liberty unless wanted in any other case.
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2006 (9) TMI 493 - SUPREME COURT
Whether High Court was correct making modification of its order dated 01.07.2005 substituted Mr. Justice P. Chenna Keshav Reddy, former Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh and Gauhati High Court as the Presiding Arbitrator in place of Mr. Justice Y. Bhaskar Rao?
Held that:- The said finding of the High Court is self contradictory inasmuch as if the Presiding Arbitrator is a retired Judge of the High Court and one of the arbitrators is a retired Chief Justice of the High Court, the member of hierarchy is upset. Even otherwise, there does not exist any such provision in law which requires that if one of the arbitrators is a retired Judge the Presiding Arbitrator also has to be a retired Judge. The parties have entered into a contract after fully understanding the import of the terms so agreed to from which there cannot be any deviation. The Courts have held that the parties are required to comply with the procedure of appointment as agreed to and the defaulting party cannot be allowed to take advantage of its own wrong.
The pleadings before the Arbitral Tribunal are not complete and written statement is yet to be filed by the appellant as the appellants have raised their objections with respect to the appointment before the arbitration proceedings which has been duly recorded by the Arbitral Tribunal in the orders passed by them. In view of the order now passed setting aside the appointment of the Presiding Arbitrator by the High Court, the appointment of the Presiding Arbitrator as per the procedure contemplated under the contract agreement has to be followed and IRC (Ministry of Shipping, Road Transport and Highways, R.K. Puram, New Delhi should be approached. The parties are at liberty to approach the Arbitrators for any further interim directions. Appeal allowed by setting aside the order passed by the High Court
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2006 (9) TMI 492 - SUPREME COURT
Appointment of Arbitrator
Held that:- Although in terms of the arbitration agreement contained in Clause 25 of the contract, ordinarily the arbitrator appointed by the Managing Director should act as arbitral tribunal in respect of the disputes and differences between the parties to the contract; in this case, the Appellants must be held to have waived their right as they consented to the appointment of Shri Bhattacharya as an arbitral tribunal. The High Court having appointed the arbitral tribunal on consent, it is, in our opinion, not open to the Appellants now to contend that no such concession was made.
Prima facie also it does not appear that the allegations contained in the said application were supported by an affidavit. In that view of the matter, no credence to the averments contained therein cannot be given. Furthermore, it is not a case where this Court should exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. For the reasons aforementioned, this appeal is dismissed.
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2006 (9) TMI 491 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... In such view of the matter, in our opinion, there was no question of imposition of any penalty. In this context, it may also be pointed out that the Commissioner had issued instruction to the Assessing Officer to prepare the assessment and simultaneously submit a proposal for waiver and therefore, at that stage, it was not necessary for the Assessing Officer to issue any demand notice and particularly to impose any penalty. On the other hand, the instruction of the Commissioner to the effect that the assessment may be prepared and waiver proposal may be submitted itself indicates that there was no requirement for imposing any penalty. 12. For the aforesaid reasons, the issuance of demand notice imposing penalty is quashed. It is made clear that the question of waiver of the tax will be considered by the Government on its own merit and the present order should not be considered as expressing any opinion on that aspect. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No costs.
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2006 (9) TMI 490 - SUPREME COURT
Statutory requirements contained in Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act had not been complied with - Held that:- Appeal allowed. It is necessary to specifically aver in a complaint under Section 141 that at the time the offence was committed, the person accused was in charge of, and responsible for the conduct of business of the company. This averment is an essential requirement of Section 141 and has to be made in a complaint. Without this averment being made in a complaint, the requirements of Section 141 cannot be said to be satisfied.
Merely being a director of a company is not sufficient to make the person liable under Section 141 of the Act. A director in a company cannot be deemed to be in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. The requirement of Section 141 is that the person sought to be made liable should be in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time. This has to be averred as a fact as there is no deemed liability of a director in such cases -
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2006 (9) TMI 489 - ITAT AHMEDABAD
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... ... ..... r view, the Assessing Officer cannot convert the stock-in-trade into an investment when the shares as stock-in-trade has been duly accepted by the Revenue in the earlier years and in the subsequent years also. It is not the case of the Revenue that the assessee has not adopted the method of the valuation so changed in the subsequent years. Under these facts and circumstances of the case, we set aside the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) and delete the addition of Rs. 16,88,76,463 made by the Assessing Officer in the income of the assessee. The next issue relates to the charging, of interest under sections 234A, 234B and 234C of the Income-tax Act. Both the parties agreed that this issue is consequential. We, accordingly direct the Assessing Officer to recompute the interest in accordance with law on the income as may be finally assessed after giving effect to this order. In the result, the appeal is allowed. Pronounced in the open court on September 22, 2006.
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2006 (9) TMI 488 - ITAT AHMEDABAD
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... ... ..... 45, it cannot be taxed at all. See S. G. Mercantile Corporation P. Ltd. v. CIT 1972 83 ITR 700 (SC) . 14. Furthermore, it would be illogical and against the language of section 56 to hold that everything that is exempted from capital gains by the statute could be taxed as a casual or non-recurring receipt under section 10(3) read with section 56. We are fortified in our view by a similar argument being rejected in Nalinikant Ambalal Mody v. S. A. L. Narayan Row, CIT 1966 61 ITR 428, 432, 435 (SC). In view of the abovementioned factual and legal aspect, respectfully following the aforementioned decision of hon ble Supreme Court, we find that the learned Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) has rightly held that the amount of Rs. 30 lakhs could not be brought to tax. We uphold his order and Departmental appeal is dismissed. In the result, appeal filed by the Revenue and the cross-objection filed by the assessee both are dismissed. This order was pronounced on September 8, 2006.
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2006 (9) TMI 487 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
Interpretation of statute - Export incentives Duty Drawback/DEPB - Deduction claimed u/s 80-IB in respect of DEPB - HELD THAT:- We are of the view that for the reasoning adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sterling Foods [1999 (4) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT], income of the assessee from duty drawback cannot be held to be income "derived from" specified business.
We are of the view that the matter being covered by the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sterling Foods (supra), no substantial question of law arises in the appeal.
Thus, the appeal is dismissed.
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2006 (9) TMI 486 - CESTAT, NEW DELHI
Appeal - Limitation - Service of order - Deemed service ... ... ... ... ..... the assessee. The Commissioner (Appeals) has not given any findings on merits of the case. This issue of deemed service was referred to a Larger Bench in the case of Margra Industries Ltd. and Others. The Larger Bench of the Tribunal vide its order No. 739/06 dated 10-7-06 2006 (202) E.L.T. 244 has held as under - ldquo 11 (a) Dispatch of adjudication order by speed post/registered post would not amount to a valid service in the absence of proof of actual delivery of speed post. rdquo 3. emsp The issue is now settled in favour of the appellant and receipt of the order-in-original/notice/summons is a must for considering the calculation the period of appeal. 4. emsp Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside and the matter is remanded back to the learned Commissioner (Appeals) to decide the issue on merits after granting an opportunity of personal hearing to the appellant. Appeal allowed by way of remand to Commissioner (Appeals). (Dictated and pronounced in the open Court)
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2006 (9) TMI 485 - CESTAT, KOLKATA
Appeal to Appellate Tribunal - Hearing ... ... ... ... ..... and making Orders by the Appellate Tribunal, as provided under Section 35C of the Central Excise Act, 1944. It is seen that Section 86(7) similar to the provisions of Section 35C of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and not Section 35B, as such, the second proviso to Section 35B cannot be pressed into service under the Finance Act, 1994. This means that an appeal lie before the Appellate Tribunal by an aggrieved assessee against the Orders passed under Sections 73, 83A, 84, 85 of the Service Tax Rules 1994, irrespective of the valuation. Apart from the above, there appears to be substantial question of law involved in the present appeal and furthermore, this Tribunal had entertained two more appeals of the same appellants, though the value therein, much below Rs. 50,000.00 (Rupees fifty thousand). 6. emsp In the light of the aforesaid discussions, the present appeal is admitted. Registry is directed to list the matter in its turn. Order accordingly. (Pronounced in the open court)
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2006 (9) TMI 484 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Writ petition - Limitation - Non-condonation of delay ... ... ... ... ..... p Before parting, we may state that initially the applicant rsquo s petitioners had engaged a very raw junior Advocate having practice of hardly few months at the Bar and whatever arguments were advanced by the learned Advocate before the Court was carefully considered and having considered the arguments the petition was dismissed. 8. emsp If the submission of Shri Naik was accepted that this Court had committed an error in dismissing the petition on 18-10-2004 as many important facts and aspects of the case were not brought to the notice at the time of hearing of the main petition, then it amounts to sitting in Appeal over our own order and Judgment dated 18-10-2004. That is not permissible in law. Review of the order can only be made when there is an error apparent on the face of the record. 9. emsp In view of the above, this application is summarily rejected. 10. emsp As this Application for condonation of delay is rejected, the above MCA (st) No. 2190 of 2006 is rejected.
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