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Showing 161 to 180 of 292 Records

1990 (3) TMI 141

Issues:
1. Stay petitions preferred by the assessee for assessment years 1984-85 and 1985-86.
2. Discrepancy in tax amounts due for the mentioned assessment years.
3. Interpretation of an agreement between the assessee and the Revenue regarding payment of tax.
4. Legal considerations for granting a stay of proclamation of sale.

Analysis:

1. The stay petitions were filed by the assessee for the assessment years 1984-85 and 1985-86. Initially, interim stay of proclamation of sale was granted by the tribunal. The Revenue raised objections regarding the nature of the petitions, arguing that no appeals were pending before the Tribunal, only cross-objections. The Department contended that the assessee's delay in filing appeals indicated a lack of conviction in the claims made in the cross-objections. However, the tribunal found that the contentions raised in cross-objections should be considered akin to those in an appeal, as per statutory provisions.

2. The dispute revolved around the tax amounts due for the assessment years 1984-85 and 1985-86. The Revenue claimed outstanding amounts of Rs. 11,92,000 and Rs. 10,19,000 respectively. The assessee contested these figures, stating that if relief claimed in cross-objections was allowed, the tax dues would be significantly lower. Detailed computations were presented by both parties, highlighting discrepancies in the calculation of net increase in assets and unexplained assets for the respective years.

3. An agreement between the assessee and the Revenue regarding tax payment was a focal point of contention. The agreement, dated 5-9-1989, outlined a scheme for payment, including a lump sum amount and monthly installments. The Revenue argued that the assessee failed to adhere to the agreement, justifying the issuance of a proclamation for sale. However, the tribunal noted that the agreement was based on the premise that the demand was admitted to be payable, which was disputed by the assessee through filed cross-objections. The tribunal emphasized the statutory right of the assessee to contest the tax demand through legal avenues.

4. The tribunal deliberated on the legal considerations for granting a stay of proclamation of sale. Citing relevant case law, the tribunal emphasized factors such as irreparable injury, public interest, and balance of convenience. It was noted that the proclamation of sale, if enforced, would cause irreparable harm to the assessee. The tribunal considered the merits of the contentions raised in the cross-objections and concluded that the issues warranted further examination. Consequently, the tribunal granted an absolute stay of the proclamation of sale until the appeal was disposed of, subject to a specified payment deadline.

This comprehensive analysis addresses the key issues and legal considerations outlined in the judgment, providing a detailed overview of the tribunal's decision-making process and reasoning.
1990 (3) TMI 139

The appeal was against the addition of Rs. 45,894 to the assessee's income under s. 64(1)(vi) of the IT Act, 1961. The Tribunal ruled in favor of the assessee, stating that the provisions of s. 64(1)(vi) should be strictly construed and do not apply to step-children. The additions made under s. 64(1)(vi) were deleted, and the appeal was allowed.
1990 (3) TMI 137

Issues:
1. Interpretation of Section 40A(8) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 regarding disallowance of interest on deposits.
2. Determination of whether a charge created in favor of trustees for the benefit of depositors satisfies the conditions of Section 40A(8)(ix).
3. Analysis of the trust deed provisions and their compliance with the exceptions under Section 40A(8).

Detailed Analysis:
The judgment by the Appellate Tribunal ITAT MADRAS-C involved an appeal against an order under Section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The primary issue was the interpretation of Section 40A(8) concerning the disallowance of interest on deposits. The assessee, a company, had paid interest on deposits received from shareholders, secured by a hypothecation trust in favor of trustees. The Commissioner of Income-tax directed a disallowance under Section 40A(8) as the charge was not created directly in favor of the depositors. The tribunal analyzed the provisions of Section 40A(8) and the trust deed to determine compliance.

The tribunal considered the provisions of Section 40A(8) which allow for a disallowance of interest expenditure on deposits unless certain conditions are met. It was noted that the exception under Section 40A(8)(ix) excludes amounts received as a loan secured by a charge on assets of the company. The tribunal found that the trust deed created a charge in favor of the depositors, as evidenced by the registered deed. The tribunal rejected the Commissioner's view that the charge should be directly in favor of the loan provider, emphasizing that the trust deed was for the benefit of depositors, meeting the requirements of the section.

Furthermore, the tribunal addressed the revenue's argument that no charge was created due to conditions related to default in repayment exceeding a certain amount. The tribunal analyzed the trust deed provisions and concluded that the clauses regarding default thresholds did not negate the creation of a charge on total deposits. The tribunal highlighted the need to interpret the document in a manner that makes it workable and not self-defeating. Ultimately, the tribunal found that the deposits were fully secured, falling within the exception of Section 40A(8)(ix), and upheld the Income-tax Officer's decision to not make the disallowance.

In conclusion, the tribunal ruled in favor of the assessee, canceling the order made under Section 263. The appeal was allowed, emphasizing the compliance of the trust deed with the provisions of Section 40A(8) and the secure nature of the deposits, thereby justifying the decision to not disallow the interest expenditure.
1990 (3) TMI 136

Issues:
1. Validity of assessment order for the assessment year 1982-83.
2. Jurisdiction of CIT (Appeals) to hear appeals for the assessment year 1982-83.
3. Consequences of the order passed by CIT (Appeals)-V, Madras on the assessment for the year 1982-83.
4. Assessment for the year 1983-84 and apportionment of income post change in firm's constitution.
5. Validity of appeals filed by the Rajaram group for the assessment year 1983-84.
6. Impact of findings for the year 1982-83 on the assessment for the year 1983-84.
7. Directives for fresh assessments for both years.

Analysis:

1. The judgment pertains to appeals for the assessment year 1982-83, where the assessment order was challenged by the assessee. The main additions to income were related to undisclosed income outside the books, which was disputed by the partners. Two appeals were filed, one before CIT (Appeals)-V, Madras, and the other before CIT(A), Madurai. The former set aside the assessment, which was not appealed by either party, leading to a certain finality in the decision.

2. The CIT (Appeals), Madurai, then considered the appeal filed by the Rajaram group for the same assessment year. He deliberated on his jurisdiction to hear the appeal and concluded that he could decide the issue on merits. Despite the previous order setting aside the assessment, he proceeded to evaluate the income discrepancies and made adjustments, which were contested by both the revenue and the assessee.

3. The judgment emphasized the importance of the finality of the previous appellate order and the implications it had on subsequent assessments. The Tribunal determined that since the assessment for the year 1982-83 had already been set aside by the CIT(Appeals)-V, Madras, the subsequent order by CIT(Appeals), Madurai, was invalid. The Tribunal directed the Income-tax Officer to conduct a fresh assessment for the year 1982-83 without being influenced by prior observations.

4. Moving to the assessment year 1983-84, the Tribunal addressed the changes in the firm's constitution and the apportionment of income post the alteration. The Tribunal acknowledged that no appeal was filed by the Kannan group for this year, and the appeal was solely from the Rajaram group. The Tribunal directed a fresh assessment for the year 1983-84 to consider the income apportionment and other relevant factors.

5. In conclusion, all appeals were treated as allowed for statistical purposes, and directives were issued for fresh assessments for both the assessment years, emphasizing adherence to legal procedures and providing full opportunities for the parties to present their cases before the Assessing Officer.
1990 (3) TMI 133

Issues Involved:
1. Imposition of penalty under Section 271(1)(c) for concealment of income.
2. Validity of the revised return filed by the assessee.
3. Assessment of unaccounted pronotes and their impact on the penalty.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Imposition of Penalty under Section 271(1)(c) for Concealment of Income:

The primary issue in this case is the imposition of a penalty of Rs. 13,860 on the assessee for alleged concealment of income under Section 271(1)(c). The Income Tax Officer (ITO) initiated the penalty proceedings after a raid conducted by the Intelligence Wing of the IT Department on 17th Jan., 1981, which led to the seizure of unaccounted pronotes from the assessee's business premises. The ITO found that the assessee had concealed income amounting to Rs. 21,000, which was not disclosed in the original return filed on 28th Aug., 1980. The ITO noted that the revised return filed by the assessee, admitting the additional income, was not voluntary but was a result of the raid and seizure. The ITO rejected the assessee's contention that the revised return was filed to purchase peace with the Department and imposed the penalty for concealment of income.

2. Validity of the Revised Return Filed by the Assessee:

The assessee argued that the revised return filed on 21st Feb., 1983, admitting an additional income of Rs. 21,000, was voluntary and aimed at settling the tax dispute. The assessee contended that the revised return was filed after verifying the books of accounts and discovering unexplained credits. However, the ITO and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner (AAC) concluded that the revised return was not voluntary but was filed under compulsion due to the seizure of pronotes during the raid. The Tribunal upheld this view, stating that the revised return could not be considered voluntary as it was filed after the Department had cornered the assessee with the seized pronotes, leaving no escape route.

3. Assessment of Unaccounted Pronotes and Their Impact on the Penalty:

The ITO and the AAC found that the unaccounted pronotes seized during the raid were part of the assessee's business activities as financiers. The pronotes represented unaccounted advances and were not recorded in the assessee's books of accounts. The ITO concluded that the concealment of these pronotes amounted to an attempt to evade tax. The Tribunal agreed with this assessment, stating that the seized pronotes were not investments but part of the business assets, and their non-disclosure in the accounts amounted to concealment of income. The Tribunal also noted that the assessee did not provide any evidence to substantiate the claim that the seized pronotes were blank or did not belong to the assessee. The Tribunal upheld the penalty, citing various judicial precedents that supported the imposition of penalty for concealment of income, even if a revised return was filed before the Department completed its investigation.

Conclusion:

The Tribunal confirmed the imposition of a penalty of Rs. 13,860 on the assessee for concealment of income under Section 271(1)(c). The Tribunal found that the revised return filed by the assessee was not voluntary and was prompted by the seizure of unaccounted pronotes during the raid. The Tribunal also concluded that the unaccounted pronotes were part of the assessee's business activities and their non-disclosure amounted to concealment of income. The appeal of the assessee was dismissed, and the penalty was upheld.
1990 (3) TMI 130

Issues Involved:
1. Ownership status of the house property in Tiruchengode.
2. Treatment of the property as Hindu undivided family (HUF) property or individual property.
3. The impact of blending on the property status.
4. The effect of estate duty proceedings on the property status.
5. Validity of the affidavit submitted by Meenakshi Ammal.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Ownership Status of the House Property in Tiruchengode:
The primary issue is whether Krishnappa Chetty inherited the house property in Tiruchengode in his individual capacity or whether it was inherited by his Hindu undivided family (HUF). The property was originally gifted to Parvathammal by her father Annamalai Chettiar in 1904 as her stridhana. Parvathammal died intestate in 1966, and the property was inherited by her son, Krishnappa Chetty. The Tribunal held that the gift deed did not indicate that the property was gifted to Parvathammal's sons and grandsons, but solely to her. Under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, her limited rights were enlarged into absolute rights, making her the absolute owner of the property. Upon her death, the property devolved upon her son Krishnappa Chetty in his individual capacity under Section 15(1)(a) of the Hindu Succession Act.

2. Treatment of the Property as HUF Property or Individual Property:
The assessee contended that Krishnappa Chetty treated the property as belonging to the HUF and blended it with HUF properties. However, the Tribunal found no positive acts by Krishnappa Chetty to indicate his intention to blend the property with HUF assets. The Tribunal emphasized that blending must be proved by positive acts and not by mere omissions. The fact that Krishnappa Chetty did not declare the property in his wealth-tax returns or income-tax returns was not sufficient to prove blending. The Tribunal concluded that the property remained individual property, not HUF property.

3. The Impact of Blending on the Property Status:
The Tribunal referred to Mulla's Hindu Law, which states that property originally separate can become joint family property if voluntarily thrown into the common stock with the intention of abandoning all separate claims. The Tribunal found no evidence of such intention from Krishnappa Chetty. The Tribunal stated that mere enjoyment of the property income by all family members or failure to maintain separate accounts does not constitute blending. Therefore, the property did not assume the character of HUF property through blending.

4. The Effect of Estate Duty Proceedings on the Property Status:
The Tribunal examined the estate duty proceedings after Krishnappa Chetty's death, where the property was shown as part of HUF properties in which he had a 1/3rd share. However, the Tribunal noted that the estate duty account filed before the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty was not produced. The Tribunal found that the estate duty assessment order did not conclusively prove that the property was HUF property. The Tribunal held that the estate duty proceedings did not change the status of the property from individual to HUF property.

5. Validity of the Affidavit Submitted by Meenakshi Ammal:
The Tribunal considered an affidavit from Meenakshi Ammal, mother of Venkatachalam and Gopalakrishnan, which stated that Krishnappa Chetty treated the property as ancestral and intended it to go to his male heirs. However, the Tribunal found the affidavit to be from an interested person and not corroborated by any material evidence. The Tribunal noted that the affidavit did not show any positive act of blending by Krishnappa Chetty. The Tribunal concluded that the affidavit did not establish that the property was HUF property.

Conclusion:
The Tribunal upheld the orders of the lower authorities, affirming that the house property in Tiruchengode was inherited by Krishnappa Chetty in his individual capacity and not as HUF property. Consequently, Venkatachalam and Gopalakrishnan inherited the property in their individual capacities after Krishnappa Chetty's death. The appeal of the assessee was dismissed.
1990 (3) TMI 129

Issues Involved:
1. Classification of Rs. 4 lakhs payment as capital or revenue expenditure.
2. Applicability of previous Tribunal and court decisions to the current case.
3. Impact of the lump sum payment on the lessee's obligations and rights.
4. Assessment of the expenditure's nature and purpose.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Classification of Rs. 4 lakhs payment as capital or revenue expenditure:
The primary issue is whether the payment of Rs. 4 lakhs made by the assessee to Vasan Charitable Trust should be treated as capital expenditure or revenue expenditure. The Income-tax Officer (ITO) disallowed the claim, treating it as capital expenditure because the payment procured an advantage of enduring nature. The CIT (Appeals) reversed this decision, holding that the payment was revenue expenditure, as it substituted a recurring revenue expenditure with a lump sum payment, thereby removing a recurring disadvantage. The Tribunal upheld the CIT (Appeals)'s decision, stating that the payment did not create any new capital asset or right but absolved the assessee from its liability to pay annual rent, thus classifying it as revenue expenditure.

2. Applicability of previous Tribunal and court decisions to the current case:
The assessee relied on the decision of the Madras High Court in CIT v. Madras Auto Service Ltd. and the Tribunal's decision in the case of Gemini Arts (P.) Ltd. The CIT (Appeals) and the Tribunal found these decisions applicable, as they involved similar circumstances where lump sum payments substituting annual rents were treated as revenue expenditure. The Tribunal noted that the earlier decision in Gemini Arts (P.) Ltd. fully answered the objections raised by the revenue, reinforcing the classification of the payment as revenue expenditure.

3. Impact of the lump sum payment on the lessee's obligations and rights:
The payment of Rs. 4 lakhs was made to ensure uninterrupted enjoyment of the leased property by sub-lessees and to waive the lessor's right of re-entry due to non-payment of rent. The Tribunal emphasized that the payment did not confer any new right or capital asset to the assessee but merely extinguished the liability to pay annual rent. The agreement preserved the right of re-entry for breach of other covenants, indicating that the payment was made to facilitate the business's efficient running rather than acquiring a capital asset.

4. Assessment of the expenditure's nature and purpose:
The Tribunal assessed the expenditure's nature and purpose, concluding that it was made for the convenient and economical running of the business. The payment was aimed at ensuring uninterrupted enjoyment of the leased property by sub-lessees, which was a recurring revenue expenditure in a lump sum form. The Tribunal referenced the Supreme Court's decision in CIT v. Associated Cement Cos. Ltd., which supported the view that expenditures securing immunity from liabilities, which would otherwise be revenue in nature, should be treated as revenue expenditure.

Conclusion:
The Tribunal upheld the CIT (Appeals)'s decision, allowing the deduction of Rs. 4 lakhs as revenue expenditure. The Tribunal found that the payment did not create a new capital asset or right but substituted a recurring revenue expenditure, aligning with the principles established in previous judicial decisions. The appeal by the revenue was dismissed, confirming the assessee's claim for deduction.
1990 (3) TMI 128

Issues Involved:
1. Levy of interest under Section 201(1A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
2. Timing of crediting interest to creditors' accounts and its impact on tax deduction at source (TDS) obligations.
3. Application of Rule 30(1)(b)(i) and relevant circulars issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT).

Detailed Analysis:

1. Levy of Interest under Section 201(1A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961:
The primary issue in these appeals is the levy of interest under Section 201(1A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for the assessment years 1980-81 and 1982-83. The Income Tax Officer (ITO) imposed interest of Rs. 7,285 and Rs. 9,227 respectively, on the grounds of delayed payment of tax deducted at source (TDS) on interest credited to the accounts of certain parties.

2. Timing of Crediting Interest to Creditors' Accounts:
The assessee argued that although the accounting years ended on 30-6-79 and 30-6-1981, the actual crediting of interest to the creditors' accounts occurred much later when the accounts were finalized. The assessee contended that since the tax deducted at source was remitted to the government within two months from the actual crediting date, no interest should be chargeable under Section 201(1A).

3. Application of Rule 30(1)(b)(i) and Relevant Circulars:
The Departmental Representative argued that under Section 194A, tax should be deducted at the time of crediting interest to the account of the payee or at the time of payment, whichever is earlier. Rule 30(1)(b)(i) specifies that tax should be paid within two months from the end of the month in which the interest is credited. The representative also cited Circular No. 288 issued by the CBDT, which clarifies that interest should be payable from the end of the period of two months from the end of the accounting year, irrespective of when the closing entries are actually made.

The Tribunal considered the rival submissions and emphasized that under the scheme of the Income-tax Act, tax deducted at source is a mode of tax collection. The Tribunal noted that the books of accounts showed that interest was credited on 30-6-79 and 30-6-1981, and there was no material evidence to support the claim that the credit was given much later. The Tribunal held that the dates recorded in the books should be taken as the actual dates of credit.

The Tribunal distinguished the present case from the decisions in Todi Investments (P.) Ltd. and Kumar Bros. (Agency Division), where the Tribunal had found as a matter of fact that the credit for interest was given much later than the last date of the accounting year. In the present case, the Tribunal found no such evidence and held that the interest had to be paid within two months from the dates recorded in the books.

The Tribunal also upheld the CBDT Circular No. 288, stating that the tax on interest credited should be payable within two months from the end of the month in which the accounts are made up, irrespective of when the closing entries are actually made.

Conclusion:
The Tribunal allowed the appeals of the Revenue, holding that the ITO was justified in charging interest under Section 201(1A) for the delayed payment of tax deducted at source. The Tribunal emphasized that the dates recorded in the books of accounts should be taken as the actual dates of credit, and the tax should be paid within two months from those dates as per Rule 30(1)(b)(i) and the CBDT Circular No. 288.
1990 (3) TMI 124

Issues:
1. Penalty under s. 273(1)(A) of the IT Act, 1961 imposed on the assessee.
2. Justification of penalty based on variation in estimated income, returned income, and assessed income.
3. Assessee's claim of unabsorbed relief under s. 80J in earlier years.
4. Burden of proof on Revenue to show false estimate of advance tax knowingly.
5. Applicability of penalty provisions under s. 273(1)(A) in the case.

Analysis:

The appeal before the Appellate Tribunal ITAT Jaipur challenged the imposition of a penalty of Rs.10,000 on the assessee under s. 273(1)(A) of the IT Act, 1961. The case involved a Private Limited Company for the assessment year 1983-84, where the estimated income, returned income, and assessed income showed significant variations. The Income Tax Officer (ITO) initiated penalty proceedings based on these variations and levied a penalty of Rs.10,000. The CIT(A) confirmed the penalty, emphasizing the lack of explanation from the assessee regarding the discrepancies in income figures and non-payment of advance tax. The assessee's counsel argued that the discrepancies were due to uncertainties related to the retrospective legislation on relief under s. 80J. The counsel contended that the assessee's estimate of income was not knowingly untrue, citing legal judgments to support the argument.

The counsel highlighted the uncertainties surrounding the application of the law before the Supreme Court's decision on the matter. The counsel argued that the assessee had a reasonable cause for filing the estimate of income and should not be penalized under s. 273(1)(A) for allegedly filing a false estimate knowingly. The counsel also referred to judicial precedents, including the case of CIT vs. Birla Cotton Spg. Wvg. Mills Ltd., to support the contention that the penalty was not justified in this case. The Tribunal considered the arguments presented by both sides and examined the orders of the lower authorities.

The Tribunal observed that the assessee had consistently filed returns showing Nil income in previous years, with some assessments resulting in positive incomes due to disputes over relief under s. 80J. The Tribunal noted that the uncertainties arising from changes in legislation had impacted the assessee's income calculations. It was emphasized that there was no evidence of mala fide intention on the part of the assessee. The Tribunal concluded that the penalty under s. 273(1)(A) was not applicable in this case and, therefore, canceled the penalty. The appeal was allowed in favor of the assessee.

In summary, the Tribunal found that the penalty imposed on the assessee under s. 273(1)(A) was not justified considering the genuine belief of the assessee in filing the estimate of income and the uncertainties arising from changes in legislation. The Tribunal emphasized the absence of mala fide intention and the historical context of the assessee's income calculations in previous years. The decision to cancel the penalty was based on the lack of evidence supporting the imposition of the penalty in the circumstances of the case.
1990 (3) TMI 123

Issues Involved:

1. Proper deductions before determining the average net yield of the property.
2. Disallowance of claim for liability towards payment of additional income-tax and wealth-tax.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Proper Deductions Before Determining the Average Net Yield of the Property:

The primary issue in these appeals is to determine the proper deductions to be allowed before calculating the average net yield of the property, which is a cinema theatre called "Devi 70 MM." The assessee had the asset valued by a registered valuer at Rs. 54,50,000 as of 31-3-1982, but the Wealth-tax Officer referred the valuation to the Valuation Cell of the Income-tax Department. The District Valuation Officer preliminarily estimated the value at Rs. 72.67 lakhs using the income capitalization method, which the assessee objected to on several grounds.

The assessee argued that the life of the building should be reduced due to the modern trend favoring video and TV, which would reduce the number of cine-goers. The urban land ceiling laws and development programs would also affect the asset's future value. Moreover, the life of a cinema hall should not be compared to a residential building due to its constant use. The assessee also contended that expenses towards interest on loans, proprietor's risk, labor, and skill should be excluded while capitalizing the net profit.

The Tribunal found that the best method of valuation for cinema houses is the income capitalization method. It was noted that deductions such as interest on capital, remuneration for the owner's risk, and entrepreneurship should be allowed. The Tribunal allowed 12% of the gross income towards the owner's risk and entrepreneurship and 15% interest on Rs. 70,000 as working capital. Additionally, municipal tax was considered a yearly outgoing and deductible.

Ultimately, the Tribunal determined the value of "Devi 70 MM" for the assessment years 1982-83 to 1986-87 at Rs. 6,00,000 for each year, allowing the assessee's appeal proportionately.

2. Disallowance of Claim for Liability Towards Payment of Additional Income-tax and Wealth-tax:

The second issue is the disallowance of the assessee's claim for liability towards payment of additional income-tax and wealth-tax for the assessment years 1982-83 to 1986-87. The Wealth-tax Officer disallowed these liabilities on the grounds that they arose from the Amnesty returns filed by the assessee, which were not outstanding liabilities as of the relevant valuation dates.

The Tribunal examined the legal principles governing the accrual of tax liabilities. It referred to several Supreme Court decisions, including CWT v. J.K. Cotton Mfrs. Ltd. and CWT v. K.S.N. Bhatt, which clarified that a tax liability crystallizes on the last day of the previous year for income-tax and on the valuation date for wealth-tax. The quantification of the liability by an assessment order does not create the liability but merely quantifies it.

The Tribunal concluded that the additional tax liabilities arising from the Amnesty returns should be deemed to have become debts on the relevant valuation dates. Therefore, these liabilities should be allowed as deductions from the wealth-tax assessments for the assessment years 1982-83 to 1986-87. The amounts, subject to verification by the Wealth-tax Officer, were specified as follows:

- 1982-83: Rs. 3,59,539
- 1983-84: Rs. 4,01,739
- 1984-85: Rs. 7,10,086
- 1985-86: Rs. 4,44,839
- 1986-87: Rs. 4,45,969

The Tribunal allowed the appeals partly, granting relief to the assessee on this point.
1990 (3) TMI 122

Issues Involved:
1. Whether the amount of Rs. 89,60,696 forms part of the income of the assessee.
2. The nature and treatment of the credit guarantee commission collected by the assessee.
3. The applicability of the Supreme Court decision in Chowringhee Sales Bureau (P.) Ltd.'s case.
4. The fiduciary capacity of the assessee regarding the collected credit guarantee commission.
5. The treatment of the collected amount in previous years and its impact on the current assessment.
6. The concept of overriding title and trustee relationship in the context of the collected amount.
7. The burden of proof regarding the nature of the receipt as income.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Whether the amount of Rs. 89,60,696 forms part of the income of the assessee:
The main question in this appeal is whether the amount of Rs. 89,60,696 collected by the assessee, Andhra Pradesh State Financial Corporation (APSFC), towards credit guarantee commission should be considered as part of its income for the assessment year 1985-86. The APSFC had shown this amount under 'liabilities' in its balance sheet, whereas similar amounts were accounted for as income in previous years.

2. The nature and treatment of the credit guarantee commission collected by the assessee:
The credit guarantee commission was introduced by the Government of India to encourage lending to small scale industries by covering risks associated with such loans. The APSFC collected this commission from loanee concerns but did not join the modified scheme introduced from 1-4-1981 due to certain reservations. The APSFC argued that the collected amount should either be paid to the Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation (DICGC) if the scheme was mandatory or refunded to the loanee institutions if the scheme was optional.

3. The applicability of the Supreme Court decision in Chowringhee Sales Bureau (P.) Ltd.'s case:
The Commissioner (Appeals) relied on the Supreme Court decision in Chowringhee Sales Bureau (P.) Ltd.'s case to sustain the addition made by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner. However, the Tribunal distinguished this case, noting that in Chowringhee, the assessee did not act in a fiduciary capacity, whereas APSFC collected the guarantee commission as a trustee for DICGC or the loanee institutions.

4. The fiduciary capacity of the assessee regarding the collected credit guarantee commission:
The Tribunal held that APSFC acted as a trustee for the collected guarantee commission, which was to be either paid to DICGC or refunded to the loanee institutions. This fiduciary relationship meant that the collected amount did not form part of APSFC's trading receipts or income.

5. The treatment of the collected amount in previous years and its impact on the current assessment:
Although APSFC had treated similar amounts as income in previous years, the Tribunal held that this did not change the nature of the receipt. The amounts collected were always intended to be passed on to DICGC or refunded to the loanee institutions, and thus did not constitute income for APSFC.

6. The concept of overriding title and trustee relationship in the context of the collected amount:
The Tribunal emphasized that the collected guarantee commission was subject to an overriding title, meaning APSFC held it in a fiduciary capacity. This concept was supported by various judicial decisions, including those from the Andhra Pradesh High Court and the Supreme Court, which established that amounts collected in a fiduciary capacity do not constitute trading receipts or income.

7. The burden of proof regarding the nature of the receipt as income:
The Tribunal noted that the burden of proving that a receipt is income lies with the Revenue. In this case, the Revenue failed to demonstrate that the collected guarantee commission was part of APSFC's income. The Tribunal concluded that the amount collected did not bear the character of income and should not be taxed as such.

Conclusion:
The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by APSFC, holding that the amount of Rs. 89,60,696 collected as credit guarantee commission did not form part of its income for the assessment year 1985-86. The Tribunal emphasized the fiduciary capacity in which APSFC held the collected amount and distinguished the case from the Supreme Court decision in Chowringhee Sales Bureau (P.) Ltd.'s case. Consequently, the amount was deleted from the computed income of APSFC.
1990 (3) TMI 121

Issues Involved:

1. Imposition of penalty under section 18(1)(c) of the Wealth-tax Act for concealing particulars of assets and furnishing inaccurate particulars.
2. Imposition of penalty under section 18(1)(a) of the Wealth-tax Act for delay in filing wealth-tax returns for assessment years 1983-84 and 1984-85.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Imposition of Penalty under Section 18(1)(c) of the Wealth-tax Act:

The appeals concern the assessee's failure to disclose certain properties in her wealth-tax returns for various assessment years. The Wealth Tax Officer (WTO) found that the assessee did not disclose house properties in Shillong and the Cantonment area, showing the value of the Cantonment land as Nil. The assessee argued that the land was leasehold under the Defence Department, which could reclaim it without compensation. The WTO also noted that the assessee had built a godown on rented land in Barabazar but did not disclose its value.

For the Jaiaw property, the WTO noted that the assessee exclusively enjoyed the property and had made extensions to the building. The assessee claimed it belonged to her clan, but the WTO found no evidence of other clan members benefiting from it. Consequently, the WTO assessed the property's value in the assessee's hands and initiated penalty proceedings under section 18(1)(c).

The WTO imposed penalties for the assessment years 1980-81 to 1984-85, concluding that the assessee had concealed assets. The Commissioner of Wealth Tax (Appeals) [CWT(A)] upheld these penalties, noting that the assessee disclosed the value of the godown in later years and that the leasehold land should be included in the wealth.

The assessee argued that there was no contumacious conduct or mala fide intention to conceal wealth and that the penalties were unjustified. The Departmental Representative supported the CWT(A)'s order, emphasizing that the WTO had provided sufficient evidence of concealment.

The Tribunal found that the property at Jaiaw was claimed to belong to the clan, and under Khasi customary law, no individual member could own clan property. The Tribunal referred to a similar case involving Mrs. C. Pyngrope, where it was held that clan properties could not be assessed in the hands of an individual member. The Tribunal concluded that the assessee could not be penalized for not disclosing the Jaiaw property as it did not belong to her individually.

Regarding the Barabazar godown, the Tribunal agreed that the superstructure should have been disclosed but not the land, as it belonged to the Syiem of Mylliem. The Tribunal found no concealment of the land.

For the Cantonment land, the Tribunal noted that the leasehold right had an intrinsic value, but the assessee had disclosed its existence, valuing it at Nil due to the Defence Department's stipulation. The Tribunal found that the value estimation was a matter of opinion and not concealment.

The Tribunal emphasized that penalties could not be imposed based on subsequent years' disclosures and that each year's assessment was independent. The Tribunal found no deliberate concealment or mala fide intention by the assessee and concluded that the penalties under section 18(1)(c) were not warranted.

2. Imposition of Penalty under Section 18(1)(a) of the Wealth-tax Act for Delay in Filing Returns:

For the assessment years 1983-84 and 1984-85, the WTO imposed penalties for the delay in filing returns. The assessee argued that the delay was due to pending bills with Government departments. The WTO rejected this explanation, stating that the assessee should have known the amounts due and filed the returns on time.

The CWT(A) upheld the penalties, citing the Delhi High Court decision in CIT v. Shanta Electrical Industries, which placed the burden of proving reasonable cause on the assessee. However, the Tribunal referred to the Gujarat High Court decision in Addl. CIT v. I. M. Patel & Co., which held that the initial burden to show reasonable cause lies with the department.

The Tribunal found that the department had not discharged this burden and that the assessee's explanation was reasonable. The Tribunal also referred to the Gauhati High Court decision in Smt. Indu Barua v. CWT, which required establishing mens rea for imposing penalties. The Tribunal concluded that there was no mens rea on the assessee's part and that the penalties under section 18(1)(a) were not warranted.

Conclusion:

The Tribunal allowed the appeals by the assessee, canceling the penalties imposed under sections 18(1)(c) and 18(1)(a) of the Wealth-tax Act. The Tribunal emphasized the lack of deliberate concealment, the independence of each assessment year, and the reasonable cause for the delay in filing returns.
1990 (3) TMI 120

The ITAT Delhi-E allowed the assessee's second appeal against a penalty under s. 273(1)(b) of the IT Act, 1961 for failure to furnish a statement of advance tax. The penalty was cancelled as the relevant provision, s. 209A, was not in force during the assessment year in question, and the assessee had already been assessed for earlier years.
1990 (3) TMI 119

Issues: Taxability of lottery winnings from Sikkim Govt., applicability of Income-tax Act to Sikkim income, interpretation of Article 371F, double taxation issue, inclusion of income for rate purposes.

Analysis:
1. The appeal raised the issue of whether income from winning a lottery run by the Sikkim Govt. would be taxable. The assessee, a minor, won Rs. 63,500 from the lottery, with Rs. 5,438 deducted as income tax by the Sikkim Govt. The assessee claimed credit for the tax deducted, but the ITO disallowed it, stating the tax was not credited to the Govt. of India account.

2. Upon appeal, the AAC agreed that the tax deduction was not eligible for credit. The assessee then claimed that the entire income should not be taxable under the Income-tax Act, which was rejected. The AAC held that while the income was taxable, the tax deduction should be allowed as a deduction as it was an expenditure incurred in earning income.

3. The appeal contended that the Income-tax Act did not apply to Sikkim income due to historical reasons. The judgment detailed the position of Sikkim under the Indian Constitution, highlighting the 36th amendment in 1975 that made Sikkim part of the Indian Union. The Income-tax Act was not applicable to Sikkim until a 1989 Notification. The assessee argued that since the Act did not apply, section 5 should not apply either.

4. The judgment analyzed the situs of the income, clarifying that the income accrued in Sikkim due to the lottery contract being based there. Section 5(1)(c) was deemed inapplicable, but sections 5(1)(a) and 5(1)(b) were considered relevant. The judgment emphasized that section 5 casts a wide net, covering all incomes worldwide for residents.

5. The judgment highlighted that while section 5 applied, existing Sikkim regulations on income tax were also applicable under Article 371F(k). It emphasized the legal principle against double taxation, citing relevant case law. It concluded that only Sikkim regulations on income tax would apply, not the Income-tax Act rates.

6. The issue of including Sikkim income for rate purposes was addressed, determining that section 86 was not applicable in this case. Consequently, the income from Sikkim lotteries was deemed non-taxable, and the appeal was allowed.
1990 (3) TMI 118

Issues:
Assessment year 1975-76, Advance tax payment, Revised return filing, Assessment time limit, Refund claim, Board's instructions under sec. 119(2), Estoppel, Validity of assessment order, Refund entitlement.

Analysis:
The appeal pertains to the assessment year 1975-76 where the assessee paid advance tax but filed a return that was not traceable. The assessee claimed a refund of the tax paid as the assessment became time-barred. The Board issued instructions under sec. 119(2) to relax the time limit for assessment. The assessing officer then made an assessment order in 1986, determining the income and refund due, which was refunded to the assessee. The assessee appealed to the AAC seeking a refund of the entire tax paid, contending the assessment was invalid due to time limitations. The AAC rejected the appeal, stating he lacked authority to order a full refund. The assessee then appealed to the ITAT, arguing the assessment was time-barred. The ITAT noted the assessee had approached the Board for relief under sec. 119(2) and accepted the Board's instructions. The ITAT held that since the assessee sought relief from the Board, it was estopped from challenging the assessment on limitation grounds. The ITAT emphasized that limitation bars the remedy but does not extinguish the right to tax on the assessed income. The ITAT dismissed the appeal, stating the assessment was valid as per the Board's instructions and the assessee's acceptance.

The ITAT distinguished the present case from the Deep Chand Jain case, where no assessment was made and no Board instructions were involved. In Deep Chand Jain, the High Court dealt with a Writ Petition, whereas the present appeal was against a valid assessment order made in accordance with the Board's instructions and the assessee's consent. The ITAT concluded that the assessee had no grounds to challenge the assessment's validity or claim a full tax refund. The ITAT emphasized that the assessee had benefited from the refund based on the Board's instructions and could not now dispute the assessment's validity. The appeal was dismissed, and the assessment order stood upheld, denying the full tax refund sought by the assessee.
1990 (3) TMI 117

Issues Involved:

1. Whether mere recording of sound on duty-paid magnetic or cassette tapes constitutes "manufacture" under the Central Excises and Salt Act.
2. Whether the appellants have manufactured "excisable goods" as defined in the Act and are liable to pay the duty demanded or fines levied.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

Issue 1: Whether mere recording of sound on duty-paid magnetic or cassette tapes constitutes "manufacture" under the Central Excises and Salt Act.

The term "manufacture" under the Central Excises and Salt Act is defined in Section 2(f), which provides an inclusive definition rather than a precise one. The definition has been expanded over time to include various processes, but recording sound on blank magnetic or cassette tapes is not one of these processes. Therefore, recording sound on duty-paid cassette tapes does not constitute "manufacture" by the inclusive definition.

The appellant argued that mere sound recording on cassette tapes does not result in a new commodity, as no new product comes into existence. This argument was supported by the decision in Union of India & Ors. vs. Delhi Cloth & Gen. Mills Co. Ltd., where it was held that "manufacture" implies a transformation resulting in a new and different article with a distinctive name, character, or use. The appellant also cited the case of Prabhat Associates vs. Collector of Central Excise, where it was held that recording sound on duty-paid magnetic or cassette tapes is not manufacture.

The Department countered that there is no ambiguity in the language used in Tariff Item No. 59 or in the definition of "manufacture" under Section 2(f) of the Act. They argued that the process of recording sound is a manufacturing activity and that sound recorded cassette tapes are excisable and liable to duty. The Department cited the case of Hyderabad Asbestos Cement Products Ltd. & Another vs. Union of India & Ors., which held that once the legislature has included an item in the Schedule, its validity cannot be questioned on the grounds that it does not involve a manufacturing process.

Upon review, the Tribunal found that the term "manufacture" should be interpreted based on its definition in the parent statute. The expression "whether recorded or not" in Item 59 of the Schedule indicates that the manufacture of the articles is complete without recording. Therefore, recording sound on duty-paid cassette tapes is not a process incidental or ancillary to the completion of manufacture. The Tribunal concluded that recording sound on duty-paid cassette tapes does not constitute "manufacture."

Issue 2: Whether the appellants have manufactured "excisable goods" as defined in the Act and are liable to pay the duty demanded or fines levied.

The term "excisable goods" is defined under Section 2(d) of the Central Excises and Salt Act as goods specified in the Schedule as being subject to a duty of excise. Item 59 of the Schedule includes articles used for sound or sound and image recording, whether recorded or not.

The appellant argued that they were not manufacturing sound recorded magnetic tapes or sound recorded cassette tapes as such. Instead, they were recording sound on duty-paid cassette tapes either purchased from the market or supplied by customers. The Department argued that once an article is named or described in the Schedule, it is automatically chargeable to duty.

The Tribunal found that the intention of the Legislature is to levy duty on goods specified as excisable in the Schedule, provided they are manufactured. The term "manufacture" implies that a new product with a distinct name, character, and use comes into existence. Mere recording of sound on cassette tapes does not transform the original product into a new product, and the same cassette tapes can be used multiple times for recording and re-recording. The Tribunal concluded that the appellant was not manufacturing excisable goods as defined in Item 59 of the Schedule.

Conclusion:

The Tribunal held that the appellant is not liable to pay any duty or fines for not having manufactured excisable goods under Item 59 of the Schedule. The recording of sound on duty-paid magnetic cassette tapes does not constitute "manufacture." The impugned order was set aside, and the appeal was allowed.
1990 (3) TMI 116

Issues:
1. Refusal of deduction under section 80-I for construction activity.
2. Disallowance of car maintenance expenses.
3. Disallowance of guarantee commission paid to bank.

Issue 1: The main issue in this case is the refusal of the claim of deduction under section 80-I for the construction activity of the assessee, a registered firm. The assessee argued that construction of buildings should be considered an industrial activity as it involves the manufacture or production of an article or thing. The counsel for the assessee referred to various court decisions and definitions of terms to support the claim. The Departmental Representative (DR) contended that the term "article or thing" in section 80-I should not be extended beyond its intended scope by the Legislature. The Tribunal analyzed the definitions of relevant terms and concluded that construction of a building could be considered as the manufacture or production of an article or thing, making the claim of the assessee justified.

Issue 2: The second issue pertains to the disallowance of car maintenance expenses. This issue was not discussed in detail in the provided text, but it was raised by the assessee in the appeal.

Issue 3: The third issue involves the disallowance of guarantee commission paid to the bank for issuing guarantees to contractees. The arguments put forth by the DR were not elaborated upon in the text, but it can be inferred that the DR contested the allowability of this expense under the relevant provisions.

In conclusion, the Tribunal ruled in favor of the assessee regarding the main issue of deduction under section 80-I for construction activity, emphasizing that construction of a building could be considered as the manufacture or production of an article or thing. The decision on the other two issues, regarding car maintenance expenses and guarantee commission, was not explicitly provided in the text.
1990 (3) TMI 115

Issues:
1. Penalty imposed under section 271(1)(a) for late submission of return.
2. Claim of exemption under section 10(22A) of the Income-tax Act.
3. Applicability of sub-section (3) of section 271 regarding penalty for failure to furnish the return.
4. Interpretation of clause (d) of sub-section (3) of section 271 concerning the maximum penalty.
5. Consideration of counsel's advice as a ground for condoning the delay.
6. Equity argument for charitable trust in penalty proceedings.

Analysis:
1. The appeal concerned a penalty imposed under section 271(1)(a) for the late submission of the return for the assessment year 1981-82. The Income-tax Officer initiated proceedings due to the return being filed 19 months late. Despite multiple opportunities, the assessee did not respond, leading to the imposition of a penalty. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner upheld the penalty, leading to the appeal before the ITAT Delhi-D.

2. The assessee claimed exemption under section 10(22A) of the Income-tax Act, arguing that their income was exempt. However, as per the record, the claim was not made during the assessment proceedings. The ITAT rejected this submission, stating that the claim should have been made during assessment for consideration, and it was too late to introduce it during penalty proceedings.

3. The assessee contended that no penalty could be levied under sub-section (3) of section 271 since their total income did not exceed the maximum amount not chargeable to tax. However, the ITAT found that the proviso to section 271(3) excluded cases where a return had to be filed under a specific section, as in the case of the trust, making the exemption inapplicable.

4. Regarding the interpretation of clause (d) of sub-section (3) of section 271, the ITAT explained that the clause's applicability was not relevant in the present case. The ITAT highlighted that the penalty for late submission of return and for concealment of income combined could not exceed twice the tax sought to be evaded, but in this case, only a penalty for late submission was imposed.

5. The counsel argued that the delay in filing the return was due to advice from previous counsel and auditors. However, the ITAT found no evidence to support this claim and noted that the counsel's advice was not presented timely or substantiated. The ITAT rejected this argument, emphasizing the lack of evidence.

6. Lastly, the ITAT addressed the equity argument for charitable trusts in penalty proceedings. Referring to legal principles, the ITAT emphasized that tax laws do not accommodate equity considerations and penalties are applicable as per the provisions. The ITAT dismissed the equity argument, upholding the penalty imposed on the charitable trust for late submission of the return.
1990 (3) TMI 114

Issues:
- Calculation of penalty limitation period under section 275(a)(ii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 based on the date of order by the Tribunal and consequential order by the CIT(Appeals).

Detailed Analysis:
1. The case involved four appeals by the Revenue related to assessment years 1975-76 to 1978-79, challenging the cancellation of penalties under section 273(a) by the CIT(Appeals) as barred by limitation. The central issue was the calculation of the penalty limitation period under section 275(a)(ii) based on the date of the Tribunal's order and the consequential order by the CIT(Appeals.

2. The Tribunal noted that the penalty proceedings were initiated by the ITO during the assessment, which was later partly allowed by the first appellate authority. Subsequently, both the assessee and the Revenue filed cross-appeals before the Appellate Tribunal, which directed the CIT(Appeals) to redetermine the issue. The CIT(Appeals) passed a fresh order in 1986, after which the ITO imposed penalties in 1985, leading to the dispute over the limitation period.

3. The Revenue argued that the limitation period should be counted from the date of the final order by the CIT(Appeals) in 1986, contending that the penalties imposed in 1985 were within the time allowed under section 275. Conversely, the assessee contended that the limitation should be calculated from the date of the Tribunal's order, emphasizing that the penalties were time-barred.

4. The Tribunal analyzed section 275(a)(ii) which stipulates the time limit for imposing penalties after an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal or the CIT(Appeals). It highlighted that the intention was to avoid unnecessary litigation until the assessment becomes final. The Tribunal clarified that when the Tribunal's order does not finally dispose of the appeal but restores it to the first appellate authority, the limitation period starts from the date of the consequential order by the first appellate authority.

5. Based on the interpretation of the law, the Tribunal concluded that the penalties imposed by the ITO were within the time provided by section 275(a)(ii) of the Income-tax Act. It emphasized that there was no prohibition against imposing penalties during the pendency of appeals before the CIT(Appeals). Consequently, the Tribunal annulled the order of the CIT(Appeals and restored all appeals to be decided on merits.

6. Ultimately, the Tribunal allowed all four appeals by the Revenue, ruling in favor of the Revenue's position on the calculation of the penalty limitation period under section 275(a)(ii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
1990 (3) TMI 113

Issues:
1. Validity of assessment order under section 143(1) based on Circulars of the Board.
2. Jurisdiction of the Commissioner under section 263 to examine assessment orders.
3. Correctness of assessment completed without waiting for Valuation Officer's report.
4. Treatment of unsecured loans in the balance sheet during assessment.

Analysis:

Issue 1: Validity of assessment order under section 143(1) based on Circulars of the Board

The assessee contended that assessments under section 143(1) based on Circulars of the Board were not erroneous or subject to proceedings under section 263. The argument relied on the binding nature of benevolent circulars and previous court decisions. However, the Tribunal clarified that while the Circulars provide guidance to Income-tax Officers, they do not prevent the Commissioner from exercising revisional jurisdiction under section 263. The Tribunal differentiated between the two sets of provisions, emphasizing the Commissioner's authority to review assessment orders even if made under section 143(1).

Issue 2: Jurisdiction of the Commissioner under section 263 to examine assessment orders

The Tribunal established that the Commissioner has the power under section 263 to scrutinize assessment orders, irrespective of whether they were completed under section 143(1) or not. The Tribunal highlighted that the Commissioner's jurisdiction is focused on the assessment order itself, not the actions of the Income-tax Officer. Previous court decisions were referenced to support the Commissioner's ability to review and correct assessment orders.

Issue 3: Correctness of assessment completed without waiting for Valuation Officer's report

The Tribunal found that an assessment completed without waiting for a Valuation Officer's report, despite a reference being made, was erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue's interests. The Tribunal emphasized that the Income-tax Officer should have conducted a thorough investigation based on the reference made to the Valuation Officer. The Tribunal concluded that the assessment order, in this case, was rightly deemed erroneous due to the incomplete assessment process.

Issue 4: Treatment of unsecured loans in the balance sheet during assessment

Regarding unsecured loans in the balance sheet, the Tribunal noted that the existence of such loans without complete addresses and confirmation letters warranted further inquiry by the assessing officer. The Tribunal highlighted that the assessment was completed without proper investigations into the genuineness of these loans, which led to the assessment being considered erroneous and prejudicial to revenue interests. Consequently, the Tribunal upheld the Commissioner's order based on these findings.

In conclusion, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee, affirming the correctness of the Commissioner's decision regarding the assessment order for the relevant assessment year.