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Case Laws
Showing 201 to 220 of 280 Records
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1996 (6) TMI 80 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Revenue Receipt ... ... ... ... ..... ing of the expression income , the decision of the Full Bench would not get any dent, in view of the position that the Full Bench has also taken into consideration the position that section 10(31) of the Act has come on the statute book by reason of an amendment on and from April 1, 1989, by the Finance Act of 1988. Additionally as we have stated hereinbefore the nature and content of inclusiveness will have to be understood as partaking of the same character and qualities shared by the situation illustrated in the statutory provisions. For all the above reasons, it is not possible to accept the submissions of learned senior standing counsel for taxes. The Full Bench decision of this court rules. The question is answered in the affirmative, against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar shall be sent to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench, for passing consequential orders.
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1996 (6) TMI 79 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Principal Value Of Estate ... ... ... ... ..... n of the Tribunal quoted above we see that the Tribunal rushed to the conclusion without first considering the finding of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). The Tribunal also has not taken into consideration Circular No. 220, dated May 31, 1977, issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes in paragraph 4 of which some of the exceptional circumstances have been laid down. We feel the Tribunal rushed to the conclusion without proper appreciation of the facts. At least the judgment of the Tribunal does not indicate so. Therefore, we are constrained to hold that the Tribunal s judgment is somewhat cryptic. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal was not justified in coming to the conclusion. Accordingly, we answer the question in the negative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. A copy of this judgment under the signature of the Registrar and the seal of the High Court shall be transmitted to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Guwahati.
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1996 (6) TMI 78 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Principal Value Of Estate ... ... ... ... ..... e of T. R. Narayanaswami Naidu v. CED 1973 90 ITR 400 (Mad) and the Full Bench decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in State v. Prem Nath 1977 106 ITR 446, held that on the death of a partner, his interest in the entire unit of the firm including the goodwill passes on to his next kin. The present case is similar to the case of CED v. Kanta Devi Taneja 1981 132 ITR 437 (Gauhati). Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the share of the deceased in the goodwill of the firm is includible in the principal value of the estate of the deceased, and, therefore, the Tribunal was not justified in upholding the order of the Controller of Estate Duty deleting the sum of Rs. 36,440 which was added by the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty in the assessment. In view of the above, we answer the question in the negative and in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. A copy of this order shall be transmitted to the Tribunal for disposing of the case in accordance with law.
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1996 (6) TMI 77 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Disallowance Of Cash Payments, High Court ... ... ... ... ..... he assessee under exceptional circumstances. That being the finding of fact, we also hold that exceptional and unavoidable circumstances did exist. However, in respect of an amount of Rs. 1,26,111.65, the Tribunal just directed the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) to make enquiry whether the payments were entered in the books of account. In our opinion, this was not enough. It was also necessary to enquire whether there existed exceptional and unavoidable circumstances for making such payment. The Tribunal ought to have directed accordingly. In view of the above, we answer question No. 1 in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue and question No. 2 in the negative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. A copy of the judgment under the signature of the Registrar and the seal of the High Court shall be transmitted to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no direction as to costs.
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1996 (6) TMI 76 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Investment Allowance ... ... ... ... ..... etc., over and above wood. It is no doubt, temporary. The temporary constructions come under various categories, viz., 1st class, 2nd class and 3rd class temporary constructions. Mr. Joshi submits that 20 per cent. depreciation is not prescribed. Depreciation of construction can be allowed depending on the nature of constructions, such as, 1st class, 2nd class and 3rd class. The rate of depreciation has been mentioned in the rule. Considering all the aspects we come to the conclusion that the Tribunal was not correct in holding that the assessee was entitled to get 20 per cent. depreciation in respect of temporary construction. In our opinion, the assessee is entitled to get 7.5 per cent. in the facts and circumstances. Accordingly, we answer question No. 4 in the negative and in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. A copy of this judgment under the signature of the Registrar and the seal of the High Court shall be transmitted to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal.
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1996 (6) TMI 75 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Discretionary Trust, Representative Assessee ... ... ... ... ..... stion about maintainability of the petition raised by Mr. Shelat, submitted that the notice is without jurisdiction. In support of his submission, he has relied upon the decision of the apex court in the case of East India Commercial Co. Ltd v. Collector of Customs, AIR 1962 SC 1893, wherein the apex court has held as under (page 1905) We, therefore, hold that the law declared by the highest court in the State is binding on authorities or Tribunals under its superintendence, and that they cannot ignore it either in initiating a proceeding or deciding on the rights involved in such a proceeding. If that be so, the notice issued by the authority signifying the launching of proceedings contrary to the law laid down by the High Court would be invalid and the proceedings themselves would be without jurisdiction. In the result, the petitions are allowed. The impugned notices are quashed and set aside. Rule made absolute accordingly in each of the matters with no order as to costs.
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1996 (6) TMI 74 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Inclusions In Total Income, Partner In Firm, Share Income ... ... ... ... ..... e apex court held (page 798) . . . . we hold that where a person is a partner in a partnership firm not in his individual capacity but as the karta of the Hindu undivided family, neither the income accruing to his wife on account of her being a partner in the same partnership firm nor the income accruing to his minor children on account of their being admitted to the benefits of such partnership firm, can be included in the total income of such person--neither in his individual assessment nor in the assessment of the Hindu undivided family. . . . In our opinion, the question referred in this case is squarely covered by the above decisions. Accordingly, we answer the question in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. A copy of this judgment under the signature of the Registrar and the seal of the High Court shall be transmitted to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no direction as to costs.
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1996 (6) TMI 73 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Capital Or Revenue Expenditure, Development Allowance, Expenditure Incurred, Raw Material, Sales Promotion, Weighted Deduction
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1996 (6) TMI 72 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Appropriate Authority, Immovable Property By Central Government, Law Applicable, Movable Property, Supreme Court, Taxing Statutes
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1996 (6) TMI 71 - PATNA HIGH COURT
House Property, Transfer Of Property ... ... ... ... ..... t receive and was received by the intending purchaser. I, therefore, do not find any material difference in the facts of the two cases. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, therefore, I do not think the Tribunal committed any error of law in holding that the income from the house property in question should not be assessed in the hands of the assessee even though the transfer has not been effected in favour of the intending purchaser by way of a registered deed. The Tribunal was right in concluding that the decision of this court in Sahay Properties and Investment Co. (P.) Ltd. s case 1983 144 ITR 357 is applicable to the present case on all fours. I would, accordingly, answer the question referred to this court for opinion in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. I would, however, make no order as to cost. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Patna Bench, Patna. M. Y. EQBAL J. -- I agree.
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1996 (6) TMI 70 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Accounting Year, Assessment Year, Minor Admitted To Benefits Of Partnership, Registration Of Firm
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1996 (6) TMI 69 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Assessment Year ... ... ... ... ..... 0) of section 139 of the Act which speaks that the provisions of sub-section (10) shall not apply to a return of loss which has been furnished before the thirty-first day of July of the assessment year relevant to the previous year during which the loss was sustained. If the income is below the maximum limit of chargeable income, whether there is loss or not, it will come within the ambit of sub-section (10) of section 139. If that is so, the return showing the loss being filed after the 31st day of July of that particular assessment year, cannot be deemed to be a return filed by the assessee and on that basis no assessment proceeding can proceed. In this respect, we disagree with the decision of the Tribunal. Accordingly, we answer both the questions in the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. A copy of this judgment under the signature of the Registrar and the seal of the High Court shall be transmitted to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Guwahati.
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1996 (6) TMI 68 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Expenditure On Repair, Finality Of Findings Of Fact, Guest House ... ... ... ... ..... question has to be referred under section 256(1) of the Act in that manner and only then the High Court can answer it. As the Revenue has not raised the question of perversity we are constrained to hold that it was not a guest house. In that view of the matter, if it was not a guest house definitely the expenditure should be allowed to be deducted. The Tribunal followed the decision in CIT v. Parshva Properties Ltd. 1987 164 ITR 673 (Cal) which was rendered before the enactment of sub-section (5) of section 37 of the Act. Sub-section (5) of section 37 has been inserted in the Finance Act, 1983, with retrospective effect from April 1, 1979. This provision is only explanatory in nature. The decision in CIT v. Parshva Properties Ltd. 1987 164 ITR 673 (Cal) was rendered on January 14, 1986, when the provision of sub-section (5) of section 37 was already there. In view of the above, we answer both the questions in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
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1996 (6) TMI 67 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Assessment Proceedings, Law Applicable To Assessment, Reassessment Proceedings ... ... ... ... ..... the amendments made in section 139(8) of the Act by amending Explanation 2 thereto which reads as under Explanation 2. --- Where, in relation to an assessment year, an assessment is made for the first time under section 147, the assessment so made shall be regarded as a regular assessment for the purposes of this sub-section. The amending Act by which the aforequoted Explanation 2 has come into force is by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1984, with effect from April 1, 1985. Mr. Rastogi further referred to the circular of the Central Board of Direct Taxes as reported in 1985 152 ITR (St.) 29, 37 and paragraphs 14.3 and 15.3 thereof. From this circular also it is clear that prior to April 1, 1985, interest could not have been charged in reassessment proceeding. We, therefore, find no difficulty in answering both the questions in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. We record our appreciation of the assistance rendered to us by Mr. Rastogi.
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1996 (6) TMI 66 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Income Tax, Wealth Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... least the Act does not say so. Mr. Joshi draws our attention to section 7A of the Compulsory Deposit Scheme (Income-tax Payers) Act, 1974, which lays down that for the purposes of exemption under section 5 of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957 (27 of 1957), the amount of compulsory deposit shall be deemed to be a deposit with a banking company to which the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (10 of 1949), applies. The provision of section 7A of the 1974 Act makes it clear that compulsory deposit is an asset. Dr. Saraf has not been able to show that the amount goes to the public fund. In view of the above, in our opinion, compulsory deposit cannot be called an annuity within the meaning of section 2(e)(2)(ii) of the Wealth-tax Act. Accordingly, we answer the question in the negative, against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. A copy of this judgment under the signature of the Registrar and the seal of the High Court shall be transmitted to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Guwahati.
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1996 (6) TMI 65 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Accounting Year, Assessment Year, Minor Admitted To Benefits Of Partnership, Registration Of Firm
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1996 (6) TMI 64 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Expenditure Incurred, Revenue Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... of the expenditure. However, deduction can be made in the relevant year if the same is incurred during that year. In this regard, we do not find any discussion in the order of the Tribunal. Therefore, it is not possible for us to answer the said question. We hold that expenditure incurred in the relevant year of assessment shall be allowed. If the expenditure is incurred in one year it will be allowed in the same year and if it is incurred in more than one year then it will be in the respective year as actually incurred. It is also not known what was the expenditure incurred during the assessment years 1981-82 and 1982-83. It is for the Tribunal to find out the actual position. Considering all these, we hold that the expenditure of Rs. 87,20,598 was not a capital expenditure but a revenue expenditure. We answer the first part of the question in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Because of meagre facts, we decline to answer the rest portion.
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1996 (6) TMI 63 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Assessment Proceedings, Claiming Depreciation, Failure To Disclose Material Facts, Fluctuation In Rate, Foreign Exchange, Reassessment Proceedings
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1996 (6) TMI 62 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Original Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... rder clearly indicates that the assessee was required to address with regard to the subject-matter before the assessment and the Assessing Officer was satisfied about factual and legal aspect and following the judgments of the apex court and of this court assessed the assessee. In reply, the respondent has not dealt with the specific contention raised by the assessee that it has fully and truly disclosed all the relevant facts. Even before this court it was not suggested by learned counsel for the Revenue that relevant facts for assessment have been concealed or have not been fully and truly disclosed. In our opinion, it is a mere change of opinion and that would not amount to escapement of income. On this ground, these petitions are required to be allowed and are hereby allowed. Notices issued under section 148 annexure D dated February 3, 1995, in both the special civil applications are hereby quashed and set aside. Rule made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1996 (6) TMI 61 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... bearing on the dispute between the parties or though referred by the Tribunal does not arise out of its order. The High Court may also decline to answer a question arising out of the order of the Tribunal, if it is unnecessary or irrelevant or is not calculated to dispose of the real issue between the taxpayer and the Department. If the power of the High Court to refuse to answer questions other than those which are questions of law directly related to the dispute between the taxpayer and the Department, and which, when answered, would determine qua that question the dispute, be granted, we fail to see any ground for restricting that power when by an erroneous order the High Court has directed the Tribunal to state a case on a question which did not arise out of the order of the Tribunal. In this case we find that no question has arisen out of the order of the Tribunal. Therefore, the submission of Mr. Joshi fails. In view of the aforesaid, we decline to answer the question.
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