|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 41 to 56 of 56 Records
-
1960 (3) TMI 34
Issues:
- Petition under Article 226 and 227 to quash notices and seek prohibition on best judgment assessment of sales tax for specific financial years.
- Legality of Assessing Authority's notices for best judgment assessment under section 11(4) of the Sales Tax Act.
- Entitlement of petitioners to extraordinary legal remedies of certiorari and prohibition.
- Jurisdiction of Assessing Authority to issue notices and make best judgment assessment after the expiry of three years from the relevant financial years.
Analysis:
The petitioners, cloth merchants registered under the Sales Tax Act, sought to quash notices and prohibit best judgment assessment for the financial years ending 31st March, 1955, and 31st March, 1956. The Assessing Authority issued notices calling for accounts, warning of best judgment assessment under section 11 of the Act if the petitioners failed to comply. The petitioners contended that best judgment assessment after three years from the relevant financial years was impermissible. The respondent, Excise and Taxation Officer, argued against the extraordinary remedies sought by the petitioners, asserting no bar to assessment completion after the specified three-year period under section 11(4) of the Act.
The court held that the petitioners should resort to ordinary remedies provided by the Act and were not entitled to certiorari or prohibition. Noting that no assessment had been made under section 11(4) yet, the court found no illegality in the notices issued by the Assessing Authority. The court emphasized that the petition seemed premature and misconceived, as no best judgment assessment had been initiated. The petitioners were advised to await the ordinary remedies under the Act if and when an assessment was made. The court cited precedents to support its stance and dismissed the petition on the grounds that the extraordinary legal remedies were not warranted in this case and the petition was premature.
The court also addressed the issue of whether the Assessing Authority could issue a final assessment order under section 11(4) after the three-year period from the end of the relevant financial year. While indicating no apparent bar to initiating proceedings within the three-year timeframe, the court refrained from giving a final opinion on the matter. Ultimately, the court dismissed the petition, ruling that the petitioners were not entitled to the extraordinary legal remedies sought and that the petition was premature. The respondent was awarded costs, including counsel fees.
In conclusion, the judgment focused on the petitioners' premature invocation of extraordinary remedies, the legality of the Assessing Authority's notices, and the permissibility of best judgment assessment after the prescribed three-year period. The court emphasized the availability of ordinary remedies under the Act and dismissed the petition on the grounds of prematurity and lack of entitlement to extraordinary legal remedies.
-
1960 (3) TMI 33
Issues:
Assessment of sales tax on a firm as an additional place of business of another registered dealer under the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947.
Analysis:
The petitioner, a firm known as M/s. Modern Dresses, was assessed for sales tax under sub-section (5) of section 4 of the Bihar Sales Tax Act on the basis that it was an additional place of business of another firm, M/s. Silk House. The materials supporting this assessment were deemed tenuous, consisting of a report by an Inspector and a seized wedding invitation card. However, the Department failed to present relevant records relating to the registration of M/s. Silk House before the Board. The petitioner argued that M/s. Modern Dresses was an independent concern and should be assessed as such. The Board noted the lack of evidence connecting the partners of M/s. Silk House with M/s. Modern Dresses, highlighting discrepancies in the registration process and the absence of Mongi Devi's name in the registration certificate of M/s. Modern Dresses.
The crux of the matter lies in the interpretation of sub-section (5) of section 4 of the Act, which requires a new business to be started by a dealer, either singly or jointly with another person, to be liable for tax from the commencement of the business. In this case, the question was whether M/s. Modern Dresses was indeed an additional place of business of M/s. Silk House, necessitating tax liability. The Board emphasized the need to establish that both partners of M/s. Silk House were involved in setting up M/s. Modern Dresses to justify the assessment under this sub-section. The absence of evidence linking the partners to the new business led the Board to set aside the assessment order and direct that the assessment proceed against M/s. Modern Dresses as an independent concern, in line with its registration certificate.
In conclusion, the Board allowed the petition, setting aside the assessment order and directing that, in the absence of further reliable evidence connecting M/s. Modern Dresses with M/s. Silk House, the assessment should proceed against M/s. Modern Dresses as an independent concern. The decision was based on the lack of substantiated evidence linking the two firms and the inconsistencies in the registration process, ultimately leading to the judgment in favor of the petitioner, M/s. Modern Dresses.
-
1960 (3) TMI 32
Issues:
1. Appealability of an order passed under section 5 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act under section 9.
2. Criteria for claiming rebate under section 5 regarding delivery of goods outside the State of Uttar Pradesh.
3. Entitlement to rebate of tax on sales of sugar despatched outside the State of Uttar Pradesh.
Analysis:
The judgment from the High Court of Allahabad addressed three key issues referred by the Judge (Revisions) Sales Tax, U.P. The first issue revolved around the appealability of an order passed under section 5 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act under section 9. The Court clarified that an order refusing to grant a rebate under section 5 cannot be considered an assessment order appealable under section 9. Instead, such orders could be challenged during the final assessment stage. Therefore, the Court answered the first question in the negative, affirming the decision of the Judge (Revisions).
Regarding the second issue, which pertained to the criteria for claiming a rebate under section 5 based on the delivery of goods outside Uttar Pradesh, the Court found that the facts assumed in the question were not established at any stage by the Judge (Revisions). Consequently, the Court refused to answer this question, deeming it irrelevant to the case at hand.
The third issue involved the entitlement to a rebate of tax on sales of sugar despatched outside Uttar Pradesh. The Court noted that the Judge (Revisions) incorrectly held that no rebate should be allowed if the buyer resided in Uttar Pradesh, contrary to the provisions of section 5 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. The Court emphasized that the crucial factor for rebate eligibility was the actual delivery of goods outside Uttar Pradesh, regardless of the buyer's location. The Court meticulously analyzed the circumstances and found that the goods were indeed delivered outside Uttar Pradesh, at Gaya in Bihar. The Court concluded that the assessee was entitled to the rebate under section 5, as the sales were intended for delivery at Gaya, and the goods were actually delivered there. Consequently, the Court answered the third question in the affirmative, granting relief to the assessee.
In light of the favorable decision for the assessee, the Court directed that the assessee be awarded costs for the reference, setting it at Rs. 200. The reference was answered accordingly, providing clarity on the issues raised before the Court.
-
1960 (3) TMI 31
Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction to levy sales tax on inter-State transactions.
2. Legality of sales tax on transactions with the Director-General of Supplies and Disposals, Government of India.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Jurisdiction to Levy Sales Tax on Inter-State Transactions:
The petitioners contended that the transactions of sale and supply of cement to the public in the State of Mysore during the relevant period were inter-State sales and thus beyond the jurisdiction of the State of Mysore to levy sales tax. They argued that the actual supply or delivery of cement to buyers was made from factories situated outside the State of Mysore, making these transactions inter-State in nature under Article 286(1)(a) of the Constitution and Section 27 of the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1948.
The court examined the explanation to Article 286(1)(a) of the Constitution and Section 27 of the Mysore Sales Tax Act, which state that if actual delivery of goods takes place as a direct result of sale or purchase within the State for consumption in that State, the State has the authority to levy sales tax. The court noted that the first petitioners accepted orders and collected payment within Mysore and directed factories outside the State to supply cement to purchasers within Mysore. Despite the cement being dispatched from outside the State, the court held that actual delivery to the buyer occurred within Mysore, making these transactions taxable by the State of Mysore. The court relied on the precedent set by the Supreme Court in Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar and Others, which clarified that delivery to a common carrier does not constitute actual delivery to the purchaser for the purposes of Article 286(1)(a).
2. Legality of Sales Tax on Transactions with the Director-General of Supplies and Disposals, Government of India:
The petitioners further contended that supplies to the Director-General of Supplies and Disposals, Government of India, were governed by an annual rate contract and were inter-State transactions. They argued that once the goods were loaded onto railway wagons at the factories situated outside Mysore, the sale was completed, making these transactions exempt from Mysore's sales tax under Article 286(2) of the Constitution and Section 27 of the Mysore Sales Tax Act.
The court rejected this contention, noting that the orders were placed with the first petitioners in Bangalore, Mysore, and the goods were delivered within Mysore. The court emphasized that the terms of the contract, including F.O.R. ex-works, did not alter the fact that the sales were concluded within Mysore and the goods were delivered for consumption within the State. Therefore, these transactions did not fall under the prohibition of Article 286(2) or Section 27, and the State of Mysore had the jurisdiction to levy sales tax on them.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the writ petition, holding that the State of Mysore had the jurisdiction to levy sales tax on the transactions in question. The transactions relating to the sale of cement to the public and the Director-General of Supplies and Disposals, Government of India, were deemed to be within the State of Mysore and thus subject to its sales tax laws. The petitioners were ordered to pay costs, including advocate's fees of Rs. 100.
-
1960 (3) TMI 30
Issues: Interpretation of sub-section (vii) of section 5 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939; Liability of sales tax on subsequent sales of beedies in the Malabar area within the Madras State; Definition of "turnover" under section 2(i) of the Sales Tax Act; Addition of profit percentage to the sale value of beedies.
The judgment of the Kerala High Court in this case involved the interpretation of sub-section (vii) of section 5 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939. The petitioners, who were assessed to sales tax for the year 1955-56, questioned the liability of sales tax on their subsequent sales of beedies in the Malabar area within the Madras State. The main issue was whether these subsequent sales were liable to tax under section 5(vii). The key contention was whether the sales by the manufacturers to the petitioners constituted the first sales within the State of Madras, making the petitioners' sales the second sales and not taxable. The Court analyzed the sub-section and highlighted three essential ingredients for a sale to be taxed under it: the sale must take place within the State of Madras, be by a dealer not exempted from taxation, and be the first of such sales. The Court referred to a previous case to support its decision that the petitioners' subsequent sales were indeed the first sales liable to tax.
Another issue raised was based on the definition of "turnover" in section 2(i) of the Sales Tax Act. The petitioners argued that if the aggregate of purchases and sales of the manufacturers were considered, they would not have been exempted under section 3(3) due to exceeding the turnover limit of Rs. 10,000. However, the Court dismissed this contention due to lack of evidence supporting that the manufacturers' turnovers exceeded the exemption limit. Additionally, a third point was raised regarding the addition of ten percent profit to the sale value of beedies by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer. The petitioners claimed this addition was unwarranted and illegal. The Court acknowledged the merit in this argument but held that their powers of revision were limited to cases where the Appellate Tribunal either decided erroneously or failed to decide a legal question. Since the question was not raised before the Tribunal, the Court could not interfere at that stage.
Ultimately, all contentions raised by the petitioners' counsel were dismissed, and the revision petitions were rejected with costs imposed on the petitioners. The Court emphasized that the petitioners' subsequent sales of beedies in the Malabar area within the Madras State were indeed the first sales liable to tax under the relevant provisions of the Madras General Sales Tax Act.
-
1960 (3) TMI 29
Issues Involved:
1. Maintainability of the application.
2. Locus standi of the State of Orissa to oppose the application.
3. Confirmation of the resolution for change of the registered office.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Maintainability of the Application:
The application by Orissa Chemicals and Distilleries Private Ltd. sought to change its registered office from Jharsuguda, Orissa to Masulipatam, Andhra Pradesh under section 17 of the Companies Act, 1956. The State of Orissa opposed the change. The learned Advocate-General argued that the application was not maintainable due to improper notice to all shareholders, specifically mentioning the absence of a proper legal representative for a deceased shareholder. The court did not express a definitive opinion on maintainability due to its decision on the merits.
2. Locus Standi of the State of Orissa:
The court considered whether the State of Orissa had the locus standi to oppose the application. It was determined that under section 17(3)(a) of the Companies Act, the State of Orissa is a person whose interests will be affected by the alteration. The court referenced a similar case decided by a division bench, affirming the State's locus standi.
3. Confirmation of the Resolution for Change of the Registered Office:
The court examined whether the resolution for changing the registered office should be confirmed. The company argued that the change would facilitate more direct and economic administration since all shareholders and directors were residents of Andhra Pradesh. However, the court found that the company did not provide sufficient particulars to support this claim. The State of Orissa raised several objections, including potential loss of revenue from Income-tax and sales-tax, and practical difficulties in enforcing local laws.
Income-tax and Sales-tax Considerations:
The court found merit in the State's objection regarding potential revenue loss. It cited previous decisions, including Orient Paper Mills Ltd. v. State and Bonai Industrial Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, which discussed the impact on state revenue. The court noted that the company's claim of being assessed in Andhra Pradesh lacked sufficient evidence. The court emphasized that the potential loss of revenue was a relevant consideration.
Labour and Industrial Legislation:
The court acknowledged that changing the registered office could create practical difficulties in enforcing labour and industrial laws. This aspect was also discussed in previous decisions, which the court followed.
Location of the Registered Office:
The court stressed the importance of the registered office's location, as outlined in section 146 of the Companies Act. It highlighted the legislative intent and the spirit of the law, emphasizing that the location should not be changed lightly. The court also noted the penal provisions for non-compliance with section 146.
Bona Fides of the Application:
The court questioned the bona fides of the application, pointing out that the special resolution for the change was passed at the Masulipatam office, undermining the company's claim of needing to change the registered office for convenience. The court suggested that there might be an ulterior motive behind the proposed change and found no clear evidence of economic benefit or administrative efficiency.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the application, concluding that the company's reasons for changing the registered office were not convincing and that the potential impact on the State of Orissa's revenue and the enforcement of local laws were significant considerations. The application was dismissed with costs, and a hearing fee of Rs. 100 was imposed.
-
1960 (3) TMI 22
Issues: Application under section 633 of the Companies Act for relieving the company and its directors and officers from liability for default in complying with sections 210, 220, and 159 - Seizure of account books by Special Police Establishment affecting audit and preparation of financial documents - Opposition by Registrar of Companies on technical grounds and merits - Distinction between defaults under sections 210/220 and section 159 - Relief granted by the court with conditions.
In this case, the company, Asia Udyog Private Limited, filed an application under section 633 of the Companies Act seeking relief from liability for not complying with sections 210, 220, and 159 of the Act. The company and its directors and officers were unable to have the accounts audited, prepare a balance sheet, profit and loss account, and file an annual return due to the seizure of all account books by the Special Police Establishment in November 1953. Despite efforts to retrieve the books, they remained in the custody of the Commission of Inquiry presided over by Mr. Vivian Bose. The company argued that without access to the account books, compliance with the statutory requirements was impossible not only for the current year but also for subsequent years. The court noted that similar petitions had been previously allowed by the District Judge, indicating a precedent for granting relief under such circumstances.
The Registrar of Companies opposed the petition on technical grounds, which were either resolved or not pursued, and on the merits. However, it was acknowledged that the account books were seized and remained unavailable for audit and preparation of financial documents. The Registrar suggested that the company could file statements of income and expenditure, as well as receipts and payments based on the currently maintained accounts. The Government Solicitor highlighted a distinction between defaults under sections 210/220 and section 159, emphasizing the requirement of filing particulars specified in Part I of Schedule V within 42 days of the annual general meeting under section 159. The court agreed that while it might not be feasible to provide all details from Part II of Schedule V, the company should submit particulars as near as possible to the prescribed form.
Ultimately, the court granted relief to the company, its directors, and officers from liability for default under sections 210/220 and 159 of the Act. However, certain conditions were imposed. The company was directed to furnish statements of income and expenditure, as well as receipts and payments for the relevant financial year, based on the current accounts within two months. Additionally, a statement containing particulars required under section 159 was to be submitted as closely as possible to the form in Part II of Schedule V. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs related to the application.
-
1960 (3) TMI 21
Issues:
- Locus standi of the petitioners to file the petition under sections 397 and 398 of the Indian Companies Act.
- Whether the petition should be stayed due to pending litigation between the parties.
Analysis:
The petition was filed by sons of Hira Lal and their partnership firm against a company and three individuals described as de facto directors. The petitioners alleged oppression by the company's controllers and sought relief. The company's three respondents challenged the petitioners' locus standi by denying their membership in the company. The preliminary issues framed were whether the petitioners had the standing to file the petition and whether the petition should be stayed due to ongoing litigation.
Today's hearing was scheduled for parties' evidence, but only a witness from the company, an accounts-clerk, was examined. The witness presented the register of members showing the petitioners' names were removed based on a resolution by the directors. The petitioners had previously filed an application for rectification of the register, which was dismissed by the District Judge, advising them to pursue their remedy through a regular suit. The respondents contended that as per the current register, the petitioners were not members, and petitions under sections 397 and 398 could only be maintained by members.
The petitioners argued that the directors' act of removing their names was illegal, but the court emphasized that such issues should be addressed through proper legal proceedings, like a regular suit. Despite the petitioners seeking rectification of the share register in their petition, the court noted they had not pursued the District Judge's advice to file a suit to establish their rights. The court held that a petition under sections 397 and 398 could only be maintained by persons listed as members in the company's register, requiring rectification before filing a petition. Consequently, the court upheld the objection regarding locus standi and dismissed the petition with costs to the respondents.
-
1960 (3) TMI 8
Whether on the above facts and circumstances of this case, the profits of the assessee were exempt from taxation under the Business Profits Tax Act of 1947 ?
Whether the sum of ₹ 6,00,000 paid by the Government of Bengal during the chargeable accounting year ending on 31st December, 1946, is in the nature of subsidy and as such exempt from business profits tax under clause (c) of the proviso to section 4 of the Business Profits Tax Act ?
Held that:- Neither the letter of the Central Board of Revenue nor the provisions of the Income-tax Act can operate in favour of the contention of the association raised before us and the first question was rightly answered in the negative.
In the present case the payments were made for services rendered to Government and that would negative their being a subsidy. Appeal dismissed.
-
1960 (3) TMI 7
Whether the net dividend income of ₹ 47,120 accrued to the assessee in the former Baroda State, or whether it is income accrued or deemed to have accrued to the assessee in British India ?
Whether the assessee is entitled to any concession under the Merged States (Taxation Concessions) Order, 1949, with regard to the net dividend income of ₹ 47,120 ?
Held that:- The objection of the assessee is well founded. The Tribunal did not address itself to the question whether the Concessions Order applied to the assessee. It decided the question of assessability on the short ground that the income had not arisen in Baroda but in British India. That aspect of the matter has not been touched by the Bombay High Court. The latter has, on the other hand, considered whether the Concessions Order applies to the assessee, a matter not touched by the Tribunal. Thus, though the result is the same so far as the assessment is concerned, the grounds of decision are entirely different.
The High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in going outside the point of law decided by the Tribunal and deciding a different point of law. The order of the High Court will, therefore, be set aside, and the case will be remitted to the High Court to decide the question framed by the Tribunal. Appeal allowed.
-
1960 (3) TMI 6
Whether the annual cash allowance paid to the appellant in circumstances stated below falls within paragraph 15(1)(i) of the Part B States (Taxation Concessions) Order, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Order) and is therefore exempt from income-tax?
Held that:- High Court was in error in holding that ₹ 35,807 was not by way of maintenance and therefore was not exempt from taxation under paragraph 15(1)(i) of the Order. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and answer the question in favour of the appellant
-
1960 (3) TMI 5
Whether there were materials to justify the finding of the Tribunal that the income in the share of the commission agency of the mills was the income of the Hindu undivided family ?
Held that:- The assets still are in the name of Charandas Haridas, and looked again from the same view point, the division has no different signification. What has altered is the status of the family. While it was joint, the Department could treat the income as that of the family; but after partition, the Department could not say that it was still the income of the Hindu undivided family, when there was none. In the face of the finding that this was a genuine document and not a sham, and that it effectually divided the income and, in the circumstances, the assets, the question answers itself in the negative, that is to say, that there were no materials to justify the finding that the income in the share of the commission agency of the mills was the income of the Hindu undivided family. Appeal allowed.
-
1960 (3) TMI 4
Whether the effect of section 24B(1) of the Income-tax Act is that the liability of the executors, administrators or other legal representatives in regard to the tax payable is the same as was the liability of the deceased person and that the tax is one and therefore the liability of the heirs of the deceased was one and joint?
Held that:- Both Kamini Kumar Dutta and the appellant were brought on the record as legal representatives of the deceased. They both admitted the liability of ₹ 58,24,023. The several assessment orders, income-tax assessment orders, excess profits tax assessment and business profits assessment orders, show that the total amount to be realised as tax was ₹ 52,34,663 divided into 8 equal parts. The liability of Kamini Kumar Dutta and his branch of the family alone, as a result of composition, came to an end, but that does not mean that the balance of the tax which was exigible must also be taken to have been satisfied. It only means that to the extent that the amount is realized from Kamini Kumar Dutta and his branch of the family the liability to tax will be taken to have been satisfied and the appellant will be liable for the payment of only the balance and to the extent that he has in his possession any of the assets of the deceased or comes into possession of the assets in future. Appeal dismissed.
-
1960 (3) TMI 3
Whether the sale of the shares and securities by the administrator of the estate of late Mr. Gannon is not a sale for the purposes of section 12B(1) in view of the third proviso to section 12B(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act?
Held that:- It is necessary to point out here that on the interpretation sought to be placed on the third proviso on behalf of the appellant, the administrator will escape paying tax if he sells the capital assets ; but the legatee will not escape if he sells the capital assets after having received them in specie from the administrator. This is an anomaly which is against the scheme of section 12B of the Act. We are accordingly of the view that the High Court rightly hold that the expression " distribution of capital assets " in the third proviso to sub-section (1) of section 12B of the Act means distribution in specie and not distribution of sale proceeds. Appeal dismissed.
-
1960 (3) TMI 2
Whether a certain sum received by the respondent was a capital receipt or a revenue receipt?
Whether this sum of ₹ 57,435 was liable to income-tax and excess profits tax?
Held that:- The sum of ₹ 57,435 had not been received by the respondent for any injury to any of its capital assets. In our view, the sum was received as compensation for loss of profits for the period during which, it was imagined, the respondent's business would remain stopped before it could be re-started at a new premises. That being so, it was clearly a revenue receipt ; it has not been disputed that if the amount in question was paid as compensation for loss of profit, it would be a revenue receipt and liable to tax. As it was a trading receipt, it cannot be held exempt from tax under section 4(3)(vii) of the Income-tax Act either. In the result we answer both the questions framed in this case in the negative.Appeal allowed.
-
1960 (3) TMI 1
Issues Involved:
1. Confiscation of gold bars under Section 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) and Section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act.
2. Compliance with principles of natural justice.
3. Legality of the interrogation and treatment of the petitioner.
4. Validity of the criminal proceedings initiated against the petitioner.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Confiscation of Gold Bars under Section 23 of FERA and Section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act:
The petitioner, a citizen of the United Arab Republic, arrived at Dum Dum Airport with 14 gold bars. The Customs authorities detained the gold, citing Government of India Notifications prohibiting the importation of gold without Reserve Bank of India (RBI) permission. The petitioner was asked to produce a permit from the RBI within four days or show cause why the gold should not be confiscated. The gold was ultimately confiscated under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act, and the petitioner was prosecuted under Section 23 of FERA.
2. Compliance with Principles of Natural Justice:
The petitioner argued that he was not given a real opportunity to show cause against the confiscation and prosecution. He was detained and interrogated immediately upon arrival and subsequently remanded to jail, where he fell ill and was hospitalized until his release on bail. The court found that the petitioner had no adequate opportunity to present his case or seek legal advice, thus violating the principles of natural justice.
3. Legality of the Interrogation and Treatment of the Petitioner:
The petitioner alleged that he was subjected to severe questioning and physical assault by Customs officers. The court noted that while these allegations were denied in the affidavit by R.C. Misra, it would have been better if an affidavit had been affirmed by Parnham, the officer involved in the interrogation. The court did not express a view on the truth of these allegations but emphasized the need for the Customs authorities to investigate and ensure no such incidents occur.
4. Validity of the Criminal Proceedings Initiated Against the Petitioner:
The petitioner was prosecuted under Section 23 of FERA and Section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act. The court held that the criminal proceedings were invalid because the petitioner was not given an opportunity to show that he had the necessary permission from the RBI, as required under the proviso to Section 23(3) of FERA. Consequently, the criminal proceedings were quashed.
Conclusion:
The court quashed the order of confiscation dated November 9, 1959, and the criminal proceedings initiated against the petitioner. The Customs authorities were directed to deal with the petitioner according to law, ensuring compliance with the principles of natural justice. The rule was made absolute without any order as to costs.
|
9911796707
Advanced Search 
