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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 444 Records
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1999 (3) TMI 637 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... them. Similar view had been taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of the Deputy Commissioner Andaman District Port Blair etc. v. Consumer Co-operative Stores Limited, reported in JT 1998 (8) S. C. 467. The Division Bench of this Court in case of Vam Organic Chemicals Limited and another reported in 1999 U. P. Tax Cases, Page 13, held that the question of unjust enrichment will not arise where the tax had been paid on the raw-material and is consumed in the manufacture of finished products. 9. Following the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhadrachalam Paperboards Limited and another reported in JT 1998 (5) S.C. 314 and the Deputy Commissioner, Andaman District Port Blair etc, v. Consumer Co-operative Stores Limited, reported in J.T 1998 (8) S.C. 467, I hold that the petitioner is entitled for refund of the amount of purchase tax paid by it on industrial alcohol manufactured by it arid captively consumed in the manufacture of chemicals in its chemical plant.
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1999 (3) TMI 636 - CEGAT NEW DELHI - LB
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... ... ..... he brand name holders and the actual manufacturers are independent units. Similar views were held by the Tribunal in the case of Card Cure Engineering Co. v. C.C.E., Coimbatore 1996 (86) E.L.T. 351 . The Tribunal in the case of C.C.E. v. C.R. Auluck & Sons (P) Ltd. held that brand name owner cannot be treated as the manufacturer of the goods and it is the actual manufacturer who alone could be treated as such under Section 2(f) of the Act. It is now well settled law that job worker using his own machinery and labour force and not supplier of raw material is to be considered manufacturer of goods. In view of these facts and the decisions of the Supreme Court and the Tribunal, it cannot be said that the appellants are the manufacturer of goods merely because they had supplied the raw material and the goods were manufactured as per their specifications. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside and appeal is allowed on merit without going into the question of time limit.
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1999 (3) TMI 635 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ar and conduct judicial proceedings, but who has not been so authorised by the High Court, has no right of audience on behalf of principal, either in the appellate or original side of the High Court There is no warrant whatever for putting a power of attorney given to a recognized agent to conduct proceedings in court in the same category as a vakalat given to a legal practitioner, though latter may be described as a power of attorney which is confined only to pleaders, i.e. those who have a right to plead in courts." The aforesaid observations, though stated sixty years ago, would represent the correct legal position even now. Be that as it may, an agent cannot become a pleader for the party in criminal proceedings, unless the party secures permission from the court to appoint him to act in such proceedings. The respondent-couple have not even moved for such permission and hence no occasion has arisen so far to consider that aspect. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
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1999 (3) TMI 634 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... ti, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1999 (3) TMI 633 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... hen the packet was recovered from the car being intercepted. He has taken a plea that it was handed over to him at Bombay to be carried to Kasaragod and somebody would come to take it from him at Kasaragod. Such a plea, on the face of it, cannot be rejected ipso facto. ( 4. ) IN the absence of any positive material to indicate as to how he can be said to have acquired the foreign exchange in question and in view of the aforesaid plea of the respondent, even applying the provisions of S.19J of the Act would not help the Department in establishing that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the respondent must be held to have otherwise acquired the foreign exchange in question in violation of the provisions of S.4(1) of the Act. In the aforesaid premises, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned orders passed by the Board and affirmed by the High Court. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. The amount of penalty, if deposited, may be refunded to the respondent.
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1999 (3) TMI 632 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Punjabi. It is also evident that he identified the photograph of creates at strong suspicion against him. If on the basis of the above evidence, the learned Additional Sessions Judge drew the inference that the accused/applicant was involved in transporting heroine from one State to another; she was not wrong in framing charge for offence u/s. 8(c) read with Section 29 and Section 21 of NDPS Act. Seeing the deposition, it also appears that there is basis for strong suspicion of there being conspiracy to transport heroine against the applicant. Accordingly, the charge had to be framed for entering into conspiracy with Chamkaur Singh to illegally acquire; possess and transport 83.77 kg. of heroine in contravention of provisions of NDPS Act. Consequently, the charge framed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge on 8th May, 1998 is not groundless to strike down the charge and to release the accused. 7. Accordingly, I do not find any force in this petition and dismiss the same.
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1999 (3) TMI 631 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... egarding the enforcement of which a command could have been issued in the form of a writ of mandamus. The appeal of the State is accordingly allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside dismissing the writ petition filed by respondent No. 1. interim order issued in the case shall stand vacated and the respondent No.1 held liable to refund ail the sums of money which he has received in pursuance of the judgment of the High Court and interim order of this Court dated 16.10.95. The excess amount shall be refunded within a period of three months. In case, the excess amount is not refunded within the time specified, the respondent No.1 shall be liable for its refund along with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of this order till the actual payment is made. Respondent No.1 is also held to pay costs which we quantify at ₹ 5,000/- . The amount of costs be deposited in the Registry for the Funds of the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee.
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1999 (3) TMI 630 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... f the fact of unauthorised possession in a notified area would be rebuttable presumption enabling the accused to prove that the weapon was not meant for use for any terrorist or disruptive act." Hence, the offence is not merely that appellant possessed firearms which fall within the ambit of Schedule I to the Arms Rules, 1962, but that he possessed them within the notified area which raises a presumption that such possession was with the intention to use them for a terrorist or disruptive act. Appellant did not choose to rebut the said presumption, nor is there any material on record for such rebuttal. The corollary thereof is that appellant cannot escape from conviction under Section 25 of the TADAA. In the result we partly allow this appeal by setting aside the conviction and sentence passed by the Designated Court on the appellant under Section 12 of the Passports Act, but confirm the conviction and sentence passed on him for the offence under Section 5 of the TADAA.
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1999 (3) TMI 629 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... e to withdraw the appeal. The appeal is dismissed as withdrawn.
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1999 (3) TMI 628 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... eated to have been extended before the expiry of the original term. This view, in our opinion, is wholly erroneous and contrary to the mandatory provisions contained in the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. The impugned judgment cannot, therefore. be sustained. The appeal is consequently allowed and the judgment passed by the High Court is set aside. The Writ Petition filed by the appellants stands allowed. The Bar Council of India is directed to appoint a Special Committee as contemplated by Rule 8A within two weeks from the date on which a copy of this judgment is communicated to them and the Special Committee shall, within four months of its being constituted, hold the elections for constituting a new Kerala Bar Council in accordance with law. Till the elections are held, the Special Committee shall, as provided by Section 8A of the Act, discharge the functions of the State Bar Council with all other consequences provided thereunder. There will be no order as to costs.
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1999 (3) TMI 627 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... ti, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1999 (3) TMI 626 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... eemed that all actions taken contrary to the declaration of law prior to its date of declaration are validated. This is done in the larger public interest. Therefore, the subordinate forums which are legally bound to apply the declaration of law made by this Court are also duty-bound to apply such dictum to cases which would arise in future only. In matters where decisions opposed to the said principle have been taken prior to such declaration of law cannot be interfered with on the basis of such declaration of law. In the instant case, both decisions of the DPC as well as the appointing authority being prior to the judgment in Sabharwal’s case, we are of the opinion that the tribunal was in error in applying this decision. For this reason, these appeals succeed and are hereby allowed; setting aside the orders and directions made by the tribunal in OA Nos.186/94, and 961/95. In view of our judgment in CA Nos.10658-59/96, this appeal also succeeds and is hereby allowed.
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1999 (3) TMI 625 - SUPREME COURT
Whether departmental proceedings and proceedings in a criminal case launched on the basis of the same set of facts can be continued simultaneously?
Held that:- Since the facts and the evidence in both the proceedings, namely, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case were the same without there being any iota of difference, the distinction, which is usually drawn as between the departmental proceedings and the criminal case on the basis of approach and burden of proof, would not be applicable to the instant case.
Since in the instant case the appellant was not provided any Subsistence Allowance during the period of suspension and the adjournment prayed for by him on account of his illness, duly supported by medical certificates, was refused resulting in ex-parte proceedings against him, we are of the opinion that the appellant has been punished in total violation of the principles of natural justice and he was literally not afforded any opportunity of hearing. Moreover, as pleaded by the appellant before the High Court as also before us that on account of his penury occasioned by non-payment of Subsistence Allowance, he could not undertake a journey to attend the disciplinary proceedings, the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer at such proceedings, which were held ex-parte, stand vitiated.
The appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment passed by the Division Bench of the High Court is set aside and that of the learned Single Judge, in so far as it purports to allow the Writ Petition, is upheld.
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1999 (3) TMI 624 - HOUSE OF LORDS
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... ... ..... accordingly dismiss the appeal. LORD LLOYD OF BERWICK. My Lords, I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech prepared by my noble and learned friend, Lord Slynn of Hadley. For the reasons he gives I, too, would dismiss the appeal. LORD HOFFMANN. My Lords, I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech prepared by my noble and learned friend, Lord Slynn of Hadley. For the reasons he gives I, too, would dismiss the appeal. LORD HOPE OF CRAIGHEAD. My Lords, I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech prepared by my noble and learned friend, Lord Slynn of Hadley. I agree with it, and for the reasons which he has given I, too, would dismiss the appeal. LORD HUTTON. My Lords, I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech prepared by my noble and learned friend, Lord Slynn of Hadley. I agree with it, and for the reason he gives I, too, would dismiss the appeal. Appeal dismissed. Solicitors Denton Hall Solicitor for the Customs and Excise.
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1999 (3) TMI 623 - HOUSE OF LORDS
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... ... ..... it received credit, were used or appropriated for use by it in making partly exempt supplies to the customers of the London branch after 1 August 1991. Carnwath J. 39 s decision was largely based on his opinion that there must be some action or decision by the taxable person which can be characterised as a use or appropriation for use and that the commissioners had failed to point to anything done by Svenska which could be regarded as a use or appropriation. But I consider that the judgment of Aldous L.J. was correct and that after 1 August 1991, by virtue of section 29 and Regulation 23(1), the partly exempt services supplied by the London branch to its customers were to be treated as supplied by Svenska so that there was a use or appropriation for use by it of the inward supplies which it had received. Accordingly for the reasons which I have given I would dismiss this appeal. Appeal dismissed with costs. Solicitors Beachcroft Stanleys Solicitor for the Customs and Excise.
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1999 (3) TMI 622 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... oice, consignment note or similar document issued by the consignor. Applicant did not produce or rely upon any of these documents except the MDH price list. Again, under rule 227(5) what is required is to determine the approximate saleable value . Therefore, if the authorities below determined the value on the basis of 10 per cent less than maximum retail price, it is not contrary to law. Hence, this contention of Mr. Dokania has no substance. 13.. Mr. Dokania appearing for the applicant did not press (like many points taken in the application) the point that penalty ought not to have been imposed at the rate of 25 per cent of saleable value. We may only refer to the reasons given by respondent No. 1 in this connection at internal page 4 of his order (page C-36). We have no reason to differ. 14.. In the result, the application is dismissed. No order is made for cost. J. GUPTA (Judicial Member). - I agree. D. BHATTACHARYYA (Technical Member). - I agree. Application dismissed.
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1999 (3) TMI 621 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ing of the revision application Board of Revenue has applied its mind regarding the question of imposition of penalty, reasonableness of quantum of penalty imposed, etc. Even though the proceedings are penal in nature it was found that there is violation of solemn declaration. It is not a bona fide mistake resulting in technical violations. Since there is proper application of mind, I see no ground to interfere with exhibit P5 order on this ground. There is no lack of jurisdiction or perversity of findings. There is application of mind in the contentions raised by the petitioner. No valid grounds are urged for setting aside the three concurrent orders passed in the subject which is finally culminated in exhibit P5 order. Therefore, I see no ground to set aside the orders by invoking provisions under article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. The original petition is, therefore, dismissed. C.M.P. No. 2816 of 1992 in O.P. No. 1614 of 1992 P dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1999 (3) TMI 620 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... allowed, the petition and quashed the complaint which was filed. In our opinion, the High Court erred in quashing the complaint. It is evident that proceedings were initiated by the appellant against A. Chinnaswami who happened to be the Managing Director of Shakti Spinners Ltd. The cheques in question which were dishonoured were signed by him. The process was issued by the Judicial Magistrate in his name. We see no infirmity in the notice issued under Section 138 addressed to A. Chinnaswami, who was a signatory of the said cheques. The High Court, in our opinion, clearly fell in error in allowing the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and in quashing the complaint and setting aside the proceedings pending before the Judicial Magistrate. For the aforesaid reasons, these appeals are allowed and the order of the High Court is set aside. The Judicial Magistrate will now proceed to decide S.C.C. Nos. 155 of 1995 and 156 of 1995 in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible.
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1999 (3) TMI 619 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... liability to the extent of such deposit, though subsequent assessment may show that such payment was in short of or in excess of the actual liability necessitating further payment of the short fall by the assessee or refund of the excess amount to the assessee by the Commissioner. In the same logic it can be said that even if an assessment is ultimately found invalid on the ground of its being made beyond the period of limitation or otherwise, the tax that has been paid by the company-applicant under section 10(3) in discharge of his admitted liability in accordance with his return is a valid tender by it as well as a valid collection by the Revenue. Hence, the company is not entitled to get refund of the same on the ground that the subsequent assessments became barred by limitation. 7.. Therefore, the two applications giving rise to the abovementioned two cases are dismissed. We make no order as to costs. D. BHATTACHARYYA (Technical Member).-I agree. Applications dismissed.
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1999 (3) TMI 618 - TAMIL NADU TAXATION SPECIAL TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... it should not be done except by an authority of law. The petitioners did not make any allegations as to any order of assessment or demand of tax without the authority of law. They also concede that no assessment order is passed against them, but their grievance is only against certain remarks on them, in the order of assessment passed against M/s. A.K. Brothers. Therefore, article 265 also is not offended by section 31. Taking into consideration of all the facts and law, we hold that the impugned expression in section 31 of the Act does not offend the articles of the Constitution mentioned by the petitioner and, therefore, the original petitions have no merit and deserve to be dismissed. Accordingly, the original petitions are dismissed. And this Tribunal doth further order that this order on being produced be punctually observed and carried into execution by all concerned. Issued under my hand and the seal of this Tribunal on the 4th day of March, 1999. Petitions dismissed.
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