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Showing 41 to 60 of 623 Records

• 2001 (7) TMI 1299
  
  The High Court of Gujarat ruled in favor of the revenue in a case involving the validity of an order passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax under Section 263. The Court agreed with the Andhra Pradesh High Court's decision and held that the Commissioner was empowered to revise the order passed by the Assessing Officer under Section 143(3) read with Section 144-B of the Income Tax Act. The reference was disposed of with no costs.

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• 2001 (7) TMI 1298
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Requirement of sanction u/s 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1974 for prosecution.
  2. Connection between the alleged acts and discharge of official duty.
  
  Summary:
  
  1. Requirement of Sanction u/s 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1974:
  The primary issue in this appeal was whether sanction u/s 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1974 was necessary for prosecuting the appellant, who was the then Secretary of Rural Development Department, Government of Sikkim. The Sikkim High Court and the Special Judge had both held that no such sanction was required. The appellant contended that his actions had a reasonable connection with the discharge of his official duties, thus necessitating sanction for prosecution. However, the prosecution argued that the acts of conspiracy alleged against the appellant had no connection with the discharge of official duty, and therefore, no sanction was required.
  
  2. Connection Between the Alleged Acts and Discharge of Official Duty:
  The Court examined various precedents to determine the scope and meaning of the relevant words in Section 197 of the Code. It was emphasized that there must be a reasonable connection between the act and the official duty for the protection u/s 197 to apply. The Court cited several cases, including *Hori Ram Singh v. The Crown* and *Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari*, to illustrate that the act must be integrally connected with the official duty. The Court concluded that the question of whether the appellant's actions were in the discharge of his official duty could be examined during the trial. The appellant claimed that the contracts were awarded lawfully and not at low rates, which needed to be established during the trial.
  
  Conclusion:
  The appeal was dismissed, but the Court observed that the question of sanction should be examined afresh during the trial. The trial court was directed to deal with this issue in the main judgment, considering the law laid down in this case without being influenced by the observations in the impugned orders.

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• 2001 (7) TMI 1297
  
  Issues involved: Assessment of loss, penalty proceedings under s. 271(1)(c) of the IT Act, 1961, concealment of income, validity of penalty proceedings.
  
  Assessment of Loss: The assessee filed a return for the assessment year 1990-91 declaring a loss of &8377; 1,92,643. The AO determined the loss to be &8377; 77,640 under section 143(3) of the IT Act, 1961. Subsequently, penalty proceedings under section 271(1)(c) were initiated based on the reduced loss amount.
  
  Validity of Penalty Proceedings: The CIT(A) accepted the assessee's claim that no penalty could be imposed, citing a precedent from the High Court. The Revenue appealed to the Tribunal, which upheld the decision. The Revenue further appealed to the High Court challenging the penalty imposition.
  
  Concealment of Income: The Revenue contended that the assessee had concealed an income of &8377; 1,15,000, leading to the reduced loss amount determined by the AO. The Revenue argued that even negative income should be considered part of the income, and since the assessee could carry forward the loss, there was concealment of income warranting penalty proceedings.
  
  Judgment: The High Court noted that the issue raised in the appeal was settled by a previous judgment of the Court and subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court. The Court emphasized that once a decision is affirmed by the Supreme Court, it becomes binding. As the Supreme Court had affirmed the earlier decision without providing reasons, the High Court found no grounds to interfere and dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue.

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• 2001 (7) TMI 1296
  
  Issues:
  1. Maintainability of the second suit under Order XXIII Rule 1(4)(b) CPC and Section 45 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961.
  2. Interpretation of the grounds for eviction based on bona fide requirement.
  3. Applicability of Order XXIII Rule 1 sub-rule (4) CPC in eviction proceedings.
  4. Consideration of subject matter and cause of action in subsequent eviction suits.
  
  Analysis:
  
  The appellant let out a portion of his residence to the respondent and later filed a suit for bona fide requirement, which was withdrawn. Subsequently, another suit was filed for the same reason, leading to a legal dispute regarding the maintainability of the second suit. The respondent argued that the second suit was not maintainable under Order XXIII Rule 1(4)(b) CPC and Section 45 of the Rent Act. The trial court rejected this argument, but the High Court allowed the revision application, stating that the relief claimed in both suits was the same, making the second suit impermissible.
  
  The Supreme Court analyzed the concept of bona fide requirement in eviction proceedings, emphasizing that the genuineness of the ground should be determined based on the current necessity at the time of the suit. The Court clarified that the dismissal of a previous suit does not preclude a landlord from establishing a genuine necessity in future proceedings with appropriate evidence. The Court cited relevant case laws to support this interpretation.
  
  Regarding the applicability of Order XXIII Rule 1 sub-rule (4) CPC, the Court explained that this rule does not bar a landlord from initiating fresh proceedings for eviction based on bona fide requirement, as the cause of action may differ even if the property remains the same. The Court highlighted the distinction between subject matter and property, emphasizing that unless the cause of action and relief claimed are identical in both suits, the subject matter cannot be considered the same.
  
  In conclusion, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order and restoring the trial court's decision. The Court directed the trial court to proceed with the matter promptly. The judgment clarified the legal principles governing the maintainability of eviction suits based on bona fide requirement and the application of procedural rules under the Rent Act and CPC in such cases.

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• 2001 (7) TMI 1295
  
  Issues:
  1. Validity of a sale deed executed by a widow with a limited life estate.
  2. Application of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act in the case.
  3. Rights of bona fide purchasers in transactions with ostensible owners.
  
  Analysis:
  1. The case involved an allotment of land by the Pepsu government to a widow for maintenance during her lifetime. The widow later executed a sale deed for the land in favor of respondents, who then applied for mutation of their names in revenue records. A dispute arose regarding the validity of the sale deed and the rights of the parties involved.
  
  2. The State of Punjab filed a civil suit challenging the sale deed's legality, arguing that the widow, with only a life estate, could not transfer the land beyond her lifetime. The respondents claimed to be bona fide purchasers under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. The trial court decreed in favor of the State, but the first appellate court and the High Court ruled in favor of the respondents, considering them bona fide purchasers.
  
  3. The Supreme Court analyzed the application of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act in such cases. Referring to precedents, the Court clarified that the rule of Section 41 applies only during the limited owner's lifetime and does not protect transferees against reversioners' claims. The Court emphasized that the widow, as an ostensible owner, could only pass on the title she held, which in this case was a life estate. Therefore, after her death, the land's title would revert to the State of Punjab. Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment and affirming the trial court's decree.
  
  This comprehensive analysis highlights the key legal issues, arguments presented, and the Supreme Court's decision, providing a detailed understanding of the judgment.

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• 2001 (7) TMI 1294
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Obligation of the State Government to restore possession of requisitioned premises.
  2. Status of possession: juridical vs. lawful possession.
  3. Impact of lease expiration on the right to possession.
  4. Applicability of general principles for recovery of requisitioned property.
  5. Legal standing of lessees post-expiry of lease.
  6. Distinction between acquisition and requisition.
  7. Judicial interpretation of "liberty to mention" in judgments.
  8. Rights of lessees in the context of expired leases and requisition orders.
  9. The concept of tenant holding over vs. tenant at sufferance.
  10. Specific performance and its implications on possession rights.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Obligation of the State Government to Restore Possession:
  The primary issue was whether the State Government was obligated to restore possession of requisitioned premises to the owners or to the tenants/lessees from whom possession was initially taken. The Supreme Court noted that juridical possession, while protected by law against wrongful dispossession, is not always equivalent to lawful possession. The High Court had negated the argument that tenants/lessees were entitled to receive back possession post-requisition.
  
  2. Status of Possession: Juridical vs. Lawful Possession:
  The court distinguished between juridical possession and lawful possession, emphasizing that lawful possession requires a positive legal right to possess the property. The court cited previous judgments, noting that a tenant cannot be said to continue in lawful possession against the landlord's wishes if the lease has expired and is not protected by statutory law.
  
  3. Impact of Lease Expiration on the Right to Possession:
  The lease in question expired by efflux of time during the pendency of the appeal. The court had to consider whether the lessees retained any right to possession after the lease expired. The court concluded that the lessees had no legal right to the property post-expiry of the lease, as their possessory rights were suspended during the requisition period.
  
  4. Applicability of General Principles for Recovery of Requisitioned Property:
  Mr. Gupta argued that general principles dictate that possession should be returned to the person from whom it was taken. However, the court found that the special factual feature of the lease's expiration impacted this principle, making it inapplicable in this case.
  
  5. Legal Standing of Lessees Post-Expiry of Lease:
  The court examined whether lessees could be considered tenants holding over or trespassers after the lease expired. It concluded that the lessees had lost their legal right to possess the property and could not be restored to possession after the lease's expiration.
  
  6. Distinction Between Acquisition and Requisition:
  The court noted that acquisition involves a permanent transfer of title, while requisition is temporary and does not transfer ownership rights. This distinction was crucial in determining the rights of the parties involved.
  
  7. Judicial Interpretation of "Liberty to Mention" in Judgments:
  The court addressed the "liberty to mention" clause, noting that it cannot be used to reopen settled issues or confer jurisdiction to re-judge a matter. It is meant for clarification purposes only and does not allow for a review of the judgment.
  
  8. Rights of Lessees in the Context of Expired Leases and Requisition Orders:
  The court emphasized that lessees whose leases have expired do not retain possessory rights, especially when the lease expired during the requisition period. The lessees' rights were considered obliterated by the lease's expiration and the requisition order.
  
  9. The Concept of Tenant Holding Over vs. Tenant at Sufferance:
  The court distinguished between a tenant holding over (with the landlord's consent) and a tenant at sufferance (without consent). The lessees in this case were not in possession and thus could not be considered tenants holding over.
  
  10. Specific Performance and Its Implications on Possession Rights:
  The court noted that one of the lessees had filed a suit for specific performance based on an alleged oral agreement for the sale of the property. However, this suit was dismissed for default, and the court did not find it relevant to the issue of possession rights.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the lessees had no legal right to possess the property after the lease expired. The court emphasized that the general principles of recovery of requisitioned property did not apply in this case due to the lease's expiration and the requisition order. The judgment was delivered without prejudice to the rights of the parties to pursue other legal remedies.

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• 2001 (7) TMI 1293
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Classification of the product Kesh Nikhar branded cake/bar.
  2. Applicability of extended period of limitation.
  3. Applicability of penalties and interest under Sections 11AB and 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944.
  4. Relevance of product advertising in classification.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Classification of the Product:
  - The primary issue is whether Kesh Nikhar branded cake/bar should be classified under Heading No. 34.01 as soap or under Heading No. 33.05 as preparations for use on the hair.
  - M/s. Peshawar classified the product under sub-heading No. 3401.12 as soap in the form of cake/bar, which is not manufactured with the aid of power or steam.
  - The Revenue argued that the product should be classified under Heading No. 33.05 as it is a bath preparation containing soap exclusively meant for use on the hair.
  - The Tribunal noted that the product was in the form of a cake/bar and was marketed as soap. The product did not contain any special ingredients for hair treatment and was soluble in water, conforming to the requirements for toilet soap.
  - The adjudicating authority acknowledged that the product was in the form of soap but classified it as a shampoo in cake form.
  - According to the Harmonised System of Nomenclature (HSN), soaps are generally in the form of bars, cakes, moulded pieces, or shapes, and shampoos are typically liquid.
  - The Tribunal referred to various case laws and concluded that the product Kesh Nikhar soap could not be classified as a shampoo under Heading No. 33.05. The product is more appropriately classified under Heading No. 34.01 as soap.
  
  2. Applicability of Extended Period of Limitation:
  - The Tribunal found that M/s. Peshawar had been producing and marketing the product since 1935, and it was never previously classified as a shampoo.
  - The product was consistently treated as soap by the Central Excise Department, and M/s. Peshawar had been filing declarations and classification lists accordingly.
  - The Tribunal concluded that there was no justification for invoking the extended period of limitation under Section 11A(1) of the Act.
  
  3. Applicability of Penalties and Interest:
  - The Commissioner of Central Excise had imposed penalties and interest under Sections 11AB and 11AC of the Act, along with Rules 9(2), 52A, and 226 of the Central Excise Rules.
  - Since the Tribunal held that the product was correctly classified under Heading No. 34.01, the penalties and interest imposed were not justified.
  - The Tribunal set aside the impugned order, thereby nullifying the penalties and interest.
  
  4. Relevance of Product Advertising in Classification:
  - The Tribunal emphasized that the nature of the product and its description in the relevant Tariff Entry should form the basis of classification, not the way it is advertised.
  - Advertisements highlighting the product's use on hair do not change its fundamental classification as soap.
  - The Tribunal referred to various judgments which held that advertisements are not decisive in determining the real nature of the product for classification purposes.
  
  Conclusion:
  - The product Kesh Nikhar branded cake/bar is correctly classifiable under sub-heading No. 3401.12 of the Central Excise Tariff as soap.
  - The classification under Heading No. 33.05 as preparations for use on the hair is not appropriate.
  - The appeal is allowed with consequential benefits as per law, and the impugned order is set aside.

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• 2001 (7) TMI 1292
  
  Issues involved: Appeal against disallowance of benefit under s. 80HHC of the IT Act, 1961 for income from interest and rent for asst. yr. 1990-91.
  
  Summary:
  The Revenue appealed against the Tribunal's order disallowing the assessee's claim under s. 80HHC of the IT Act, 1961 for income from interest and rent. The CIT(A) allowed the appeal, stating that the amounts were part of the assessee's business income and could be excluded only from 1st April, 1992, due to the insertion of sub-cl. (baa) to the Explanation of s. 80HHC. The Revenue challenged this decision before the Tribunal, which upheld the CIT(A)'s order. The Revenue contended that interest and rent income should not be considered part of business income, but the Tribunal found that the deposits and rental income were related to the normal business activities of the assessee. The Tribunal also relied on a Supreme Court decision stating that income from different sources does not cease to be business income for computation purposes. Additionally, the legislative intent to exclude interest and rent income from s. 80HHC benefits from 1st April, 1992, was noted. No other points were raised, and the Court upheld the Tribunal and CIT(A) findings, dismissing the appeal without costs.

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• 2001 (7) TMI 1291
  
  Issues involved: Defamation complaint against a newspaper publisher for publishing defamatory imputations against a hospital, challenge to the trial court's discharge order based on lack of locus standi of the complainant, interpretation of Section 258 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and determination of locus standi of the complainant in a defamation case involving a company.
  
  Defamation Complaint: The complainant, the Director of a hospital, filed a defamation complaint against a newspaper publisher for publishing defamatory imputations against the hospital. The High Court directed the trial to proceed after the trial magistrate discharged the accused based on contentions regarding defamation and locus standi of the complainant.
  
  Trial Court Discharge: The trial magistrate discharged the accused based on the contention that the complainant, as the Director of the hospital, did not have the locus standi to file the complaint as the hospital was a private limited company. The magistrate held that the complainant failed to prove his status as the Director of the hospital, thus lacking the standing to file the complaint.
  
  Interpretation of Section 258: The accused challenged the High Court's decision based on Section 258 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which allows for stopping proceedings in certain cases. However, the court clarified that Section 258 applies only to summons cases instituted otherwise than upon complaints, and since the present case was instituted upon a complaint, Section 258 did not apply.
  
  Locus Standi in Defamation Case: The court discussed the complainant's locus standi in a defamation case involving a company. It was noted that under Section 199 of the Code, the complainant need not necessarily be the defamed person himself, and any person aggrieved by the publication can file a complaint. In this case, as the Director of the hospital, the complainant fell within the purview of "some person aggrieved" as per the law.
  
  Conclusion: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's decision to proceed with the trial. The court emphasized that the imputations were prima facie libellous, and the complainant, as the Director of the hospital, had the locus standi to file the defamation complaint. The court also clarified the application of Section 258 of the Code in summons cases instituted upon complaints.

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• 2001 (7) TMI 1290
  
  Issues:
  - Demand of interest by Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC) from respondents post the appeal regarding natural gas price fixation.
  
  Analysis:
  1. The main issue in this judgment revolves around the demand for interest by ONGC from the respondents after a court appeal decided the price of natural gas. The contracts between the parties ended in 1979, but subsequent court orders impliedly continued the terms of the agreements. ONGC sought interest on the principal amount due to delayed payment by the respondents. The Supreme Court held that ONGC is entitled to claim interest as per the terms of the agreements, even though the main judgment did not specifically mention interest payment.
  
  2. The Supreme Court referred to various legal precedents to support the principle of restitution, stating that when interim orders prevent payment initially but the final judgment requires payment, the recipient can claim interest by way of restitution. The Court emphasized that ONGC had the right to claim the money due to it, including interest, despite the absence of a specific direction in the main judgment regarding interest payment. The judgment upheld the price charged by ONGC and allowed the claim for interest as per the contractual terms.
  
  3. The Court allowed ONGC to claim interest from the respondents at the rate specified in the previous agreements. However, two respondents were dealt with separately and adjourned for further proceedings. ONGC was granted the right to recover the entire amount due if the respondents failed to provide undertakings for payment in instalments within two months. The judgment outlined a payment plan for the respondents to clear the interest amount in monthly instalments over five years, with provisions for immediate payment in case of defaults.
  
  4. In conclusion, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of ONGC, allowing the claim for interest on the principal amount from the respondents. The judgment provided a structured approach for the respondents to repay the interest amount in instalments, ensuring compliance with the contractual terms and facilitating the recovery of the outstanding dues by ONGC.

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• 2001 (7) TMI 1289
  
  Issues:
  1. Validity of revisional order passed by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes.
  2. Compliance with principles of natural justice and Rule 58 of the A.P. General Sales Tax Rules.
  
  Issue 1: Validity of revisional order passed by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes
  
  The appellant, a wine dealer, was assessed for the year 1992-93 under the A.P.G.S.T. Act 1957. The Appellate Deputy Commissioner allowed an appeal based on a Supreme Court decision, reducing the tax on the value of bottles and cartons. However, the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes set aside this decision, stating that liquor sales with bottles and cartons should be assessed at a higher rate. The appellant challenged the revisional order, questioning its conformity with natural justice principles and Rule 58 of the Rules. The Court examined the service of notices and found discrepancies. The Court noted that the second show cause notice proposing a significant tax revision was not properly served, violating natural justice principles and Rule 58. Consequently, the revisional order by the Commissioner was deemed invalid.
  
  Issue 2: Compliance with principles of natural justice and Rule 58 of the A.P. General Sales Tax Rules
  
  The Court analyzed Rule 58 of the Rules, which specifies modes of service for notices. It highlighted that service by affixture (Clause d) can only be used if other modes (Clauses a to c) are impracticable. The Court questioned the Department's satisfaction regarding the impracticability of other modes before resorting to affixture. The Department failed to demonstrate such satisfaction, rendering the use of affixture invalid. Additionally, the Court found that the Department did not adequately serve the second show cause notice to the appellant or their counsel, as required by Rule 58. This failure to follow proper service procedures led to a violation of natural justice principles and Rule 58. Consequently, the Court set aside the revisional order and directed a fresh disposal of proceedings, emphasizing the importance of providing the appellant with a reasonable opportunity to present their objections.
  
  This judgment underscores the significance of adhering to procedural requirements, ensuring fair treatment and opportunities for parties involved in tax assessments. It emphasizes the need for proper service of notices and compliance with legal rules to uphold principles of natural justice in administrative proceedings.

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• 2001 (7) TMI 1288
  
  The Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition regarding a customs order without interfering with the re-shipment. The delay was condoned. The citation is 2001 (7) TMI 1288 - SC.

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• 2001 (7) TMI 1287
  
  The Supreme Court dismissed the special leave petitions after condoning the delay. (Citation: 2001 (7) TMI 1287 - SC)

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• 2001 (7) TMI 1286
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Classification of 'necktie' for drawback purposes.
  2. Whether 'necktie' is a readymade garment.
  3. Whether 'necktie' is a 'made up' article.
  
  Summary:
  
  1. Classification of 'necktie' for drawback purposes:
  The primary issue in this writ application u/s 226 of the Constitution of India is whether the authorities were justified in classifying 'necktie' exported by the petitioner as "made-up articles" under Heading No. 6203(C) of the drawback table. The petitioner exported consignments of polyester neckties and claimed a drawback under Heading No. 6204, arguing that neckties are readymade garments. However, the Assistant Commissioner of Customs classified them under Heading No. 6203(C). The petitioner's appeals to the Commissioner of Customs (Appeal) and the Central Government u/s 129 (DD) of the Customs Act were dismissed, leading to this writ application.
  
  2. Whether 'necktie' is a readymade garment:
  Mr. Banerjee, counsel for the petitioner, argued that a necktie should be classified as a readymade garment under Heading 6204 based on its plain dictionary meaning. He further contended that if not a readymade garment, it should fall under Heading No. 6201. The court examined various dictionary definitions and concluded that a 'necktie' is a decorative material worn around the neck and is an accessory of clothing, not a garment itself. The court rejected the petitioner's contention that a necktie is a readymade garment, noting that it is not meant for covering the human body but is a decorative article.
  
  3. Whether 'necktie' is a 'made up' article:
  The court noted that the term 'made up' is not defined in the Drawback Schedule but is defined in the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, and the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. The authorities had classified the necktie under Heading 6203(C) by treating it as a 'made up' article. However, the court found that the use of the term "namely" in Clause 6203(A) indicates the exhaustiveness of the list of 'made up' articles. The court held that 'tie' or 'necktie' not being listed in Clause 6203(A), cannot be classified under Clause 6203(C) simply because it appears along with 'shawls' and 'scarves' in other statutes. The court concluded that the appropriate classification for 'necktie' should be under Serial No. 6201, which covers all other articles of apparel or clothing accessories not specified elsewhere.
  
  Conclusion:
  The court set aside the orders of the authorities below, directing the Assistant Commissioner of Customs to reclassify the disputed consignments of 'necktie' under Heading 6201 of the Drawback Rules within three months. The writ application succeeded, and no orders as to costs were made.

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• 2001 (7) TMI 1285
  
  The Supreme Court condoned delay, admitted appeal, and tagged with Civil Appeal No. 4789 of 2000. (Case Citation: 2001 (7) TMI 1285 - SC)

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• 2001 (7) TMI 1284
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... elay condoned. The civil appeal is dismissed.

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• 2001 (7) TMI 1283
  
  Issues involved: Challenge to High Court order under Section 11 of U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948 regarding dealer status and sales tax liability.
  
  Summary:
  The Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. Lucknow challenged a High Court order setting aside a Sales Tax Tribunal decision, which held the assessee as a dealer liable for sales tax. The appellant argued that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 11 of the Trade Tax Act by interfering with factual findings. The appellant contended that the assessee admitted to being a dealer and purchaser of tractors, as evidenced by bills and statements. The respondent argued a mixed question of law and facts existed, justifying the High Court's intervention based on a purchaser's certificate. The assessing authorities found the assessee to be a dealer based on documentary evidence like account books and Form 'C'. The High Court erred in relying on certificates to conclude the assessee was not a dealer, disregarding Section 11 limitations. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, quashing the High Court's order and reinstating the Tribunal's decisions.

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• 2001 (7) TMI 1282
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Validity of Rules 8(ii) and 15(ii) of The Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1969.
  2. Eligibility of a full-time salaried Deputy District Attorney for consideration under Article 233 of the Constitution.
  3. Alleged irregularities in the selection process, including relaxation of minimum marks.
  
  Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Validity of Rules 8(ii) and 15(ii) of The Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1969:
  The appellant in Civil Appeal No. 6469 of 1998 challenged the validity of Rules 8(ii) and 15(ii), arguing that they were ultra vires Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, as they made only those advocates eligible for consideration who had practiced in the Rajasthan High Court or subordinate courts for at least seven years. The Supreme Court examined the rationale behind these rules, which was to ensure that candidates had knowledge of local laws and regional languages. However, the Court found this reasoning fallacious, noting that for the post of Munsif in the Rajasthan Judicial Service, there was no such requirement. The Court referred to the Constitution Bench decision in J.Pandurangarao v. Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission, which held that such classifications must have a reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved. The Court concluded that the rules did not meet this test and were thus violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Consequently, Rules 8(ii) and 15(ii) were struck down.
  
  2. Eligibility of a Full-Time Salaried Deputy District Attorney:
  The appellant in Civil Appeal No. 2411 of 1999 contended that his period as a full-time salaried Deputy District Attorney should be considered as practice as an advocate. The High Court had rejected his candidature on the grounds that he was in the service of the State of Haryana and did not practice in any court. The Supreme Court noted that the High Court had erred in not calling him for an interview, as he was engaged to act and plead on behalf of the Government of Haryana in a court of law. However, the Court refused to grant any relief, as the selected candidates had already joined their duties, and the appellant was yet to be interviewed. The Court directed that in future, applications of candidates like him should be processed for direct recruitment in light of these observations.
  
  3. Alleged Irregularities in the Selection Process:
  The appellant in Civil Appeal No. 722 of 1999 challenged the selection process, alleging that two candidates were selected by relaxing the minimum marks, which was beyond the competence of the Selection Committee. The High Court dismissed this writ application, finding it devoid of any substance. The Supreme Court upheld this decision but expunged the severe strictures passed against the appellant and set aside the order awarding costs.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Supreme Court allowed Civil Appeal No. 6469 of 1998, setting aside the High Court's judgment and striking down Rules 8(ii) and 15(ii) as violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The Court made the judgment prospective, ensuring that past appointments under these rules would not be affected. The Court also allowed Civil Appeal No. 722 of 1999 by expunging the remarks against the appellant and setting aside the costs. Civil Appeal No. 2411 of 1999 was dismissed, but the Court observed that future applications of similar candidates should be processed.

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• 2001 (7) TMI 1281
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Organized Crime and Underworld Activities
  2. Criminal Conspiracy and Contract Killing
  3. Confessional Statements and Their Admissibility
  4. Role of Various Accused
  5. Evidence and Witness Testimonies
  6. Legal Provisions and Sentencing
  
  Summary:
  
  1. Organized Crime and Underworld Activities:
  The judgment discusses the pervasive influence of organized crime, particularly in Mumbai, where criminal gangs, led by notorious dons, engage in contract killings and extortion. The underworld activities, including the collection of "protection money" or "Khandani," pose significant challenges to societal peace and legal order.
  
  2. Criminal Conspiracy and Contract Killing:
  The case revolves around the murder of Pradeep Jain and the attempted murder of Sunil Jain, orchestrated by criminal dons from abroad. The respondents were charged u/s 302, 307 read with Sections 120B, 23, 114 of the IPC, and various sections of the Arms Act and TADA Act. The crime was committed to force the Jain brothers to relinquish their property.
  
  3. Confessional Statements and Their Admissibility:
  The confessional statements of A5 and A6 were crucial to the prosecution's case. These statements, recorded u/s 15 of the TADA Act, were initially excluded by the trial court due to procedural issues. However, the Supreme Court held that the confessions were voluntarily made and legally recorded, thus admissible in evidence.
  
  4. Role of Various Accused:
  - A1 and A2: The court upheld their acquittal, finding insufficient evidence to link them directly to the conspiracy for murder.
  - A3 (Subedarsingh): Convicted for extortion u/s 384 read with Section 34 IPC, as he coerced the Jain brothers to sign release deeds.
  - A4 (Shaukatali): His involvement was noted, but he had died in a police encounter.
  - A5 (Subhash Bind) and A6 (Shekhar Kadam): Convicted for murder and other offenses, sentenced to life imprisonment.
  
  5. Evidence and Witness Testimonies:
  The prosecution relied on extensive evidence, including witness testimonies and documentary proof. The confessional statements of A5 and A6 were corroborated by other evidence, such as the recovery of weapons and identification parades.
  
  6. Legal Provisions and Sentencing:
  - A3: Sentenced to two years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 5,000 for extortion.
  - A5 and A6: Convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for murder and related offenses under the IPC, Arms Act, and TADA Act. The court emphasized that the case did not warrant the death penalty.
  
  The appeal was partly allowed, modifying the trial court's judgment by convicting A3, A5, and A6, while maintaining the acquittal of A1 and A2.

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• 2001 (7) TMI 1280
  
  The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal after condoning the delay. (Case citation: 2001 (7) TMI 1280 - SC)

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