|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 401 to 420 of 479 Records
-
1998 (11) TMI 79 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ut 1 per cent. The levy of this tax has, therefore, made the acceptance of deposits by non-banking non-financial companies from the public all the more attractive. In order to ensure that the effectiveness of the monetary policy is not blurred by unrestricted growth of deposits in the non-banking sector, the Bill seeks to provide that 15 per cent. of the interest paid by non-banking non-financial companies on deposits received from the public will be disallowed in computing their taxable income. From the above delineated portion, it is manifest that sub-section (8) of section 40A of the Act was inserted to curb the tendency of the non-banking and non-financial companies resorting to indiscriminate public deposits. We are, therefore, of the view that the view taken by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) in his order, is wholly incorrect. In the result, the above-mentioned question is answered in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
-
1998 (11) TMI 78 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Amnesty Scheme, Search And Seizure ... ... ... ... ..... the Tribunal. It is correct that the Tribunal has not analysed the matter in the way we laid down the guidelines in our judgment in the case of N. C. J. John 1998 233 ITR 475 (Ker) to find out as to in what circumstances the return filed to take advantage of the Amnesty Scheme after the search operation, could be taken into consideration for the purpose of the Amnesty Scheme. It will, therefore, be nothing but appropriate to set aside the orders of the Appellate Tribunal and remand the case back to the Tribunal for passing fresh orders taking into consideration the observations made by LIS III the case of N. C. J. John 19981 233 ITR 475 (Ker). For the above reasons, we set aside the orders of the Appellate Tribunal, in so far as they relate to the above mentioned questions and return all the questions referred to this court unanswered to the Tribunal directing it to pass orders afresh taking into consideration our judgment in the case of N. C. J. John 1998 253 ITR 475 (Ker).
-
1998 (11) TMI 77 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Salary, Life Insurance Corporation ... ... ... ... ..... incurred in earning the incentive bonus in the light of our observations. The facts and circumstances remain the same in the case of the assessee before us also. We, therefore, set aside the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in this regard and remit the matter back to the Income-tax Officer with a direction to allow deduction of expenditure up to 40 per cent. of the bonus or the actual expenditure incurred by the assessee, whichever is less, in earning the incentive bonus. The Tribunal s order relating to the assessment years 1979-80 and 1980-81, which formed the basis of the decision of the Tribunal, relating to the consecutive assessment years 1982-83 to 1984-85, was set aside and the case was remanded back to the Tribunal by a judgment of this court, reported in CIT v. Varghese Mathew 1991 190 ITR 356. Following the case of Varghese Mathew 1991 190 ITR 356(Ker), we return the question unanswered and remand the case to the Tribunal to decide the appeals afresh.
-
1998 (11) TMI 76 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Search And Seizure ... ... ... ... ..... ts in their favour. In the order referred to by the Income-tax Department in Crl. R. P. No. 571 of 1996 (Ibrahim Othayoth v. Sub-Inspector of Police 1998 232 ITR 320 (Ker)), and connected cases, it is a case where the Department themselves applied for release of the articles seized. The question under section 132A was not raised or considered in that case. For the above reasons, the warrant issued under section 132A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, by the Commissioner of Income-tax and the seizure of the gold from the custody of the court is held to be without jurisdiction. Therefore, the third respondent is directed to return the gold seized forthwith to the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-II, Thiruvananthapuram, and the fourth respondent is directed to consider the applications pending before it along with any application that may be filed by the Income-tax Department for the release of the gold in accordance with law. The original petition is allowed in the above terms.
-
1998 (11) TMI 75 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Reference, Exports, Special Deduction, Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... n their interpretation of section 80HHC of the Income-tax Act and in holding that the agreement between the assessee and the export house supersedes the above section particularly in their finding that the benefits not reserved for any of the parties cannot be conferred on one as against the other party unless the other party files disclaimer certificate ? In our opinion, the following question does arise from the Tribunal s order dated March 28, 1995 On the facts and in the circumstances of the case whether the Tribunal was right in holding that on the basis of the terms of the contract between the assessee and the export house, in the absence of a disclaimer certificate from the export house, the assessee is not entitled to the benefit of section 80HHC of the Income-tax Act ? Since the questions formulated by the assessee do not point out the real controversy, we direct the Appellate Tribunal to refer the above stated question reframed by us, for the opinion of this court.
-
1998 (11) TMI 74 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income Tax, Tenants-in-common ... ... ... ... ..... in the common properties. (emphasis supplied) The question in the above authority was whether joint owners could be assessed in the status of tenants-in-common as held by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner. As already pointed out, tenants-in-common are not an assessable entity. Under charging section 3(1), the assessable entity is person . However, the learned judge held that a tenant-in-common is an individual and he has to be assessed in that status, meaning thereby, as person, which is an assessable entity under the Act. Therefore, this authority does not benefit the respondents, but that supports the view which we have taken in the matter. For the above reasons, we are of the considered view that sub-section (9B) of section 13 is merely explanatory and that tenants-in-common, who hold an extent of property not exceeding 20 hectares, are entitled to the benefit of compounding as persons under section 13(1) of the Act. In the result, all the TRCs succeed and are allowed.
-
1998 (11) TMI 73 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income Tax, Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... the appellant-company at any stage of assessment or appeal. The appellant-company has not done that before us also. Instead, the appellant is pleading before us for a blanket acceptance of eligibility for deduction for the nomenclature head office expenses . This is not sufficient for our interference on the point. In the circumstances, we are unable to interfere on the point and we uphold the findings of the lower authorities. From the order of the Tribunal, it is clear that the claim of the assessee for deduction was not accepted for want of evidence. No evidence in support of its claim, much less cogent evidence, has been pointed out to us as well by the assessee. In the absence of evidence, the claim of the assessee could not be accepted and, therefore, we do not see any prima facie illegality in the view taken by the Appellate Tribunal. The above mentioned question is, therefore, answered in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the Department and against the assessee.
-
1998 (11) TMI 72 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Reassessment, Condition Precedent, Reason To Believe, Income Escaped Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... guage of section 32AB, no person informed of the provision of law, and as an Assessing Officer entrusted with implementation of the Act, the presumption is that he is aware about the provision at least for the breach of which he is seeking to initiate action under section 147, on the plain reading of section 32AB can hold a belief that a trader simpliciter is not carrying on eligible business. We are of the opinion that the impugned notice has been issued on mere pretext without having any ground for holding belief that income has escaped assessment without application of mind to the provision of law of which violation is assumed. Formation of subjective belief in such a case cannot be sustained. The conclusion is irresistible that action under section 147 has been initiated de hors the provisions of section 32AB of the Income-tax Act which makes it ultra vires and void. As a result, the impugned notices are quashed. Rule is made absolute. There shall be no order as to costs.
-
1998 (11) TMI 71 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Reassessment, Limitation, ITO ... ... ... ... ..... sessment, for that assessment year. We have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion on the facts stated above, and in view of the reasons disclosed by the Assessing Officer that the proviso is applicable to the facts of these petitions, and the notices issued in each of the cases, after the expiry of four years from the end of the relevant assessment years 1984-85/1985-86 are beyond the period of four years from the end of that assessment year as en-visaged under the aforesaid proviso and the Assessing Officer had no jurisdiction to issue notice under section 147 in these cases after March 31, 1989, in the case of the assessment year 1984-85 and after March 31, 1990, in the case of the assessment year 1985-86. The initiation of action in each case under section 147 is clearly barred by time. Accordingly, these petitions succeed. Notices under section 148 read with section 147 in each of the cases above are quashed. Rule is made absolute. There shall be no order as to costs.
-
1998 (11) TMI 70 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Limitation, Powers Of High Court, Power To Remand, Central Government, Pre-emptive Purchase, Appropriate Authority
-
1998 (11) TMI 69 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Firm, Assessment, Reconstitution Or Succession, Firm Consisting, Partners ... ... ... ... ..... the death of Jayantilal, as provided in section 42 of the Partnership Act. In our opinion, no exception can be taken to the decision of the Tribunal on the question about the coming to an end of the existing partnership on the death of the partner under the Partnership Act when there was no contract to the contrary. If that be so, the consequence would follow that the existing partnership firm of which the deceased was a partner would be assessed only up to the date up to which it existed and for the period thereafter the new firm which has come into existence by dint of a new partnership deed will be assessed for the remainder of the previous year, relating to the said assessment year. This also is the view taken by this court in CIT v. G. Dalabhai and Co. 1997 226 ITR 922. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, we answer the questions referred to us in the affirmative, that is to say, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. There shall be no order as to costs.
-
1998 (11) TMI 68 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Total Income, HUF, Inclusions In Total Income, Karta, Firm ... ... ... ... ..... a partner in a partnership firm as an individual, i.e., in his individual capacity. It is not attracted where he is a partner as the karta of the Hindu undivided family to which such wife and/or minor children belong. This is the holding of the decisions of this court in L. Hirday Narain s case 1970 78 ITR 26 Harbhajan Lal s case 1993 204 ITR 361 and Jayantilal Prem Chand Shah s case 1995 211 ITR 111. It may not be quite apt to say that vis-a-vis the members of the Hindu undivided family, the karta is still an individual and, therefore, such income of wife and minor children should be included in the income of the karta derived as karta. Nor are we satisfied that such income of the wife and/or minor children should be included in the individual assessment of the karta. In view of the aforesaid declaration of law, the question referred above is answered in the affirmative, that is to say, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. There shall be no order as to costs.
-
1998 (11) TMI 67 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Royalty, Foreign Company, Rate Of Tax ... ... ... ... ..... ned in drawings of documentation at Switzerland. We therefore answer the questions referred to us, namely --- (i) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and having regard to the provisions of section 9 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Appellate Tribunal is right and had valid materials to hold that the collaboration agreement with the company does not fall under section 115A(1)(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ? (ii) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and having regard to the provisions of section 9 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Tribunal is right and had valid materials to hold that the collaboration agreement fell under section 115A(1)(ii) of the Act and, therefore, only 20 per cent. of the technical know-how fees received by the assessee to be brought to tax as income arising in India ? in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The assessee shall be entitled to costs in the sum of Rs. 2,000 (rupees two thousand) only.
-
1998 (11) TMI 66 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Reassessment, Extension Of Period Of Limitation, Writ ... ... ... ... ..... n 147, therefore, cannot be sustained. As the error here is one of jurisdiction it is not necessary for the assessee to have recourse to the remedies by way of appeal, revision, etc. It is well settled that when a jurisdictional error is brought to the notice of this court such errors are capable of being corrected by this court in exercise of the court s powers under article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Progressive Engineering 1993 200 ITR 231 (sic), held that when all the relevant facts were before the court and the law is clear on the subject, it is the duty of the High Court to interfere. That was also a case where the proceedings were sought to be initiated against the assessee under section 147 of the Act. The impugned notice is, therefore, quashed. The respondent is prohibited from taking any further proceedings, pursuant to that notice. The writ petition is allowed, with costs of Rs. 2,000. Connected W. M. P. s are closed.
-
1998 (11) TMI 65 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Double Taxation Relief ... ... ... ... ..... the income received by the assessee in Malaysia is not taxable in India, having regard to the provisions of the agreement entered into between the two countries for avoidance of double taxation. Counsel for the Revenue sought for a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court on the ground that the question involved is one of general importance and one that requires to be decided by the Supreme Court. Counsel also submitted that Civil Appeals Nos. 5751 to 5757 of 1997 are pending in the Supreme Court against the decision of this court in the case of CIT v. VR. S. R. M. Firm 1994 208 ITR 400. Having regard to the fact that the Supreme Court is already seized of the matter, and the question is one which involves the interpretation of the agreement between India and Malaysia and the question is one of general importance and is one which is required to be decided by the Supreme Court, we grant the certificate as prayed for under article 134A of the Constitution of India.
-
1998 (11) TMI 64 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Double Taxation Relief ... ... ... ... ..... e answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Following the judgment reported in CIT v. VR. S. R. M. Firm 1994 208 ITR 400 (Mad) and for the reasons stated therein, we answer these questions referred to us, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Counsel for the Revenue made an oral application for a certificate of fitness for appeal to the Supreme Court. Having regard to the fact that the questions involve the interpretation of an international treaty, the questions are of general importance and the questions involved are substantial questions of law with regard to the extent of the benefits conferred on the assessee in India in terms of that agreement, we grant the certificate sought. The questions need to be decided by the apex court. We do so also in the light of the fact that Civil Appeals Nos. 5751 to 5757 of 1997 are pending in the apex court against the decision of this court rendered in the case of CIT v. VR. S. R. M. Firm 1994 208 ITR 400.
-
1998 (11) TMI 63 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Association Of Persons, Condition Precedent ... ... ... ... ..... f the Commissioner. This court in the case of CIT v. A. U. Chandrasekharan 1998 229 ITR 406 has held that in the case of several persons entering into a written agreement for purchase of lottery tickets from contributions, the winnings have to be equally distributed and the prize money is assessable in the status of association of persons under section 2(24) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, since the two conditions for assessing the income under the status of an association of persons (a) that there must be joint venture, and (b) that the object of the joint venture must be to earn income, had been satisfied and, therefore, the assessees were assessable in the status of association of persons. In the instant case, the two conditions are satisfied and, therefore, following the above decision and for the reasons stated therein, we answer the question in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee, holding that the assessees are assessable as an association of persons. No costs.
-
1998 (11) TMI 62 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Income From House Property, Deduction, Condition Precedent ... ... ... ... ..... 1973, which falls in previous year relevant to asst. yr. 1975-76, as the assessee had his previous year ending on Diwali. Thus, the claim could be considered for deduction in respect of asst. yr. 1975-76 only. 9. Thus, our answer to the question referred to us is that so far as the assessee s claim to deduction in respect of unrealisable arrears of rent from M/s Dadaji Dhagji and Co. is concerned, the assessee does not press for such claim any more for the years in question and to that extent the disallowance of claim to deduction by the Tribunal cannot be said to be erroneous. However, so far as assessee s claim to deduction in respect of unrealised rent from M/s De Smet India (P) Ltd. is concerned, the Tribunal was not justified in denying the claim for the reasons for which it has been denied to it in the order out of which this reference has arisen, and that part of the order is erroneous in law. 10. The reference stands disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.
-
1998 (11) TMI 61 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Territorial Jurisdiction, Reassessment, Notice, Writ
... ... ... ... ..... y the Supreme Court in Baldev Singh's vs. CIT was not brought to the notice of the Punjab High Court. We express our respectful dissent with the view so taken for the reasons stated above. 17. There is yet another reason why we are not inclined to inference with the notices under s. 148. The notices were issued in the years 1993 and 1995. These petitions have been filed in the year 1997, i.e., after a lapse of more than four and two years, respectively, from the dates of the notices. Assessments have been finalised. The question of jurisdiction having received the attention of the CIT(A), was left at large to be dealt with by the AO pursuant to the orders of remand. At such at belated stage the petitioner cannot be shown indulgence in exercise of writ jurisdiction of this Court. For the foregoing reasons, we find the petitioners not entitled to any relief in exercise of writ jurisdiction of this Court. Both the petitions are dismissed though without any order as to costs.
-
1998 (11) TMI 60 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Ceiling On Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... as right to the extent that the expenditure of each individual employee is required to be considered under the sub-rule. However the claim of the assessee that all the trips undertaken by an employee can be clubbed together cannot be accepted in view of specific provisions contained in clause (b) of sub-rule (2) of rule 6D and the proviso appearing thereunder. We are therefore of the opinion that there is nothing in sub-rule (2) of rule 6D of the Rules which may give even the slightest indication to support the contention of the assessee. Rather the use of the words an employee and such employee clearly leads to the conclusion that the expenditure for the purpose of rule 6D(2) of the Rules is to be considered on the basis of each trip of an individual employee outside the headquarters. For the conclusion arrived at by us above question No. (iii) is answered in the negative i.e. in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. Reference stands answered accordingly. No costs.
....
|
