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Showing 441 to 460 of 569 Records
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1997 (7) TMI 129
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals related to the classification of 'bars', 'flats', 'hop', 'strips' manufactured by the respondents, citing a previous judgment where they were classified under tariff Item 26(AA), sub-item (ia) of the Central Excise Tariff. No costs were awarded. (Citation: 1997 (7) TMI 129 - SC)
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1997 (7) TMI 128
The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision that maintenance and service charges are part of the cost of packing for durable and returnable containers used for liquid chlorine. The respondent's claim for deduction of packing costs was allowed. The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs. (Case citation: 1997 (7) TMI 128 - SC)
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1997 (7) TMI 127
Issues: Classification of products under Central Excise Tariff, Bar of limitation for duty demand
Classification Issue:
The case involved a dispute regarding the classification of Carbon Paper and Carbonised Adding Machine Rolls under the Central Excise Tariff. The respondent initially classified the products under Tariff Item 68 but later faced a show cause notice to reclassify them under Tariff Item 17(2) due to a change in the definition. The Assistant Collector initially approved the classification under Tariff Item 68 but later directed the respondent to pay duty under Tariff Item 17(2). The Tribunal partially allowed the appeal, classifying Carbonised Adding Machine Rolls under Tariff Item 17(2) and Carbon Paper under Tariff Item 68. However, a previous Supreme Court judgment established that Carbon Paper should be classified under Tariff Item 17(2), leading to the Tribunal's decision being set aside.
Bar of Limitation Issue:
The second issue revolved around the bar of limitation for duty demand. The Tribunal held that the demand preceding six months from the show cause notice date was barred by limitation. The appellant argued that since the Assistant Collector's order directed duty payment for six months before the show cause notice of December 29, 1979, that period should not be considered time-barred. However, the Court rejected this argument, stating that until the order of July 2, 1980, no decision was made on the classification. As the demand notice was issued on September 1, 1980, the Tribunal's decision on the limitation period was upheld.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court upheld the classification of Carbon Paper under Tariff Item 17(2) and affirmed the Tribunal's decision on the bar of limitation for duty demand. The appeals were disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1997 (7) TMI 126
The Supreme Court held that equalised freight cannot be part of assessable value for excise duty. The Tribunal's decision was overturned, and the appeals were allowed. (Case citation: 1997 (7) TMI 126 - SC)
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1997 (7) TMI 125
Whether the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering that the allegations contained in the third show cause notice should be looked into for the purpose of adjudication, on remand, of the first and second show cause notices?
Held that:- It is to be noted that the High Court by its order dated 21st July, 1994, permitted the assessee and the Revenue to file appeals against the said adjudication order within two months, but the Revenue did not take advantage thereof and filed its appeal only on 13th December, 1994.
The Tribunal found no legal difficulty in holding that the allegations contained in the third show cause notice should be looked into for the purpose of adjudication of the first and second show cause notices. We find great difficulty in upholding the Tribunal's view. As we see it, each show cause notice must be limited to the case that is made out therein by the Revenue. It is not within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to direct otherwise; to do so is to go beyond its purely adjudicatory function. Appeal allowed.
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1997 (7) TMI 124
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, stating it is covered by a previous decision related to Section 11A of the Central Excise Act. No costs were awarded. (Citation: 1997 (7) TMI 124 - SC)
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1997 (7) TMI 123
The Supreme Court considered the appeal regarding the assessee's claim for refund of Rs. 7,18,671.55 in a duty matter. The Court set aside previous orders and remitted the matter to the Assistant Collector for a fresh decision in accordance with the law. The issue of unjust enrichment was also discussed in light of a previous court decision.
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1997 (7) TMI 122
The Supreme Court decided that pulverisation of rock phosphate does not amount to a process of manufacture for duty purposes. The Tribunal's decision was upheld, dismissing the appeals. The Court referenced a previous case to support its decision.
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1997 (7) TMI 121
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals regarding the classification of elastic rail clips under the Central Excise Tariff, as the Department accepted the Tribunal's decision in Sikka Heat Treatment Centre, which overruled the earlier judgments. The impugned judgments of the Tribunal were set aside.
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1997 (7) TMI 120
The Supreme Court dismissed Civil Appeal Nos. 11333-34 of 1995 as not pressed. In Civil Appeal No. 3375 of 1991, the appeal was allowed, and the Tribunal's order was set aside due to Modvat credit being given on inputs used in the manufacture of sand moulds for subsequent production of iron castings.
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1997 (7) TMI 119
Issues involved:
The effective date for raising demand under Section 37B of the Central Excises and Salt Act and the application of Section 11A in the present case.
Judgment Summary:
Issue 1: Effective date for raising demand under Section 37B
The appellant contended that the demand could not be from any date prior to the issuance of trade notice No. 29 on 5-11-1992, which notified the reclassification. It was argued that actions under Section 37B are effective from the date of notification or publication, as per existing practice. The Board's order dated 24th September, 1992, was only published on 5-11-1992, and hence, the demand by the revenue cannot be prior to this date. The use of the word "henceforth" by the Board also supported this interpretation. The Court accepted this submission, holding that the demand cannot be from any date before 5-11-1992.
Issue 2: Application of Section 11A and refund claim
It was noted that the duty had already been paid by the appellant. The Court emphasized that the discipline of amended Section 11B must be followed for claiming a refund, and it is the appellant's burden to demonstrate that the duty has not been passed on to consumers to support the refund claim. Consequently, the appeals were allowed, and the Tribunal's orders were set aside.
This judgment clarifies the significance of the effective date for raising demands under Section 37B and the requirements for claiming a refund under Section 11B, emphasizing the burden of proof on the appellant regarding passing on the duty to consumers.
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1997 (7) TMI 118
Whether an assessee is liable to pay interest under Section 10A of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941, on the turnover tax for the period during which recovery of the tax amount was stopped by orders of the High Court?
Held that:- Here it is admitted that the appellants have not mentioned the amount of turnover or the tax payable thereon in the return filed by them. If that be so the consequence is that they have failed to furnish a return which is "referred to in Section 10". The corollary is that there was failure to furnish the return as envisaged in sub-section (2). Thus, the liability to pay interest commenced under that sub-section at the very moment the assessing authority made the assessment under Section 11. Interest thereon would start accruing from the date prescribed for furnishing the correct return in accordance with Section 10.
We are, therefore, not adopting a construction which would upset or even impair the purpose in introducing Section 10A in the Act. The return to be filed by the dealer is the full and correct return as referred to in Section 10 and on failure to furnish such a return the liability to pay interest from the prescribed date would arise when assessment is completed. Appeal dismissed.
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1997 (7) TMI 117
Whether the `animal feed supplement' would fall under the Exemption Notification dated 1-11-1982?
Held that:- It must be noted that presumably the amendment to exemption Notification No. 234/82 by a subsequent Notification No. 6/84-C.E., dated 15-2-1984 was not before the Court for consideration. The majority view also failed to take note of the subsequent amendment to the main exemption Notification as well as the effect of the amendment
The appellant is entitled to the refund under the relevant Exemption Notification. However, it is for the concerned authority to further look into the refund applications and pass orders in the light of the ratio laid down by this Court in Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India (1996 (12) TMI 50 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA). The appeals are accordingly allowed.
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1997 (7) TMI 116
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal citing a previous court decision in CIT v. Canara Workshops P. Ltd. [1986] 161 ITR 320. The judgment under appeal was set aside with no order as to costs. (1997 (7) TMI 116 - SC)
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1997 (7) TMI 115
The Supreme Court overruled the judgment under appeal in the case of Ganesh Dass Sreeram v. ITO [1988] 169 ITR 221 (SC). The appeals are allowed with no order as to costs.
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1997 (7) TMI 114
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal in a case involving the reopening of an assessment, stating that there was material to support the Income-tax Officer's decision and it was not a mere change of opinion. The Court held that acceptance of the assessee's case in the original assessment did not prevent the Officer from reopening the assessment based on new findings in a subsequent year. No costs were awarded. (Case citation: 1997 (7) TMI 114 - SC)
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1997 (7) TMI 113
Whether a sum of ₹ 79 lakhs representing debenture redemption reserve was includible in computing the capital of the assessee-company for the purpose of the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964?
Held that: The basic principle is that any amount retained by way of providing for a known liability will not be " reserve ". Explanation to rule 1 of the Second Schedule to the Surtax Act takes this principle to its logical conclusion by providing that even a sinking fund, which has to be shown as a reserve in the prescribed form of balance-sheet, will not be treated as " reserve " for the purpose of computation of capital.
It is further to be noted that the surplus and unallocated balance in the profit and loss account has been specifically excluded from " reserves " for computation of capital under the Surtax Act. Therefore, availability of the amount for utilisation as working capital of the company or for distribution of dividend cannot be a criterion for deciding whether a particular amount retained from the profits of the company will be treated as its reserve or not. Appeal dismissed.
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1997 (7) TMI 112
Whether the Tribunal was justified in confirming the disallowance claimed by the accountable persons under section 48 of the Act in respect of the death duty paid in U. K., interest paid on death duty in U. K., interest payment to Lloyds Bank in U. K., and loss on devaluation ?
Held that:- Allowance of the estate duty paid in the U. K. was given in the estate duty payable in this country. The amount of pound sterling 75,320.12 as the death duty paid in U. K. cannot be treated as an expense which the appellants are entitled to claim as an additional expense in administering or in realising the property falling under section 48 of the Act. The appellants are only entitled to deduction of the death duty paid in England out of the estate duty payable as computed by the authorities under the Act in this country. It is difficult to accept the argument of the appellant that relief granted by way of avoidance of double taxation is not a relief under the provisions of the Act and that there is a distinction between the relief under the agreement entered into by virtue of the provisions of section 30 and the relief to be given under section 48 of the Act.
As regards the interest paid on delayed payment of the death duty in England and interest on service charges paid to the Lloyds Bank, it is necessary to note that the property in U. K. consisted of certain deposits and war bonds which could be easily realised. We see no justification for allowing the claim in respect of these two items, finding of the Appellate Tribunal has not been questioned by the appellants. So far as the amount of pound sterling 4,855.55 towards solicitor's fee in London is concerned the Appellate Controller of Estate Duty held that it was an additional expense in administering or in realising the property by reason of the property being situate outside India and deduction was, therefore, allowed. Appeal dismissed.
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1997 (7) TMI 111
Issues:
1. Interpretation of provisions regarding treatment of short-term capital loss and long-term capital gain under the Income-tax Act, 1961.
2. Assessment of statutory deductions under section 80T.
3. Referral of a question of law to the High Court under section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Analysis:
The judgment pertains to a petition filed by the Commissioner of Income-tax under section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, seeking a mandamus to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Chandigarh. The main question raised was whether the Tribunal was correct in not allowing the short-term capital loss to be mingled with long-term capital gain for the purpose of claiming deductions under section 80T. The assessee, an individual, had declared a net income for a specific assessment year, including gains from the sale of equity shares and preference shares. The Income-tax Officer disputed the cost of acquisition of preference shares, leading to a short-term loss discrepancy. The Assessing Officer allowed statutory deductions under section 80T based on the adjusted figures and assessed the remaining income to tax. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) upheld the working out of capital gains but provided relief in deduction under section 80T. Subsequently, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal allowed the appeal by directing that short-term capital loss be treated as a loss of the current year and deductions under section 80T be allowed on the entire long-term capital gain amount.
The Tribunal's decision was challenged by the Revenue through a petition under section 256(2) to refer the question of law to the High Court. The Tribunal initially dismissed the petition, stating that its decision was in accordance with the law. However, the High Court, upon hearing the Department's counsel, found that a question of law did arise from the Tribunal's order. The High Court modified the question and directed the Tribunal to refer the question of law, focusing on whether the Tribunal was correct in not deducting the short-term capital loss from the long-term capital gain while allowing statutory deductions under section 80T of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The High Court emphasized that the interpretation of statutory provisions giving rise to a question of law warranted a referral for the court's opinion.
In conclusion, the judgment delves into the intricate interplay between short-term capital loss, long-term capital gain, and statutory deductions under the Income-tax Act, 1961. It underscores the significance of accurate assessment and treatment of capital gains and losses in determining taxable income and allowable deductions. The High Court's decision to refer the question of law highlights the importance of clarity and consistency in applying tax laws to ensure fair and equitable tax treatment for taxpayers.
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1997 (7) TMI 110
Issues:
1. Deduction of liability on account of dividend on preference shares.
2. Deduction of tax payable in Malaysia under section 40(a)(ii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Analysis:
1. The assessee, an Indian company, claimed deduction on account of dividend paid on preference shares during the assessment year 1982-83. However, the claim was disallowed under section 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) and the Tribunal also confirmed the disallowance. The Tribunal referred two questions of law under section 256(1) of the Act. The first question was whether the assessee was entitled to the deduction of the liability on account of dividend on preference shares. The court answered this question against the company based on similar references for the earlier years, holding that the company is not entitled to claim such deduction.
2. The second question revolved around the deduction of tax payable in Malaysia under section 40(a)(ii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The court analyzed the relevant sections of the Act, particularly section 40(a)(ii) and section 5, to determine the tax treatment of income accrued in Malaysia. The court noted that the income arising in Malaysia was part of the total income of the company as per the Act's provisions, deeming the company a resident in India. The court emphasized that the tax paid in Malaysia on the profits accrued there cannot be deducted for computing taxable income under the Act. Section 40(a)(ii) clearly states that sums paid on account of tax levied on profits or gains of any business cannot be deducted, even if the tax is paid outside India. Therefore, the court answered the second question against the assessee, concluding that the tax paid in Malaysia cannot be claimed as a deduction.
3. In summary, the court's judgment upheld the disallowance of the deduction on account of dividend on preference shares and the tax payable in Malaysia for the assessment year 1982-83. The decision was based on the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961, specifically sections 40(a)(ii) and 5, which restrict the deduction of certain expenses and taxes for computing taxable income. The court's interpretation of the relevant sections led to the conclusion that the assessee was not entitled to claim these deductions, resulting in the dismissal of the company's claims in this regard.
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