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Showing 81 to 100 of 209 Records

• 1980 (9) TMI 145
  
  Issues:
  1. Whether the conversion of proprietary business into a partnership constitutes a gift.
  2. Whether the transfer of property was without consideration.
  3. Valuation of the gift for tax purposes.
  
  Issue 1: Conversion of proprietary business into partnership - Gift or not
  
  The appeal was against the order confirming the assessment made on the assessee for converting his sole proprietorship business into a partnership. The contention was that this conversion did not involve a gift. The GTO determined the value of the gift as Rs. 85,520, considering the transfer of 90% of the right to share profits without consideration. The assessee argued that the capital contribution and agreement to bear losses by other partners constituted consideration, relying on relevant case laws. The Tribunal noted that the transaction involved the grant of partnership in property, constituting a transfer. It held that the conversion amounted to a gift, as per the decision in CGT vs. V.A.H. Ayya Nadar.
  
  Issue 2: Transfer of property without consideration
  
  The question was whether the transfer of the proprietary business into a partnership was without consideration. The assessee argued that the capital contribution and agreement to bear losses by other partners constituted consideration. The Tribunal referred to a case where the transfer was deemed to have consideration due to capital contribution and service rendered. In this case, the partners contributed only Rs. 101 each, while the bulk of the capital was contributed by the assessee. The Tribunal found the capital contribution by other partners illusory, with no prior experience in the business, leading to the conclusion that the transaction amounted to a gift.
  
  Issue 3: Valuation of the gift
  
  The GTO valued the gift at Rs. 85,520, considering average profits, interest on capital, and managerial remuneration. The assessee argued for higher interest and remuneration rates. The Tribunal agreed with the assessee's contentions and recalculated the value of the gift at Rs. 53,877, considering a higher interest rate and managerial remuneration. The appeal was allowed in part, modifying the assessment to reflect the revised taxable gift amount.
  
  This detailed analysis of the judgment highlights the issues surrounding the conversion of a proprietary business into a partnership, the consideration involved in such transfers, and the valuation of gifts for tax purposes as determined by the Tribunal.

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• 1980 (9) TMI 144
  
  The appellate tribunal upheld the decision of the first appellate authority in the case of M/s. Krishna Bone Crushing Industries, Madras for asst. yr. 1975-76. The tribunal found no grounds for rejecting the accounts and dismissed the appeal. The gross profit and wastage variations were not significant enough to warrant rejection of accounts.

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• 1980 (9) TMI 143
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Inclusion of Rs. 4,000 as the value of the deceased's share in the goodwill of the firm.
  2. Inclusion of Rs. 30,000 thrown into the common hotchpot of the HUF under Section 10 of the ED Act.
  3. Inclusion of Rs. 13,000 gifted by the deceased to his son, daughter-in-law, and granddaughter under Section 10 of the ED Act.
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Inclusion of Rs. 4,000 as the value of the deceased's share in the goodwill of the firm:
  The accountable person contended that the firm, M/s Rajputana Trading House, did not have any goodwill since it was merely trading in grocery articles. However, the tribunal rejected this contention, stating that the firm had been in existence for 25-30 years in a significant commercial locality, thereby earning some goodwill. The tribunal also addressed the computation of the goodwill value. It accepted the contention that interest on capital should be allowed at 12% instead of 10%, but upheld the remuneration to partners at Rs. 500 per month. Consequently, the average net income for three years was recalculated to Rs. 10,729, and the goodwill was valued at Rs. 16,000, with the deceased's share being Rs. 2,500.
  
  2. Inclusion of Rs. 30,000 thrown into the common hotchpot of the HUF under Section 10 of the ED Act:
  The accountable person argued that the Rs. 30,000 thrown into the common hotchpot by the deceased was not a disposition and hence not a gift, relying on decisions from the Madras High Court. The tribunal noted that the departmental representative contended that the transaction amounted to a disposition under Explanation 2 to Section 2(15) of the ED Act, making it a gift under Section 27, and thus, includable under Section 10. However, the tribunal referred to the Madras High Court decisions in A.N.K. Rajamani Ammal vs. CED and CED vs. Smt. Mookammal, which held that such transactions did not amount to a disposition. The tribunal concluded that Rs. 30,000 should be treated as belonging to the HUF and only the deceased's share therein should be deemed to have passed on his death under Section 7 of the ED Act.
  
  3. Inclusion of Rs. 13,000 gifted by the deceased to his son, daughter-in-law, and granddaughter under Section 10 of the ED Act:
  The tribunal addressed the inclusion of Rs. 13,000 gifted by the deceased to his son, daughter-in-law, and granddaughter. Although the gifted amounts remained in the firm where the deceased was a partner, the tribunal referred to the Supreme Court decision in CED vs. Kantilal Trikamlal, which held that mere enjoyment or benefit by the donor in the gifted property does not attract Section 10 unless it is clearly referable to the gift. Thus, the tribunal held that the inclusion of Rs. 13,000 was not justified and directed its deletion.
  
  Conclusion:
  The appeal was allowed in part. The tribunal directed that the assessment be modified to reflect the revised value of the deceased's share in the goodwill of the firm as Rs. 2,500, excluded the Rs. 30,000 thrown into the common hotchpot of the HUF from being deemed to have passed under Section 10, and deleted the inclusion of Rs. 13,000 gifted to the deceased's relatives.

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• 1980 (9) TMI 127
  
  Issues:
  Appeal against dismissal of appeals by Asstt. Commr. of Agrl. IT for assessment years 1973-74, 1974-75, and 1978-79.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Dismissal of Appeals by Asstt. Commr. of Agrl. IT:
  The appeals were filed by a public limited company against the assessments made by the Agrl. ITO for the years 1973-74, 1974-75, and 1978-79. The Agrl. ITO finalized the assessments under section 17(3) due to the non-appearance of the assessee and failure to produce accounts despite notices. The Asstt. Commr. of Agrl. IT dismissed the appeals stating that the assessments should have been made under section 17(4) instead of 17(3) as the appellants did not produce the required accounts. The appellants argued that they maintained proper accounts, filed returns supported by statements, and cooperated with the assessing authority by attending with accounts and vouchers on multiple occasions. The Tribunal found discrepancies in whether the appellants actually produced accounts before the Agrl. ITO and held that the assessments were completed without proper verification of accounts, warranting a remand for disposal according to law after verification.
  
  2. Assessment Procedure and Legal Interpretation:
  The Agrl. ITO assessed the appellants by estimating income based on village accounts after issuing notices for production of accounts. The Asstt. Commr. of Agrl. IT's dismissal of the appeals was challenged on the grounds that the assessments were completed under section 17(3) and not 17(4), denying the appellants the opportunity to apply for cancellation of assessments under section 19. The Tribunal cited precedents and emphasized that assessments can be completed under section 17(3) even if the appellants fail to comply with notice under section 17(2). The Tribunal concluded that the assessments were not completed under section 17(4) and ordered a remand for proper verification of accounts before disposal.
  
  3. Tribunal Decision and Refund of Fees:
  In the final decision, the Tribunal remanded the appeals back to the Asstt. Commr. of Agrl. IT for disposal according to law after verifying the accounts. It was also ordered that the institution fees paid for the appeals would be refunded in full.
  
  This judgment highlights the importance of proper compliance with assessment procedures, the distinction between sections 17(3) and 17(4) of the Act, and the necessity for thorough verification of accounts before finalizing assessments.

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• 1980 (9) TMI 125
  
  The ITAT Jaipur allowed the appeal of M/s Mahavir Kirana Store, Rawatbhata for the assessment year 1976-77. The ITAT held that a composite appeal challenging both the assessment under section 143(3) and the refusal of registration under section 185(b) was competent. The matter of refusal of registration was remanded back to the AAC for fresh consideration. The appeal by the assessee was allowed for statistical purposes.

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• 1980 (9) TMI 124
  
  The Revenue sought to refer questions of law to the High Court regarding properties held on monthly tenancy and exclusion of sum from net wealth. Tribunal declined as no referable question of law arose. AAC and Tribunal held assessee was merely a tenant who sublet properties, with no interest therein. Tribunal's finding of monthly tenancy is a finding of fact, no question of law arises.

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• 1980 (9) TMI 123
  
  The appeal was filed by the assessee for the assessment year 1976-77 against the order of the AAC regarding a deemed gift due to retirement from a partnership firm. The ITAT Jaipur held that there was no right to share future profits upon retirement, based on a decision by the Madras High Court, and allowed the appeal. (Case: 1980 (9) TMI 123 - ITAT JAIPUR)

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• 1980 (9) TMI 122
  
  Issues:
  - Application by the Department under s. 256(1) of the IT Act, 1961 for making a reference of questions of law arising out of the Tribunal's order.
  - Assessment for the asst. yr. 1972-73 with undisclosed income.
  - Penalty proceedings under s. 271(1)(c) for unexplained investments.
  - Tribunal's decision on the unexplained investment in a fixed deposit.
  - Application of penalty under s. 271(1)(c) and the explanation provided.
  - Tribunal's analysis of the evidence and decision on the penalty imposition.
  - Rejection of the Revenue's application based on the Tribunal's factual findings.
  
  Analysis:
  1. The Department sought to refer questions of law under s. 256(1) of the IT Act, 1961, but the Tribunal declined as it found no question of law arising from the order.
  
  2. The assessment for the asst. yr. 1972-73 revealed undisclosed income, including unexplained investments in house property, income from a truck plying business, and a fixed deposit, leading to penalty proceedings under s. 271(1)(c). The penalty of Rs. 25,000 was reduced to Rs. 10,000 on appeal to the Tribunal.
  
  3. The Tribunal examined the case of unexplained investment in a fixed deposit, where the assessee's wife claimed the deposit was made from her past savings. Despite discrepancies in her financial records, the Tribunal considered the possibility that the amount belonged to the wife, leading to the cancellation of the penalty based on the explanation provided.
  
  4. The Tribunal emphasized that while the addition of the amount to the assessee's income was justified for assessment purposes, the penalty imposition required a different standard of proof. Citing legal precedents, the Tribunal concluded that the explanation, though not fully substantiated, was not proven false beyond doubt, warranting the cancellation of the penalty.
  
  5. Ultimately, the Tribunal rejected the Revenue's application, highlighting that its decision was based on the factual evaluation of the evidence on record, precluding the existence of a question of law for reference.
  
  This detailed analysis of the Tribunal's decision provides insights into the assessment, penalty imposition, evidentiary considerations, and legal standards applied in the case, culminating in the rejection of the Revenue's application for reference.

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• 1980 (9) TMI 121
  
  The appeal was against a penalty of Rs. 2,691 under s. 271(1)(a) of the IT Act, 1961 for the asst. yr. 1974-75. The delay in filing the return was due to serious disputes between partners and a family illness. The Tribunal found a reasonable cause for the delay and canceled the penalty. The appeal was allowed.

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• 1980 (9) TMI 120
  
  Issues:
  1. Disallowance of welfare expenses and trading addition by the lower authorities.
  2. Addition of income from other sources by the lower authorities.
  
  Analysis:
  Issue 1:
  The assessed appealed against the disallowance of welfare expenses and trading addition by the lower authorities. The first ground regarding the disallowance of welfare expenses was withdrawn by the assessed during the appeal hearing. The lower authorities had disallowed Rs. 4,440 in lieu of welfare expenses, which was upheld based on the assessed's counsel's statement. However, the second ground related to the trading addition of Rs. 10,000 was challenged. The lower authorities had made this addition on a lump sum basis, citing inflation of expenses and the absence of withdrawals for personal expenses. The Appellate Tribunal found this approach unreasonable as no specific expenses were identified as inflated, and the absence of personal withdrawals did not justify a lump sum addition. The Tribunal reversed the lower authorities' decision on this issue and ordered the deletion of the Rs. 10,000 trading addition.
  
  Issue 2:
  Regarding the addition of Rs. 17,845 as income from other sources, the lower authorities had sustained this addition. They treated the amount as income from other sources due to the family's lack of withdrawals for personal expenses and the unexplained nature of the investment. The Appellate Tribunal disagreed with this reasoning, stating that the mere absence of personal withdrawals or explanations for other sources of income was insufficient grounds for treating the amount as income from other sources. The assessed had explained that the capital formation represented agricultural income from the production and sale of green tea, but this explanation was not accepted by the lower authorities. The Tribunal found no evidence provided by the Revenue to prove that the amount of Rs. 17,845 constituted income in the hands of the assessed. Therefore, the Tribunal ordered the deletion of the Rs. 17,845 addition as income from other sources.
  
  In conclusion, the appeal by the assessed partly succeeded, with the disallowance of welfare expenses upheld but the trading addition and income from other sources addition being deleted.

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• 1980 (9) TMI 119
  
  The ITAT Delhi-D directed the ITO to condone the delay in filing Form No. 11 by the assessee, as it was filed along with the return under a bona fide impression. The appeal was partly allowed for statistical purposes. (Case Citation: 1980 (9) TMI 119 - ITAT DELHI-D)

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• 1980 (9) TMI 118
  
  Issues:
  1. Dismissal of appeal by CIT (A) due to technical defect in the memorandum of appeal.
  2. Interpretation of relevant legal provisions and precedents regarding the signing of appeal documents.
  3. Justifiability of dismissing the appeal in limine based on technical grounds.
  4. Applicability of principles of natural justice in appeal proceedings.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  The appeal was filed against the order of the CIT (A) who dismissed the appeal in limine due to a technical defect in the signing of the appeal memo. Initially, the appeal was not signed by a partner as required by the IT Rules, but by the Financial Controller acting as the attorney for the firm. The CIT (A) allowed time for rectification, and subsequently, the appeal memo was properly signed by the partner, and written arguments were submitted. However, the CIT (A) relied on legal texts and previous decisions to dismiss the appeal, stating it was time-barred and the defect was not curable.
  
  The appellant argued that once the defect was rectified, the CIT (A) should not have dismissed the appeal in limine. They cited legal precedents where defects in appeal documents were allowed to be rectified, emphasizing that the right to appeal should not be denied on technical grounds. The departmental representative supported the CIT (A)'s decision.
  
  The Tribunal referred to a Supreme Court case regarding the validity of returns and distinguished it from the current case, where the issue was the signing of the appeal memo. They held that the appeal being a re-hearing of assessment proceedings, the technical defect in the signing should not deprive the appellant of their right to appeal, especially when the defect was promptly rectified upon notification.
  
  Furthermore, the Tribunal cited decisions from the Patna and Calcutta High Courts, emphasizing that defects in appeal documents can be rectified through amendments, and the appeal should be accepted if the appellant intended to file it. Therefore, the Tribunal concluded that the CIT (A) was not justified in dismissing the appeal and directed the appeal to be admitted and decided on its merits.
  
  In conclusion, the Tribunal allowed the appeal for statistical purposes, setting aside the CIT (A)'s order and emphasizing the importance of allowing appellants the opportunity to rectify technical defects in appeal documents before dismissing the appeal.

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• 1980 (9) TMI 117
  
  The appeal was filed by the assessee against the AAC's order regarding penalty for late payment of self-assessed tax. The ITAT Delhi-A held that the penalty could not be sustained as the provision under section 140A(3) was struck down by the Madras High Court. The penalty of Rs. 5,500 was deleted, and the appeal was allowed. (Case Citation: 1980 (9) TMI 117 - ITAT DELHI-A)

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• 1980 (9) TMI 116
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Whether the assessee society qualifies for exemption under Section 11 read with Section 2(15) of the Income Tax Act.
  2. Whether the assessee society qualifies for exemption under Section 10(22) of the Income Tax Act.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  Issue 1: Exemption under Section 11 read with Section 2(15) of the Income Tax Act
  
  The primary contention revolves around whether the assessee society's activities qualify as "charitable purposes" under Section 2(15) of the Income Tax Act, thereby entitling it to exemption under Section 11.
  
  Arguments by the Revenue:
  - The Revenue argued that the first two objects of the society, which involve the production, printing, publishing, stocking, and distribution of approved textbooks, are non-charitable in nature.
  - The Revenue cited judgments from the Delhi High Court and Rajasthan High Court, asserting that if even one object of a charitable society is non-charitable, the society would not be entitled to benefits under Section 11.
  - The Revenue referred to the Supreme Court's decision in the Loka Shikshana Trust case, arguing that the assessee's activities fall under the fourth wing of the definition of charitable purpose, i.e., "object of general public utility," and involve the carrying on of an activity for profit, which disqualifies it from exemption.
  
  Arguments by the Assessee:
  - The assessee contended that its primary and dominant object is the advancement of education, which falls within the term "education" as used in Section 2(15).
  - The CIT (A) supported the assessee's view, stating that the activities of producing and distributing high-quality textbooks are integral to promoting better teaching in Delhi schools and cannot be isolated from the main educational objective.
  - The assessee referred to Clause 17(1) of its Rules and Regulations, which mandates that its income shall be applied only towards its objectives, thus reinforcing its charitable nature.
  
  Tribunal's Findings:
  - The Tribunal agreed with the CIT (A) that the activities of the assessee, which include the production and distribution of textbooks, are essential to the advancement of education and thus fall within the meaning of "education" under Section 2(15).
  - The Tribunal noted that the provision of high-quality textbooks is directly connected with education, as it aids in the training and development of students' knowledge, skills, and character.
  - The Tribunal also considered whether the activities could be classified under "the advancement of any other object of general public utility." It concluded that even if this were the case, the assessee would still qualify for exemption under Section 11, as the predominant object is not profit-making but the advancement of education.
  
  Issue 2: Exemption under Section 10(22) of the Income Tax Act
  
  The second issue is whether the assessee society qualifies for exemption under Section 10(22), which pertains to educational institutions existing solely for educational purposes and not for profit.
  
  Arguments by the Revenue:
  - The Revenue argued that the assessee's activities do not constitute "education" as defined by the Supreme Court in the Loka Shikshana Trust case, which requires systematic instruction or schooling.
  - The Revenue contended that the assessee is merely a publishing house and its activities are profit-oriented.
  
  Arguments by the Assessee:
  - The assessee argued that its activities are solely for educational purposes and do not exist for profit, citing similar exemptions granted to other textbook societies like the Tamil Nadu Text Book Society.
  - The CIT (A) supported this view, referring to judgments that granted exemption under Section 10(22) to similar educational bodies.
  
  Tribunal's Findings:
  - The Tribunal upheld the CIT (A)'s decision, noting that the assessee society's activities are directly connected with education and fulfill the conditions for exemption under Section 10(22).
  - The Tribunal referred to the judgment in Secondary Board of Education, Orissa vs. ITO, which supports the assessee's case.
  - The Tribunal also noted that similar exemptions have been granted to other textbook societies, reinforcing the assessee's eligibility for exemption under Section 10(22).
  
  Conclusion:
  The Tribunal confirmed the CIT (A)'s orders, granting the assessee society exemption under both Section 11 read with Section 2(15) and Section 10(22) of the Income Tax Act. The appeals by the Revenue were dismissed.

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• 1980 (9) TMI 115
  
  Issues:
  1. Application under s. 256 (1) of the IT Act, 1961 for drawing up a statement of case and referring a question of law.
  2. Dispute regarding deduction of bad debts in the assessment for the asst. yr. 1975-76.
  3. Interpretation of whether bad debts can be claimed as deduction as a capital loss.
  4. Contention on whether successor firm can claim deduction for bad debts of predecessor firm.
  5. Consideration of legal precedents in support of allowing deduction for bad debts.
  
  Analysis:
  The judgment involves an application made under s. 256 (1) of the IT Act, 1961, by the CIT requesting the Tribunal to draw up a statement of case and refer a question of law arising from an order dated 8th May, 1980. The Tribunal declined to draw up a statement as it found no referable question of law in the order. The case pertains to a firm that was dissolved, and its business assets were taken over by a new firm formed by some of the partners. The dispute arose when the new firm claimed deductions for bad debts in its assessment for the year 1975-76, which were rejected by the ITO. The AAC upheld the decision, considering the bad debts as capital loss due to the purchase price of the business being lower than its actual value.
  
  In the second appeal before the Tribunal, the assessee argued that the debts written off should be allowed as deductions since they became bad and irrecoverable after the business was taken over. The Tribunal, relying on various legal precedents, agreed with the assessee's contention and allowed the appeal, stating that bad debts of the predecessor firm, if they become bad after the successor takes over, can be claimed as a deduction by the successor firm. The Commissioner contended that a question of law should be referred to the High Court based on the Tribunal's finding. However, the Tribunal found no contrary decision and considered the issue settled in favor of the assessee based on the authorities cited. Therefore, the application was dismissed, and no referable question of law was found to arise from the Tribunal's decision.

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• 1980 (9) TMI 114
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Whether the CIT (Appeals) erred in cancelling the penalty of Rs. 37,000 levied by the ITO under Section 273(a) of the IT Act, 1961.
  2. Whether the assessee filed an estimate of advance-tax which it knew or had reason to believe to be untrue.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  Issue 1: Cancellation of Penalty by CIT (Appeals)
  
  The Revenue contended that the CIT (Appeals) erred in law and facts by cancelling the penalty of Rs. 37,000 levied by the ITO under Section 273(a) of the IT Act, 1961. The penalty was initially imposed because the assessee, a limited company, filed a wrong estimate of advance-tax for the assessment year 1972-73.
  
  The CIT(A) had considered the past history of the case and noted that the penalty proceedings under Section 273(a) are quasi-judicial in nature, and the onus to prove that the assessee knew or had reason to believe that the estimate was untrue lies on the Department. The CIT(A) referred to a previous order in the assessee's own case for the assessment year 1971-72, where a similar penalty was deleted and accepted by the Revenue. The CIT(A) emphasized that the ITO's decision was influenced by irrelevant factors, which vitiated the order.
  
  Issue 2: Validity of the Estimate Filed by the Assessee
  
  The assessee filed an initial estimate of advance-tax at 'Nil' and later revised it to Rs. 1,12,750, which was paid. The return of income eventually declared a total income of Rs. 4,45,433, and the assessment was completed on a total income of Rs. 5,02,890. The ITO initiated penalty proceedings under Section 273(a) for filing a wrong estimate.
  
  The assessee provided multiple explanations, stating that the estimate of Rs. 2,00,000 was based on the following figures: income from various units and losses from the export wing and Unit 5. The assessee contended that simply because the income returned was more than the estimated income, it could not be inferred that the estimate was knowingly untrue. The explanation highlighted that the onus in penalty proceedings lies on the Revenue to establish mens rea.
  
  The CIT(A) noted that the ITO failed to appreciate the facts regarding the trading activities of Unit No. 4. The ITO observed that the revised estimate was filed when only fifteen days were left for the close of the financial year, and there was no justification for not making a fair estimate. However, the CIT(A) emphasized that the ITO misread the section by not finding evidence that the assessee knew or had reason to believe the estimate was untrue.
  
  The CIT(A) further analyzed the sales, receipts, and expenses of Unit No. 4, highlighting that the assessee's estimate was based on a comparative study of higher sales and receipts. The CIT(A) concluded that the ITO's decision was influenced by irrelevant material, and the penalty was not justified.
  
  Conclusion:
  
  The appellate tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order on the following grounds:
  1. The assessee justified its estimate of income from Unit No. 4 at Rs. 50,000.
  2. The assessee did not furnish an estimate of advance-tax which it knew or had reason to believe to be untrue.
  
  In the result, the Revenue's appeal was dismissed.

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• 1980 (9) TMI 113
  
  Issues:
  1. Exemption under sections 10(16), 10(22), and 11 for the assessee society.
  2. Interpretation of the term "education" and "educational institution" under the Income Tax Act.
  3. Application of exemption under section 11 and the time limit for filing the application.
  
  Analysis:
  1. The appeal pertains to the assessment year 1975-76 of a society registered under the Societies' Registration Act of 1860 claiming income exemption under sections 10(16), 10(22), and 11. The Income Tax Officer (ITO) disallowed the exemptions, resulting in a total income tax liability of Rs. 28,720. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner (AAC) partially allowed the appeal, granting relief under section 11 but denying accumulated income exemption due to a delayed application filing. The assessee, in the second appeal, argued for exemption under section 10(22) based on the institution's educational objectives.
  
  2. The debate centered on whether the society qualified as an "educational institution" under section 10(22) of the Income Tax Act. The AAC acknowledged the society as an institution but questioned its direct promotion of education. However, the Tribunal found no such restriction in the law and relied on the definition of "education" in section 2(15) to support the society's activities, such as granting scholarships and financial assistance to students, as educational in nature. Citing precedents and analogies, the Tribunal concluded that the society qualified as an educational institution entitled to exemption under section 10(22).
  
  3. Additionally, the Tribunal addressed the issue of exemption under section 11, despite a delayed application filing. Relying on legal interpretations from previous cases, including Smt. Godavari Devi Saraf and M.CT. Trust, the Tribunal held that the time element in the application process should not be a barrier to granting exemptions. Drawing parallels with a Supreme Court decision on the phrase "in the prescribed manner," the Tribunal directed the Income Tax Officer to accept and process the delayed application under section 11. Consequently, the appeal was allowed in favor of the assessee society.

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• 1980 (9) TMI 112
  
  The ITAT Calcutta-C partially allowed the appeal against the CIT(A) order for the assessment year 1973-74. The CIT(A) was correct in setting aside the assessment due to lack of basis for computing total income at Rs. 5 lakhs, but erred in directing the ITO to allow the assessee to produce evidence. The ITAT deleted this direction and modified the order accordingly.

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• 1980 (9) TMI 111
  
  Issues Involved:
  
  1. Validity of the partial partition under Section 171 of the Income Tax Act.
  2. Authority of the CIT to revise the order under Section 263(1) of the Income Tax Act.
  3. Requirement of consent from minor coparceners for partial partition.
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Validity of the Partial Partition under Section 171:
  
  The assessee, a Hindu Undivided Family (HUF), claimed a partial partition of assets, including capital and profit shares from a partnership firm, M/s Khetu Ram Bishamber Dass. The Income Tax Officer (ITO) accepted this claim and recorded a finding under Section 171 of the Income Tax Act, leading to the exclusion of the share of profit from the assessee's income for the assessment years 1975-76 and 1976-77. The Commissioner of Income Tax (CIT) later vacated this finding, arguing that the partial partition was not valid as it lacked a valid agreement and the consent of minor coparceners. The CIT relied on the Madhya Pradesh High Court decision in CIT vs. Seth Gopal Dass (HUF), which held that a Hindu father could not effect a partial partition without the consent of his sons.
  
  2. Authority of the CIT to Revise the Order under Section 263(1):
  
  The CIT, upon reviewing the ITO's orders, issued notices under Section 263(1) of the Income Tax Act, proposing to revise the assessments on the grounds that the ITO's acceptance of the partial partition was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. The CIT argued that the minors' incapacity to consent and the lack of a valid agreement invalidated the partial partition. Despite the assessee's objections and submissions, both oral and written, the CIT proceeded to revise the assessments.
  
  3. Requirement of Consent from Minor Coparceners for Partial Partition:
  
  The primary objection raised by the CIT was that the partial partition was not valid due to the lack of consent from the minor coparceners. The CIT argued that a valid agreement among all coparceners was essential for a partial partition, and since the minors could not consent, the partition was invalid. The CIT's stance was supported by the Madhya Pradesh High Court's decision in CIT vs. Seth Gopal Dass (HUF), which emphasized that partial partitions require mutual agreement among all parties.
  
  Analysis and Judgment:
  
  The Tribunal, after considering the arguments and precedents, disagreed with the CIT's view. The Tribunal noted that the decision in CIT vs. Seth Gopal Dass (HUF) was not universally accepted and contradicted several High Court and Supreme Court rulings. The Tribunal cited the Supreme Court's decision in Charan Dass Haridass vs. CIT, where a partial partition effected by a father among himself, his wife, and minor sons was upheld as valid. The Tribunal emphasized that under Hindu Law, a partition is a unilateral act by the Karta (head of the family) and does not require the consent of other coparceners, including minors.
  
  The Tribunal also referred to authoritative texts on Hindu Law, which support the view that a father can effect a partition without the consent of his sons, provided the partition is fair and equal. The Tribunal concluded that the CIT's reliance on the Seth Gopal Dass case was misplaced and that the ITO's finding of partial partition was correctly recorded.
  
  Conclusion:
  
  The Tribunal set aside the CIT's orders under Section 263(1) and restored the ITO's finding under Section 171, validating the partial partition. The Tribunal held that the CIT was misdirected in disregarding the Supreme Court's authority in Charan Dass Haridass and that the partial partition was valid despite the lack of consent from the minor coparceners. The assessments for the years 1975-76 and 1976-77 were restored to their original state as determined by the ITO.

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• 1980 (9) TMI 110
  
  Issues Involved:
  
  1. Validity of reassessment under Section 17(1)(a) of the Wealth Tax Act.
  2. Determination of fair market value of the property.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Validity of Reassessment under Section 17(1)(a) of the Wealth Tax Act:
  
  The primary issue in this appeal is whether the Wealth Tax Officer (WTO) was justified in reopening the assessment under Section 17(1)(a) of the Wealth Tax Act. The assessee contended that he had disclosed all material particulars required at the time of the original assessment. Specifically, he had returned the value of the property based on the valuation by an approved valuer, which the WTO had accepted during the first assessment. The WTO later realized that the property was sold for Rs. 6 lakhs before the completion of the assessment, and thus, issued a notice under Section 17(1) on the grounds that the assessee failed to disclose this sale.
  
  The appellate tribunal found merit in the assessee's argument that the WTO was already aware of the sale at the time of the original assessment. The WTO had issued a certificate under Section 230(A) of the Income Tax Act, certifying no outstanding liabilities for wealth tax, which implies knowledge of the sale. The tribunal held that the assessee did not fail to disclose any primary and material facts, and thus, the reassessment was not justified under Section 17(1)(a).
  
  2. Determination of Fair Market Value of the Property:
  
  The second issue revolves around the determination of the fair market value of the property. The WTO had reassessed the value of the assessee's share in the property at Rs. 3 lakhs, based on the sale proceeds, as opposed to the originally assessed value of Rs. 1,10,837. The assessee argued that the sale price did not reflect the fair market value but rather a "fancy price" paid by a purchaser keen to utilize the plot for commercial purposes, which was not the prevailing market price for similar properties in the neighborhood.
  
  The tribunal agreed with the assessee's contention, noting that the sale price was influenced by the purchaser's intention to demolish the existing structure and build a multi-storeyed complex, which is not typical of a residential property transaction. Comparative valuations of similar properties in the vicinity supported the assessee's claim that the original valuation was reasonable. The tribunal concluded that the WTO erred in determining the property's value based on the sale proceeds and that the addition of Rs. 1,89,163 was unjustified.
  
  Conclusion:
  
  The tribunal vacated the finding of the AAC and quashed the reassessment, holding that the reopening of the assessment was not validly justified under Section 17(1)(a) of the Wealth Tax Act. Furthermore, the tribunal found no justification for the addition made to the valuation of the property based on the sale proceeds, thus allowing the appeal filed by the assessee. The appeal was allowed in its entirety.

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