2002 (1) TMI 1290 - SC - Indian Laws

Allegations of bias in the selection process - Nature of a preliminary objection - appointment to the post of Professor - failure to keep any records - Validity of the Amendment of Eligibility Criteria - HELD THAT - Bias may be generally defined as partiality or preference. It is true that any person or authority required to act in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter must act impartially. If however bias and partiality be defined to mean the total absence of preconceptions in the mind of the judge then no one has ever had a fair trial and no one ever will. The human mind even at infancy is no blank piece of paper. We are born with predispositions and the processes of education formal and informal create attitudes which precede reasoning in particular instances and which therefore by definition are prejudices . No doubt the respondent No. 2 has in the note lavished praise on the performance of the appellant. As the Head of the Department it would be but natural that he formed an opinion as to the abilities of the Readers working under him. It is noteworthy that it was not the respondent No. 5 s case that the respondent No.2 s praise of the appellant was unmerited or that the respondent No. 2 had any extraneous reasons or reasons other than the competence of the appellant for selecting the appellant s as Professor. We are also not persuaded as the High Court was to infer bias merely because at the previous selection in September 1995 the appellant was found unsuitable. If the outcome of the previous selection was conclusive as to the non-suitability of the appellant for all times to come it was conclusive as far as the respondent No. 5 as well. Yet the respondent No. 5 applied again because he knew that a reappraisal by a new Selection Committee at a later point of time might yield a different result. As for the failure to keep any record as to the grading of the candidates under Statute 15 the procedure to be followed by the Selection Committee in making recommendations are required to be such as may be laid down in the Ordinances. No Ordinance was drawn to our notice which prescribes a particular mode of rating the respective merits of the candidates. When appointments are being made to posts as high as that of a Professor it may not be necessary to give marks as the means of assessment. But whatever the method of measurement of suitability used by the Selection Committee it was an unanimous decision and the Courts will in the circumstances obtaining in this case have to respect that. Accordingly we set aside the decision of the High Court and allow the appeal but without any order as to costs.

Summary

1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED

- Whether the second writ petition challenging the appellant's selection as Professor of Marine Science was maintainable after withdrawal of the earlier writ petition on the same subject matter.

- Whether the amendment of eligibility criteria for the post of Professor of Marine Science by the University was lawful and in accordance with the University's Statutes.

- Whether the appellant possessed the essential qualifications as advertised for the post of Professor of Marine Science.

- Whether the Selection Committee was properly and legally constituted in accordance with the University Statutes.

- Whether the selection process was vitiated by bias, particularly with regard to the participation of certain members of the Selection Committee and the alleged partiality towards the appellant.

- Whether the absence of records reflecting the inter-se grading of candidates by the Selection Committee constituted a procedural irregularity invalidating the selection.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Maintainability of the second writ petition:

The Court noted that the first writ petition was filed on the ground of apprehended bias concerning the participation of certain members in the selection process scheduled for 13th September 1995, pursuant to the 1994 advertisement. This petition was withdrawn by the respondent No. 5, allegedly due to the Court's observation that it was premature and an oral assurance that the concerned members would not participate. The subsequent writ petition challenged the selection made pursuant to a fresh advertisement issued in October 1995 and the selection held in May 1996. The Court emphasized that the subject matter of the two petitions was different. The first related to the earlier selection process, while the second related to the later selection process under a different advertisement and committee. Therefore, the second writ petition was held to be competent and maintainable.

Legality of amendment of eligibility criteria:

The eligibility criteria for the post had been amended between the 1994 and 1995 advertisements. The initial criteria included detailed qualifications such as M.Sc., Ph.D. in Marine Science or related subjects with outstanding accomplishments and a proven record of publications in international journals. The 1995 advertisement simplified the specialisation requirement and removed some of the detailed conditions.

The respondent No. 5 contended that the amendment was illegal as it was not prescribed by the Executive Council after considering the Academic Council's recommendations, as required under Statute 8. However, the Court observed that the respondent No. 5 had knowledge of the changed criteria, had applied under the amended advertisement, and appeared for the interview without objection. Hence, he could not now challenge the framing of eligibility criteria. The Court declined to entertain this grievance, applying the principle that a candidate cannot accept the benefit of changed rules and later object to their validity.

Qualifications of the appellant:

The Court analyzed the advertised minimum qualifications, which required either (a) an eminent scholar with high-quality public work, active research engagement, and 10 years of postgraduate teaching and/or research experience including guiding doctoral research, or (b) an outstanding scholar with an established reputation and significant contribution to knowledge.

The appellant claimed qualification under the first limb. He completed post-graduation in 1982, obtained his doctorate in 1986, was appointed Lecturer in December 1986, and became Reader in 1991. The selection took place in May 1996. The appellant contended that his pre-doctoral research period (approximately three years) should be counted towards the 10-year experience requirement.

The Court referred to precedent establishing that teaching and research experience can be combined to satisfy the experience requirement. However, it held that the phrase "research at University/national level including guiding doctoral research" should be interpreted ejusdem generis, meaning the research must be independent and capable of guiding others, not pre-doctoral research conducted by the candidate himself. Strictly applying this interpretation, the appellant fell short of the 10-year experience by about four months.

Nonetheless, the Court adopted a purposive approach rather than a purely legalistic one. It noted the University's consistent practice of counting pre-doctoral research towards the experience requirement, including in the case of the respondent No. 5 himself. The Court also relied on binding precedent confirming that pre-doctoral research experience can be included. Accordingly, the appellant was held to be qualified for the post.

Constitution of the Selection Committee:

Statute 15 prescribes the composition of the Selection Committee for Professorships, including the Vice Chancellor, a nominee of the Chancellor, the Head of Department (or alternate), the Dean of the Faculty, one Professor nominated by the Vice Chancellor, and three external experts nominated by the Executive Council from a panel recommended by the Academic Council.

The respondent No. 5 challenged the constitution on the ground that the panel of external experts was not subject-wise paired with the specialisations advertised, and that some experts were from unrelated fields such as Immunology and Biochemistry.

The Court found no evidence that the Executive Council was required to pair experts by specialisation or that the panel was improperly constituted. The experts were approved by the Academic Council and recommended by the Executive Council. The Executive Council's preparation of a panel in order of preference was legitimate. The Court held that there was no violation of Statute 15.

The High Court's finding that the absence of one expert (Dr. Chandramohan) at the meeting vitiated the quorum was rejected. The Registrar's affidavit clarified that the expert did participate and signed the report. There was no allegation to the contrary from the respondent No. 5. The Court accepted the Registrar's statement and held the committee was properly constituted and quorate.

Allegations of bias:

Bias was defined as partiality or preference, which must be founded on irrationality or self-interest to vitiate a decision. The Court emphasized that mere preconceptions or favorable opinions do not constitute bias. The principle that no man shall be a judge in his own cause was reiterated, but the Court recognized that some degree of predisposition is inevitable.

The respondent No. 5 relied on a note written by the Head of Department (respondent No. 2) praising the appellant and requesting an urgent interview to retain him. The Court found that such appreciation by a senior officer of a junior's competence did not amount to bias or disqualify participation in the selection. There was no evidence of extraneous or improper motives behind the praise.

The Court also rejected the inference of bias from the fact that the appellant was found unsuitable in the earlier selection but selected in the later one. The possibility of a different outcome on reappraisal by a new committee was recognized as legitimate.

Absence of records on grading of candidates:

Statute 15 requires the Selection Committee to make recommendations to the Executive Council, but the procedure for grading candidates is to be prescribed by Ordinances. No Ordinance prescribing a particular mode of rating was brought to the Court's attention.

The Court held that for a high-level post like Professor, it may not be necessary to assign numerical marks. The unanimous decision of the Committee was to be respected in the absence of procedural prescriptions or evidence of arbitrariness.

3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

"The subject matter of both proceedings being different, the second writ application is competent."

"The respondent No. 5... cannot be allowed to now contend that the eligibility criteria were wrongly framed."

"The phrase 'research at the University/national level institution' should be read ejusdem generis... the research must be independent such that the researcher could guide others aspiring for doctorate degrees and not the research where the researcher is striving for a doctorate degree himself."

"The University had intended, understood and consistently proceeded on the basis that the pre-doctoral research could be counted towards the 10 years experience clause."

"There has thus been no violation of Statute 15."

"It is not every kind of bias which in law is taken to vitiate an act. It must be a prejudice which is not founded on reason, and actuated by self interest whether pecuniary or personal."

"As the Head of the Department it would be but natural that he formed an opinion as to the abilities of the Readers working under him... such appreciation... would not amount to bias."

"Whatever the method of measurement of suitability used by the Selection Committee, it was a unanimous decision and the Courts will, in the circumstances obtaining in this case, have to respect that."

The Court set aside the High Court's decision and allowed the appeal, confirming the validity of the appellant's selection as Professor of Marine Science.