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2007 (10) TMI 678 - SC - Indian LawsSuit for Perpetual Injunction - Right of worship in temple upon inheritance thereof from their predecessor - turn of Pooja comes after every 12 years - High Court committed a serious error in passing the impugned judgment insofar as it failed to take into consideration that in terms of condition No.2(C) of the agreement the first respondent was not entitled to gold sliver and money etc. which were offered to the deity and not to himself in his personal capacity - consent decree - HELD THAT - It is equally well settled that which construing a decree the court can and in appropriate case ought to take into consideration the pleadings as well as the proceedings leading upto the decree. In order to find out the meaning of the words employed in a decree the Court has to ascertain the circumstances under which these words came to be used. See Bhavan Vaja Ors. v. Solanki Hanuji Khodaji Mansang Anr. 1972 (2) TMI 94 - SUPREME COURT . It is now also a trite law that in the event the document is vague the same must be construed having regard to surroundings and/or attending circumstances. The nature of the document also plays an important part for construction thereof. The suit filed by the parties inter alia involved the question of interpretation of the said consent decree. Parties adduced evidences inter alia in regard to the nature of poojas and offerings made to the priest in their individual capacity. Their rights in regard to offer poojas in the temple are itself not in dispute. In a case of this nature where a consent decree does not refer to the entire disputes between the parties and some vaguness remained the factual background as also the manner in which existence of rights have been claimed by the parties would be relevant. The consent decree appears to be meant to be operative for a limited period viz. 1956 and 1961. If any of the party to the suit was entitled to keep with him even such non-perishable goods which were to be offered to the Deity the question of using the terms in his individual capacity was not necessary. The parties therefore were allowed to lead evidence to show as to what ceremonies are performed by the Priest in his individual capacity and not necessarily offering pooja to the Deity. A devotee may arrange a special ceremony or a special pooja and entrust the same to be done by one or the other Priest of the said temple. The courts therefore were required to construe the terms implied in the consent decree having regard to the customs in regard to holding of religious and other functions in the temple by the devotees. Equally important was the conduct of the parties soon thereafter. We have noticed hereinbefore that the father of the defendant No.1 executed deeds of sale in favour of the plaintiff s father. The relationship between the parties and their status were referred to therein. Defendant No.1 s father in the said document accepted the right of the plaintiff s father of having equal right to the offerings and offer poojas during the turn of said Neelawwa. It is not the case of the defendants that such statements came to be made by reason of any fraud or inducement or threat on the part of the plaintiff s father. That being so the said statements were relevant. The learned Trial Judge as also the Court of the First Appeal in our opinion cannot be said to have committed any mistake in taking the same into consideration for determining the rights of the parties. The High Court in our opinion was thus not correct in reversing the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge as also the Court of Appeal. We however make it clear that we have not gone into the question as to whether any offerings made in Hundies for development shall go to any of the parties or not. Such a question having not been gone into by the courts below we refrain ourselves from doing so. Thus the impugned judgment is set aside. The appeal is allowed.
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