1949 (2) TMI 11 - Other - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Legality of the conviction based on accomplice evidence.
2. Admissibility and weight of the confession of a co-accused.
3. Corroboration requirements for accomplice testimony.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Legality of the Conviction Based on Accomplice Evidence:
The primary issue in this case is whether there was sufficient evidence to convict the appellant. The evidence against the appellant included the testimony of an accomplice (Kholli Behara), the confession of another accused (Trinath), and the recovery of items (a loin cloth and a khantibadi) allegedly connected to the crime.

The law in India regarding accomplice evidence is similar to that in England. According to Section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act, an accomplice is a competent witness against an accused person, and a conviction is not illegal merely because it is based on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. However, Illustration (B) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act suggests that the court may presume an accomplice to be unworthy of credit unless corroborated in material particulars. Courts in India have held that while it is not illegal to act on uncorroborated accomplice evidence, it is a rule of prudence to seek corroboration in material respects implicating the accused.

In this case, the approver (Kholli Behara) initially gave a statement under Section 164, Criminal P.C., implicating the appellant, but later retracted his statement in the Sessions Court, claiming it was the result of police coercion. The Sessions Judge brought the approver's earlier statement on record under Section 288, Criminal P.C., making it evidence for all purposes. The High Court accepted the approver's statement before the Committing Magistrate but recognized the necessity for corroboration.

2. Admissibility and Weight of the Confession of a Co-accused:
Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act allows the court to consider the confession of a co-accused against other accused persons being tried jointly for the same offense. However, this type of evidence is considered weak because it is not given under oath, not in the presence of the accused, and cannot be tested by cross-examination.

In this case, Trinath's confession implicated both himself and the appellant but was later retracted in the Sessions Court. The High Court did not find Trinath's confession sufficient corroboration for the approver's testimony. The court emphasized that a confession of a co-accused could only support other evidence and not serve as the sole basis for a conviction.

3. Corroboration Requirements for Accomplice Testimony:
The High Court stated that the evidence of an approver should be corroborated by independent evidence in material particulars against each accused. The court found that the approver's evidence was not sufficiently corroborated against the appellant. The recovery of the loin cloth and the khantibadi did not implicate the appellant directly. The cloth was found at a location pointed out by the approver, but there was no independent evidence connecting the appellant to it. Similarly, the khantibadi was a common agricultural tool, and its recovery from the appellant's house did not prove it was used in the murder.

The High Court concluded that neither the loin cloth nor the khantibadi provided the necessary corroboration to implicate the appellant. Sir Valentine Holmes, representing the Crown, argued that Trinath's confession should be considered sufficient corroboration. However, the court noted that Trinath and the approver had ample opportunity to coordinate their stories, and their statements lacked intrinsic evidence of truth.

Conclusion:
The Privy Council agreed with the High Court's assessment that the conviction of the appellant could not stand based on the uncorroborated testimony of the approver and the weak confession of the co-accused. The court emphasized the importance of independent evidence implicating the accused to safeguard against wrongful convictions. Therefore, the conviction of the appellant was set aside, and the appeal was allowed.