Home
Forgot password New User/ Regiser ⇒ Register to get Live Demo
2019 (10) TMI 1575 - HC - Indian LawsMaintainability of judgment beyond pleading - actual owner of the building - landlord is the person who inducted a person as tenant or not - building is constructed over a leased land which is owned by Cantonment Board - eviction of tenant in a rent case - Principles of Estoppel. Whether a judgment beyond pleadings can be sustained? - HELD THAT - It is the settled law that the jurisdiction of a court has to be determined on the basis of plaint allegation alone and on the defence taken in written statement. The jurisdiction of the Prescribed Authority under the U.P. Act XIII of 1972 is essentially one for eviction of a tenant or release of the tenanted accommodation of a building as defined in Section 3(i) and not as to whether the land over which building is constructed is a leased land or a free-hold land. In Municipal Corporation of the City of Jabalpur vs. State of M.P. 1962 (4) TMI 94 - SUPREME COURT Hon ble Supreme Court held Save in exceptional cases parties should be held strictly to their pleadings and if owing to discovery of new matter or grounds there is need to add to or to modify the allegations either in the petition or in the counter- affidavit the Court should insist on formal amendments being effected for this would enable each party to state its case with precision and definiteness and the other side would have a proper opportunity to know this case and meet it with appropriate defences - Thus the impugned judgment on the points beyond pleadings cannot be sustained. Scope of release application for eviction of a tenant in a rent case - HELD THAT - It is settled law that in an eviction suit filed by a landlord against the defendant-tenant the landlord and tenant are the only necessary parties. The plaintiff-landlord in such a suit is required to plead and prove only two things to enable him to claim a decree for eviction against his tenant from the tenanted suit premises. Firstly plaintiff-landlord has to prove that there exists a relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendant and secondly the grounds on which the plaintiff-landlord has sought defendant-tenant s eviction under the Rent Act exists. When these two things are proved eviction suit succeeds. In the present set of facts it is the admitted case of the defendantrespondent that he is tenant of the disputed building and the plaintiffpetitioner is the landlord. The relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff-petitioner and the defendant-respondent was undisputed. Under the circumstances the appellate court committed a grave error of law to hold that since the disputed building is standing over a leased land of Cantonment Board of which the Cantonment Board is the owner and therefore the provisions of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 shall not be applicable since the plaintiff-petitioner is not the owner of the land. Whether plaintiff-petitioner is landlord of the building in question which was built over leased land? - HELD THAT - The eviction of tenant under Section 21(1) of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972 is only with respect to a building as defined in Section 3(i) of the U.P. Act No.XIII of 1972 which is an inclusive definition and means a residential or non-residential roofed structure. Neither Section 21(1) nor the definition of the word building in Section 3(i) of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972 requires that the land of the building should be free-hold or it should not be a leased land. Therefore for the purposes of Section 21(1) of the Act the relevant consideration is the building of which the applicant should be the landlord and person whose eviction is sought should be a tenant and there is landlord-tenant relationship between them. Principles of Estoppel - HELD THAT - As per undisputed facts as briefly noted above and also as per his own stand of the defendant-respondent he is the tenant of the disputed house of which the plaintiff-petitioner is the landlord. Therefore the defendant-respondent is estopped from denying the landlordship of the plaintiff-petitioner in view of Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act. This legal position is also supported by the law laid down by Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of D. Satya Narayan vs. P. Jagdish 1987 (9) TMI 432 - SUPREME COURT and State of Andhra Pradesh and others vs. D. Raghukul Pershad (dead) by LRs and others 2012 (8) TMI 1221 - SUPREME COURT . As a general rule a tenant who has been let into possession cannot deny his landlord s title however defective it may be so long as he has not openly restored possession by surrender to his landlord. Hence the defendant-respondent who was tenant of the plaintiff-petitioner/ landlord cannot deny the landlord s title and he has to surrender possession to the plaintiff-petitioner before he can challenge the title of the plaintiff-petitioner - thus under the facts and circumstances of the case it was not permissible for the defendant-tenant/ respondent to deny the title of the plaintiff-petitioner. Petition allowed.
Issues Involved:
1. Whether a judgment beyond pleading is sustainable. 2. Whether the owner of a building who inducted a person as a tenant is not the landlord of the building because it is constructed over leased land owned by the Cantonment Board. 3. Scope of a rent case. Detailed Analysis: 1. Whether a judgment beyond pleading is sustainable: The court emphasized that pleadings, as defined under Order VI Rule 1 and Rule 2 of the CPC, must contain a concise statement of material facts relied upon by the party. It is well-settled that no amount of evidence can prove a case not set up in the pleadings. The appellate court erred by deciding the case on grounds not raised in the pleadings or memorandum of appeal. The judgment cited several precedents, including *Poonam Vs. Sumit Tanwar*, *Municipal Corporation of the City of Jabalpur vs. State of M.P.*, and *Bharat Singh and others vs. State of Haryana and others*, to reinforce that decisions must be based on the issues raised in the pleadings, and any deviation without proper amendment and opportunity to the other party is impermissible. 2. Whether the owner of a building who inducted a person as a tenant is not the landlord of the building because it is constructed over leased land owned by the Cantonment Board: The court clarified that the jurisdiction of the Prescribed Authority under the U.P. Act XIII of 1972 is primarily for the eviction of a tenant or release of the tenanted accommodation of a building as defined in Section 3(i). The nature of the land, whether leased or freehold, is irrelevant for this purpose. The court also referred to the principle of estoppel under Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, which prevents a tenant from denying the landlord's title once they have been let into possession. This principle was supported by precedents such as *D. Satya Narayan vs. P. Jagdish* and *State of Andhra Pradesh and others vs. D. Raghukul Pershad*. 3. Scope of a rent case: The court reiterated that in an eviction suit, the landlord needs to prove the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship and the grounds for eviction under the Rent Act. The question of title to the suit premises is not germane to the decision of an eviction suit. The relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties was undisputed, making the appellate court's decision to focus on the ownership of the land erroneous. The court cited *Apollo Zipper India Ltd. vs. W. Newman and Co. Ltd.* and *Kamaljit Singh vs. Sarabjit Singh* to emphasize that the landlord need not prove title in the same manner as in a title suit, and the tenant is estopped from denying the landlord's title. Conclusion: The court concluded that the appellate court's judgment was unsustainable as it was based on grounds beyond the pleadings. The Prescribed Authority's decision was upheld, emphasizing that the landlord-tenant relationship and the grounds for eviction were sufficiently established. The principle of estoppel under Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act was reinforced, preventing the tenant from denying the landlord's title. Final Order: The petition was allowed, and the appellate court's judgment was set aside. The judgment of the Prescribed Authority/Civil Judge (S.D.), Kanpur Nagar, was upheld.
|