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2017 (7) TMI 151 - CESTAT MUMBAIPower of Committee of Chief Commissioners to review orders of Commissioner of Customs - prevail of specific power over general power - Clearance of ‘unaccompanied baggage’ - two wooden crates of goods - baggage rules - regulation no.22(8) of Custom House Agents Licensing Regulations, 2004 - Held that: - Tribunal has, while disposing of the dispute in Commissioner of Customs (General), Mumbai v. Mukadam Freight Systems Pvt Ltd [2017 (5) TMI 798 - CESTAT MUMBAI], held that the licensing authority is not vested with the privilege of filing an appeal against its own order and that the Committee of Chief Commissioners is not vested with the power to review orders issued in exercise of powers under the Custom House Agents Licensing Regulations, 2004/Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2007. The institution of ‘custom house agents’ is a characteristic of the customs regulatory mechanism; at the same time, it is not unique to this country but is universally recognised as a facilitation catalyst for clearance of cargo. The geographical distance between the entry/exit hubs and the location of the importer/exporter, as well the complexities of procedures, warrants professional representation that may not be available in-house. Consequently, in a statute that is essentially concerned with the power to levy tax, with procedure for recovery of tax and with enumeration of offences and penalties, special provision have been enacted to accord legal status, and thereby to exercise statutory control on certain institution. It is inconceivable that the licensing authority is so base as to forfeit the high reputation of the organisation that is presided over warranting intervention by another authority howsoever eminent. It, therefore, does not behove upon a collegial body/individual, not acknowledged in the Regulations, to take upon itself the mantle of supervision and thus insinuate itself into a process not contemplated either in section 146 of Customs Act, 1962 or by the Regulations framed thereunder. For us to permit recourse to the general provision in section 129D of Customs Act, 1962 merely because of the absence of such a remedy in the Regulations and for convenience of some executive authority would be tantamount to proclaiming that our perspicacity is superior to that of the sovereign legislative organ - an overreach that we will not even deign to consider. A licensing system, concerned with the functioning of a facilitation mechanism is, not to be equated with the power to collect tax - the provisions of section 129E is not intended to apply to the appellant-Commissioner. Appeal dismissed - decided against appellant.
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