TMI Blog1957 (4) TMI 56X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... validity of some of the provisions of the Act and the rules framed thereunder. It will be convenient first to refer to the provisions of the Act and of the rules, so far as they are material for the purpose of the present petitions. The object of the legislation is, as stated in the short title and in the preamble, to provide for the control and regulation of prize competitions . Section 2(d) of the Act defines prize competition as meaning any competition (whether called a cross-word prize competition, a missing-word prize competition, a picture prize competition or by any other name), in which prizes are offered for the solution of any puzzle based upon the building up, arrangement, combination or permutation of letters, words or figures . Sections 4 and 5 of the Act are-. the provisions which are impugned as unconstitutional, and they are as follows: 4. No person shall promote or conduct any prize competition or competitions in which the total value of the prize or prizes (whether in cash or otherwise) to be offered in any month exceeds one thousand rupees; and in every prize competition, the number of entries shall not exceed two thousand. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... register in Form C and ignore the remaining entries, if any, in cases where no entry fee is charged and refund the entry fee received in respect of the entries in excess of the first two thousand to the respective senders thereof in cases where an entry fee has been charged after deducting the, cost (if any) of refund. Now, the contention of Mr. Palkhiwala, who addressed the main argument in support of the petitions, is that prize competition as defined in s. 2(d) would include not only competitions in which success depends on chance but also those in which it would depend to a substantial degree on skill; that the conditions laid down in ss. 4 and 5 and rr. II and 12 are wholly unworkable and would render it impossible to run the competition, and that they seriously encroached on the fundamental right of the petitioners to carry on business; that they could not be supported under Art. 19(6) of the Constitution as they were unreasonable -and amounted, in effect, to a prohibition and not merely a regulation of the business; that even if the provisions could be regarded as reasonable restrictions as regards competitions which are in the nature of gambling, they could not be supp ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... th reference to those competitions whether ss. 4 and 5 and rr. 1 1 and 12 are reasonable restrictions enacted in public interest. But Mr. Seervai has fairly conceded before us that on the materials on record in these proceedings, he could not maintain that the restrictions contained in those provisions are saved by Art. 19(6) as being reasonable and in the public interest. The ground being thus cleared, the only questions that survive for our decision are (1) whether, on the definition of prize competition in s.2(d), the Act applies to competitions which involve substantial skill and are not in the nature of gambling; and (2) if it does, whether the provisions of ss. 4 and 5 and rr. II and 12 which are, ex concessi void, as regards such competitions, can on the principle of severability be enforced against competitions which are in the nature of gambling. 1. If the question whether the Act applies also to prize competitions in which success depends to a sub stantial degree on skill is to be answered solely on a literal construction of s. 2(d), it will be difficult to resist the contention of the petitioners that it does. The definition of prize competition in s. 2(d) is wide ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on shall be deemed to be an unlawful prize competition unless a licence in respect of such competition has been obtained by the promoter thereof. Section 12 imposed a tax on the amounts received in respect of competitions which had been licensed under the Act. With a view to avoid the operation of the taxing provisions of this enactment, persons who had there to before been conducting prize competitions within the Province of Bombay shifted the venue of their activities to neighbouring States like Mysore, and from there continued to receive entries and remittances of money therefor from the residents of Bombay State. In order to prevent evasion of the Act and for effectually carrying out its object, the legislature of Bombay passed Act XXX of 1952 extending the provisions of the Act of 1948 to competitions conducted outside the State of Bombay but operating inside it, the tax however being limited to the amounts remitted or due on the entries sent from the State of Bombay. The validity of this enactment was impugned by a number of promoters of prize competitions in proceedings by way of writ in the High Court of Bombay, and dealing with the contentions raised by them, Chagla C.J. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the States, and at no time had there been any legislation directed to regulating them. And if the State legislatures felt that there was any need to regulate even those competitions, they could have themselves effectively done so without resort to the special jurisdiction under Art. 252(1). It should further be observed that the language of the resolutions is that it is desirable to control competitions. If it was intended that Parliament should legislate also on competitions involving skill, the word, ,control would seem to be not appropriate. While control and regulation would be requisite in the case of gambling, mere regulation would have been sufficient as regards competitions involving skill. The use of the word control which is to be found not only in the resolution but also in the short title and the preamble to the Act appears to us to clearly indicate that it was only competitions of the character dealt with in the Bombay judgment, that were within the contemplation of the legislature. Our attention was invited by Mr. Seervai to the statement of objects and reasons in the Bill introducing the enactment. It is therein stated that the proposed legislation falls under ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ple, the topics enumerated in the Lists in the Seventh Schedule in the Indian Constitution, ss. 91 and 92 of the Canadian Constitution, and s. 51 of the Australian Constitution; or it may be with reference to the character of the legislation which they could enact in respect of subjects assigned to them, as for example, in relation to the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution and similar constitutionally protected rights in the American and other Constitutions. When a legislature whose authority is subject to limitations aforesaid enacts a law which is wholly in excess of its powers, it is entirely void and must be completely ignored. But where the legislation falls in part within the area allotted to it and in part outside it, it is undoubtedly void as to the latter; but does it on that account become necessarily void in its entirety? The answer to this question must depend on whether what is valid could be separated from what is invalid, and that is a question which has to be decided by the court on a consideration of the provisions of the Act. This is a principle well established in American Jurisprudence, Vide Cooley s Constitutional Limitations, Vol. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... than agricultural land, and that, in that view, the legislation was wholly intra vires. It is contended by Mr. Palkhiwala that this decision does not proceed on the basis that the Act is in part ultra vires and that the remainder however could be separated therefrom, but on the footing that the Act is in its entirety intra vires, and that thus, no question of severability was decided. That is true; but that the principle of severability had the approval of that Court clearly appears from the following observations of Sir Maurice Gwyer C. J.: It should not however be thought that the Court has overlooked cases cited to it in which the same words have been applied in an Act to a number of purposes, some within and some without the power of the Legislature, and the whole Act hag been held to be bad. If the restriction of thegeneral words to purposes within the power of the Legislature would be to leave an Act with nothing or next to nothing in it, or an Act different in kind, and not merely in degree, from an Act in which the general words were given the wider meaning, then it is plain that the Act as a whole must be held invalid, because in such circumstances it i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... that the restrictions imposed upon the right to possess or sell or buy or consume or use those categories of properties are unreasonable, the impugned sections must be held valid so far as these categories are concerned. This decision is clear authority that the principle of severability is applicable even when the partial invalidity of the Act arises by reason of its contravention of constitutional limitations. It is argued for the petitioners that in that case the legislature had through the rules framed under the statute classified medicinal and toilet preparations as a separate category, and had thus evinced an intention to treat them as severable, that no similar classification had been made in the present Act, and that therefore the decision in question does not help the respondent. But this is to take too narrow a view of the decision. The doctrine of severability rests, as will presently be shown, on a presumed intention of the legislature that if a part of a statute turns out to be void, that should not affect the validity of the rest of it, and that that intention is to be ascertained from the terms of the statute. It is the true nature of the subject-matter of the l ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he nature of an exception to the rule against severability of laws which are partially unconstitutional, and that it has no application to the present statute. We are unable to find any basis for this argument in the American authorities. That the decision in Bowman s case ([1921] 256 U.S. 642 ; 65 L. Ed. II37) related to a taxing statute is no ground for limiting the principle enunciated therein to taxing statutes. On the other hand, the discussion of the law as to severability in the authoritative text-books shows that no distinction is made in American Jurisprudence between taxing statutes and other statutes. Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 82, dealing with the subject of severability, states first the principles applicable generally and to all statutes, and then proceeds to consider those principles with reference to different topics, and taxation laws form one of those topics. We have now to consider the decisions in Punjab Province v. Daulat Singh and others ([1946] F.C.R. 1), Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras ([1950] S.C.R. 594) and chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh ([1950] S.C.R. 759) relied on by the petitioners. In Punjab Province v. Daulat Singh and others (supra), ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Court appear have contemplated another form of severability namely, by a classification of the particular cases or which the impugned Act may happen to operate, involving an inquiry into the circumstances of each individual case. There are no words in the Act capable of being so construed, and such a course would in effect involve an amendment of the Act by the court, course which is beyond the competency of the court, as has long been well established. It will be noticed that, in the above case, there was no question of the application of the Act to different categories which were distinct and severable either in fact or under the provisions of the Act. The notification issued under s. 4 on which the judgment of the Federal Court was based did not classify those who did not belong to the tribe and those who did not hold property or reside in the district as two distinct groups. It described only one category, and that had to satisfy both the conditions. To break up that category into two distinct groups was to go against the express language of the enactment and to substitute the word for and . The Privy Council held that that could not be done, and it also observed that ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uthorised the Provincial Government to prohibit the entry and circulation within the State of a newspaper for the purpose of securing the public safety or the maintenance of public order . Subsequent to the enactment of this statute, the Constitution came into force, and the validity of the impugned provision depended on whether it was protected by Art. 19(2) which saved existing law in so far as it relates to any matter which undermines the security of or tends to overthrow the State. It was held by this Court that as the purposes mentioned in s. 9(1-A) of the Madras Act were wider in amplitude than those specified in Art. 19(2), and as it was not possible to split up s. 9(1-A) into what was within and what was without the protection of Art. 19(2), the provision must fail in its entirety. That is really a decision that the impugned provision was on its own contents in severable. It is not an authority for the position that even when a provision is severable, it must be struck down on the ground that the principle of severability is inadmissible when the invalidity of a statute arises by reason of its contravening constitutional prohibitions. It should be mentioned that the dec ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is invalid. It is immaterial for the purpose of this rule whether the invalidity of the statute arises by reason of its subject-matter being outside the competence of the legislature or by reason of its provisions contravening constitutional prohibitions. That being the position in law, it is now necessary to consider whether the impugned provisions are severable in their application to competitions of a gambling character, assuming of course that the definition of 1 prize competition in s. 2(d) is wide enough to include also competitions involving skill to a substantial degree, It will be useful for the determination of this question to refer to certain rules of construction laid down by the American Courts, where the question of severability has been the subject of consideration in numerous authorities. They may be summarised as follows: 1.In determining whether the valid parts of a statute are separable from the invalid parts thereof, it is the intention of the legislature that is the determining factor. The test to be applied is whether the legislature would have enacted the valid part if it had known that the rest of the statute was invalid. Vide Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ubstantial extent on skill and competitions in which it does not so depend, form two distinct and separate categories. The difference between the two classes of competitions is as clear-cut as that between commercial and wagering contracts. On the facts, there might be difficulty in deciding whether a given competition falls within one category or not ; but when its true character is determined, it must fall either under the one or the other. The distinction between the two classes of competitions has long been recognised in the legislative practice of both the United Kingdom and this country, and the courts have, time and again, pointed out the characteristic features which differentiate them. And if we are now to ask ourselves the question, would Parliament have enacted the law in question if it had known that it would fail as regards competitions involving skill, there can be no doubt, having regard to the history of the legislation, as to what our answer would be. Nor does the restriction of the impugned provisions to competitions of a gambling character affect either the texture or the colour of the Act; nor do the provisions require to be touched and re-written before they co ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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