1965 (11) TMI 137 - HC - VAT and Sales Tax

Summary

Issues: Interpretation of section 57 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959 regarding the disclosure of assessment records in civil suits.

In the judgment delivered by Justice Veeraswami, the issue at hand was the interpretation of section 57 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959, specifically in relation to the disclosure of assessment records in civil suits. The petitioner sought to summon certain assessment records in a pending suit, which was objected to on the grounds of privilege and confidentiality under section 57(1) of the Act. The key contention put forth was whether section 57(1) restricted only voluntary disclosure by the officer concerned or also encompassed involuntary disclosure to civil courts. The court analyzed the language of section 57(1) which stipulates that all particulars in statements, returns, accounts, records, or documents produced under the Act shall be treated as confidential and not disclosed. However, sub-section (2) provides exceptions, including disclosure to civil courts in suits involving the government arising from proceedings under the Act.

The court compared the language of section 57(1) with a similar provision in the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, and noted that the latter explicitly prohibited courts from requiring public servants to produce certain documents. Drawing from precedent in Abdulla v. Assankutty and Venkatachala Chettiar v. Sampathu Chettiar, the court opined that section 57(1) did not bar disclosure of particulars on summons to be produced in court. The court held that section 57(1) primarily prohibited voluntary disclosure by Sales Tax Department officers and did not extend to courts calling for such records. Sub-section (2) was interpreted as not expanding the scope of subsection (1) and did not impose a prohibition against courts calling for records mentioned in the sub-section.

Furthermore, the court acknowledged that while section 57(1) aimed to protect assessees by treating certain particulars as confidential, this privilege was deemed qualified rather than absolute. Consequently, the court allowed the petition, emphasizing that since section 57(1) did not expressly prohibit courts from calling for specified records, there should be no hindrance to marking such documents as evidence as deemed appropriate by the court. The judgment concluded by highlighting that the confidentiality provided under section 57(1) was not absolute, thereby allowing the petition with costs incurred.