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2006 (10) TMI 463 - SC - Indian LawsPartition Suit - Execution of sale deed - Grand-father as lineal heirs - lawful heirs entitled to the bequests under the Will - Order of permanent injunction the defendants, their agents, servants from demolishing, altering, constructing or reconstructing the suit schedule property - grant cost of the suit - bungalow which was the subject mater of the suit was demolished by Appellants - HELD THAT:- Plaintiffs who are the daughters of the original defendant No. 1, in law was not entitled to inherit their father's share in the properties but for the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, which brought statutory change. Admittedly, by reason of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, they became heirs of their father in terms whereof the sister's share is equal to that of the brothers. If they were to be excluded, it would have been said so in the Will. The decision of this Court in N. Krishnammal [1979 (4) TMI 177 - SUPREME COURT] is binding on this Court. The meaning of the expression "heir" in the context of the Hindu Succession Act has been considered therein. The expression "heir" would mean a legal heir. In construing a document, this Court cannot assign any other meaning. A document as is well-known must be construed in its entirety. Although some parts thereof should not be read in isolation, the contents of Clause (7) of the Will are really important. It may be true that in the last part of the Will, the propounder while placing his sons adduced the words 'Putra Poutra'. But the same cannot control the unequivocal expression contained in Clause (7) thereof. We fail to understand as to how in the year 1975 the sale deed could be executed. The original defendant No. 1 knew the implication of Will. He was aware that an embargo had been created in his right to transfer the property to any other person. In view of the injunction contained in the said document he could not have alienated the property. He could only be in enjoyful possession thereof. The original defendant No. 1, therefore, thought that if his son is impleaded as one of the executant of the document; probably the embargo created under the Will would not come in his way. In law, he was not right there. His son also did not inherit the property as he was alive. In terms of Clause (7) of the Will, the question of his son's inheriting the property from the original defendant No.1 did not arise. Mr. Bhat is correct in his submission that the suit was pre-mature as no cause of action for the suit arose for the plaintiffs for obtaining a decree to set aside the deed of sale dated 3.12.1975. The cause of action arose on the death of the original defendant No.1 which took place during pendency of the suit. If the cause of action arose during pendency of the suit and if having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, the suit keeping in view the subsequent event could not have been dismissed on the ground that it was barred under the law of limitation, we are of the opinion that it would not be proper for us to interfere with the impugned judgment. An appeal is in continuation of the suit. The appellate court in view of Order VII Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure may take into consideration subsequent events with a view to mould the relief. The High Court, therefore, could not be said to have acted illegally and wholly without jurisdiction in passing the impugned judgment. The son of the original defendant No.1 was not a party but he is a party before us now. He supports the plaintiffs but then he himself did not challenge the deed of sale. So far as his interest in the property is concerned, the same may be claimed by the appellants herein having regard to the principles contained in Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is, therefore, not a case where Articles 59 and 60 of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act would apply. Submission of Mr. Lalit that his clients are bona fide purchasers is not of much significance in this case. If the deed of sale executed by the original defendant No.1 and the Respondent No.3 is void and thus, not binding upon the plaintiffs-respondents, the consequences therefor would ensue. What would be the effect of the sale deed vis-`-vis the Respondent No.3, as we have noticed hereinbefore, would be different having regard to the provisions contained in Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. In the event a partition suit is filed, which property shall be allowed in the share of the Respondent No.3 is not a matter wherewith this Court's attention is required to be engaged. Such question shall appropriately fall for consideration in appropriately constituted suit. Thus, we are of the opinion that no case has been made out for exercise of our discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the constitution of India. This appeal is dismissed.
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