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2007 (7) TMI 673 - SC - Indian LawsRemoval From Army Services - competent authority has wrongly quoted Section 20 in the order of discharge - Challenged the Order of discharge from service in the High Court - Violation Of Principles of Natural Justice - appellant found guilty of prejudicial act to good order and military discipline, charged u/s 63 of the Army Act, 1950 [Army Act] - HELD THAT:- It is an admitted case of the parties that the appellant is governed by the provisions of the Army Act and the Army Rules framed thereunder. The scheme of the Army Act is fairly clear. Chapter IV of the Act deals with Conditions of Service of persons subject to the Army Act. It is well settled that if an authority has a power under the law merely because while exercising that power the source of power is not specifically referred to or a reference is made to a wrong provision of law, that by itself does not vitiate the exercise of power so long as the power does exist and can be traced to a source available in law [see N. Mani v. Sangeetha Theatre & Ors. [2004 (3) TMI 786 - SUPREME COURT]]. Thus, quoting of wrong provision of Section 20 in the order of discharge of the appellant by the competent authority does not take away the jurisdiction of the authority u/s 22 of the Army Act. Therefore, the order of discharge of the appellant from the army service cannot be vitiated on this sole ground as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant. A plain reading of the order of discharge shows that it is an order of termination of service simpliciter without casting or attaching any stigma to the conduct of the appellant, therefore the said order cannot be termed to be punitive in nature or prejudicial to the future employment of the appellant in getting employment in civil service. Thus, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the order of discharge is punitive in nature does not merit acceptance. We are satisfied that there is ample evidence on record in support of the judgment and order of the Division Bench of the High Court and there is nothing that would justify this Court interfering with it. Therefore, the above arguments of the appellant are unacceptable to us. Thus, the appeal is devoid of merit and it is, accordingly, dismissed. The judgment and order of the Division Bench is affirmed. The parties, however, are left to bear their own costs.
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