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2020 (6) TMI 216 - HC - Money LaunderingMoney Laundering - interplay between Section 306, and Section 308, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - revocation of the tender of pardon - HELD THAT:- The Certificate, of the Public Prosecutor, in the present case, does not allege that, before the Court, the respondent concealed anything essential, or gave false evidence. In fact, a holistic reading of the application, filed by the petitioner before the learned Special Judge, reveals that the grievance of the petitioner is, essentially, that the respondent has not cooperated during investigation, and has withheld material in his possession. Mr. Handoo is right when he contends that non-co-operation, during investigation, is not one of the circumstances contemplated, by Section 308 (1), as justifying issuance of certificate by the Public Prosecutor. Quite obviously, this is because the condition, whereunder pardon is granted to the accomplice, is candour before the court, and not candour before the investigating officer. Non-cooperation with the investigative process, therefore, is irrelevant, insofar as Section 308 (1) is concerned. The grounds, urged in the application of the petitioner, preferred before the learned Special Judge did not, therefore, make out a case for issuance of Certificate under Section 308 (1), by the Public Prosecutor. The learned Special Judge, therefore, rightly chose not to “revoke the pardon” extended to the respondent, on the basis of the said averments. One of the serious apprehensions, voiced by the learned ASG, was that, as a consequence of the impugned order of the learned Special Judge, the prosecution would be compelled to lead the evidence of the respondent, even after having found him to be an untrustworthy witness. This apprehension, in my view, cannot be said to rest on any sound factual, or legal, basis. Factually, the apprehension is unfounded, as the learned Special Judge has not rejected the application, of the petitioner, on merits, but has dismissed it as premature, as no statement, of the respondent-approver, was recorded during trial. Liberty has been reserved, even in the impugned order, with the petitioner, to move an appropriate application, at the appropriate stage. It cannot, therefore, be said that, by operation of the impugned order, the petitioner has been compelled to use the evidence of an untrustworthy witness. Legally, too, this apprehension cannot sustain. Before the recording of his statement under Section 306 (4) of the Cr PC, the application, of the petitioner, as preferred before him, was not maintainable - the issuance of certificate, by the Public Prosecutor, under Section 308 (1), Cr PC, had to be necessarily preceded by the recording of the statement of the approver, under Section 306 (4). Petition dismissed.
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