2020 (9) TMI 713 - SUPREME COURT

Condonation of delay in filing appeal - power to condone the delay beyond a period of 45 days - appellants admittedly received the certified copy of the order on 19.12.2019, they chose to file the statutory appeal before NCLAT on 20.07.2020 - Winding up of Company - contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants are twofold namely (i) that the Appellate Tribunal erred in computing the period of limitation from the date of the order of the NCLT, contrary to Section 421(3) of the Companies Act, 2013, and (ii) that the Appellate Tribunal failed to take note of the lockdown as well as the order passed by this Court on 23.03.2020, extending the period of limitation for filing any proceeding with effect from 15.03.2020 until further orders - Section 420(3) of the Companies Act, 2013.

Computation of period of limitation from the date of the order of the NCLT - Section 421(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 - HELD THAT:- From 19.12.2019, the date on which the counsel for the appellants received the copy of the order, the appellants had a period of 45 days to file an appeal. This period expired on 02.02.2020 - By virtue of the proviso to Section 421(3), the Appellate Tribunal was empowered to condone the delay upto a period of period of 45 days. This period of 45 days started running from 02.02.2020 and it expired even according to the appellants on 18.03.2020. The appellants did not file the appeal on or before 18.03.2020, but filed it on 20.07.2020. It is relevant to note that the lock down was imposed only on 24.03.2020 and there was no impediment for the appellants to file the appeal on or before 18.03.2020. To overcome this difficulty, the appellants rely upon the order of this Court dated 23.03.2020.

Failure to take note of the lockdown as well as the order passed by this Court on 23.03.2020, extending the period of limitation for filing any proceeding with effect from 15.03.2020 until further orders - HELD THAT:- What was extended by the order of this Court was only “the period of limitation” and not the period upto which delay can be condoned in exercise of discretion conferred by the statute. The above order passed by this Court was intended to benefit vigilant litigants who were prevented due to the pandemic and the lockdown, from initiating proceedings within the period of limitation prescribed by general or special law. It is needless to point out that the law of limitation finds its root in two latin maxims, one of which is Vigilantibus Non Dormientibus Jura Subveniunt which means that the law will assist only those who are vigilant about their rights and not those who sleep over them.

The expression “prescribed period” appearing in Section 4 cannot be construed to mean anything other than the period of limitation. Any period beyond the prescribed period, during which the Court or Tribunal has the discretion to allow a person to institute the proceedings, cannot be taken to be “prescribed period”.

The appellants cannot claim the benefit of the order passed by this Court on 23.03.2020, for enlarging, even the period up to which delay can be condoned - The second contention is thus untenable.

Appeal dismissed - decided against appellant.