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2024 (3) TMI 443 - SCH - Indian LawsMarket fee/mandi shulk - Whether ghee is a product of livestock under the provisions of The Andhra Pradesh (Agricultural Produce and Livestock) Markets Act, 1966? - whether the Government notification (G.O. Ms. No.286 dated 05.07.1994), which inter alia notifies ghee as one of the products of livestock for the purpose of regulation of purchase and sale of ghee in all notified market areas was published after due compliance of the procedure contemplated under the provisions of the Act? HELD THAT:- The argument that “ghee” is not a product of livestock is baseless, and bereft of any logic. The contrary argument that “ghee” is indeed a product of livestock is logically sound. Livestock has been defined under Section 2(v) of the Act, where Cows and buffalos are the livestock. Undisputedly, “ghee” is a product of milk which is a product of the livestock. The majority opinion of the Full Bench decision in Kommisetty Nammalwar [2009 (5) TMI 1021 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT] while referring to the judgments of this Court in Park Leather Industry (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P. [2001 (2) TMI 893 - SUPREME COURT]]; Kishan Lal v. State of Rajasthan [1990 (3) TMI 323 - SUPREME COURT]; Ram Chandra Kailash Kumar v. State of U.P. [1980 (3) TMI 262 - SUPREME COURT] and Smt. Sita Devi (Dead) by LRs. v. State of Bihar & Ors. [1994 (11) TMI 439 - SUPREME COURT] held that all animal husbandry products would fall within the meaning of ‘products of livestock’ as defined under Section 2 (xv) of the Act. Further, the majority decision has also held that the inclusion of “ghee” as a livestock product cannot be faulted merely because it is derived from another dairy product. It was observed by the High Court that even though “ghee” is not directly obtained from milk, which is a product of livestock, it would still be a “product of a product of livestock”. The second argument of the appellant that the procedure given under Section 3 of the Act has not been followed, is also not correct. There is a basic difference between the notification which has to be made under Section 3 of the Act and the notification which has to be made subsequently under Section 4 of the Act. What has to be done under Section 3 is a onetime measure where the Government notifies an area where purchase and sale of agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock can be made. This is a one-time exercise - A perusal of Sections 3 and 4 of the Act clearly shows that whereas a draft notification is mandatory under Section 3 and so is the hearing of objections to the draft notification, there is no similar provision under Section 4 of the Act. Market fee - HELD THAT:- Since the 1994 notification had an effect which made ‘Ghee’ a product that could be regulated under provisions of the Act, Market Committees were empowered to levy fee on the sale and purchase of ‘ghee’ as per section 12 of the Act. During the pendency of the matter before the High Court, the appellants were not required to pay market fee as they were granted interim protection by the High Court. After the majority decision of the High Court in Kommissetty Nammalwar [2009 (5) TMI 1021 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT], market committees started issuing demand notices to the producers of ‘Ghee’ asking them to pay fees from the date of the notification in the year 1994 to the date of the High Court judgment i.e. 01.05.2009. As per section 4(2) of the Act, the Market Committee has the duty to enforce the provisions of the Act within a notified area. Section 4(3), which empowers Market Committees to establish markets within the notified area, also directs that these Market Committees have to provide facilities in the markets for the purchase and sale of notified products. Appellants’ argument that these Market Committees did not provide any facilities has already been dealt with and rejected by the High Court and we are also of the same view as that taken by the High Court. The appellants have availed the facility given by the Market Committee and hence they are liable to pay the fee. Appeal dismissed.
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