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Income Tax - Case Laws
Showing 61 to 80 of 123 Records
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1955 (7) TMI 29 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... unce any opinion either on the contention of the learned counsel for the assessee, that, in any event, only a pronouncement of a High Court which had preceded the assessment, which pronouncement had been overlooked by the Income-tax Officer in the relevant assessment years, could at all be brought within the scope of section 34. Our answer to the first question is in the negative and in favour of the assessee. In our opinion, in the circumstances of this case, the Patna decision referred to in this question did not satisfy the requirement of section 34. We answer the second question in the negative and in favour of the assessee, though the reason formulated in the question itself, that the department had hitherto treated such income as exempt from income-tax, is not what affects the validity of the proceedings under section 34 of the Act. The assessee will be entitled to the costs of this reference. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Questions answered in favour of the assessee.
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1955 (7) TMI 28 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ture can be lawfully deducted from the income liable for assessment, the burden will shift on the assessee and if there is any ambiguity in the construction of the various clauses of section 6 or of the rules made under that section, a construction in favour of the State should be made. 14. I would therefore hold that in clause (a) of sub-rule (2) of rule 3 of the Orissa Agricultural Income-tax Rules, descendants in the male line of the present proprietor were designedly omitted and that the maintenance allowance given to the son of the present proprietor cannot be taken as a permissible deduction merely because that son also happens to be the grandson of the previous proprietor within the meaning of that clause. The answer to the question raised by the Member, Board of Revenue, is therefore in the negative. The reference is disposed of accordingly. The petitioner should pay hearing fee of ₹ 100 to the Department. MOHAPATRA, J.--I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1955 (7) TMI 27 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ey which is proposed to be spent for the widow but not actually spent. We may in this connexion refer to the meaning of the word "maintenance" given in Iyer's Law Lexicon, 1940 Edition, page 767 "Maintenance also means of subsistence, supply of necessaries and conveniences; aid, support, assistance; the support which one person who is bound by law to do so, gives to another for his living. (Bouvier L. Dict.)" For the above reasons, the second question is answered that a further sum of ₹ 4,505-14-0 spent by the assessee on the subsistence, supply of necessaries and conveniences for the lady and transferred to the maintenance allowance of the lady constitutes maintenance allowance within the meaning of the Orissa Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1947. 11. The reference is disposed of accordingly. The assessee is entitled to costs of this Court. Hearing fee is assessed at one hundred rupees (Rs. 100). MISRA, J.--I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1955 (7) TMI 26 - HOUSE OF LORDS
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... ... ..... e their decisions can only be upset on appeal if they have been positively wrong in law. The court is not a second opinion, where there is reasonable ground for the first. But there is no reason to make a mystery about the subjects that commissioners deal with or to invite the courts to impose any exceptional restraints upon themselves because they are dealing with cases that arise out of facts found by commissioners. Their duty is no more than to examine those facts with a decent respect for the tribunal appealed from and if they think that the only reasonable conclusion on the facts found is inconsistent with the determination come to, to say so without more do. I agree that the appeal should be allowed. LORD TUCKER. My Lords, I agree, for the reasons which have been stated, that this appeal should be allowed. LORD SOMERVELL OF HARROW. My Lords, I have had the advantage of reading the opinion of my noble and learned friend Lord Radcliffe, in which I concur. Appeal allowed.
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1955 (6) TMI 14 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the Rules framed under the Public Demands Recovery Act. was not discussed before us; nor were any of the vexed questions raised as to what the duties of a custody court were when it was merely a custody court and when it was both such court and the executing court, or such court and the attaching court; nor were we asked to consider when, in the circumstances of this case, the money sent by the Superintending Engineer could be said to have been received and whether any crediting to the Petitioners' suit was required for completing reception. No question was raised either on the earlier attachment of the money in the hands of the Superintending Engineer which appears to have been made in 1951. Our decision must be regarded as limited to the two points urged before us. o p /o p 16. For the reasons given above, this Rule is discharged, but in the circumstances of the case no order for costs is made. o p /o p pjudge S.C. Lahiri /pjudge , J. o p /o p 17. I agree. o p /o p
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1955 (6) TMI 13 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ver an Income-tax Officer, after having issued a notice of demand in respect of an amount due under his own order or an order of a higher authority, issues a second notice of demand in respect of the same amount due under the same order it will have to be considered whether he is entitled to do so and I have no doubt whatever what the answer will be. But the present case is not of that description. Here, an alteration had been made in the assessee's liability by, first, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and then by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and there was clearly no repetition of a notice of demand in respect of the same amount due under the same order, but a notice of demand in respect of a fresh or an altered liability. In my view, the contention urged on behalf of the petitioner is not tenable. The Rule is accordingly discharged with costs the hearing fee being assessed at two gold mohurs. Ad-interim stay will stand automatically vacated. LAHIRI, J.-I agree.
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1955 (6) TMI 10 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... me other officers and therefore the knowledge about the facts could be acquired by Shri Gahlot after perusing the previous cases and after considering the manner in which the assessments were made. For these reasons, it was said, that the knowledge so gained by Shri Gahlot could be regarded as information. In our opinion whoever may have made assessments in the past, the Income-tax Officer who acts under section 34 must be deemed to have always had before him the fact and the knowledge which the officers making the assessments themselves had at the time of making the assessment. 16. Lastly it was contended that the argument advanced on behalf of the assessee does not arise on the points which are referred to this Court. In our opinion, the argument is clearly referable to the first question put before us. 17. Our answer to the first question posed therefore is that the notice was not validly issued by the Income-tax Officer under the amended section 34 of the Income-tax Act.
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1955 (5) TMI 21 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ot been made; Nandaram is said to be the sole karta of the undivided Hindu family and Kashiram only an ordinary member, without any share in managing the property. When he is not in charge of any portion of the joint family property which alone is available for payment of the debt, I cannot see how the question of his doing any of the acts mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of the proviso to section 51 can arises at all. I have, therefore, come to the conclusion that as Kashiram Agarwalla is not a karta of the joint family and is not said to have charge and control of any part of the joint family property, the Collector has no jurisdiction to recover the arrears in question by his arrest and detention. I would, therefore, make the rule obtained by Kashiram Agarwalla absolute and quash the proceedings pending against him before the Collector. In view of the circumstances of the case, I would order that the parties will bear their own costs. Sailendra Nath Guha Ray, J. - I agree.
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1955 (5) TMI 20 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... see which are oppressive. Where, however, moneys are or may become due to a defaulting assessee and express provision is made in the Statute granting power to the Income Tax Officer to proceed against the same, the exercise of such power cannot be said to be oppressive. Mr. Mitra has argued, that a taxing statute should be construed in such a manner as will work the least possible hardship to the assessee. This statement of the law is quite correct, but where an express power is conferred by statute it is not open to the Courts to interpret it in such a manner as to take away that power. I am unable, therefore, to hold that because of the pendency of the certificate proceedings, the Income Tax Officer was not entitled to proceed under the provisions of Section 46 (5A) of the Income Tax Act. 23. The result is that all the points put forward have failed and the petition must be dismissed. The rule is discharged and all interim orders vacated. There will be no order as to costs.
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1955 (5) TMI 19 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... oint Hindu family even though the person concerned became qualified to become a director only because the share of the joint Hindu family were placed at his disposal. These authorities are not relevant to the decision of this case, for the joint family property in those cases was not put in jeopardy for the purpose of earning the remuneration of the directors. In the present case. Shil Chandra deposited valuable securities with the bank which could have been completely lost to the joint Hindu family. It cannot be said, therefore, that the income derived by Shil Chandra was derived without detriment to the family property. For these reasons, I would declare (1) that the emoluments received by Shil Chandra as treasurer of the bank are assessable under the head "Profits and gains of business" and (2) that Shil Chandra's emoluments as treasurer were rightly assessed in the hands of the Hindu undivided family of which he is the karta. Reference answered accordingly.
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1955 (5) TMI 16 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
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... ... ..... dings in the course of which the penalty proceedings came to be initiated. The assessee has to be given notice under sub-section (3) and has to be heard and finally the penalty may be levied, notwithstanding that at the date of the actual order of levy the proceedings in the course of which the concealment etc. took place had terminated. In the present case, all the notices have been issued by the Income-tax Officer when the matter was pending before him. The fact that by the date of the hearing of the assessee under section 28(3) or of the actual order levying the penalty under section 28(1) the assessment proceedings had terminated is wholly irrelevant and does not affect the validity of the penalties levied against the assessee. These writ petitions therefore fail and are dismissed with costs. In view of the nature of question raised which made it necessary for the Advocate-General to appear, we fix the fee payable to counsel at ₹ 350 for all the petitions together.
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1955 (5) TMI 15 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t question to be considered is whether the expenditure was incurred by the assessee solely and exclusively for his business. There cannot however be any serious dispute as regards this matter and indeed even the Tribunal did not hold against the assessee on this head. The business of the assessee was as a transport operator. He expanded his business by expenditure of new capital which resulted in the acquisition of the five buses with their route permits. The cost of acquisition was of course expenditure of a capital nature. But to assert the rights to this business which he acquired, he incurred the expenses in dispute. If that expenditure was not of a capital but of a revenue nature, it was certainly laid out for his business and solely and exclusively for it. This question referred to us is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to his costs in this reference. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Reference answered in the negative.
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1955 (5) TMI 14 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hat there should be an apportionment on the basis that three rights were surrendered and released in consideration of the payment of ₹ 28,799, namely, (1) giving up the right to 50 per cent. of the profits. The amount apportionable to this item would be a revenue receipt. (2) The surrender of the right to royalty and (3) the surrender of preemption right. The consideration received for the surrender of these latter two items of rights would be a capital receipt not assessable to tax. The Appellate Tribunal should apportion the sum received to these three items and on that basis determine the assessable portion of the same. Our answer to the question referred is that the sum of ₹ 28,779 represents not merely remuneration for services rendered but also other items of a capital nature and cannot therefore be wholly treated as a revenue receipt..... As neither side wholly succeeded in this reference, there will be no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1955 (4) TMI 57 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
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... ... ..... a. 1 of that section with Para. 2. The further allowance of 20" per cent, is an allowance for depreciation within the meaning of Section 10(2)(vi), Since that was a depreciation allowance actually allowed to the assessee under the Act, and as the assets with reference to which that depreciation allowance was made were acquired before the previous year, that is, before 1946-47, this allowance of ₹ 25,970 should be included in computing the written down value for purposes of assessing the capital gains under Section 12-B of the Act. 11. Our answer to the second question therefore is that the initial depreciation of ₹ 11,506 allowed in the year of account 1946-47 should be excluded and the initial depreciation of ₹ 25,970 allowed in the accounting year 1945-46 should be included in computing the written down value of the assessees' assets. 12. As neither side has wholly succeeded in its contentions, there will be no order as to costs on this reference.
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1955 (4) TMI 56 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ted that the loss incurred by the assessee in the present case arose incidentally out of the enforcement of the penalty imposed by the Magistrate and should therefore be deemed part of the penalty. In other words, the suggestion was that the Magistrate must be deemed to have inflicted a further punishment by his direction as regards the manner in which the confiscation should be enforced in addition to the confiscation ordered. We are unable to consider this as any reasonable deduction from, or construction of, the order of the Magistrate. 14. In our opinion the loss sustained by the assessee to the extent of ₹ 8,844 is a trading loss which is deductible in computing the income of the assessee for the assessment year. The reference is therefore answered in favour of the assessee to the extent stated above. The assessee is in favour of the assessee to the extent stated above. The assessee is entitled to his costs. Counsels fee ₹ 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1955 (4) TMI 54 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... bay v. Valiram Bherumal. 22. Our answers to the questions referred to us in Case Referred No. 46 of 1951 are as follows. The first question is answered in the affirmative and against the assessee. The second question is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. 23. Our answers to the questions referred to this Court in Case Referred No. 108 of 1953 are as follows. The first question is answered in the affirmative with reference to the accounting years 1944, 1945 and 1946 and in the negative with reference to the other assessment years. The second question is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. Our answer to the third question is that the assessee is entitled to no more than one allowance of ₹ 4,500 under the third proviso to section 4(1)(c). of the Income Tax Act. 24. Since neither side could claim to have succeeded in either of the cases we direct that there should be no order as to costs in either case. Reference answered accordingly.
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1955 (4) TMI 53 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... income. It should be remembered that Sokkalal died on 22nd June, 1942, and the accounting year came to a close on 16th August, 1942. There was no finding either by the taxing authorities or by the Appellate Tribunal that Hariram himself was in charge of his estate or that his guardians were in any way responsible for any concealment or suppression of income. The requirement of section 28(1)(c) being that Hariram to be penalised must have himself concealed his income, and that requirement not having been satisfied, we have to hold that there was no basis at all for the Tribunal to come to the conclusion, that Hariram should be penalised to the extent of ₹ 10,000. In the view we have taken of the requirement of section 28(1) (c ) it is not necessary to discuss any of the other questions, no doubt interesting, raised by counsel on both sides. We answer the question in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to the costs of this reference.
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1955 (4) TMI 51 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ction 5. The prime mover of these proceedings was opposite party No. 2. It is true that opposite party No. 2 being beyond our jurisdiction, we cannot issue a writ directed to that party, but it does not mean that costs cannot be awarded against that party, when that party is given an opportunity to appear and represent its case before us. There may be a case where a person, residing outside the jurisdiction of this court, may institute a suit in a court within the jurisdiction of this court. In such a case, if a writ of certiorari or of prohibition is issued against that court, the liability for the costs incurred by the petitioner would fall not on the court but on the person, who initiated those proceedings, even though he may be residing outside the jurisdiction of the court. On that principle the costs should be payable by the opposite party No. 2 and we direct that the petitioners shall be entitled to their costs from opposite party No. 2 which we assess at ₹ 500.
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1955 (4) TMI 50 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nce of an intention to trade. Even the mere fact, that the purchase itself was for the purpose of resale at a profit, is thus a relevant factor in deciding whether the purchase and sale constituted a transaction, and that transaction was an adventure in the nature of trade. Only, in given circumstances it may by no means be a conclusive factor as Lord Dunedin pointed out in Leeming v. Jones 15 TC 333. In the present case the intention to resell was not the only factor that weighed with the Tribunal when it came to the conclusion that it was a transaction in the nature of trade. We are unable to hold that on the material placed before the Tribunal and considered by it there was no evidence on which it could come to the conclusion, that it was an adventure in the nature of trade and the profits from that transaction constituted taxable income. The question referred to us is answered in the affirmative and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of the respondent.
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1955 (4) TMI 49 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the Income-tax Act and rule 12 of Schedule I of the Excess Profits Tax Act, there was really no basis on record to show that, judged from the point of view of a businessman, payments in excess of the minima recommended by the I.C.I. were not reasonable. We are of opinion that the entire claim should have been allowed both under section 10(2)(x) of the Income-tax Act and under rule 12 of Schedule I of the Excess Profits Tax Act on the ground that the statutory requirements were satisfied by the assessee. The first question is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The second question, as we have already pointed out, has to be answered with reference to the requirements of section 10(2)(x) of the Income-tax Act, and our answer to that question is that the amount of commission paid out by the assessee to its branch managers and assistant managers was reasonable. The assessee will be entitled to its costs in each of the two references, 53 of 1952 and 44 of 1953.
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