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VAT / Sales Tax - Case Laws
Showing 61 to 80 of 27696 Records
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2025 (3) TMI 116
Entitlement to the benefit of prospective effect as contemplated under Section 56 (2) of the MVAT Act - Appellant Trust is a deemed dealer under section 2 (8) of MVAT Act 2002 liable for registration and payment of tax under MVAT Act or not - whether it is not necessary for levy of Sales Tax, that the Appellant must carry on ‘business’ in the capacity of the dealer? - sale of movable or immovable property, to be ascertained by the field officers at the appropriate stage.
Whther the appellant is a 'deemed dealer' as contemplated under the explanation to section 2 (8) of the MVAT Act? - HELD THAT:- The Appellant became the full and absolute owner of the loans and the stressed assets [by virtue of the Transfer Deed dated 30th September 2004] and the only person legally entitled to recover those loans or any part thereof. To ensure that the Appellant could in fact avail of quick remedies of recovery under the provisions of the RDDB Act, 1993, as well as the SARFAESI Act, 2002, the Government, in exercise of powers conferred by sub-clause (ii) of clause (h) of Section 2 of the RDDB Act, 1993 specified/notified the Appellant to be a financial institution for the purposes of the said clause. On perusing the clauses of the Trust Deed as well as the Transfer Deed, it is clear that the objects of the Appellant Trust were for recovering debts of defaulting borrowers by disposing of the stressed assets inter alia under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, 2002.
The deemed dealer provision under the MVAT Act becomes operational when the categories thereunder sell any goods, whether by auction or otherwise. The Explanation which introduces the deeming provision further stipulates that the deemed dealer provision would operate notwithstanding anything contained in Section 2 (4) [the definition of the word “business”] or any other provisions of the MVAT Act - The Explanation in clear terms provides that the enumerated entities would be deemed to be a “dealer” when they sell any goods, by auction or otherwise. Thus, the definition itself specifies that the sale of goods, whether by auction or otherwise would render the person/body/entities enlisted in the clauses to the Explanation to be a dealer.
Whether the Appellant would fall within any of the ten clauses as set out in the Explanation to Section 2 (8) of the MVAT Act? - HELD THAT:- Clause (x) of the Explanation clearly stipulates that any corporation, company, body or authority owned or constituted by or subject to the administrative control of the Central Government, any State Government or any local authority, would be deemed to be a dealer for the purposes of the MVAT Act. It can hardly be disputed that the Appellant is a body constituted by the Central Government. This is abundantly clear from the Trust Deed which in fact constitutes and sets up the Appellant as a Trust and the settlor of this Trust is the Central Government. The Appellant therefore is clearly a body constituted by the Central Government. Once this is the case, we find that the Appellant is certainly a deemed dealer for the purposes of the MVAT Act.
Denial of benefit of prospective effect to the DDQ order (u/s 56(2) of the MVAT Act) - HELD THAT:- Under Section 56 (1), if any question arises regarding, inter alia, a person being a dealer, or whether such person is required to be registered as a dealer, or any particular thing done to any goods amounts to or results in the manufacture of goods, or any transaction is a sale or purchase etc., and such a question/s is posed to the Commissioner, the Commissioner shall determine such question/s in terms of Section 56 (1) of the MVAT Act. Section 56 (2) gives the power and discretion to the Commissioner to direct that the determination made by him under sub-section (1) shall not affect the liability under the MVAT Act in respect of any sale or purchase effected prior to the determination - the Commissioner has the power and discretion to put a quietus to transactions entered into prior to his DDQ Order. It is, of course, needless to clarify that this discretion has to be exercised on sound judicial principles and cannot be on the ipse dixit of the Commissioner.
Whether the Petitioner had made out a case for getting the benefit of prospective effect to the DDQ Order? - HELD THAT:- There is a force in the argument of Ms. Badheka that by virtue of Article 285 of the Constitution of India the Appellant was of the bona fide opinion that it being set up and constituted by the Central Government, and all the proceeds that it recovers from sale of stressed assets are to go to the Central Government, coupled with the fact that if for any reason the stressed assets are not sold during the tenure of the Trust, the same would vest in the Central Government, it was not liable to collect any tax on the sale of securities of the stressed assets - the Appellant ought to have been extended the benefit of prospective effect to the DDQ Order.
Conclusion - The Appellant is a deemed dealer under the MVAT Act and liable for sales tax on the sale of movable properties. However, the Appellant is granted prospective effect to the DDQ Order, exempting it from liability for past transactions.
Appeal disposed off.
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2025 (3) TMI 61
Entitlement to concessional rate of tax - inter-state sale - Rejection of application filed by the writ petitioner on the ground that the tribunal cannot issue the direction sought for - HELD THAT:- It is required to be seen as to what remedy the petitioner is entitled to. Form-C declaration have been held to be documents when produce by the dealer, they will be entitled to benefit of the concessional rate of tax or reduced rate of tax. There are several decisions which have been pointed out and even if there is a defect in Form-C declaration issued in respect of an inter-State sale the same can be rectified and if there is a delay in issuance of Form-C declaration by the assessing officer of the purchasing dealer and if the Form-C declaration is issued belatedly, such declaration can be produced before the jurisdictional assessing officer of the selling dealer and the assessment for the relevant period can be revised.
In the instant case, the factual position is much better as the respondent/department does not dispute the fact that the transaction done by the writ petitioner with the 7th respondent is a case of inter- State sale. There may be cases where the purchasing dealer might have faced action by the department including that of cancellation of registration and there are decisions which have held that if the registration of the selling dealer is valid during the period when the inter-State sale took place, then the selling dealer would be entitled to the concessional rate of tax.
More or less an identical issue was decided by the Division Bench of this court in the case of Commissioner of Commercial Taxes and Another v. Tata Steel Limited and Others [2022 (11) TMI 1274 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT] - It is informed the said decision though the appeal was filed against the said order before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, subsequently, the State Government accepted the decision and the concessional rate of tax was extended to the assessee therein, namely, Tata Steel Limited. Though this writ petition arises out of a challenge to an order passed by the learned tribunal yet this court is not denude of jurisdiction to do substantial justice in the instant matter in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, particularly when facts are not in dispute, that the transaction between the writ petitioner and the 7th respondent is a case of inter-State sale.
Conclusion - The petitioner was entitled to the concessional tax rate of 2% for the inter-State sale based on the admitted facts and the 6th respondent's acknowledgment.
The writ petition is disposed of by directing the 6th respondent to address a letter to the writ petitioner to the effect that the subject sale transaction is admittedly an inter-State sale, and Form-C declaration is not being able to be issued as the 7th respondent has not filed any application for issuance of Form-C declaration.
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2025 (2) TMI 1050
Refund of excess tax deposited during appellate proceedings - infringement of Articles 14, 19(1)(g), and Article 265 of the Constitution of India or not - HELD THAT:- The respondents cannot retain the amounts deposited by the petitioner pursuant to condition imposed by the appellate authority for stay of the assessment order and contend that there is no necessity to refund the same. If the actual tax assessed from the petitioner is much less than the amount which the petitioner had deposited at the time of filing the appeal and seeking stay, retention of the balance after the assessing officer, post remand, reduced the demand drastically, would undoubtedly amount to unjust enrichment on the part of the respondents and would be violative of Article 14 and Article 265 of the Constitution of India.
The respondents are directed to refund the amounts deposited by the petitioner after adjusting the same towards the tax finally assessed post remand by the assessing authority for the Assessment Year 2013-14 and Assessment Year 2014-15 with interest at the rate of 9% per annum from 09.01.2021 till the date of actual payment. The respondents shall also pay cost of Rs. 2,00,000/- to the petitioner for unjustly retaining the said amount for the last four years. The cost as well as the refund shall both be paid to the petitioner within six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
Petition allowed.
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2025 (2) TMI 1014
Works contract - Exemption to subcontractors in terms of Entry 59-A of the 1st schedule to the AP VAT Act - HELD THAT:- Entry 59A exempts all goods sold within the SEZ area by an operator, developer, a co-developer or contractor or by any of the above. The term contractor has now been interpreted to include sub-contractors, by virtue of the Judgment of the erstwhile High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh in M/s. Larsen and Toubro and Others vs. State of Andhra Pradesh [2006 (10) TMI 377 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT].
However, Section 7A, which was introduced subsequently, on 24.09.2008, states that exemption of tax on sale of goods within the Special Economic Zone will be available on sale of any goods to persons who have been authorized to establish unit in the SEZ or authorized to develop operate and maintain a SEZ. The further condition is that only such sales of goods made for the purposes, set out in Section 7A would be eligible for such exemption.
In the present case, entry 59A states that all goods sold by the persons mentioned in entry 59A, would be eligible for exemption. Section 7A also provides for such exemption. However, the said exemption is subjection to certain conditions - When there is a possibility of conflict between two provisions of law, the rule of harmonious construction would have to be applied to see if both provisions of law can operate simultaneously. Applying this principle, there are no reason as to why both provisions cannot operate at the same time. At best, Section 7A is a more restrictive provision of law whereas item 59A is a more expansive exemption. It may also be noted Entry 59A was not deleted from the Act, when Section 7A was introduced, and came to be deleted much later. This is also a factor, which has to be taken into account while trying to harmonize both the provisions of law.
Conclusion - There are no reason to hold that there is a conflict between Section 7A of AP VAT Act and Entry 59A of the 1st Schedule to the AP VAT Act. In the absence of a conflict, the non-obstante clause does not come into operation and consequently the petitioner was entitled to the benefit of Entry 59-A of the 1st schedule which exempts all the sales made by the petitioner, in the course of execution of the works contract, for M/s. Abhijeet Projects Limited.
All the impugned orders are set aside and the Writ Petitions are allowed.
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2025 (2) TMI 943
Challenge to search and seizure proceedings conducted in the appellants’ Firm by the Taxation Authorities, in exercise of powers conferred under Sections 74 (3) and 74(4) of the Assam Value Added Tax Act, 2003 - main contention raised by the appellants before the Writ Court was that the respondent authorities had conducted the aforesaid search and seizure proceedings without following the due process of law - HELD THAT:- The learned Single Judge, while taking into consideration the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in Sections 46, 47, 51 and 100, has come to the conclusion that while conducting the search and seizure proceedings, the respondent authorities ought to have followed the procedure laid down under Sections 47 and 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, because detail procedure for search and seizure has not been provided in the Assam Value Added Tax Act, 2003. At the same time, the learned Single Judge has not interfered with the search and seizure proceedings effected way back on 03.09.2014, while observing that since much time had already elapsed after conducting the search and seizure proceedings, it may not be necessary to make any further observation except to hold that if any cause of action still survives, the appellants will be at liberty to approach the appropriate forum. It is to be noticed that while passing the impugned order on 05.11.2019, no one appeared on behalf of the appellants before the learned Single Judge.
Since in the order dated 05.11.2019 passed in WP(C) No. 6363/2014 and WP(C) No. 6364/2014 and orders dated 25.01.2021 passed in I.A. (Civil) No. 956/2020 and I.A. (Civil) No. 1262/2020 the learned Single Judge has kept it open for the appellants to challenge the validity of the assessment order and the notice of demand issued during the pendency of the writ petitions, or after disposal of the writ petitions, no further order is required to be passed in these writ appeals.
Appeal dismissed.
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2025 (2) TMI 942
Valuation - Invocation of revisional jurisdiction of this court u/s. 8F of the Karnataka Entertainment Tax Act, 1958 - inclusion of service tax component in the ‘amount received or receivable’ while levying entertainment tax, in terms of Sec. 4G of the Act
Whether the service tax collected by the Petitioner from the subscribers under the provisions of the Finance Act, 1994 against the DTH broadcasting services shall from part of consideration for the levy of Entertainment Tax under Section 4G of the 1958 Act? - HELD THAT:- The entertainment tax is levied and collected ‘on the amounts received or receivable’ by a Multi System Operator or Direct To Home service provider [DTH]. These amounts are nothing but the consideration which the customers would pay towards providing television signals under the DTH scheme. The transaction would obviously include both entertainment and service. Since both are discernible independent of each other, they are taxable separately; the entertainment is taxed under the provisions of 1958 Act whereas, the service is taxed under the provisions of Finance Act, 1994. The text, content & intent of section 4G leaves no manner of doubt that for the purpose of levy of entertainment tax, the ‘amount received or receivable’ cannot include service tax component. Had the legislature intended inclusion, the text of this provision would have been a bit different. Therefore, the first question of law is answered in the negative and in favour of the Assessee.
The above view gains support from the decision of Apex Court in M/s Anand Swarup Mahesh Kumar vs. Commissioner Of Sales Tax [1980 (9) TMI 238 - SUPREME COURT] wherein, Assessee therein had argued that the market fee payable under the UP Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964 being a sum which could be collected from the purchaser under the provisions of the said statute by the commission agent for being remitted to the market committee, could not be considered as forming part of the consideration payable by the purchaser of the goods to the commission agent and therefore, it could not be included in the ‘turnover of purchases’ for the purpose of levy of tax under section 3-D of the UP Sales Tax Act, 1948.
Whether in the absence of definition of ‘invoice’ in the 1958 Act, the bills/statement of accounts containing the itemized details/segregation of the basic value of DTH broadcasting services, service tax, license fee etc. will be considered as ‘invoice’? - HELD THAT:- Abundant evidentiary material is produced even in the paper book of the petition. The Assessee had placed before the authorities the Statement of Account showing itemized billing and separate collection of service tax amount which aspect has been discussed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Assessee’s earlier STRP No. 436/2017 disposed off on 10.12.2021 [2022 (1) TMI 443 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT]. True it is that the word ‘invoice’ is not defined in the 1958 Act nor in the Mysore General Clauses Act, 1899. However, Black’s law dictionary, 5th edition, gives the meaning of this word. “A written account or itemized statement of merchandise shipped or sent to a purchaser, consignee, factor, etc., with the quantity, value or prices and charges annexed. Document showing details of a sale or purchase transaction…The new International Webster’s comprehensive dictionary, 2004 edition, defines ‘invoice’ to mean a list sent to a purchaser, etc., containing the items and charges of merchandise.” Both the authorities at their level and the Tribunal in its domain would have treated this aspect of the matter in a satisfactory way. This having not happened, it is required to upset the finding in this regard so that even this aspect of the matter would be considered afresh.
Conclusion - i) The 'amount received or receivable' for entertainment tax does not include the service tax component. ii) The absence of a statutory provision authorizing the passing on of tax to consumers affects the consideration for tax levy.
The impugned order of the Tribunal is set at naught; matter is remitted to the domain of the Tribunal for consideration afresh in the light of the observations hereinabove made and in accordance with law - Petition allowed by way of remand.
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2025 (2) TMI 892
Constitutional validity of Section 3C of the Kerala Local Authorities Entertainments Tax Act, 1961 - Section 5 of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958 - levy of cess on cinema tickets to fund the Kerala Cultural Activists' Welfare Fund - HELD THAT:- The Cess levied under Section 3C of the Act of 1961 and collected is for the Kerala Cultural Activists' Welfare Fund, established under the Act of 2010. This Cess shall not exceed Rs. 3/- per cinema admission where the ticket price is more than Rs. 25/-. The local authority has to collect the Cess along with the tax on cinema admission and, after deducting the collection charges at a rate specified by the Government, has to transfer the proceeds to the Kerala Cultural Activists' Welfare Fund Board. The Cess is levied on the cinema viewers and not on the theatre owners. The impugned provision seeks to levy a cess on the ticket purchased by cinema viewers for the purpose of entertainment, and, therefore, it is clearly relatable to entertainment under Entry 62 of List II, VII Schedule to the Constitution of India.
In the case of M/s. Vijayalakshmi Rice Mill [2006 (8) TMI 307 - SUPREME COURT], the Hon'ble Supreme Court, had an occasion to consider the term "Cess". In this case, a cess under the Andhra Pradesh Rural Development Act, 1986, which was in addition to the purchase of sales tax, was the subject matter of challenge. The contention was that the enactment does not fall in any of the entries in List II or List III of Schedule VII to the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court considered the question of whether the said impost was a fee or a tax. In that context, the Supreme Court elaborated on the term "Cess" and held that ordinarily, Cess is also a tax but is a special kind of tax.
The Cess can also mean a tax levied for a special purpose or as an increment to the existing tax and, in given circumstances, a fee. In the case at hand, entertainment tax is already levied under the Act of 1961 and the Cess under Section 3C is an additional levy. Thus, the contention of the learned Senior Advocate for the Appellants that under Entry 62 of List II of Schedule VII to the Constitution of India, only tax can be levied, and Cess cannot be levied is without merit. The Cess is another term for the tax that is levied, which is a special kind of tax. The levy of impugned Cess is traceable to Entry 62 of List II, VII Schedule to the Constitution of India.
If the levy of the impugned Cess on entertainment improves the quality of entertainment, then a broad correlation will be established. We find a correlation between the Cess on entertainment levied on the cinema viewers as a fee and the utilisation of the Fund for the welfare of cultural activists. That is because the levy on cinema viewers contributes to the welfare of cultural artists in the State and the overall development of cultural and artistic ethos. When cultural activities relatable to art are supported and valued, it fosters a culture that appreciates art. This then creates a positive cycle of creativity and appreciation. When society encourages and supports artists, the overall artistic ethos strengthens, leading to quality artistic output - the impugned Cess can be traced to the legislative power of the State Government to Entries 62 and 66 of List II, Schedule VII to the Constitution of India, and the levy of this Cess is relatable to the benefits received by the cinema viewers on whom the Cess is levied.
Challenge to levy of impugned Cess on the grounds of violation of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India - HELD THAT:- The Cess impugned is to be collected by the local authority. The proceeds of the Cess have to be remitted by the local authority to the account of the Kerala Cultural Activists' Welfare Fund Board. There is no role for the theatre owners, and the levy does not fall on them. No data has been provided to demonstrate how this levy amount per ticket has affected the functioning of the theatre owners' business. This argument is not supported by adequate pleadings and cannot be accepted.
Conclusion - i) The constitutionality of Section 3C upheld, affirming the State's legislative competence under Entry 62 of List II. ii) The cess was a valid tax on entertainment, serving a specific purpose of funding the welfare of cultural activists.
There is no merit in the challenge. There is no error in the view taken by the learned Single Judge - Appeal dismissed.
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2025 (2) TMI 884
Challenge to assessment order - authorization given to the Deputy Commissioner, Guntakal was not available in a valid format - HELD THAT:- In the present case, the turnover of Rs. 4.54 crores, being the turnover relating to sale of alcohol and the turnover relating to sale of food has been taxed. The sale of alcohol, in the State of A.P., under the A.P. VAT Act, was to be taxed under Schedule VI ‘at the point of first sale in the State’. This sale would be the sale between M/s. Andhra Pradesh Beverages Corporation Limited and the petitioner. The subsequent sale of liquor by the petitioner to his customers would not be exigible to tax.
Explanation-II to the definition of ‘taxable turnover’ stipulates that the sale prices relating to second and subsequent sale of goods, enumerated in Schedule VI, shall not form part of ‘taxable turnover’. This would mean that the entire turnover of Rs. 4.54 crores, which is on account of sale of alcohol would have to be excluded from the taxable turnover of the petitioner. This would leave a turnover of Rs. 1,02,20,407/-, which is the turnover relating to sale of food. As the turnover in question, is less than Rs. 1.5 crores per year, the same would be taxable only under Section 4 (9) (d).
Conclusion - The sale of alcohol was taxed at the point of first sale and subsequent sales were not taxable. Therefore, the turnover from alcohol sales should be excluded from the taxable turnover, leaving only the turnover from food sales, which was below the threshold for the higher tax rate.
The matter remanded back to the assessing authority to pass fresh assessment orders by excluding the turnover of Rs. 4.54 crores arising out of sale of liquor from the turnover on which tax is levied - petition partly allowed by way of remand.
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2025 (2) TMI 883
Scope of Revision Petition - Set Top Boxes (STBs) are goods within the meaning of section 2(15) of the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003 or not - consideration for transfer of right to use STB - mutual exclusiveness of service tax and VAT - retrospectivity of Government notification dated 15.03.2021.
Scope of Revisional Jurisdiction - HELD THAT:- Revision is more a matter of power of the Revising Authority than the right of revisionist. Several Statutes provide for suo moto Revision whereas suo moto Appeals are almost unknown - The scope of Appeal or Revision depends upon the text of the provision of a statute which creates the right of Appeal, or vests revisional power. It has been a long settled position of law that normally scope of Appeal is wider than that of Revision. Ordinarily, first appeal is both on law and facts unless the statute otherwise says.
Thumbnail description of Section 65 - HELD THAT:- In terms of order on Revision, Assessment Orders have to be modified and any excess payment has to be refunded to and any deficit is to be made good by the Assessee, says Sub-section (9). Sub-section (10) (a) provides for review of the order made on Revision on the basis of facts that were not there when the Revision was decided. Sub-section (10) (b) empowers the government to make rules prescribing limitation period for Review and the manner in which Review should be preferred. Sub-section is on par with section 152 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and it provides for rectification of mistakes in the order made in Revision. This would include order made in review as well. Rectification can be sought for at any time within five years; before effecting rectification, stakeholders need to be heard. Sub-section (12) provides for discretionary levy of cost while making orders on Revision.
Question of law within the meaning of section 65 - HELD THAT:- It is well settled that a question may be treated as of law even if in Salmondian sense, it is not: when a finding of fact is recorded without evidence or contrary to evidence or founded on inadmissible evidence, ordinarily they are treated as questions of law. It may also arise when, on the basis of evidentiary material on record, no reasonable person in the armchair of the authority would have entered a finding, that has a bearing on the outcome of the proceeding. These are only illustrative.
It is the specific case of Assessees that a finding in the form of answers in the affirmative has been recorded to the above questions without or contrary to evidentiary material; this has been done in disregard of decisions of Apex Court and High Courts. Therefore, it is opined that the preliminary objection as to maintainability of the Revision Petitions is not sustainable.
Whether a set top box is goods u/s 2(15) of the Act - HELD THAT:- A Set Top Box is an appliance between cable outlet and a subscriber’s receiver, cannot be disputed. Regulation 2(z) of the Telecommunication (Broadcasting and Cable Services) Interconnection (Digital Addressable Cable Television Systems) Regulations, 2012 defines “Set Top Box” means a device, which is connected to, or is part of a television and which allows a subscriber to receive in unencrypted and descrambled form subscribed channels through an addressable system - It is not out of place to refer to a Central Government Office Memorandam dated 13.08.2014 which says that STBs fall within the definition of goods for the purpose of Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 and therefore, Form-C facility to be extended to them.
STB is capable of exclusive use by the subscribers or not - HELD THAT:- Regulation 17 obligates every Multi Service Operator like the Assessees herein to provide to the subscribers STBs conforming to standard, set by the Bureau of Indian Standards, with a minimum warranty of one year, unless the subscriber himself has bought one on his own. There is a statutory obligation to repair the STBs within 24 hours of the complaint that too, free of cost. It is admitted before us by both the sides that the STBs are installed in the premises of subscriber only, albeit license to visit the same for service/repair is accorded under the subject agreements. In deciding the question, what are the goods involved in a sale transaction of the kind and with what intent the parties have entered into it, would assume importance. The seller and purchaser, the words being used in their widest amplitude have to be ad idem as to the subject matter of the arrangement. To this to be added, the intent of law also. In finding answers to questions of the kind, the approach of the court should be of a reasonable person of average intelligence.
There being nothing to substantiate pervasive control of the Assessee over the STBs, merely because they have license to gain entry to the premises of the subscriber for periodic inspection/repair.
Consideration for transfer of right to use STB - HELD THAT:- The simple question is whether the transfer of right to use STBs is for consideration or it is free. The Authorities and the Tribunal have held that the consideration for right to use STB is Rs. 2,000/-. That estimate is made inter alia on the basis of a clause in the Inter-connect Agreement that obtained between the Assessees and their local cable operators. A clause in the agreement prescribes Rs. 2,000/- payable by the local operator if STB is damaged or it is not used for the purpose for which it is installed - The authorities having accumulated expertise in the matter have formed a considered opinion that a sum of Rs.2,000/- is the consideration for transferring the right to use the STBs. A Court exercising a limited revisional jurisdiction cannot run a race of opinions with the authorities and Tribunals which have recorded concurrent findings.
Service tax and VAT are mutually exclusive or not - HELD THAT:- There can be levy of more than one tax on a subject matter, if incidence of each of the taxes is different from the other and such taxes may be imposed under different statutes. A tax on the sale of goods is envisaged under Entry 54 of List II (Sales Tax) of Schedule 7 of the Constitution and the taxable event is transfer of goods including fictional sale envisaged under Article 366 (29A). In the case at hand, sales tax is levied under the State Enactment. There the State is not levying tax on service aspect of the transaction, since that exclusively belongs to the domain of the Parliament, which has enacted Finance Act, 1994 - In the case at hand, sales tax is levied under the State Enactment. There the State is not levying tax on service aspect of the transaction, since that exclusively belongs to the domain of the Parliament, which has enacted Finance Act, 1994.
Retrospectivity of Government notification dated 15.03.2021 - HELD THAT:- Sub-section (2) of Sec. 174 has to be read with sub- section (3) of Sec. 164. Added, sub-section (4) of Sec. 174 in a way enacts Sec. 6 of the Mysore General Clauses Act, 1899. In view of this, it cannot be assumed that the tax regime during the transition period between repeal of 2003 Act and enactment of 2017 Act, was ever intended to be left as a vacuum creating a limited/partial tax heaven, in the mere absence of a notification under sub-section (2) of Sec. 174. If legislature intended to make operation of sub- section (1) of Sec. 174 dependent upon a notification to be issued under sub-section (2), the language of the provision would have been much different. An argument to the contrary would offend the tax jurisprudence evolved over centuries, in civilized jurisdictions. Therefore, the vehement submission made on behalf of the Assessees that the notification of 2021 could not have been issued with retrospective effect, pales into insignificance.
Conclusion - i) STBs are goods within the meaning of section 2(15) of the Act, capable of exclusive use by subscribers, and that the right to use them is transferred for valuable consideration. ii) Service tax and VAT are not mutually exclusive. iii) The notification dated 15.03.2021 could have retrospective effect.
Petition dismissed.
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2025 (2) TMI 797
Doctrine of promissery estoppel - Rejection of the respective eligibility certificates applied under the relevant provisions of the Industrial Policy of 2008 - rejection of eligibility certificates without due and proper appreciation of the facts and materials available before the respondent-Department of Industries - industrial unit was “non-functioning” or not - validity of assessments made by the Department of Finance and Taxation, during the pendency of eligibility certificate applications.
Whether the rejection of eligibility certificates by the Department of Industries and Commerce under the Industrial Policy of Assam, 2008, on the grounds of being "non-functioning," was justified? - HELD THAT:- The period of validity of the Industrial Policy of 2008 was for a period of five years with effect from 01.10.2008 till 30.09.2013. The eligibility criteria as per the said Policy was all new units as well as existing units which go in for substantial expansion and which had commenced commercial production within the period of validity will be eligible for the incentives from the date of commencement of commercial production for the period applicable for each incentive. In the said Industrial Policy of 2008, various fiscal incentives such as interest subsidy on term loan, power subsidy, subsidy of quality certification/technical knowhow and subsidy on drawal of power line were given.
The respondents were permitted to place before the Court the materials on the basis of which the General Manager, DICC submitted its report of ‘non-functioning’ unit. The Court considered it apposite to permit the respondent authorities to place such materials to show the relevant date(s) when the physical inspection was made and the said unit was found to be non-functioning. On the other hand, the Sales Tax Department completed the assessments and raised the demand on the petitioner and other similarly situated petitioners. The assessment order clearly reveals that the assessment and the consequential demand was made after due examination of the books of accounts. The assessment of tax was made on the turnover of the unit/industry. Consequently, there appears to be a contrary stand reflected by the two departments of the Government namely, the Industries and the Finance Department. It is trite to mention here that in the State Level Committee constituted to examine and issue eligibility certificates, representatives of both the industries as well as the Finance and Taxation Department are members and which fact is not disputed by the respondents. Under such circumstances, it cannot be understood as to how a unit which was found to be non-functioning by the industries department could have reflected the turnover of goods manufacture and on the basis of which the assessments were carried out and demands were raised by the Finance and Taxation Department.
In Duroply Industries Limited Vs. The Union of India & 5 Ors [2023 (11) TMI 1353 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT], the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court held that the Petitioner’s unit was duly functioning at the time when the claims for Transport Subsidy were made, and the said unit has to be closed down subsequently due to the financial crisis and shortage of raw material and thereby the State Level Committee ought not to have rejected the claims of the Petitioner on the ground that with effect from January, 2018 the Petitioner unit was not functioning.
In Sukhamoy Paul Vs. State of Tripura & Ors. [2021 (5) TMI 1077 - TRIPURA HIGH COURT] while dealing with a similar situation with regard to the Transport Subsidy Scheme, the Tripura High Court held that the eligibility period for claiming subsidy may be 5 years, the scheme nowhere provides that only if a new industrial unit continues such manufacturing activity for a period of 5 years that it can claim the transport subsidy. Therefore, even if, as pointed out by the respondents, the petitioner at some later point of time after commencing its production got engaged into the same activity as a job worker, this would not amount to breach of any of the eligibility conditions of the scheme.
The aforesaid two judgments of this Hon’ble Court and that of Tripura High Court are squarely applicable in the present case.
Whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel applies to prevent the government from denying benefits promised under the Industrial Policy of Assam, 2008, after the petitioners had altered their position based on those promises? - HELD THAT:- Under the doctrine of promissory estoppels where the Government has made a promise and the prose relying on the promise has altered it’s position to its detriment the Government is not exempt from it’s liability to carry out the representation made by it as to its future conduct and it cannot on some undefined and undisclosed ground of necessity or expediency fail to carry out the promise solemnly made by it, nor claim to be the judge of its own obligation to the citizen on an ex-parte appraisement of the circumstances in which the obligation has arisen - The Apex Court in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P. [1978 (12) TMI 45 - SUPREME COURT] observed that that the doctrine was not limited only to cases where there was some contractual relationship or other pre-existing legal relationship between the parties. The principle would be applied even when the promise is intended to create legal relations or affect a legal relationship which would arise in future. The Government was held to be equally susceptible to the operation of the doctrine in whatever area or field the promise is made — contractual, administrative or statutory.
The Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel has been repeatedly applied by the Apex Court in statutory notifications. In Pournami Oil Mills v. State of Kerala [2020 (12) TMI 1241 - SUPREME COURT] the Government of Kerala by an order dated 11-4-1979 invited small-scale units to set up their industries in the State of Kerala and with a view to boost industrialization, exemption from sales tax and purchase tax was extended as a concession for a period of five years, which was to run from the date of commencement of production. By a subsequent notification dated 29-9-1980, published in the gazette on 21-10-1980, the State of Kerala withdrew the exemption relating to the purchase tax and confined the exemption from sales tax to the limit specified in the proviso of the said notification.
After elaborate discussions of the law on Promissory Estoppel as laid down by the Apex Court, it is seen that the State authorities as well as its limbs covered under the sweep of Article 12 of the Constitution of India being treated as ‘State’ within the meaning of the said article, can be made subject to the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel in cases where because of their representation the party claiming estoppel has changed its position and if such an estoppel does not fall under any statutory prohibition, absence of power and authority of the promisor and/or is otherwise not opposed to public interest, and also when equity in favour of the promisee does not outweigh equity in favour of the promisor entitling the latter to legally get out of the promise.
Whether the assessments made by the Department of Finance and Taxation, during the pendency of eligibility certificate applications, were valid? - HELD THAT?- The assessment orders itself reflects that the books of accounts etc were examined and pursuant to which the assessment orders and the consequential demands were raised. Therefore, in the facts of the present case, besides the other departments which had the occasion to examine the papers submitted for establishment of the industry as well as assessment order and the consequential demands raised by the Finance Department, the fact remains that there is no mala fide alleged against the industry or unit by the respondent authorities. There is also no allegation that undue advantage has been sought to be taken by the industries in respect of Industrial Policy concerned. Under such circumstances, the department of Finance as well as the Industries Department, being representatives of different department but a part of the same Government and a constituent members of the State Level Committee,- the State Level Committee being the mouth piece of the Government in so far as the Industrial Policy is concerned they must speak in one voice by taking into various views and evaluations undertaken by each of the constituent members.
The sole ground for assailing the assessment orders in these writ petitions is that the Finance Department ought not to have proceeded with the assessments in question as the relevant applications for grant of eligibility certificates in respect of the industries or units were pending before the appropriate authority under the relevant Industrial Policy. As a consequence thereof, the benefit of exemptions by the petitioners could not be availed off as the returns could not be filed on the online mode supported by the eligibility certificate as is required under the procedure. These returns were filed in the physical mode with due representations that the claims for eligibility are under consideration and the department is required to await the grant of eligibility certificate by the Industries Department.
Conclusion - i) The rejection of eligibility certificates on the grounds of being 'non-functioning' is contrary to the objectives of the Industrial Policy and the evidence of operational status as indicated by tax assessments. ii) The assessments conducted by the Finance Department without awaiting the outcome of eligibility applications are procedurally flawed and must be reconsidered. iii) The doctrine of promissory estoppel applies, binding the government to its promises under the Industrial Policy, as the petitioners relied on these promises to their detriment. iv) The Court directed the State Level Committee to reconsider the eligibility applications and issue certificates, ensuring that the petitioners receive the benefits they are entitled to under the Industrial Policy. v) The Court ordered that once eligibility certificates are granted, the petitioners should receive tax exemptions and any necessary refunds or adjustments.
Petition disposed off.
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2025 (2) TMI 739
Refund of excess amount realized by Respondents in terms of Settlement Scheme of 2022 - Dismissal of Jharkhand Karadhan Adhiniyamon Ki Bakaya Rashi Ka Samadhan Act, 2022 - rejection of exemption from payment of additional tax and surcharge - HELD THAT:- A perusal of Settlement Scheme would reveal that under Settlement Scheme, term ‘admitted tax’ is defined to mean an amount of tax admitted as being payable as per the return filed by an assessee, and, the term ‘disputed amount’ means the amount of tax, interest or penalty which determined as payable by an assessee pursuant to an order of assessment/re-assessment/scrutiny or any other order and which is not admitted, and, for such demand, a litigation has been filed by an assessee - under the Scheme, amount of ‘admitted tax’ clearly represents an amount which is admitted by assessee, whereas ‘disputed amount’ means amount of tax, interest or penalty which is in dispute pursuant to a litigation filed by an assessee.
The Scheme clearly provides that assessee is liable to pay 40% of the amount of tax in dispute provided the same has not been declared/considered in any order/assessment/re-assessment. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the petitioner admitted an amount of Rs. 33,79,374/- being the admitted amount of tax payable by it as per its return. However, pursuant to an adjudication order, an amount of Rs. 6,27,82,418/- was determined against the petitioner - balance between disputed tax and admitted tax was the amount in dispute i.e. in the present case Rs. 5,94,03,043/-. Under the Scheme, Petitioner was only liable to deposit 40% of the disputed amount and there was 60% waiver, but while computing the tax liability, Settlement Officer first deducted the amount of pre-deposit from the amount in dispute and, thereafter, extended the benefit of waiver under the scheme which is clearly travelling beyond the contours of the scheme itself.
Admittedly, Settlement Scheme is a beneficial scheme and Hon’ble Supreme Court in its judgment rendered in the case of Government of Kerala and Another v. Mother Superior Adoration Convent [2021 (3) TMI 93 - SUPREME COURT], has held that even in tax statutes, exemption provisions should be liberally considered in accordance with the object sought to be achieved. In a beneficial legislation, literal formalistic interpretation should be eschewed to give full effect to the provisions of the beneficial legislation.
The impugned order passed by the appellate authority is set aside and, further, order of settlement to the extent, amount of pre-deposit of 49,00,000/- has been directed to be adjusted from the amount in dispute before extending the benefit of settlement is set aside.
Conclusion - i) The calculation of tax liability under the Settlement Scheme must not deduct pre-deposits from the disputed amount before applying the waiver. ii) The petitioner is entitled to a refund of the excess amount paid due to the misapplication of the Scheme. iii) The petitioner is entitled to interest on the refunded amount at 6% per annum from the date of deposit until the refund is made.
Petition disposed off.
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2025 (2) TMI 738
Jharkhand Karadhan Adhiniyamon Ki Bakaya Rashi Ka Samadhan Act, 2022 (Amnesty Scheme) - Computation method of settlement amount - amount of pre-deposit was first adjusted against the disputed amount and upon remaining balance, waiver of 60% and 50% of tax respectively was extended to petitioner - HELD THAT:- A perusal of Settlement Scheme would reveal that under Settlement Scheme, term ‘admitted tax’ is defined to mean an amount of tax admitted as being payable as per return filed by an assessee, and, the term ‘disputed amount’ means the amount of tax, interest or penalty which is determined as payable by an assessee pursuant to an order of assessment/re-assessment/scrutiny or any other order and which is not admitted, and, for such demand, a litigation has been filed by an assessee - Thus, under the Scheme, amount of ‘admitted tax’ clearly represents an amount which is admitted by assessee, whereas ‘disputed amount’ means amount of tax, interest or penalty which is in dispute pursuant to a litigation filed by an assessee.
The difference between disputed tax and admitted tax was the amount in dispute and under the scheme, petitioner was entitled for waiver of 60% and 50% respectively, but while computing the tax liability, Settlement Officer first deducted the amount of pre- deposit from the amount in dispute and, thereafter, extended the benefit of waiver under the scheme which is clearly travelling beyond the contours of the scheme itself.
The petitioner is right in contending that due to incorrect application of Settlement Scheme, petitioner is denied its actual benefit which resulted into a loss of Rs. 1,32,03,446/- (Rs. 1,33,42,802-1,39,356). However, before the appellate authority, petitioner filed its revised computation taking into consideration the component of declaration form and claimed as per revised computation an amount of Rs. 1,18,02,056/- as refund. Hence, we are of the opinion that petitioner cannot take a different stand than what it has taken in the appellate proceedings and it can only be entitled for refund as per the revised computation submitted before the appellate authority of an amount.
Settlement Scheme is a beneficial scheme and Hon’ble Supreme Court in its judgment rendered in the case of Government of Kerala and Another v. Mother Superior Adoration Convent [2021 (3) TMI 93 - SUPREME COURT], has held that even in tax statutes, exemption provisions should be liberally considered in accordance with the object sought to be achieved. In a beneficial legislation, literal formalistic interpretation should be eschewed to give full effect to the provisions of the beneficial legislation.
Conclusion - Under the Amnesty Scheme, the waiver should be applied to the full disputed amount before deducting any pre-deposit. This ensures that taxpayers who have made partial payments are not disadvantaged compared to those who have not paid. The petitioner is entitled to a refund of Rs. 1,18,02,056/- with interest at 6% per annum from the date of deposit until the refund is made.
Petition allowed.
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2025 (2) TMI 675
Interpretation of statute - New conditions for allowing ITC - Whether Rule 21(8) of the Punjab Value Added Tax Rules, 2005 (Punjab VAT Rules) could have been introduced during the period between 25.01.2014 to 01.04.2014 when there was no enabling provision in the parent statute i.e. the Punjab Value Added Tax Act, 2005 (Punjab VAT Act)? - HELD THAT:- Punjab VAT Act was amended the second time by the Punjab Value Added Tax (Second Amendment) Act, 2013 (Punjab Act No. 38 of 2013). Though as per Section 1(2) of the Second Amendment Act, the same was to come into force at once, the proviso thereto mentioned that amendment of sub-section (1) of Section 13 shall come into force on and with effect from the first day of April, 2014 i.e. from 01.04.2014. Section 5 of the Second Amendment Act deals with amendment to Section 13 of the Punjab VAT Act.
A taxable person who had stock in trade as on 25.01.2014 or as on 01.02.2014 had already paid the tax while making the purchase of such goods. In this case, the purchase was made by paying higher rate of tax on iron and steel goods to be used as input for the purpose of manufacture etc. of taxable goods. The taxable person who is otherwise entitled to avail input tax credit on the goods already purchased and lying in stock would suffer serious prejudice and loss if his entitlement to input tax credit are reduced by virtue of lowering of the rate of tax on such goods on a subsequent date. High Court has noted that the enabling provision in the statute came into effect on and from 01.04.2014 and, therefore, Rule 21(8) of the Punjab VAT Rules which permits application of the reduced rate of tax cannot be given effect to transactions which already stood concluded prior thereto. It could only be applied to transactions on and from 01.04.2014.
In Eicher Motors Limited Vs. Union of India [1999 (1) TMI 34 - SUPREME COURT], a three- Judge Bench of this Court examined the challenge to the validity and application of the scheme as modified by way of introduction to Rule 57(F) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 under which credit which was lying unutilised as on 16.03.1995 with the manufacturers stood lapsed in the manner set out therein. While examining the above issue, this Court held that if on the inputs, the assessee had already paid the taxes on the basis that when the goods are utilised in the manufacture of further products as inputs thereto then the tax on these goods gets adjusted which are sold subsequently. Thus, a right accrued to the assessee on the date when he paid the tax on the raw material or the input would continue until the facility available thereto gets worked out or until those goods existed. The impugned rule cannot be applied to the goods manufactured prior to the date it came into force i.e. 16.03.1995 on which duty had been paid and credit facility thereto has been availed of for the purpose of manufacture of further goods.
The respondent had earned input tax credit on purchase of iron and steel goods which it kept as its stock in trade to be used as inputs or raw materials in the manufacture etc. of taxable goods. State lowered the rate of tax with effect from 01.02.2014 on those goods. The related amendments in the rules i.e. Rule 21(8) of the Punjab VAT Rules were notified on 25.01.2014 to come into effect from 01.02.2014. There was however no corresponding provision in the parent statute i.e. Punjab VAT Act which permitted availing of input tax credit at the lower rate of tax on the existing stock in trade though the purchase of such input was already made at a higher rate of tax thereby reducing the quantum of credit. The enabling provision in the statute i.e. first proviso to Section 13(1) of the Punjab VAT Act came into force with effect from 01.04.2014.
Under sub-section (9) of section 13, a person is under a mandate to reverse input tax credit availed by him on goods which could not be used for the purposes specified in subsection (1) of Section 13 of the Punjab VAT Act or which remained in stock at the time of closure of business. If the interpretation sought to be given to Rule 21(8) of the Punjab VAT Rules by the State is accepted, the natural corollary would be that reversal of input tax credit would be at the lower rate of tax on the goods in question when those goods could not be used for the purposes specified in Section 13(1) or which remained as part of the stock in trade at the time of closure of business. Such an interpretation besides being fallacious, would also lead to revenue loss for the State exchequer.
Conclusion - The interpretation given by the High Court to the applicability of Rule 21(8) of the Punjab VAT Rules read with the amended first proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Punjab VAT Act is legally sound and warrants no interference.
There are no merit in the appeal which is accordingly dismissed.
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2025 (2) TMI 618
Deletion of amount of tax levied by the assessing authority - rejection of account of books have been confirmed - illegal shifting the burden on the department - it was held by High Court that 'Once the dealer has failed to prove its purchases from registered dealer, the levy of entry tax treating the same to be purchases from outside the local area and levying of entry tax on the HDEP bags is also justified.'
HELD THAT:- Attention drawn to the rejoinder affidavit incorporating certain documents in order to comply with his obligations to prove that the disputed quantity of wheat received by the petitioner is non-taxable under the provisions of Uttar Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2008.
Learned counsel for the respondent seeks time to verify those documents and to revert - Hence, list the matter(s) on 19.03.2025.
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2025 (2) TMI 617
Demand of surcharge, despite the absence of an assessment and recovery mechanism - demand of purchase tax, without establishing that the Petitioner has violated the condition precedent, namely, that the goods purchased have been used for purposes other than for use in manufacture or for resale - HELD THAT:- Though ordinarily it is agreed that recovery of taxes ought not to be stayed, and which is stipulated in Section 21 (7), it is found that there is an inherent inconsistency in the argument canvassed on behalf of the State. If the State contends that surcharge is different from tax, then, the statutory bar as referred to in Section 21 (7) cannot apply because the Section clearly stipulates that what should not be stayed is only the recovery of tax. On the other hand, if one were to treat surcharge as tax, then, at least prima facie, the Petitioner would be entitled to the benefits set out in Rule 15 (2) (b) and would make the recovery itself vulnerable to challenge.
The Petitioner has certainly made out a case to have the recovery proceedings stayed pending the disposal of the Reference Applications filed by it before the MSTT. This is said because the Petitioner-HPCL is a Public Sector Undertaking and it is not as if the Petitioner would be unable to pay the tax, if finally decided, either by the Tribunal or by this Court. In these circumstances, it is opined that even the balance of convenience lies in favour of the Petitioner.
Conclusion - The MSTT is directed to decide the Reference Applications filed by the Petitioner expeditiously and stay the recovery proceedings until a decision is reached.
Petition disposed off.
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2025 (2) TMI 475
Revision of assessments of the assessee-respondent made for the assessment years 2002-2003 to 2004-2005 - refund the exempted portion of the tax as per the provision of Package Scheme of Incentives 1993 on the sale of goods effected in the course of inter-State trade or commerce - HELD THAT:- The State Government though continues to have the power in public interest to grant exemption/partial exemption of tax on inter- State sale, trade or commerce but the same is subject to fulfilment of the requirements laid down under Sub-Section (4) of Section 8 of the CST Act which means that henceforth the exemption so granted would be admissible only if Form ‘C’ and ‘D’ are supplied by the dealer in context with the aforesaid interstate sale, trade and commerce.
The absolute power initially conferred under Section 8(5) upon the State Government to grant exemption/partial exemption of tax in connection with inter-State sale, trade or commerce with the amendment was circumscribed and restricted to the fulfilment of the requirement of Section 8(4) of the CST Act which prescribes for the submission of Form ‘C’ and ‘D’ only w.e.f. 11.05.2002. However, such restrictions are prospective in nature and would not apply retrospectively to cases where absolute exemption was permitted much prior to the amendment.
In the instant case, the assessee-respondent was granted tax benefits under the PSI 1993 issued in exercise of power under Section 8(5) of the CST Act as per the eligibility and entitlement certificates dated 20.02.1998 and 24.03.1998 respectively and that said benefit was available to the assessee-respondent up to the period of 2012 or to the extent of Rs.273.54 crore, whichever was earlier. The said benefit granted to the assessee-respondent was not with any restriction, much less the condition of submission of Form ‘C’ and ‘D’. Thus, on the basis of such exemption granted by the petitioner vide Eligibility Certificate dated 20.02.1998 and Entitlement Certificate dated 24.03.1998, a substantive right had accrued to the respondent to claim the said benefit up to the year 2012 or to the extent of Rs.273.54 crore - in view of the amendment of Section 8(5) by the Finance Act, 2002, the State Government ceases to have power to grant exemption in respect of sale of goods covered under Section 8(2) but that is not the issue herein. The precise issue in the present case is whether the aforesaid amendment would take away the right which had accrued to the assessee-respondent under the Eligibility/Entitlement certificates wherein absolute exemptions were granted without any condition of submission of Form ‘C’ and ‘D’.
In the case at hand, the assessee-respondent was held eligible for absolute exemption under the PSI 1993 issued in exercise of power under Section 8(5) of the CST Act as per Eligibility certificate dated 20.02.1998 and Entitlement certificate dated 24.03.1998 granting exemption to it from payment of tax under the BST Act and CST Act to the extent of Rs. 273.54 crore or up till 2012, whichever is earlier. The said exemption granted to the assessee-respondent was much prior to the enforcement of the Finance Act, 2002 with effect from 11.05.2002. Therefore, by virtue of the unamended Section 8(5) and the Notification issued thereunder as well as under the aforesaid Eligibility and Entitlement certificates, a substantive right of exemption from payment of tax had accrued to the assessee-respondent - The requirement for fulfilling the condition of Section 8(4) of the CST Act for getting the benefit of tax exemption came subsequently after the amendment of Section 8(5) with effect from 11.05.2002 and would apply prospectively to transactions in respect of which eligibility and entitlement certificates are issued subsequently.
Conclusion - The State Government was not competent to issue the impugned notices for revising the assessment of the assessee-respondent and to demand the exempted tax only for the reason that the assessee-respondent has not submitted Form ‘C’ and ‘D’ in support of inter-State sale, trade & commerce. The requirement of submission of Form ‘C’ and ‘D’ would apply prospectively after 11.05.2002 i.e., after the Finance Act of 2002.
The appeal lacks merit and hence dismissed.
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2025 (2) TMI 474
Dismissal of second appeal - Denial of entire input tax credit and special rebate claimed - absence of any separate account, for raw materials traceable to products transferred outside the state, maintained by the assessee - HELD THAT:- It is found that inasmuch as the Tribunal has merely accepted the findings of the First Appellate Authority on facts that were not disputed by the State in the appeals before the Tribunal, there is no substantial question of law that arises for consideration in these OT. Revision petitions. The subjective satisfaction arrived at by the First Appellate Authority, based on records and data produced before him, would suffice to hold that the revenue has not made out a case warranting interference with the impugned order of the Tribunal.
Conclusion - The revenue did not establish a case warranting interference with the Tribunal's order, leading to the dismissal of the OT.
These OT. Revisions are dismissed.
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2025 (2) TMI 473
Addition of sale turnover by relying on the income disclosed under the head 'Income from Other Sources'/ 'Other Income’ in the trading profit and loss account for the relevant assessment year - estimating the sales turnover for the purpose of assessment under the Kerala Value Added Tax Act - estimating the sales turnover from the income disclosed under the head 'Income from Other Source' in the trading profit and loss account, without any independent finding - estimating the sale turnover by adopting the turnover at 8% as gross profit as the benchmark without any comparable data - benefit of the sub clause (3) of Section 25AA of the KVAT Act - HELD THAT:- Section 25 (1) of the Kerala Value Added Tax Act, 2003 prescribes the power of the assessing authority to complete the assessment on best judgment basis, if it is found that any income has escaped the assessment. It is now trite law that even when an intelligence officer initiates proceedings for penalty under Section 67 of the KVAT Act and finalises a report, the said report cannot form the basis of reopening of the assessment. The above principle equally applies to the proceedings initiated under Section 25. The assessing officer is bound to conduct an independent enquiry as regards the materials available, which according to him requires reopening of the assessment or completing the assessment on a best judgment basis.
The assessing officer proceeded clearly on an assumption, which is impermissible under the scheme of the Act. The infirmity which had crept into the assessment order was not considered in proper perspective by the first appellate authority as well as by the appellate tribunal.
Conclusion - None of the authorities have considered the case in hand in its true perspective and applied the law correctly. Thus, the order of assessment as confirmed by the first appellate authority and the tribunal cannot be sustained.
The O.T. Revision is allowed by setting aside the order of assessment dated 17.10.2017 as confirmed by the first appellate authority as well as by the tribunal and answering the questions of law in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
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2025 (2) TMI 472
Disallowance of input tax credit claimed by the Respondent on purchases effected from dealers who had failed to discharge their tax liability on such sales - disallowance of input tax credit claimed by the Respondent, despite the fact that the Respondent had utterly failed to discharge his burden of proving the correctness and genuineness of such claim - levy of penalty under Section 70(2)(a) of the KVAT Act - HELD THAT:- The Revenue officials have power to investigate and for that, they can summon any person as witness or otherwise cannot be gainfully disputed. The Assessment Officer having undertaken the investigation has formed an opinion as to there being a clandestine case of Bill Trading with the connivance. Once such an opinion is available in the very Assessment Order, it was open to the Assessee to dispel/dilute the same by producing evidentiary material. In fact, he had undertaken in writing to bring the representative of dealers to depose in his favour - No explanation is offered why he did not avail that facility. To this needs to be added one militant fact that the selling dealers enumerated in the Reassessment Order have not deposited the tax component claimed to have been paid by the Respondent Assessee on its purchase of goods.
The goods in question were copper/GI strips, sheets, patties, plates & wires. How such heavy things could have been transported in two-wheelers & three wheelers, remains to be a mystery wrapped in enigma. The reasoning of the Tribunal that in only one instance of transports, Kinetic Honda two-wheeler was used and other vehicles were autos/trucks, does not make much sense. If a dealer does not offer explanation as to why he militantly lied even in respect of one single vehicle, that would cast shadow on the truthfulness of his other statements. We hasten to add that we are not invoking the maxim falses in uno, falses omnibus i.e., proof of falsity in one thing raises a strong presumption of falsity in everything - There is force in the submission of learned AGA that the version of officials of the Tax Department, founded on evidentiary material as to the unscrupulous transactions cannot be lightly interfered for askance. Therefore, the Tribunal is not justified in upsetting the findings recorded by the Assessing Authority. Even the First Appellate Authority committed an error in upsetting the levy of penalty inasmuch as, there was absolutely no material warranting the same.
Penalty - HELD THAT:- The Tribunal was swayed away by the documents such as purchase –sale invoices, statement of accounts, purchase & sale register extract coupled with copies of cheques, it missed a very two important factors i.e., the requirement of proof of movement of goods, especially when the Revenue had pleaded that the tax component had not reached the Public Exchequer. Lastly, it needs to be stated that there are no basis on which the First Appellate Authority could quash the Penalty Order u/s.70 (2) of the Act.
Conclusion - i) The burden of proof lies with the dealer claiming input tax credit and that mere production of invoices or payment by cheques is not sufficient to discharge this burden. ii) The Tribunal is not justified in upsetting the findings recorded by the Assessing Authority. Even the First Appellate Authority committed an error in upsetting the levy of penalty inasmuch as, there was absolutely no material warranting the same.
The impugned order of the Tribunal is set at naught in its entirety - appeal of revenue allowed.
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2025 (2) TMI 471
Challenge to Assessment Order revised by the Additional Commissioner of Commercial Taxes - HELD THAT:- It is not inclined to grant interference in the matter inasmuch as the question as to revisability of Assessment Order of the kind is no longer res integra. In KIRLOSKAR POWER SUPPLY CO. LTD. VERSUS STATE OF KARNATAKA [2006 (6) TMI 490 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT], it is observed 'Jurisdiction is clearly defined under section 15 of the Act. In the case on hand, it is seen that the Additional Commissioner has rightly invoked his power under section 15 of the Act for the purpose of revising the order passed by the Joint Commissioner. However, while passing the final order he has chosen to set aside the subsequent assessment order passed by the assessing authority. This could not have been done by him in terms of section 15 of the Act.'
It is difficult to countenance the contention of learned AGA that the expression ‘any proceedings’ employed in Section 15 would include the order of the Commercial Tax officer and therefore, the impugned order is sustainable.
Appeal allowed.
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