Pricing Login

Tax Management India. Com
Law and Practice : Digital eBook
Research is most exciting & rewarding

For Sales / Support:
WhatsApp

9911796707

Case Laws Acts Notifications Circulars Classification Forms Manuals Articles News D. Forum Highlights Notes

🚨 Important Update for Our Users

We are transitioning to our new and improved portal - www.taxtmi.com - for a better experience.

Home

Case Laws

Home Case Index All Cases Customs This

Law
Court
Citation	- -
Landmark
Order by

Advanced Search Options

Customs - Case Laws

Showing 81 to 100 of 40536 Records

2025 (6) TMI 1366

Suspension of CHA license - F Card (F Pass) No. S-108/01 (F) attached with the said CHA Firm also became non-functional - difference in quantity between the quantity as declared in the B/E and that were found physically - violation of Regulations 10(a), 10(b), 10(d), 10(m) and 10(q) of CBLR, 2018 - Penalty of Rs. 50,000/- imposed on the appellant under Regulation 18 of the CBLR, 2018.

HELD THAT:- The appellant was an employee of the Customs Broker Firm M/s. S.K. Acharya and the F Card bearing No. S-108/01 (F) was issued to him on 06.03.2007. A perusal of the above F Card number clearly shows that the said F card had been tagged with the CB Firm M/s. SK Acharya bearing CHA License No. S-108, Code No. 2104. It is also observed that the F Card of the appellant was renewed from time to time and it was last renewed on 07.08.2019 (renewed up to 26.11.2026), when the Customs Broker, M/s. S K Acharya was operational. On 17.06.2022, the Customs Broker License of M/s. S.K. Acharya (PAN No. ABFFS9543N) was suspended relating to some purported irregularity. So, we observe that the natural corollary of the suspension of the License of the CB Firm S K Acharya was that the F-Card of the appellant, attached with the said CB Firm, also lost the status of being operative with effect from 17.06.2022.

It is also observed that the appellant started to function as a freelancer based on his experience in the import-export matters in his individual capacity to earn his livelihood. It is observed that this activity of the appellant cannot be considered as an activity undertaken by him in his capacity as an F-Card Holder, as his F card was already inoperative.

In this case, an Offence Report was forwarded by SIIB to the Commissioner of Customs indicating therein some discrepancies noticed in the consignments imported by M/s. Ashok Trading Co. and M/s. New Heera Sales Corporation. It is a fact on record that the clearance of the said consignments were dealt with by the CB Firm M/s. P.R. Logistics - the appellant played a limited role of liasoning in the form of intimating duty liability, sharing assessed Bill of Entry copy along with ICEGATE E-payment link for payment of said duty amount etc. It is clear that these activities were undertaken by him in his individual capacity and not as a F Card holder, as his F card is already non operational.

Further, in the instant case, it is observed that the entire allegation against the appellant has been upheld on the basis of statement given by Shri Ashok Banka, Importer. There are no concrete evidence against the appellant in the offence report against the appellant. It is also found that there is no evidence brought on record by the Department against the appellant to establish that the appellant has violated the provisions of the Regulations 10(a), 10(b), 10(d), 10(m) and 10(q) of the CBLR, 2018.

It is well settled that mere allegation alone is not sufficient to establish the role of the appellant in the alleged offence. Accordingly, the allegation of violation of the provisions of the Regulations 10(a), 10(b), 10(d), 10(m) and 10(q) of the CBLR, 2018 against the appellant herein are not substantiated. Consequently, the revocation of the F card of the appellant by the Pr. Commissioner of Customs (Airport & ACC Commissionerate) Custom House, Kolkata vide Order dated 27.03.2024, is legally not sustainable and hence we set aside the same.

Penalty of Rs. 50,000/- imposed on the appellant under Regulation 18 of the CBLR, 2018 - HELD THAT:- It is observed that when the charge against the appellant is not sustainable, the question of imposition of penalty on him does not arise. Accordingly, the penalty imposed on the appellant is set aside.

Conclusion - i) The Revocation of the F Card of the appellant as ordered in the impugned order set aside. ii) The penalty imposed on the appellant in the impugned order is set aside.

Appeal disposed off.
2025 (6) TMI 1365

Revocation of suspension of Customs Broker License - forfeiture of security deposit - levy of penalty - goods weighed 28230 kilograms as against the declared quantity of 9880 kilograms by the importer - whether Customs Broker fulfilled their obligations under the CBLR 2013, and if not, whether the disciplinary action taken against them was legally sound? - HELD THAT:- The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shri Parma Nanda Vs. State of Haryana and others [1989 (3) TMI 233 - SUPREME COURT], held that the Tribunal could exercise only such powers which the civil courts or the High Courts could have exercised by way of judicial review.

In Caretel Infotech Ltd. Vs Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd., [2019 (4) TMI 1838 - SUPREME COURT] also the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that Courts are expected to exercise restraint in interfering with the administrative decision and ought not to substitute their view for that of the administrative authority. Mere disagreement with the decision-making process would not suffice.

Based on the judgments above the scope of examining the appeal is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and not the decision. The Tribunal is not expected to interfere with the original authority’s decision unless it is illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards or has reached a conclusion without adducing proper proof.

Conclusion - The order suffered from fatal procedural irregularities, including non-adherence to mandatory timelines and failure to specify charges clearly, rendering the order unsustainable and liable to be set aside.

Appeal of Revenue dismissed.
2025 (6) TMI 1364

Revocation of the Customs Broker License - forfeiture of the entire security deposit - imposition of penalty - attempt to aid the importer to bye-pass the policy restrictions - failure to discharge the obligations cast upon him under Regulation 10(d), (e) & (n) of CBLR 2018 - HELD THAT:- Though the CHA/Customs Broker acted in good faith still, there are other grey areas like the above, which require clarifications, but however the same are not explained by the CHA/CB. This does not ipso facto mean that the Revenue has proved violations of Regulations of CBLR, 2018 to the extent of cancelling the very license issued to the Customs Broker apart from forfeiture of the entire Security Deposit and imposing penalty.

Considering the above, and the fact that the Customs Broker could have been more diligent in discharging his obligations cast not only towards his clients but also to justify holding “H” card, it is deemed appropriate to modify the impugned order by setting aside the revocation of license and forfeiture of entire Security Deposit; however, reducing the penalty to Rs.5,000/- as a deterrent.

Appeal disposed off.
2025 (6) TMI 1363

Classification of imported goods - multimedia speakers with added ancillary features of USB/SD card/ MMC Playback and/ or FM radio - classifiable under CTH 8527/8519 as claimed by the Revenue or under CTH 8518 as claimed by the appellant - headphones with added feature of FM radio is classifiable under CTH 8527 as 'radio broadcast receivers' as claimed by the Revenue or under CTH 8518 as claimed by the appellant? - Invocation of extended period of limitation.

Whether multimedia speakers with added ancillary features of USB/SD card/ MMC Playback and/ or FM radio are classifiable under CTH 8527/8519 as claimed by the Revenue or under CTH 8518 as claimed by the appellant? - HELD THAT:- An identical issue had come up before this Tribunal in the appellant’s own cases. In M/s. Jupiter International Limited vs Commissioner of Customs (Port), Kolkata [2025 (2) TMI 430 - CESTAT KOLKATA], under similar facts and circumstances, it has been observed the goods should be classified under heading no.85182200 as speakers, rather than under heading no.85279100 as broadcast receivers.

Thus, he appellant has rightly classified the multimedia speakers with added ancillary features of USB/SD card/ MMC Playback and/ or FM radio under CTH 8518. Accordingly, the demands confirmed against the appellant by reclassifying the said goods under CTH 8527/CTH 8519 are not sustainable and therefore, the same is set aside.

Whether the headphones with added feature of FM radio is classifiable under CTH 8527 as 'radio broadcast receivers' as claimed by the Revenue or under CTH 8518 as claimed by the appellant? - HELD THAT:- While classifying goods, as per the General Rules of Interpretation, a specific heading is always to be preferred over a general heading. In the present case, the appellant has imported ‘headphones and earphones’, which are specifically covered under Tariff Item No. 8518 30 00. Thus, the goods imported by the appellant are appropriately classifiable under Tariff Item No. 8518 30 00, as claimed by the appellant.

Reliance placed in the judgment pronounced in the case of Logic India Trading Company vs. CC [2016 (3) TMI 5 - CESTAT BANGALORE], wherein by placing reliance on the Interpretative Rules, Section Note 3 to Section XVI and the judgment pronounced by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Xerox India Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs, Mumbai [2010 (11) TMI 20 - SUPREME COURT], it has been held that the criteria for classifying the product under consideration is the principal and the main function it performs, which remains to be speakers, in spite of the fact that the multimedia speakers under consideration had added features of USB playback and/or FM radio. Admittedly, the headphones imported by the appellant in this case are primarily meant to provide audio/sound facility restrictively to the person using it with merely an ancillary feature of in-built FM radio.

The headphones imported by the Appellant merit classification under Customs Tariff Item 8518 30 00 as headphones and earphones, whether or not combined with a microphone, and sets consisting of a microphone and one or more loudspeakers' and not as radio broadcast receivers as contended by the Department.

Invocation of extended period of limitation - HELD THAT:- It is seen that there is no evidence available on record to establish intent on the part of the appellant to evade payment of duty. The issue also pertains to interpretation of statutory provisions under the Customs Tariff Act and hence, in such a case, the invocation of extended period provisions are not warranted. Thus, the invocation of the extended period of limitation in this case is not sustainable and hence, the demand confirmed by invoking the extended period of limitation is set aside.

Conclusion - i) The demands confirmed against the appellant by reclassifying the said goods, namely, multimedia speakers with added ancillary features of USB/SD card/ MMC Playback and/ or FM radio under CTH 8527/CTH 8519, are not sustainable. ii) The demands confirmed in the impugned order, by reclassification of the said goods, namely, headphones with built in FM radio under Customs Tariff Item 8527 19 00 as 'radio broadcast receivers' are not sustainable.iii) The classification of goods in respect of models as per Annexure-D to the Show Cause Notice under Tariff Item No. 8518 29 00, has not been contested by the appellant and hence the same is upheld. iv) The invocation of the extended period of limitation in this case is not sustainable and hence, the demand confirmed by invoking the extended period of limitation is set aside.

Appeal disposed off.
2025 (6) TMI 1291

Classification of imported Bovine Serum Albumin - to be classified under ITCHS Code 30039031 or under 35029000? - challenge to impugned order on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice and also on the ground that the impugned order is a non-speaking order - HELD THAT:- Though a non-speaking order with regard to the contentions of the petitioner, which has been reiterated by the petitioner in this writ petition, the first respondent has held that the consignment of “Bovine Serum Albumin” Standard imported by the petitioner vide the subject Bill of Entry dated 30.03.2024 has been rejected and the imported goods should be immediately be deported to the country of origin or destroyed at the petitioner's own cost under intimation to the first respondent. Being a order which drastically affects the right of the petitioner, the first respondent should have passed a speaking order after adhering to the principles of natural justice.

In case, the petitioner is able to establish after having been afforded an opportunity of hearing, that the consignment of “Bovine Serum Albumin” Standard imported by them has to be classified only under ITCHS Code 35029000, in which event, there is no requirement for them to produce an advance Sanitary Import Permit (SIP) issued by Government of India before import. Since the impugned order is a non-speaking order with regard to the contentions of the petitioner and since the impugned order is an order passed by violating the principles of natural justice, the impugned order has to be quashed and remanded back to the first respondent for fresh consideration on merits and in accordance with law after giving due consideration to the petitioner's contentions raised in this writ petition and after affording personal hearing to the petitioner.

The impugned order dated 08.04.2024 passed by the first respondent is hereby quashed and the matter is remanded back to the first respondent for fresh consideration on merits and in accordance with law - Petition disposed off by way of remand.
2025 (6) TMI 1290

Dismissal of petition for discharge filed under Section 245(2) Cr.P.C. - offences u/s 135(1)(a) and 135(1)(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 - smuggling of foreign origin gold bars - reliability of statements - case of the petitioner canvassed in the discharge petition is that the prosecution mainly relied on the alleged confession made by the first accused and the second accused and if the said confession is kept aside, no incriminating material is available to frame charge as against the second accused - HELD THAT:- It is settled law that at the stage of framing charge, the Court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused and the Court is not required to appreciate evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused.

It is also settled law that while considering an application seeking discharge from a case, the Court is not expected to go deep of the probative value of the material on record, but on the other hand, the Court has to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged, and for that purpose, the Court cannot conduct a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if it is a main trial.

In the present case, as already pointed out, the main reason advanced is that the confession of the first accused available in the case on hand cannot be used against the petitioner and that the suspicion is only mere suspicion and there is not even strong suspicion available. As already pointed out, the prosecution has examined 5 witnesses as P.W.1 to P.W.5 and exhibited 15 documents. According to the prosecution, the petitioner herein has given two confession statements which came to be exhibited as Exs.P.9 and P.10 through P.W.3. It is the specific case of the prosecution that the first accused as well as the petitioner were summoned under Section 108 of the Customs Act and after appearance, they have given statements admitting their involvement in the alleged gold smuggling.

It is settled law that a statement recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act is a material piece evidence and can be used as a substantive evidence. As rightly contended by the learned Special Public Prosecutor, such statement cannot be equated with the confession taken by the police officer under the Code of Criminal Procedure - In the present case, as rightly pointed out by the learned Special Public Prosecutor and also by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, a cursory perusal of the statements recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act from the accused including the petitioner, the evidence of P.W.1 to P.W.5 and other billings and export documents produced, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the prosecution has produced materials sufficient enough to frame charges against the petitioner and as such, the impugned order dismissing the discharge petition cannot be found fault with.

Conclusion - The dismissal of the discharge petition filed by the second accused upheld, holding that the prosecution had produced sufficient prima facie evidence, including the accused's own statements under Section 108 of the Customs Act, corroborated by other material, to frame charges under Sections 135(1)(a) and 135(1)(b) of the Customs Act, 1962.

This Court concludes that the Criminal Revision case is devoid of merits and the same is liable to be dismissed - the Criminal Revision Case is dismissed.
2025 (6) TMI 1289

Declination of drawbacks claimed by the petitioner for the exports made by him by way of two shipping bill - entitlement to drawback on exports made, given the delay in realization of export proceeds beyond the stipulated period under Section 75 of the Customs Act, 1962 - sufficient evidence to prove - whether there is any extension of time by the AD-I Bank? - HELD THAT:- According to the petitioner, Ext.P11 was issued in response to Ext.P10, wherein it is mentioned by the AD-I bank that all the transactions of the petitioner has now been regularised. All the export repatriation of the petitioner were regularized and at present there is no pending shipping bills for payment for the said exporter. Thus, based on the aforesaid documents, the specific case advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that, Ext.P6 issued by the AD-I bank read with Ext.P11 would clearly indicate that, the period stipulated in Rule 16A stand extended and therefore, the petitioner is entitled to get the drawbacks, as the same falls within the extended period as permissible under the said rules.

When going through the impugned orders, it is discernible that, the documents referred to above could not be considered because, evidently Ext.P11 was obtained by the petitioner after original order, which is Ext.P9. Moreover, Ext.P11 does not contain a specific reference to the earlier transactions and therefore the mere production of the same by itself cannot be an indicator of the fact that there was an extension of time by the AD-I bank, as stipulated in Rule 16A. These are matters to be examined.

However, it is to be clarified that, if the amount received by the petitioner as evidenced by Ext.P6 on 29.04.2015 was within the periof of an extension as required in Rule 16A, then the petitioner should be entitled to get the benefit of drawback. It is also to be noted that, going by Ext.P15 Master Circular, it is not necessary that extension should come from the Reserve Bank of India itself as the AD-I bank are authorized to grant such extension. Therefore, the question as to whether the receipt of the amount as evidenced by Ext.P6 was on the basis of extension as contemplated under Section 16A is a matter which requires to be considered. Since such a consideration is could not be made in any of the impugned orders, it needs to have a reconsideration.

Conclusion - The extension of time for realization of export proceeds under Rule 16A can be granted by AD Category-I banks authorized by the RBI, not solely by the RBI.

This writ petition is disposed of quashing Exts.P9, P12 and P14 with a direction to the 3rd respondent to reconsider the claim of the petitioner and take a fresh decision after taking into account all the documents referred to in this writ petition and with specific reference to Ext.P6, P10 and P11 - petition disposed off.
2025 (6) TMI 1288

Entitlement to duty drawback on re-export of imported capital goods only on the Basic Customs Duty (BCD) paid, or on the total customs duties paid inclusive of Countervailing Duty (CVD), Special Additional Duty (SAD), and Education Cesses - interpretation of the term "any duty" as used in Section 74 of the Customs Act, 1962 - applicability of N/N. 23/2008-Cus. dated 01.03.2008 regarding the percentage of drawback payable - HELD THAT:- As per the Section 2 (15) of the Customs Act, the duty means the duty payable under the Customs Act only and not the duty which is payable under the Custom Tariff Act,1975 or any other duty being the countervailing duty or special secondary and higher secondary education Cess as per the Cess Act or the Special Additional Duty as per the provisions of the Custom Tariff Act,1975. On perusal of Section 74 of the Customs Act which refers to any duty paid at the time of importation and therefore any duty must have reference to as per the provision of the Customs Act, 1962 which refers only to the basic custom duty and therefore we are of the opinion that the petitioner was justified in claiming the duty drawback on the basic custom duty only.

Applicability of Notification No. 23 of 2008 to compute the drawback allowable on re-export of the duty paid goods - HELD THAT:- It is not not inclined to interfere in the findings of the Revisionary Authority as it is required to be found out by the original adjudication authority from the date of clearance of the goods in question for home consumption and the date of actual re-export of such goods by the Custom authority to apply the rate of duty drawback allowable on such re-export of the goods as per the N/N. 23 of 2008.

It is also pertinent to notice that the provisions of Rule 3 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 which permits for availing the Cenvat credit in respect of the CVD, SAD and Cesses only and not the basic custom duty which the petitioner has already availed and has not claimed the same for the purpose of duty drawback claim made by the petitioner.

Conclusion - The impugned orders passed by the respondent authorities are modified by holding that the petitioner is entitled to drawback claim on the basic custom duty as per the provision of Section 74(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 and the duties paid under any other act being CVD, SAD or Cesses cannot be considered as part of ‘any duty’ as is interpreted by the respondent authorities while computing the duty drawback allowable to the petitioner under Section 74 of the Act.

The respondent authorities are therefore directed to recompute the duty drawback allowable to the petitioner as per the provisions of Section 74 of the Custom Act, 1962 by considering only the basic custom duty and after considering the directions issued by the Revisionary Authority regarding the computation of the period for the purpose of applying the N/N. 23 of 2008 - Petition allowed by way of remand.
2025 (6) TMI 1287

Classification of Low Noise Block Down Converter (LNB) - to be classified under Customs Tariff Heading 85437099 as per CBEC Circular No. 13/2013-Customs or under Heading 85291099 as proposed by the Assessing Officer? - applicability of the Circular No. 13/2013-Customs - HELD THAT:- The judgment referred by learned Counsel for the Appellant in Arviva Industries (I) Ltd. case [2007 (1) TMI 6 - SUPREME COURT] was passed and the other judgment on Varsa Plastic Pvt. Ltd. [2009 (2) TMI 40 - SUPREME COURT] relates to the proviso which states that Board should not issue orders, instructions or directions so as to require any Officer of the Customs to make a particular assessment or to dispose of a particular case in a particular manner and not to interfere with the discretionary power of the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner of Customs (Appeals) in exercise of his appellate functions. Literal meaning of this proviso would go to suggest that orders, instructions or directions concerning the way in which assessment is to be made should never be issued by the Board and we do not agree to the view that when Board issued a clarificatory instruction on classification of goods, it should be considered as interference in the assessment order for the reason that through such clarificatory instruction, Board wanted to streamline certain disputes concerning classification but that does not mean that assessment and adjudication order should be passed without even hearing the other side on the ground that classification issue was settled. This is what is we mean by not passing any particular assessment order in a particular manner but this would never suggest arbitrary use of such provision to make any assessment or pass any adjudication order without a rational basis and without following due process of law, as has happened in the instant case in putting forth a logic that change of rate of duty would automatically change the Rules of Interpretation and General Explanatory Note etc. despite the fact that explanation appended to the Notification No. 01/2017-Integrated Tax (Rate) has clearly stipulated that those rules of interpretation and general explanatory note would follow, apart from the fact that HSN Note and WTO both also have suggested for classification of the disputed goods (LNB) in the same manner as being explained by the Board Circular No. 13/2013-Cus. - the Circular is squarely applicable to the Appellant who had appropriately classified the disputed item LNB under Tariff Heading No. 85437099 and therefore, the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) in classifying it under Tariff Item No. 85291099 is held to be improper.

Conclusion - The classification must be guided by principal function and HS explanatory notes, and that Board Circulars issued under Section 151A are binding on Customs officers for uniformity. Changes in duty rates under GST Notifications do not override classification rules under the Customs Tariff Act unless formally amended under the Act. The appellant's classification of LNB under tariff heading 85437099 is correct.

The impugned order is set aside - appeal allowed.
2025 (6) TMI 1286

Under valuation of imported goods with an intention to evade customs duty - redetermination of assessable value u/s 14(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 - demand of differential duty on the imported goods - confiscation of goods - imposition of penalty - HELD THAT:- The issue of enhancement of value on the basis of the computer print-outs, documents taken from the premises of M/s Winsor Enterprises by DRI are the same as relied upon in a similar proceedings separately taken for their sister concern M/s i.e., Plastic Cottage Trading Co., and statements of the partners of the appellant company given before DRI which were retracted by them are also a part of the same investigation.

These were examined by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Tribunal in the case of Junaid Kudia Vs. Commissioner of Customs, Mumbai Import-II [2023 (9) TMI 22 - CESTAT MUMBAI], wherein it was held that the demand of differential duty by enhancing the assessable value and consequential imposition of penalty are not legally sustainable.

Conclusion - On the basis of the order passed by the Tribunal in the case of Junaid Kudia Vs. Commissioner of Customs, Mumbai Import-II arising on the basis of same investigation, the confirmation of differential duty along with interest, confiscation of the impugned goods and imposition of penalty on the appellants, by the learned Commissioner of Customs vide impugned order dated 21.08.2020 does not stand the legal scrutiny.

The impugned order dated 21.08.2020 passed by the learned adjudicating authority is set aside - Appeal allowed.
2025 (6) TMI 1285

Mis-declaration and mis-classification of export goods - rejection and redetermination of FOB value declared of the goods - confiscation - redemption fine - penalty - duty drawback and other export incentives pending disbursal should appropriated against the fine and penalties - entire case of the department rests on the allegation that the Jayantah had over-valued the export goods - HELD THAT:- It refers to the “Free on Board” value agreed to between the buyer and the seller of the goods. It is the transaction value for the goods. It is the price which the buyer agrees to pay the seller for the goods without including the costs of transportation and transit insurance. FOB is one of the INCOTERMS i.e., international commercial terms which are the universally understood standards to determine the risks and responsibilities and liabilities of the buyers and sellers. If goods are sold on FOB basis, the seller is free from all his responsibilities once the goods are put on board the ship or aircraft. If goods are sold on C & F basis, the seller is also responsible for the transport of the goods upto the place of destination. However, the seller is not responsible for any risk which may occur during the transportation. If the goods are sold on CIF basis, the seller is responsible for delivery of the goods including the cost of transportation and transit insurance upto the port of delivery.

The transaction value shall be the assessable value on which duty should be determined-whether it is import duty or export duty. However, there are circumstances under which the transaction value can be rejected by the Customs Officers and the value can be re-determined as per the Valuation Rules adopting other methods. What needs to be noted is that if the transaction value is rejected and the value is re-determined by the officer, he is not changing and he cannot change the transaction value. All he is doing is refusing to accept the transaction value as the assessable value and is determining the assessable value through some other method.

If the drawback and other export incentives must be paid on the FOB value or on the value re-determined by the officer? - HELD THAT:- A doubt may arise as to why drawback and other export incentives have been made payable as a percentage of the FOB value and not on the basis of the assessable value under the Act which is basis for determining the duty. The reason for this is self-evident. Drawback and other export incentives are given to encourage exporters to export and to obtain remittances of sale proceeds - In fact, the drawback rules provide that if the remittance is not received, the drawback can be recovered. Similarly, in some schemes like Merchandise Export from India Schemes [MEIS], the exporter is required to apply for the scrip along with bank relieasing certificate showing that the remittance has been received. In other words, neither the transaction value (FOB value) nor the obligation on the exporter to realize remittance of the FOB value can be modified by any customs officer. Therefore, export incentives also need to be paid accordingly as per rules.

In this case the Commissioner (Appeals) specifically recorded in the impugned order that the exporter had realized remittance as per FOB value of the goods but dismissed this fact on the ground that the foreign remittance does not establish that the declared value was true - the Commissioner (Appeals) committed a grave error in this respect. What is declared is the FOB value and what is realized is the FOB value and not some value determined by the Customs Officer. The FOB value cannot be re-determined by any Customs Officer.

Conclusion - i) The Customs authorities had no jurisdiction or authority to re-determine the FOB value, which is the transaction value agreed between buyer and seller. The re-determination of FOB value by the Additional Commissioner was without legal authority and the impugned order upholding such re-determination was unsustainable. ii) The confiscation of goods, imposition of redemption fine, penalties, and appropriation of export incentives against such penalties based on the re-determined FOB value were all set aside.

The impugned order which is based on re-determination of FOB value cannot be sustained. The impugned order is set aside - Appeal allowed.
2025 (6) TMI 1284

Classification of imported goods under the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 - imported goods comprising LED panels and other components - benefit of N/N. 12/2012-Cus dated 17th March 2012 - invocation of rule 2 of General Rules for Interpretation of the Tariff appended to Customs Tariff Act, 1975 - HELD THAT:- The appellants had imported several articles in the impugned consignments that were neither available for examination during the course of adjudication which, however, did not hinder the adjudicating authority from concluding that the goods, put together, constituted fully functional television sets. The appellant, on the other hand, insisted that only ‘LED panels’ had been imported, along with other parts, in the 171 impugned bills of entry. No one knows because there is no record of the goods having been inventorized and examined. To presume that the present was the past is neither logical nor legal. Furthermore, having arrived at a dead end in the earlier notices, it would appear that, with intent to deny exemption available to ‘LED panels’ and which was not refuted for presence in the consignment, eligible goods had to be made to vanish – an impossibility in fact made possible by deeming the ‘panels’ to be within a television even if the television was not yet a thing.

Rule 2 of General Rules for Interpretation of the Tariff appended to Customs Tariff Act, 1975 is not an absolute rule, of its own, but is an extension of rule 1 which places emphasis on the description as the test for placement and at each of three levels of enumeration. Thus, there is no bar on merit classification of parts of the whole; there is no illegality there, either. The Rules are a guide to placement of rates for formulation of tax policy and, as well, to fitment of imported goods - Rule 2 of General Rules for Interpretation of the Import Tariff appended to Customs Tariff Act, 1962 is not a criminalizing law to test import for misdeclaration; as a guidance principle, it must be read in its totality for adherence to legislative intent. The Explanatory Notes makes no bones about the manner, and circumstances, in which this particular rule was to be applied.

There is no evidence that the 171 consignments, as imported and presented on each occasion, was capable of being assembled into specific number of television sets by very basic operations. That three consignments of later occasion could have been was not tested and neither was the evidence gathered during the investigation then subjected to relevancy test and acceptability test for determining the outcome in adjudication as legal and proper - the classification as ‘television sets’ must lie upon evidence of inventory of each individual consignment, as presented, or upon fresh documented or deposed evidence. Both are, palpably, not present.

The consignments did contain, inter alia, ‘LED panels’ entitled to be cleared on rate of duty noted in the impugned notification. With the ‘parts’ meriting appropriate classification, the basis of denial, viz., treatment of the goods as finished articles, is no longer available to be pressed into service. The differential duty was not to have been ordered for recovery. There is, also, no misdeclaration of value or any other particular in the impugned bills of entry. The confiscation of goods is not in order and must be aside.

Conclusion - The impugned order imposing differential duty, penalties, and confiscation was legally unsustainable and was set aside - The imported goods, including LED panels, were entitled to exemption as per the relevant notification, and joint and several liability was not tenable under the Customs Act.

The impugned order is bereft of any legal and factual sustenance and is set aside - Appeal allowed.
2025 (6) TMI 1283

Recovery of customs duty on inputs and packing materials procured by an Export Oriented Unit (EOU) - recovery of duty on destroyed goods that were procured duty-free under the EOU scheme and destroyed as per mandatory pharmaceutical industry protocols - entitlement of benefit of N/N. 52/2003 dated 31st March 2003 - HELD THAT:- From the manner in which the adjudicating authority has dealt with the issue of ‘inputs’ and ‘packing materials’, imported but not used in manufacture, and, admittedly, destroyed in the factory, it would appear that the scheme and its manner of implementation, through the relevant provisions of Customs Act, 1962 and governing notification issued under section 25 of Customs Act, 1962, has been misconstrued. The scheme of export promotion, through export oriented units (EOU), had been in existence for several decades and was aligned, one way or another, with the provisions of Customs Act, 1962. The scheme underwent several changes that, in many ways, paralleled the liberalization of control over manufacturing units and the relevant notifications, issued from time to time, reflected the evolution.

The scheme of exemption in the impugned notification requires compliance with conditions and one among those is the execution of bond upon which a unit, issued with the ‘letter of permission (LoP)’, becomes eligible for benefits of exemption. Conditions in the bond are not the conditions contingent upon which exemption is granted; bond, as prescribed, should be furnished - The exemption in terms of impugned notification is granted by the assessing officer under section 17 of Customs Act, 1962. Likewise, the condition in the bond for payment of duty leviable on the goods and the interest charged, at the rate as specified in the notification from the date of import of the said goods till the payment of duty, is contingent upon the said officer not having been satisfied about usage of goods in connection with production and packing of the goods, and in accordance with ‘standard input output norms (SION)’, for export or cleared for home consumption within a period of three years from the date of import or procurement. Investigation was taken up in March 2012 of goods, purportedly imported between October 2007 and October 2009. Therefore, satisfaction of the proper officer would have to be of the goods for the said period, to the extent that the ‘standard input output norms (SION)’, not being so compliant.

It was also inappropriate on the part of the Commissioner of Customs to invoke the provisions of bond executed, only as threshold condition to be eligible for availment of N/N. 52/2003-Cus dated 31st March 2003 and obliging the executor to conform to the terms of the bond upon demand, without either notice of intent or justification for appropriation of jurisdiction. It is clear from the show cause notice that no such demand was made on the appellant; nor was any proposal for demand under section 28 of Customs Act, 1962 confirmed in adjudication proceedings to be recovered through bond. The adjudicating authority has acted in excess of jurisdiction.

The prescriptions in section 142 of Customs Act, 1962 refer either to Assistant Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner as ‘proper officer’. It was incumbent upon the adjudicating authority to make it clear in the impugned order as to the manner in which the functions of ‘proper officer’ had been appropriated by him in accordance with law. The absence of that taints the entire process of adjudication.

Conclusion - i) No duty is recoverable on inputs and packing materials destroyed in compliance with pharmaceutical regulations and FTP provisions. ii) The adjudicating authority's reliance on rescinded notifications and warehousing requirements was incorrect. iii) Invocation of bonds without confirmed demand and proper proceedings was beyond jurisdiction.

The impugned order cannot be sustained and is consequently set aside - appeal allowed.
2025 (6) TMI 1282

Liability of customs duty - appellant as a courier firm and clearing agent, can be held liable as the owner or importer of the parcels for the purpose of customs duty or not - failure to properly examine several crucial aspects - principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- Both the authorities below have failed to properly examine several crucial aspects. It would appear from the order of the original authority, as confirmed by the first appellate authority, that the appellant was penalized under Customs Act, 1962 for non-compliance with the Courier Imports and Exports (Clearance) Regulations, 1998 and for not exercising due diligence. However, no reason has been assigned by both the authorities below as to the applicability of Rule 11 of Foreign Trade (Regulation) Rules, 1993 which is intended for the ‘owner of the imported goods’, though the appellant, throughout, has maintained that they are not the owner of the parcels. Importantly, during the adjudication proceedings, they produced the copies of the receipts of the parcels in question to the respective consignees/owners as documentary evidence but the same was neither looked into nor considered by either of the authorities below. The said document has to be looked into by the adjudicating authority before arriving at any conclusion. There is also a conspicuous absence of finding as to which parcel allegedly contained prohibited goods or how the goods have been held as prohibited as mandated by Section 111(d) of Customs Act, 1962. In the absence of such a finding, merely referring the provisions of regulations is not an adequate substitute. A breach of the regulations can be visited with consequences contained therein.

Mere handling in the course of professional engagement does not necessarily imply prior knowledge about confiscation or reason to believe that any document produced by them is false in any manner. That requires an independent and specific finding which is absent in the orders of the authorities below. If the parcels have been sent by a company and not by any individual as a consignor of goods the prohibition, if any, in the Regulations of 1998 has also not been elaborated. Furthermore, the valuation method adopted by the lower authorities has also not been explained.

Conclusion - The adjudication and appellate orders were flawed due to inadequate examination of the appellant's role, failure to consider crucial evidence, absence of reasoned findings on prohibited goods and valuation, and non-compliance with natural justice.

The adjudication has not been done properly and has been upheld by the first appellate authority in a mechanical manner without proper examination. Therefore without commenting on the merits, the matter deserves to be remanded to the adjudicating authority for a de novo adjudication after examining all the relevant evidences/documents - the appeal is allowed by way of remand.
2025 (6) TMI 1281

Eligibility for exemption under Customs Notification Nos. 11/1997, 23/1998, and 20/1999, which apply only to DC defibrillators for internal use and pacemakers - mis-declaration or suppression of facts or not - time limitation - Penalty u/s 112(a) of the Customs Act, 1962.

HELD THAT:- The issue on merits with regard to eligibility of exemption Notification stands settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the appellant’s own case B.P.L. LTD. Versus Commr. of C.EX., Cochin-II [2015 (5) TMI 248 - SUPREME COURT] where it was held that the appellant's Defibrillators did not qualify for exemption under Notification No. 8/96 and Notification No. 4/97.

Thus, in view of the above decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the appellant is not eligible for the benefit of Notification for both defibrillators and their parts.

Time limitation - It is argued that it is a question of interpretation of the Notification and since one of the Members of the Tribunal had held that they are eligible for the benefit of Notification, the benefit of doubt should be given to the appellant and therefore, suppression could not be alleged against them - HELD THAT:- The period of dispute in both the appeals Customs Appeal No. C/355/2003 and Appeal No. C/21182/2017 is for the imports from 1997-1999 and 2002 respectively. As seen from the above order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court “the appellant was very well aware of the fact that the product which is basically a defibrillator for external use but capable of using during open heart surgery if the optional accessory of internal defibrillators paddles are also provided, cannot be treated as defibrillators for internal use as contemplated in the exemption provisions.”

Taking into consideration the fact that the appellant was aware that these components imported by them were not meant for internal use continued to declare in their Bills of Entry that they are meant for internal use inspite of the fact that at the time end-use, the benefit of Notification was being denied to them. The Commissioner in the impugned order notes that the appellant had furnished undertaking from time-to-time for furnishing the end-use certificates and failed to produce the same nor availed any extension of time. It is also noted by the Commissioner that the appellant was very well aware of the fact that the Central Excise Authorities on investigation had issued the notice denying the benefit of the Notification, and the appellant knew that they could not have obtained end-use certificates from the jurisdictional Central Excise Authorities, but continued to claim benefit of the Notification - this is a clear case of mis-declaration and suppression of facts by the appellant in order to claim the benefit of Notification which was not available to them.

Penalty u/s 112(a) of the Customs Act, 1962 - HELD THAT:- Taking into consideration that there is no evidence of the fact that the General Manager had a role in suppressing the facts before the Customs Authorities in claiming the benefit while filing the Bills of Entry, is not forthcoming; hence, the question of imposing penalty on him does not arise. Accordingly, the penalty under Section 112(a) of the Customs Act, 1962 on Shri Hariharan is set aside.

Conclusion - i) The appellant's goods do not qualify for exemption under the relevant Customs Notifications as they are primarily for external use and exemption is restricted to internal use only. ii) The appellant committed mis-declaration and suppression of facts by declaring goods for internal use despite knowing the denial of exemption, justifying imposition of duty, interest, and penalty. iii) The extended period of limitation is applicable for the demand relating to imports during 1997-99 due to suppression but not for the 2002 imports where the demand is barred by limitation. iv) Penalty under Section 112(a) on the General Manager is set aside for lack of evidence of his involvement.

Appeal allowed in part.
2025 (6) TMI 1280

Classification of imported goods - Architectural Gypsum Moulding products - classifiable under Customs Tariff Heading (CTH) 2520 2090 or under CTH 6809 9000? - suppression and mis-declaration of facts or not - entitlement for exemption under N/N.12/2012 (Sl. No.108) dated 17.03.2012 - scope of SCN - HELD THAT:- The items imported by the appellant clearly fall under Chapter 6809 as articles of plaster as the impugned products are described as Gypsum Plaster Moulding Products (Ceiling, Cornice, Medalliaon, Panels, Pillars, Frames, etc.) and the catalogue of the supplier also describe them as architectural and decorative plaster moulding products.

The Revenue has also placed on record Bills of Entry dated 17.12.2013 much prior to the impugned imports to show that the similar products which are described as ‘Architectural Gypsum Moulding Products HKH C975, HKH C446, HKH C949, HKH C449 etc., were classified by the appellant under CTH 6809 9000. It is also a fact that the classification was mis-declared only to avail the benefit of Notification No.12/2012 which was otherwise not available to the products classifiable under CTH 6809. Therefore, it is a clear case of suppression and misdeclaration since the appellant had now classified the products under CTH 2520 knowing very well that they are rightly classifiable under 6809.

The original authority had observed that there is no evidence in the nature of e-mail or any other correspondence to prove the fact that it was the CHA (Cargomar) who had directed/advised the appellant to mis-declare the classification of the impugned products and moreover, the benefit of the Notification based on mis-declaration is to accrue to the importer and not to the CHA. The Commissioner (Appeals) in the impugned order has not brought on record anything to show that the CHA was the person responsible for mis-declaring the products. In view of the above there are no reason to impose penalty on the CHA.

The customs broker had no role to play in mis-declaring the product the question of prohibiting him from operating within the jurisdiction of Bengaluru Customs under Regulation 23 of CBLR 2013 does not arise.

Conclusion - i) The impugned products are correctly classifiable under Chapter Heading 6809 as articles of plaster and not under Chapter 25 which covers gypsum and plasters in crude or minimally processed forms. ii) The appellant's classification under CTH 2520 2090 was a deliberate mis-declaration to avail exemption under Notification No.12/2012, which is not applicable to products classifiable under Chapter 68.

The impugned order Order-in-Appeal No. 932-933/2017 is confirmed only to the extent of confirming the demand of duty along with interest on the appellant M/s. J P Traders and imposition of penalty u/s 114A but setting aside the penalty u/s 114AA - appeal disposed off.
2025 (6) TMI 1279

Enhancement of assessable value of imported goods by 20% on the ground of related party transactions - PowerAde - non-consideration of rule of Jurisdiction - jurisdiction of the first appellate authority and the Tribunal to entertain appeals against directions or advisory opinions issued by the SVB - HELD THAT:- It may be observed that the enhancement of 20% over the declared value was directed on the finding of alleged relationship between supplier and the importer. Two aspects militate against its acceptability: exercise of empowerment to assess under section 17 of Customs Act, 1962 and the stipulations which strip the assessment of certainty. The disposal of the appeal by the first appellate authority would have been appropriate had final assessment of imported goods under section 17 Customs Act, 1962 been in dispute; the consequence of direction for enhancement is not evident either as determination of duty under section 17 of Customs Act, 1962 or as finalization of provisional assessment under section 18 of Customs Act, 1962.

The scope of ‘directions’ of ‘special valuation branch (SVB)’ in assessment had been dealt with by the Tribunal in TBK India Pvt Ltd v. Commissioner of Customs (Import), Mumbai [2023 (9) TMI 825 - CESTAT MUMBAI] and it was held that 'The first appellate authority should have dealt with the appeal, at the behest of jurisdictional Commissioner of Customs, within such circumscribing and passed such order as is legal and proper for disposal of appeal. Notwithstanding the lack of appellate recourse, that the jurisdictional Commissioner of Customs opted for review does not fall within our empowerment, or that of Commissioner of Customs (Appeals), to prevent; but it is certainly within empowerment to render appropriate disposal in terms of our exposition on the true nature of Special Valuation Branch (SVB).'

The order impugned has not considered the root issue of jurisdiction to entertain such appeal. That the Tribunal is itself lacking in jurisdiction, as set out supra, divests the jurisdiction of the first appellate authority. Determination of jurisdiction on facts was a necessary preliminary for moulding the outcome of appeal appropriately. The lack thereof warrants setting aside of the impugned order for remand back to the first appellate authority to enable appropriate disposal thereof on the submissions made by the appellant herein on circumstances leading to the grievance.

Appeal is allowed by way of remand.
2025 (6) TMI 1278

Confiscation of the consignment under import and imposition of penalty - assessment was undertaken on the value declared for the purpose of charging duties under section 12 of Customs Act, 1962 - appellant submitted that the goods had been seized owing to which non-issuance of the show cause notice under section 124 of Customs Act, 1962 for confiscation was inappropriate - HELD THAT:- The clearances effected against the earlier bill of entry are not connected with the present proceedings as is abundantly clear in the order of the original authority confiscating goods imported vide bill of entry no. 2749408/30.07.2013. The appellant had discharged duty liability on the current, as well as past imports, on 13th August 2013 despite which the goods under import were seized on 20th August 2013. It would, thus, appear that the intention to confiscate the goods had not been made known to the importer at any stage and the waiver of show cause notice as preliminary to adjudication appears to have been grounded on the lack of such intent even as late as September 2013. Indeed, the original authority had failed to verbalise the proposals sought to be invoked against the importer.

There is not a whiff of allegation that any post-importation conditions were breached and also it is noticed that section 3 of Customs Tariff Act, 1975 does not extend to declarations made nor does responsibility devolve upon importers for distinguishment of declaration for the purpose of basic customs duty and, in special cases, for additional duty of customs. In such circumstances, and in the absence of any finding that the value to be declared for the purpose of section 3(1) of Customs Tariff Act, 1975 was different, the scope for invocation of section 111(m) of Customs Act, 1962 does not exist. Moreover, it is seen that the appellant had made good the differential duty liability immediately upon it being pointed out that the goods were to be subjected to duties on the basis of ‘retail sale price (RSP)’ and not on the basis of transaction value. It may also be noted that, even for the purposes of assessment of basic customs duty, the scope for confiscation arises from a specific provision in rule 11 of Customs Valuation (Determination of Value of Imported Goods) Rules, 2007 and, by no stretch, does that extend to declaration or non-declaration of the price at which the goods were intended to be sold.

Especially in the light of immediate discharge of duty liability along with interest on past imports, there is no reason to sustain confiscation under section 111 of Customs Act, 1962 or for retention of penalty under section 112 of Customs Act, 1962.

Appeal disposed off.
2025 (6) TMI 1277

Rejection of classification of MCPCB under Customs Tariff Item No. 85340000 and re-classifying them under Customs Tariff Item No. 94054090 - HELD THAT:- A perusal of the order passed by the Division Bench in Havells India [2025 (1) TMI 269 - CESTAT NEW DELHI] clearly shows that MCPCB imported by the appellant would classify merit classification under Customs Tariff Item No. 85340000.

The impugned order dated 10.11.2022 cannot be sustained and is set aside - Appeal allowed.
2025 (6) TMI 1276

Applicability of N/N. 30/2004-CE dated 09/07/2004 as amended by N/N. 34/2015-CE dated 17/07/2015 and N/N. 37/2015-CE dated 21/07/2015 - applicability of additional customs duty upon import of mulberry silk fabrics without dyed & without printed - HELD THAT:- The Honb'le Supreme Court in the case of AIDEK Tourism Services Pvt. Ltd. [2015 (3) TMI 690 - SUPREME COURT], has held that for the purpose of levy of duty under Section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act, actual production or manufacture of a like article in India is not necessary. It is to be imagined that article imported has been manufactured or produced in India and it then need to be seen as to what amount of excise duty was leviable thereon. Honb'le Supreme Court held that the importer is to be treated as a manufacturer of the goods and thereafter the amount of Excise duty/Additional Duty that is required to be determined and paid.

It is now settled that the rate of duty would be only that which an Indian Manufacturer would pay under the Excise Act on a like Article. Therefore, the importer would be entitled to payment of concessional/reduced or NIL rate of Countervailing duty if any notification is issued providing exemption/remission of excise duty for a like article if produced/manufactured in India.

Conclusion - The exemption notifications apply, and the imported goods are not liable to additional customs duty.

There are no reason to interfere with the impugned orders and accordingly, the same is sustained - appeal filed by the appellant Revenue is dismissed.