Advanced Search Options
Law of Competition - Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 340 Records
-
2025 (2) TMI 145
Anti-competitive practices - abuse of dominant position - delaying the possession of flats and increasing the cost - violation of Section 4(2)(a)(i) read with Section 4(1) of the Competition Act, 2002 - entitlement to compensation under Section 42A and Section 53N(1) of the Competition Act - HELD THAT:- The compensation is payable in case of contravention of order of CCI. Section 42 A provides that any person may make an application to the Appellate Authority for an order of recovery of compensation from any enterprises for any loss or damage shown to have been suffered by such person as a result of said enterprise violating directions issued by CCI.
It is noted that every Appellant has claimed the monthly rental @10,000 per month amounting to Rs. 10,20,000/- for the period from 01.01.2010 to 30.06.2018 which continue till payments. Similarly, the Appellants have claimed the damage for inconvenience, mental, physical loss, expectancy loss amounting to Rs. 25,50,000/- each. Another claim has been made regarding interest on payment deposited amounting to Rs. 1,70,000/- each and finally litigation and out of pocket expenses of Rs. 5,00,000/- each. Thus, the total compensation by each is Rs. 42,42,000/- which continues till payment is made by the Appellants - the eligibility criteria for the applicant to apply for EWS flats was annual earnings ceilings of Rs. 25,000 each.
The claims, on face of it do not seems to be convincing. Be that as it may, it is already noted in earlier that that the compensation is due only if CCI orders have been violated by the Respondent No. 1 which is not the case here. As such, there are no merit in the appeal.
It is observed that after giving consent for enhancement of cost of flats, it does not lie in the mount of the Appellants to challenge the same. This does not help the cause of the Appellants, despite CCI holding that Respondent No. 1 was involved in abusive conduct as dominant player in relevant geographic market.
Conclusion - i) The compensation is due only if CCI orders have been violated by the Respondent No. 1, which is not the case here. ii) After giving consent for enhancement of cost of flats, it does not lie in the mount of the Appellants to challenge the same.
Appeal dismissed.
-
2025 (2) TMI 76
Prayer for stay of effect and operation of the impugned order - jurisdiction of Competition Commission of India (CCI) to initiate suo moto proceedings against WhatsApp LLC and Meta Platforms for the 2021 update of WhatsApp's Privacy Policy under the Competition Act, 2002 - breach of Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 - HELD THAT:- The decision of Supreme Court [2022 (10) TMI 1269 - SUPREME COURT] clearly supports the submissions of the CCI that suo moto proceeding initiated by the CCI was not to be interfered with. However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that the proceedings shall be decided and disposed of in accordance with law and on its own merits. The initiation of proceeding was thus, not interfered but the ultimate order passed by the Commission has to be tested on its own merits.
The directions which have been issued in paragraph 247.1 and 247.2 are with respect to “for advertising purposes” and “for purpose other than advertising”. Insofar as sharing of user data for advertising purposes, the said is going on from 2016 when 2016 privacy policy was enforced. The ban of five years which was imposed in paragraph 247.1 may lead to the collapse of business model which has been followed by WhatsApp LLC. It is also relevant to notice that WhatsApp is providing WhatsApp services to its user free of cost - the ban of five years imposed in paragraph 247.1 need to be stayed. We, however, are of the view that the directions issued by the CCI under paragraph 247.2 and 247.3 need not be stayed and they need to be complied with. The only limited interim order which we are inclined to grant is to stay the direction in paragraph 247.1 by which five years’ ban has been imposed. The direction in paragraph 247.1 are stayed.
Penalty - It is submitted by Appellant that 25% penalty has already been deposited - HELD THAT:- Subject to deposit of 50% of penalty (after taking into consideration 25% already deposited), the direction in paragraph 263 need to be stayed. The Appellant is directed to deposit 50% of penalty as indicated above within two weeks from today.
Conclusion - The five-year ban on sharing user data for advertising purposes stayed, subject to conditions imposed. The other directions and penalties imposed by the CCI upheld.
Application disposed off.
-
2024 (11) TMI 1084
Seeking an injunction restraining infringement of copyright, piracy of registered design, passing off etc. - whether the filing of a design infringement action could constitute an anti-competitive practice or vexatious/sham litigation, so as to lead to a conclusion that the Plaintiff in the infringement action in the original suit has engaged in abuse of dominance? - HELD THAT:- The potential for the CCI to continue an inquiry after a settlement has been reached, could even jeopardize the settlement, dissuading parties from opting for mediation in the first place. It could lead to a lack of trust in the mediation process, as parties may fear that their efforts to settle disputes amicably would be disregarded. Moreover, settlements in general being agreements voluntarily agreed to between parties, unless there is an extraordinary situation, they cannot be permitted to be reopened – so as to ensure ‘FINALITY’ and ‘CLOSURE’. Furthermore, the threat of continued investigations by the CCI could compel parties to engage in prolonged and costly legal battles, defeating the purpose of settlements.
The question whether JCB’s stance is misleading or not would have been for the High Court to decide, not the CCI. Thereafter, the Information makes an reference to the ad-interim injunction dated 25th November, 2011 granted by the Delhi High Court. The allegation is that the litigation in itself is an overall diabolical and insidious strategy and is a misuse of judicial process. In the entire Information, the repeated allegations are of abuse of judicial process and regulatory process. Details of various hearings in the Delhi High Court are set out in the Information. The consequences of the litigation are set out in the Information and it is argued that JCB abused its dominance in view of the said litigation, which is termed as a ‘predatory litigation’ - No issues regarding anti-competitive practices were also raised in the information, apart from the allegation of abuse of dominant position in the garb of filed injunction suit and being lead players in the market.
In the present dispute also the substratum of the dispute being the design infringement action filed by JCB for protection of its registered designs, the said suit having itself being settled, in the opinion of this Court, the CCI proceeding cannot continue and deserves to be disposed of - This is in line with the decision of the Division Bench in Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (PUBL) v. Competition Commission of India & Anr. [2014 (1) TMI 1954 - DELHI HIGH COURT] where the Court categorically holds that once the settlement is reached, the substratum of the proceedings itself no longer exists.
The settlement dated 22nd July, 2021 is taken on record. The impugned order dated 11th March, 2014 under Section 26(1) of the Act is set aside. The proceedings before the CCI in Case No. 105/2013 are accordingly terminated. The order dated 17th September 2014 passed by the ld. Metropolitan Magistrate is also set aside. Any material seized by CCI shall not be used in any other proceedings and be returned to JCB - the application is allowed.
-
2024 (11) TMI 1007
Contravention of the provisions of Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 - abuse of dominant position - IREL is an ‘enterprise’ in terms of provisions of the Act or not - ‘relevant market’ in the present case - IREL holds a dominant position in the relevant market.
Whether OP is an ‘enterprise’ as defined in Section 2(h) of the Act? - HELD THAT:- The Commission observes that IREL, the erstwhile Indian Rare Earths Limited is a Public Sector Undertaking and an unlisted Public Company, was incorporated on August 18,1950. It became a full-fledged Government of India Undertaking under the administrative control of Department of Atomic Energy in year 1963. It has its own Board of Directors for managing its overall affairs. Accordingly, the Commission is of the considered view that IREL is not a department of the Government. The Commission notes that Sillimanite is sold by the OP in the open market for monetary consideration. Thus, IREL does not qualify for an exemption from the provisions of Section 2(h) of the Act with respect to the activity of mining and sale of Sillimanite in India. Based on the above and nature of activities carried on by OP, the Commission finds no reason to deviate from its prima facie order dated 03.01.2022 where it held OP to be an enterprise under the Act. Accordingly, the Commission finds OP to be an enterprise under extant provision of Section 2(h) of the Act.
What is the ‘relevant market’ in the present case as defined in Section 2 (r) of the Act? - HELD THAT:- With regard to delineation of relevant geographic market, the Commission notes the submission of DG that there are no geographical barriers for production as well as sale of Sillimanite in India. OP has stated that the relevant geographic market in the matter is India including import. The Commission, while agreeing with this contention of the OP, notes that the import of Sillimanite, if any, in Indian market may be appropriately considered under the relevant product market. However, there would be no change in geographic market as competition concerns (even accounting for imported relevant product) would still be evaluated within the boundary of India. Accordingly, the Commission finds no reason to disagree with the finding of DG and accepts the relevant geographic market in the instant case as ‘India’ - the Commission holds that the relevant market in the present case as “mining and supply of Beach Sand Sillimanite in India”.
Whether OP holds a dominant position within the scope of Section 4 of the Act? - HELD THAT:- The contention of the OP that the market share of an entity cannot be a definitive and exclusive indicator of its dominance and therefore, the findings of DG with respect to dominance of the OP cannot be relied upon. However, the Commission observes that the DG has analysed dominance based on various factors, as provided under Section 19(4) of the Act, and not alone on the basis of market share. Further, market share of an entity can be a strong indicator of its presence in the market and simply cannot be brushed aside in toto in absence of other negating factors - the Commission is in agreement with the conclusion drawn by the DG that the OP enjoyed a dominant position in the defined relevant market.
Whether OP has violated the provisions of section 4(2)(a)(ii) by charging unfair/ excessive prices from the consumers? - HELD THAT:- The price charged by KMML was much higher than IREL despite KMML being a much small player. The Commission also notes that allegation have been levelled in respect of higher quantities being offloaded to a particular company and its associates and also that the price charged is substantially lower vis-à-vis what is being charged from other customers. There seems to be no economic incentives for the OP, being in a dominant position, to indulge in such activities where it sold higher quantities at lower prices. Further, the Commission is of the view that market price is best left to the dynamic interaction between forces of the market and intervention would normally be required only in appropriate cases based on facts and circumstances of such a case - there is no reason for the Commission to hold that OP has indulged in excessive pricing. Resultantly, no case of contravention of Section 4(2)(a)(ii) of the Act is made out against the OP.
Whether the OP violated the provisions of section 4(2)(a)(ii) by charging discriminatory prices? - Whether the OP violated the provisions of section 4 (2)(a)(i) by imposing discriminatory supply conditions? - HELD THAT:- The Commission is of the view that quantity supplied by OP to different categories of consumers of Sillimanite may be different for the reasons such as long-standing business relations, assured off-take quantity, past off-take etc. and therefore, may not be discriminatory. Here, it is trite to say that every commercial enterprise enjoys freedom to carry out trade and take appropriate business decisions. As a normal business prudence, the Commission has reasons to believe that, a party buying in bulk would get better terms (including purchase price) than a small buyer. Unless and until there are manifest contravention of the provisions of the Act, the freedom of enterprise remains sacrosanct and the Commission would not like to dictate the terms of the trade. Based on the facts of the case and analysis, the Commission is of the view that no case of contravention of Section 4(2)(a)(i) of the Act for adopting discriminatory practices in supply of Sillimanite favouring MNCs/foreign customers as against domestic customers is made out against the OP.
Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, material on records, Investigation Report of the DG, submission made by the parties and analysis carried out in preceding paragraphs, the Commission is of the view that the OP is covered under the ambit of enterprise prescribed under extant provision of Section 2(h) of the Act and is dominant in mining and sale of Beach Sand Sillimanite in India. However, no case of contravention of provisions of section 4(2)(a)(i) and 4(2)(a)(ii) of the Act is made out against the OP. Accordingly, the matter is directed to be closed.
The Commission deems it appropriate to deal with the request of the parties seeking confidentiality over certain documents/information filed by them under Regulation 35 of the Competition Commission of India (General) Regulations, 2009. The Commission notes that during the course of the proceedings, parties had filed their respective submissions in confidential as well as non-confidential version. Certain excerpts from such submissions, over which confidentiality has been sought, have been relied upon by the Commission.
-
2024 (11) TMI 1006
Contravention of the provisions of Section 4(2)(c) of the Competition Act, 2002 - abuse of dominant position - HELD THAT:- In the absence of dominant position of the OPs in the delineated relevant market, the allegations of abuse made against the OPs need not be examined by the Commission.
Be that as it may, based on the information available on record, the Commission is of the view that the alleged conduct cannot be considered as an abuse of dominant position by the OPs. The Informant has not provided any evidence indicating that the OPs used the Informant’s information to develop and launch their products. Additionally, there is no evidence suggesting that the OPs prevented the Informant from introducing a similar product into the market. Furthermore, there is no record of the Informant having a similar product in development that was close to being launched and accordingly the Informant lost the first-mover advantage due to OPs’ product launch. Moreover, it is not demonstrated that having a first-mover advantage is crucial in this market.
There does not seem to be any abuse of dominant position by the OPs in the delineated relevant market - the Commission is of the considered opinion that no prima facie case of contravention of the provisions of Section 4 of the Act is made out against the OPs in the present matter. Hence, the matter is directed to be closed in terms of the provisions contained in Section 26(2) of the Act.
All pending applications stand disposed of accordingly.
-
2024 (11) TMI 1005
Price fixation and bid-rigging by sugar mills and associations - price parallelism - contravention of the provisions of Section 3(3)(a) and 3(3)(d) read with Section 3(1) of the Competition Act, 2002 - HELD THAT:- It is seen that for the allegations of price cartel amongst ISMA and the sugar mills of the State of Uttar Pradesh in contravention of the provisions of Section 3(3)(a) of the Act, the only credible evidence brought out in the investigation report is a few instances of quotation of identical prices by OP-11 and OP-19 in the Impugned Tender, and exchange of calls by them as well as by key officials of certain other OPs with Shri GK Thakur, Director of ISMA, during the tender period - It is no longer res integra that price parallelism cannot be the sole criteria to establish a cartel. Evidence of parallel pricing must be supplemented with “plus factors” showing that alleged conduct is conscious and not the result of independent business decisions. In the present matters, the plus factors on record to supplement price parallelism by 2 OPs, is exchange of a few calls between the OPs with the representative of the industry association ISMA, which may have been to understand the nuances of the Impugned Tender as it ushered a novel way of tendering process.
The investigation has not brought out sufficient evidence on record for the Commission to arrive at a finding of contravention of the provisions of the Act against any OP in the present matters - It is made clear that all information used in the present order is for the purposes of the Act and as such, in terms of Section 57 of the Act, does not qualify for grant of confidential treatment.
Thus, no case of contravention of the provisions of the Act can be made out in the present matters against any OP and the matters are directed to be closed forthwith - The Secretary is directed to forward certified copy of the present order to the Informants and the OPs, accordingly.
-
2024 (11) TMI 1004
Alleged anti-competitive practices under Sections 3(4) and 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 - exclusive supply obligation - forced co-branding - refusal to deal - resale price maintenance - HELD THAT:- The Commission notes that the Informant has primarily relied upon an undated and unsigned document titled ‘Propel Agreement’ to allege ‘exclusive supply obligation’ and ‘forced co-branding’. The Commission also notes that other two allegations i.e., ‘refusal to deal’ and ‘resale price maintenance’ are stated to be imposed through oral directions. Accordingly, the Commission directed the Informant to furnish a copy of an actual agreement signed between the OP-1 and a processor. The Informant, in its response dated 07.02.2024, stated that it does not have access/ possession of a signed agreement.
Despite being given the opportunity, the Commission observes that the Informant has not been able to produce a valid and subsisting copy of the said Propel Agreement on the edifice of which the entire allegations rest - A bare perusal of the said Propel Agreement reveals that it is only an agreement to meet the requirements of the end consumers through the assistance imparted by the manufacturers to the processors by way of supply of raw materials, imparting technical and marketing training, rendering services to the customers as per the requirements, among others.
With regard to the allegation of exclusive supply obligation, the Commission observes that exclusive purchase obligation is said to be imposed on processors only in respect of ‘High Performance Glass & Allied Products’ and ‘Clear Tempered Glass’. However, no such imposition of exclusivity is observed from the submitted Propel Agreement, in respect of clear float glass/other glass, thereby implying that the processor has a choice to procure clear float glass from other glass manufacturers.
With regard to allegation of forced co-branding, the Commission has perused clause 3.3 of the said Propel Agreement which reveals that the OP-1 would facilitate the processor to use its own trademark/brand name alongside trademark/brand name of OP- 1 under certain terms and conditions. Thus, the Commission is of the view that co- branding, in itself, does not raise competition issue.
As regards allegations of refusal to deal, it has been submitted by the Informant that processors/ distributors are being offered significant discounts on products of OP-1, if they purchase exclusively from OP-1. Additionally, the processors who are dealing with competitors of OP-1 will not be sold products of OP-1. The Commission is of the view that the Informant has merely alleged the conduct to be carried out through oral directions and has not substantiated the same with any evidence. It may be noted that offering discounts on the basis of volume of purchase may not be anti-competitive, per se.
In relation to allegation of resale price maintenance (‘RPM’) being practiced through oral direction, the Informant has claimed that in certain cases, OP-1 is stated to have directly approached the large bulk customers and negotiated prices directly with them. The processors and distributors are then forced to issue invoices at such prices - the Commission notes that OP-1 would have no control over the price charged by the processors from the end consumers for the services provided by it. It is clear that the processors are free to charge the price from the end users for the value addition/ enhancement they carry out in the glass received from OP-1 and OP-1 does not control it. This nowhere shows that the price of end product is being controlled by the OP-1 as OP-1 only charges for the products it sells to the processor.
The Commission is of the view that no prima facie case is made out against OP-1 in respect of either Section 3(4) or 4 of the Act. Accordingly, the Information filed is directed to be closed forthwith under Section 26(2) of the Act.
Considering the grounds put forth by the Informant for the grant of confidential treatment, the Commission grants confidentiality to such documents/ information in terms of Regulation 35 of the General Regulations read with section 57 of the Act for a period of three years from the passing of this order. The Commission also grants confidentiality on the identity of the Informant as prayed. It is, however, made clear that nothing used in this order shall be deemed to be confidential or deemed to have been granted confidentiality as the same has been used for the purposes of the Act in terms of the provisions contained in Section 57 thereof.
-
2024 (11) TMI 1003
Anti-competitive agreements under Section 3 of the Competition Act, 2002 - contravention of the provisions of Section 3(1), 3(2), 4(2)(a)(ii) and 4(2)(c) of Competition Act, 2002 - abuse of dominant position under Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 - unfair trade practices and imposition of excessive interest rates - HELD THAT:- The Commission perused the material available on record and information available in public domain. The Commission notes that the Informant is mainly aggrieved with the alleged unfair and discriminatory increase in the rate of interest charged by OP-1. The Informant has alleged that due to imposition of high rate of interest, frequent increase of rate of interest and not allowing pre-payment of Loans (imposition of pre-payment penalty) resulted in the creation of barriers for new entrants in the market, as consumers would be disinclined to switch to a new entrant due to the apprehension of incurring losses. It is also alleged that the competition gets adversely affected as consumers face hindrance in the form of penalties when they switch to another bank. Therefore, the conduct of OP-1 allegedly amounts to be in violation of Sections 3(1) and 3(2) of the Act. It is also alleged that imposing unjust and excessively high rates of interest contravene provisions of Section 4 of the Act.
For the purpose of analysis of conduct of OP-1 under the ambit of Section 4 of the Act, the Commission deems appropriate in the present matter to delineate relevant market as ‘provision of loan against property in India’. The Commission notes that the Informant has suggested that OP-1 has the biggest share in the area of Delhi and NCR and therefore is dominant. The Commission also notes from the information available in public domain that OP-1 is a housing finance company which is India’s third largest non-bank mortgage lender in the country and is regulated by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) - it is observed from the information in public domain that the relevant market appears to be competitive with the presence of large number of banks and Non-Bank Financial Companies (NBFCs) and housing finance companies and thus, dominance of OP-1 is not established in the aforesaid relevant market. Further, the allegation of aftermarket abuse is misplaced since the loan services of the nature impugned herein do not involve any aftermarket as alleged by the Informant and is, thus, rejected.
The Commission is of the view that there is no prima facie case made out under the provisions of Section 4 of the Act. As far as the provisions of Section 3 of the Act is concerned, the agreement with an end-consumer like in the present case is not envisaged as an anti-competitive agreement under Section 3 of the Act and therefore, no case is made out under the provisions of Section 3 of the Act.
The Commission is of the view that prima facie there is no competition concern arising in the present matter under the provisions of Section 3 and Section 4 of the Act and therefore, the matter is directed to be closed forthwith under Section 26(2) of the Act - the Secretary is directed to communicate the decision of the Commission to the Informant, accordingly.
-
2024 (11) TMI 1002
Seeking confidentiality over its identity under provisions of Section 57 of the Act read with Regulation 35 of the Competition Commission of India (General) Regulations, 2009 - bid-rigging and cartelisation - abuse of dominant position - contravention of Section 3 of the Competition Act, 2002 - HELD THAT:- There was a significant difference of more than INR 2000/- between bids quoted by OP-2 and OP-3; in the remaining two tenders viz. Tender Nos. 03221028 and 03211577, there seems to be a minor difference of around INR 10 in the bid amounts of OP-2 and OP-3. However, there is no evidence on record that any part of the remaining two tenders were awarded to OP-2 and/ or OP-3. Further, it is noted that the bids quoted by several remaining bidders (approved or un-approved sources) were in the same range or higher than the bids quoted by OP-2 and OP-3. Specifically, it is noted that in all three tenders, the approved source Nanda Engineering Works, quoted rates higher than the OPs.
The Commission observes that apart from the bid quotations made by OP-2 and OP-3 in two tenders with minor difference in their prices, there is no other evidence on record, which may support the allegations of the Informant regarding cartelisation between them - it is no longer res integra that mere price parallelism is not sufficient to arrive at a finding of cartelisation without there being evidence of any plus factors in support of parallel pricing.
In the present matter, there are no plus factors averred by the Informant indicating meeting of minds or collusion between OP-2 and OP-3 or among OPs. Accordingly, in view of the Commission, neither case of cartelisation in contravention of the provisions of Section 3 of the Act is made out in the present matter against OP-2 and OP-3 nor there arises any question of violation of the provisions of Section 3 of the Act by OP-1.
The Commission is of the view that OP-1 being a consumer/ procurer of the impugned item has freedom to specify its requirements/ conditions/ EC and the said requirements/ conditions/ EC themselves cannot be deemed to be anti- competitive. Thus, the Commission does not find OP-1 to be in violation of the provisions of Section 4 of the Act also.
The Commission finds that no prima facie case of contravention of provisions of the Act is made out against any of the OPs in the present matter and decides to close the matter forthwith in terms of the provisions of Section 26(2) of the Act - The Secretary is directed to communicate certified copy of the present order to the Informant, accordingly.
-
2024 (11) TMI 1001
Abuse of dominant position by DAE and IREL under Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 - contravention of the provisions of Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 - HELD THAT:- From a conjoint reading of Section 2(h) of the Act and the relevant Allocation of Business Rules, it is amply clear that DAE is exempted from the purview of ‘enterprise’ in terms of the provisions of the Act. Accordingly, conduct of DAE does not invite scrutiny under the provisions of the Act.
Furthermore, based on the above, the Commission notes that the IREL has no role to play in renewal of the off-take agreement, rejection of import licenses, and non-approval of an alternate disposal plan.
Based on the facts and circumstance of the instant case and analysis carried out in preceding paragraphs, since no prima facie case is made out either against DAE or IREL, the matter may be closed under Section 26(2) of the Act forthwith. Consequently, no case for grant of relief(s) as sought under Section 33 of the Act arises.
-
2024 (11) TMI 1000
Alleged contravention of Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 by Maruti Suzuki India Limited regarding pricing strategy for the 'Jimny' SUV - abuse of dominant position - HELD THAT:- In the opinion of the Commission, the OP does not hold a market share large enough to enable it to operate independently of competitive forces prevailing in the market or to affect its competitors or consumers or the market in its favour, especially in the SUV segment of passenger vehicles. As such, the OP does not appear to be a dominant player in the market. Therefore, in the opinion of the Commission, a case of violation of the provisions of Section 4 of the Act cannot be made out against the OP.
Further, the Commission also notes that the grievance raised by the Informant is an inter-se dispute between the Informant and the OP regarding price of the product sold by the OP to the Informant. In the opinion of the Commission, on the basis of the grievances alleged by the Informant, no competition issue or concern seems to arise from the facts and allegations stated by the Informant. Once a buyer purchases a product from a seller at a given price, it cannot insist to avail benefit of any future discount which may be offered on such product by the seller. The discounted price alleged also does not seem to be predatory in nature.
The Commission is of the considered opinion that no prima facie case of contravention of the provisions of Section 4 of the Act is made out against the OP in the present matter. Hence, the matter is directed to be closed in terms of the provisions contained in Section 26(2) of the Act.
-
2024 (11) TMI 999
Contravention of provisions of Section 3 and 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 - abuse of dominant position/dominant enterprise - cartel formation - HELD THAT:- From the facts, the Commission notes that the Informants are the retail shop owners in the Mall and are aggrieved by the way Mall has been managed. The gravamen of grievance is that the management of the Mall has not been handed over to the association of the owners of the Mall (buyers of the retail space in the Mall) and it continues to be in the hands of OP-1 acting through OP-2 (maintenance agency); charging of high maintenance and electricity charges; selling joint common areas without consent of the shop owners. The Commission also notes that the Informants have claimed the Mall to be a relevant market and the conduct of OPs causing AAEC in such market - The Informants have already filed a civil suit against OPs claiming permanent injunction against OPs.
The Commission notes from the information available in public domain that Metropolitan Mall is not the only mall situated in Gurugram and there are other malls situated in Gurugram and nearby areas. Thus, the Commission is of the view that the case does not merit any narrow delineation of relevant market for the purposes of Section 4 of the Act. As far as the alleged abuse is concerned, the Commission is of the view that the grievances of the Informants like payment of maintenance and electricity charges, rights and entitlement to joint common areas etc. are in the nature of contractual/civil issues/disputes - The Commission also does not find any merit in the case for its examination under Section 3(4) of the Act. Thus, the Commission is of the view that no competition concerns seem to arise in the present matter given the nature of allegations and the alleged conduct of the parties so arrayed by the Informant.
The Commission is, thus, of the opinion that there exists no prima facie case of contravention of the provisions of Section 3 and Section 4 of the Act against the OPs in the present case and therefore, the matter be closed forthwith under Section 26(2) of the Act. Consequently, no case for grant for relief as sought under Section 33 of the Act arises and the same is disposed of accordingly.
-
2024 (11) TMI 947
Unlawful seizure of shares and the monopolization of the cable TV network business in Chhattisgarh by the Opposite Parties - contravention of Sections 3 and 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 - HELD THAT:- As regards contravention of Section 3 of the Act, the Commission notes that the provisions of Section 3(1) of the Act read with Section 3(3) thereof have no manner of application in the factual matrix of the present case as Section 3(3) of the Act requires two or more enterprises engaged in identical or similar trade of goods or provision of services and even if they are not engaged in identical trade, they must be presumed to be part of an agreement if they participate or intend to participate in furthering such an agreement. Looking at the relationship among OPs and the facts and circumstances of the case, as detailed above, it is evident that provisions of Section 3(3) of the Act are not applicable.
Further, the Commission is of the view that, for the applicability of Section 4 of the Act and the examination of contravention thereof, it may be axiomatic to define a relevant market and assess the dominance of the entity alleged to be abusing its dominant position in such market.
However, considering the facts and circumstances of the case and having regard to the abuses as alleged, the Commission does not find it imperative to define a precise relevant market in the instant matter. Furthermore, the Commission notes that the Informants have alleged violation of Section 4 of the Act against all the OPs. The Commission observes that it is a settled position that the provisions of the Act do not provide for inquiry into the cases of joint/collective dominance. Accordingly, no case of contravention under Section 4 of the Act has been established.
The Commission notes that for the aforesaid reasons, it is unnecessary to delve deeper into the allegations. While the grievances raised by the Informant may give rise to a dispute, however, the Commission is not the right forum for adjudication of the same.
The Commission is of the opinion, prima facie, no case of contravention of provisions of Section 3 and Section 4 of the Act is made out and accordingly, the Information filed against OPs is directed to be closed forthwith in terms of the provisions of Section 26(2) of the Act - no case for grant of relief(s) as sought under Section 33 of the Act arises and the prayer for the same is also rejected.
-
2024 (11) TMI 946
Contravention of the provisions of Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 - hospital specializing in infertility care through misleading statements on social media - HELD THAT:- Upon perusal of the Information, it appears that the primary grievance of the Informant is that the Opposite Party through Dr. Raju Nair, has made certain misleading statements/mis-information about the cost of IVF and fertility treatments on its You Tube channel against hospitals offering affordable treatment for infertility care. These statements are alleged to be detrimental to a competitive market and would prejudice market players who are willing to offer quality treatment at an affordable rate. This conduct has been alleged to be in abuse of dominant position by the Opposite Party in contravention of provisions of Section 4 of the Act.
As per the Information available in public domain, it appears that Informant is running a hospital which offers services including infertility treatments such as IVF; pediatrics, laparoscopy (Endoscopy); obstetrics & gynaecology; orthopaedics treatment etc. However, the allegations that the Opposite Party is allegedly spreading mis- information/mis-statements about the cost of such treatment do not fall within the ambit of the Competition Act, 2002.
The Commission is of the view that there is no prima-facie case of contravention of provisions of the Act warranting an investigation into the matter - the Information is directed to be closed forthwith in terms of Section 26(2) of the Act. Consequently, no case arises for grant for relief(s) as sought under Section 33 of the Act.
-
2024 (11) TMI 945
Jurisdiction of the Competition Commission of India (CCI) in the matter - Contravention of the provisions of Section 4(2)(a)(ii) and 4(2)(c) of the Act by National Internet Exchange of India - it is submitted that the Informant has erroneously delineated the relevant market as the same is misconceived, baseless and incomplete - concealment of previous litigation by the Informant - erroneous delineation of the relevant market - whether there is any issue involved in the present matter which may oust the jurisdiction of the Commission or may merit invocation of Section 21A in the present proceedings?
HELD THAT:- The Commission observes that the obligation to comply with the provisions of the Act and maintain fair competition in the market is independent of the obligation to comply with the provisions of TRAI Act/Regulations, and violation of one need not ipso facto result in violation of the other. The Commission is, inter alia, entrusted with the duty of eliminating practices having an adverse effect on competition, to promote and sustain competition in markets, to protect the consumers and to ensure freedom of trade carried on by other participants in the market. As a sectoral regulator, the TRAI may formulate and enforce obligations through appropriate code of conduct for the entities operating in the telecom sector, keeping in view its sector-specific objectives. However, compliance with the TRAI regulatory framework remains independent of the possibility of any practice of an entity operating in the telecom sector falling afoul of the provisions of the Act.
The OP’s submission that the entity’s existence stems from sectoral regulator’s recommendations and thus, it is within the domain of TRAI and not Commission’s, does not hold water.
It will be erroneous to interpret the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bharti Airtel case [2018 (12) TMI 1683 - SUPREME COURT] to mean that in every case of overlap of jurisdiction with a sectoral regulator, the Commission will have to withhold taking action and await examination by the sectoral regulator. This would render the object and purpose of the Competition Act, 2002, nugatory. The law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Bharti Airtel case was specific to the peculiar facts of that case. A universal application of the law laid down on those particular facts cannot be inferred and implied in all cases where the Commission is exercising its jurisdiction in sectors which are also regulated by a sectoral regulator.
It is clear that the allegations involved in the present matter are determinable within the legal mandate given to the Commission. Thus, the Commission does not find any merit in the preliminary objection regarding lack of jurisdiction in the matter. Further, seeking opinion of any statutory authority such as TRAI under the provisions of Section 21A of the Act is the prerogative of the Commission and may be exercised in appropriate cases, as deemed fit by the Commission.
The Commission notes that the Informant has alleged contravention of provisions of Section 4 of the Act. In this regard, the Commission notes that the Informant has delineated (in Information) relevant market as provision of ‘internet exchange services for peering between content providers, CDNs and ISPs in towns/cities in India in which CDNs/content providers are not present/do not have their data centres’ - considering the homogeneous nature of services throughout India provided by the parties in the matter, the Commission deems it appropriate to delineate relevant market as ‘provision of internet exchange services in India’.
Based on the data provided by the OP, it appears that in terms of volume of traffic and number of connected networks, the Informant has significant presence vis-à-vis OP in abovementioned six cities. The Commission also notes that despite the OP being the oldest IX provider and the much later entry of the Informant in the market, the Informant has been able to increase its relative presence in the relevant market which suggests that the relevant market remains contestable - Thus, from the data available on record and the facts and circumstances present in the matter, the Commission is of the view that dominance of the OP is not getting established. Accordingly, the Commission is not inclined to delve further into the matter.
The Commission is of the view that the OP does not appear to be dominant in the aforesaid delineated relevant market and consequently, there is no competition concern arising in the present matter. Therefore, the matter is directed to be closed forthwith under Section 26(2) of the Act.
The Secretary is directed to communicate the decision of the Commission to the parties, accordingly.
-
2024 (11) TMI 944
Cartelization in respect of procurement of medicines by ESIC - contravention of provisions of Section 3(3) of Competition Act, 2002 - HELD THAT:- The Commission observes that there are numerous medicines and medical/healthcare products which are procured by ESIC and other government bodies. The Informant has not provided details of tenders/ medicines/ parties involved in the alleged conduct. Apart from making bald allegations, the Informant has not placed on record any cogent material to enable the Commission to examine the matter. Rather, the Informant failed to provide the requisite information in spite of being accorded two opportunities.
The Commission finds that no prima facie case of contravention of the provisions of Section 3(3) of the Act is made out against any of the OPs in the instant matter. Accordingly, the information is ordered to be closed forthwith in terms of the provisions contained in Section 26(2) of the Act. Consequently, no case for grant for relief(s) as sought under Section 33 of the Act arises and the said request is rejected.
-
2024 (11) TMI 943
Contravention of provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 - abuse of dominant position by the OPs - OPs have a monopoly in respect of provision of logistic services including cold storage facilities and movement of goods at the Visakhapatnam Port - HELD THAT:- The Commission has perused the Information and observed that the Informant appears to be aggrieved by the following conduct of the OP i.e. the lease agreement being camouflaged as a ‘Leave and License Agreement’ for the purpose of avoiding stamp duty and registration charges to the State exchequer; enforcing the ‘lock-in-period’ clause in the Leave and License Agreement and refusal by the OPs to adjust the rental arrears against the security deposit; repeated threats to forfeit the security deposit and restricting access of Informant's staff to the cold storage plant and threatening to switch off the power supply to the cold storage plant.
The Commission observes that the Informant entered into Leave and License Agreement with OP-1 for a period of 5 years for a portion of the cold storage plant with a lease rent of INR 17,38,800/- per month and on payment of security deposit of a sum of INR 52,16,400/- (equivalent to 3 month’s rent). The said agreement also contains a clause pertaining to a ‘lock-in-period’ of 18 months from the date of taking possession of the cold storage plant during which the said agreement cannot be generally terminated unless there is a breach of the terms and conditions of the said agreement.
The Commission notes that the alleged conduct of OPs of the lease agreement camouflaged as a ‘Leave and License Agreement’ for the purpose of avoiding stamp duty and registration charges to the State exchequer is not a competition issue and does not fall within the four corners of the Competition Act, 2002 - The alleged actions do not appear to give rise to competition concerns as envisaged within the provisions of the Competition Act, 2002.
The Commission is of the view that there is no prima-facie case of contravention of provisions of the Act warranting an investigation into the matter - the Information is ordered to be closed forthwith in terms of Section 26(2) of the Act. Consequently, no case for grant for relief(s) as sought under Section 33 of the Act arises.
-
2024 (11) TMI 942
Abuse of dominance and anti-competitive practices in violation of the provisions of Competition Act, 2002 - HELD THAT:- From the facts of the present case, the Commission observes that alleged disparate disputes raised in the Information appear to be individual/contractual disputes regarding alleged mis-representation/ mis-selling/ deficiency in service against various OPs and do not involve competition concerns as such. Further, no material has been provided by the Informant to indicate violation of any provision of the Act.
The nature of disputes raised in the matter do not fall under the ambit of the Act and for redressal of the said grievances, remedy(ies), if any, may lie before an appropriate forum, in accordance with law.
The Commission is of the considered view that no prima facie case of contravention of provisions of the Act is made out against any of the OPs in the present matter and decides to close the matter forthwith in terms of the provisions of Section 26(2) of the Act.
-
2024 (11) TMI 941
Contravention of provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of Competition Act, 2002 - abuse of dominant position - HELD THAT:- The Commission has perused the Information, including legal notices served by the Informant upon OP-1 and OP-2 and also their respective replies. The Informant appears to be primarily aggrieved by: (i) arbitrary change in delivery time of the car from two months to eight months; (ii) pick and choose policy in delivery of the car; (iii) unlawful demand of premium by DSAs; (iv) imposition of RPM; and (v) forcing customers to purchase accessories. The Informant has alleged that OP-1 has a dominant position in the relevant market of ‘strong hybrid passenger vehicles in the territory of India’ and has violated provisions of Sections 4(2)(a)(ii) and 4(2)(c) of the Act.
The Commission is of the view that the primary issue in the matter appears to be revolving around the waiting period in delivery of the car booked by the Informant and prices of accessories. The Commission notes that such kind of allegations bear the tone and tenor of inter se dispute between Informant and OP1/ OP2 and does not have market-wide anti-competitive ramifications, in the facts and circumstances of the instant matter. Normally, long waiting period cannot be the subject matter of antitrust scrutiny as they are dependent upon various factors including reasons adduced by the OP1 - As regard price, the Commission is of the view that the same is an outcome of demand and supply forces in the market and consumer preferences, among others. In the present case, the Informant has failed to highlight whether such prices have overtone of being ‘unfair’ or ‘discriminatory’ in terms of the provisions of the Act. Accordingly, the allegations levelled above do not reveal any anti-competitive concern and consequently, the Commission finds no reason to carry out an analysis of abuse of dominant position by the Opposite Parties.
The allegation pertaining to RPM i.e., Section 3(4) of the Act requires the existence of an agreement amongst enterprises or persons at different stages or levels of the production chain in different markets in respect of production, supply, distribution, storage, sale or price of, or trade in goods or provision of services which causes or is likely to cause AAEC in India. The Commission notes that the Informant has not substantiated his allegation of RPM by way of any evidence to show the existence of any such agreement.
Thus, no prima facie case of contravention of the provisions of Section 3 or 4 of the Act is made out against the Opposite Parties and the Commission directs that the matter be closed forthwith under Section 26(2) of the Act. Consequently, no case for grant of relief(s) as sought under Section 33 of the Act arises.
-
2024 (11) TMI 940
Contravention of provisions of Section 4 of Competition Act, 2002 - abuse of dominant position - it is alleged that Google is granting exclusive access to Truecaller to share private contact information of the users with everyone while prohibiting other apps from doing the same - HELD THAT:- The Commission has perused the rival submissions of the Informant and Google. Based on the experiment run by the Informant, it appears that users have voluntarily provided the contact details data to Truecaller. Therefore, the allegations of the Informant that Truecaller is engaging in ‘unauthorised publishing’ or that Google has allowed any preferential access to Truecaller do not appear to be substantiated.
The Commission is of the view that the allegation of the Informant remains unsubstantiated and despite sufficient opportunity, the Informant has not provided any evidence to prima facie establish that Google is according either preferential treatment to Truecaller or resorting to discriminatory practises by allowing access to user’s contact data to Truecaller while denying the same to the competing applications.
The Commission finds that no prima facie case of contravention of the provisions of Section 4 of the Act is made out against Google in the instant matter. Accordingly, the Information is ordered to be closed forthwith in terms of the provisions contained in Section 26(2) of the Act. Consequently, no case for grant for relief(s) as sought under Section 33 of the Act arises and the said request is also rejected.
........
|