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FEMA - Case Laws
Showing 421 to 440 of 854 Records
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2013 (2) TMI 201 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Order of preventive detention - writ to release of the detenue by quashing detention orders - intelligence unit contraband fake noteswere recovered from the baggage carried by the detenue - Held that:- When a passport of the detenu was retained with the Customs department, the likelihood of the detenu indulging in the smuggling activities was foreclosed. Impounding the passport of the detenu was enough to curb the potentiality of the smuggling, and therefore there was no justification to pass order of preventive detention when there was no chance of the detenu travelling to foreign country without passport.
As decided in Rekha vs. State of Tamil Nadu [ 2011 (4) TMI 1217 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA] if the ordinary law of the land (the Penal Code and other penal statutes) can deal with a situation, recourse to a preventive detention law will be illegal. Principle emanating from the frame work of the Constitution of India assuring personal liberty and giving fundamental rights to each citizen of India is that the order of the preventive detention being exceptional measure by way of social defence ought to be used with great deal of care and circumspection.
Applying the principle to the case on hand it is concluded that the impugned order of preventive detention passed in the present case is faulty, caution less and unsustainable Preventive detention orders quashed.
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2013 (2) TMI 39 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Breach of principles of natural justice - non providing of cross-examine of the persons whose statements have been supplied - petitioners were charged with contravention of the provisions of Section 42 of the FEMA - Held that:- Neither the provisions of FEMA i.e., Section 16 which requires a reasonable opportunity to be given to the party against whom a complaint is instituted or the Adjudication Rules, in particular Rule 4 (5), oblige the adjudicating authority to grant as of right the opportunity to the noticees to cross-examine the persons who may have given statements explaining a transaction. The provisions of Section 16 of the FEMA and Rule 4 of the Adjudication Rules do not explicitly advert to this aspect, therefore, much would depend on the discretion of the adjudicating authority as he progress with the enquiry. See M/s. Kanungo and Company Vs. Collector of Customs and Others [1972 (2) TMI 35 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA]
On a fair reading of the statute and the Rules suggests that there is no duty of disclosure of all the documents in possession of the Adjudicating Authority before forming an opinion that an inquiry is required to be held into the alleged contraventions by a noticee. Even the principles of natural justice and concept of fairness do not require the statute and the Rules to be so read. Any other interpretation may result in defeat of the very object of the Act. Concept of fairness is not a one way street. The principles of natural justice are not intended to operate as roadblocks to obstruct statutory inquiries. Duty of adequate disclosure is only an additional procedural safeguard in order to ensure the attainment of the fairness and it has its own limitations. The extent of its applicability depends upon the statutory framework.Thus at this stage, it cannot be stated that mere denial of the request for cross-examination has led to breach of principles of natural justice and thus, warranting an intercession by this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
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2013 (1) TMI 776 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e matter was adjourned for today. Today also, the petitioner is not present and has deputed a counsel to appear on his behalf. Considering the adjournments given earlier and the Status Report in terms of the order of the Court having been filed, we do not deem it appropriate to adjourn the matter. We have perused the Status Report filed by the respondent. The Status Report would show that only few irregularities mentioned therein were found and those irregularities are not serious enough at this stage to warrant a criminal investigation. The report further shows that during inspection, no documentary proof in the record of the Association was found to show the use of the fund in any such political activity or in IAC Movement or agitation. Considering the fact that writ petition has already been disposed of on 30.05.2012 and a Status Report in compliance of the said order has also been filed, we see no good reason to keep this matter pending. The matter is accordingly closed.
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2013 (1) TMI 392 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Failure to comply with the summons issued u/s 37 - investigations being carried out against him for violation of the provisions section 13 of the FEMA - action of revocation of passport of the petitioner under section 10(3)(c) of the Passports Act, 1967 - Held that:- The DOE investigation had revealed that the petitioner as the Chairman of the Governing Council of the IPL of the Board of Control for Cricket in India (in short BCCI), had committed gross irregularities in the conduct of the IPL tournaments, leading to fraudulent activities in violation of FEMA, had led to the siphoning of funds to the extent of hundreds of crores of rupees, which apparently he was suspected to have parked outside India.
In response to the first summon, issued on 02.08.2010, as replied by petitioner vide communication dated 07.08.2010, delivered on 09.08.2010, that there was an apprehension of threat to the petitioner's life. The concerned authority not being convinced, sought further details, from the petitioner vide communication dated 13.08.2010. It is at this stage that the petitioner referred to the threat assessment made by the Mumbai Police, with regard to the petitioner's safety, and the provision made for his security, while he was in Mumbai. The concerned authority, not being persuaded, by the material supplied and the reasons put forth, issued a second summon to the petitioner under Section 37 on 24.08.2010, requiring the petitioner to appear before him, on 07.09.2010. Admittedly, the petitioner did not appear before the concerned authority, and trotted out the same reasons, i.e., threat to his life. It is at this stage that a complaint under Section 16(3) of the FEMA was filed, on 16.09.2010. Notice in this complaint was issued on 20.09.2010.
The DOE, in the background issued a communication to the APO as received by him on 05.10.2010, to take action for revocation of the petitioner's passport under Section 10(3)(c) of the Passports Act who in turn sought an explanation as to why, action ought not to be initiated under Section 10(3)(c) of the Passports Act. Admittedly, the petitioner did not present himself either in response to the summons issued by the DOE nor in response to the show cause notice dated 15.10.2010. Replies were filed, however, on behalf of the petitioner on 12.10.2010, followed by several other communications demanding the material on the basis on which the passport authorities were proceeding to take action in the matter.
Thus by virtue of the impugned order, the passport authority, came to the conclusion that the reply did not answer the main charge made against the petitioner, which is, his failure to present himself in person, in response to the summons issued under Section 37 of FEMA. The copies of the summons issued under Section 37 of FEMA, and the complaint filed under Section 16(1) of FEMA were admittedly available with the petitioner. Therefore, the action of the RPO under the Passport Act, which invested upon him, amongst others, the power to impound/ revoke the passport, was clearly within the scope of the show cause notice dated 15.10.2010.
Briefly perusing the provisions of clauses (a) to (h) of Sub-Section 3 of Section 10 of the Passport Act provides for various eventualities under which a passport authority has been invested with the power to impound or cause to be impounded or revoke a passport or a travel document. Some of these powers pertain to circumstances which require either direct determination by the passport authorities of the fact situation and / or require the passport authority to seek or receive inputs from other statutory authorities with regard to the eventuality referred to the clause in issue. Therefore, having regard to the fact that the APO received information on 04.10.2010, which was actionable, provided the necessary jurisdictional facts to exercise power under Section 10(3)(c) of the Passports Act.
Section 131 of the Income Tax Act, which is a precursor to Section 132 of the Income Tax Act, empowers an Income Tax Officer, and thus by implication an officer of the DOE, to enforce the attendance of the persons who have violated the provisions of the Income Tax Act, and by necessary implication the provisions of FEMA, and are therefore necessarily the noticees in the said proceedings. The statute quite clearly, thus empowers the officers of the DOE exercising powers under Section 37 to take recourse to the provisions of Section 32 of the CPC, even against the noticee, like the petitioner, and not just the witnesses - The right to have interminable hearings, as demanded by the petitioner, cannot be a ground to lay challenge to the impugned order on the ground of breach of principles of natural justice.
Argument that show cause notice was issued by one authority i.e., the APO while the impugned order dated 03.03.2011 was passed by the another i.e., the RPO hence breached the principles of natural justice is misconceived as it is seen that against item no. 7A(a) of Schedule I the RPO (Mumbai) is also described as a passport authority alongwith the APO. Therefore, it is not as if the RPO does not have the necessary power invested in him in Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. This is not a case where a hearing was held by the APO and the impugned order was passed by the RPO. This is a case where show cause notices were issued by the APO, while hearing in the matter was held by a superior officer, i.e., the RPO. Therefore, this argument is also not tenable.
Argument that the relevant material which formed the basis for issuing the show cause notice was not supplied is also not quite correct as APO vide letter dated 01.11.2010, admittedly had given extracts of the material, which was supplied by the DOE to him. The receipt of the said letter is not denied by the petitioner. It is also not denied by the petitioner that he was made available the complaint filed by the DOE under Section 16(3) of FEMA. The petitioner was well aware of the charge against him and the material which formed the basis of the charge, and therefore, cannot be heard to plead that he had not been supplied with the requisite material to answer the charge.
Argument of no right was given to cross-examine officers of DOE, is also untenable as that there is no inalienable right to cross-examine, it is not unknown to law that proceedings can be decided based on documents, especially documents which form the basis of the decision are not in dispute. And while the petitioner chooses to keep himself from his investigators, he seeks to subject his investigators to cross-examination, a request if granted would really turn the situation on its head.
Thus as the petitioner has refused to surrender the passport, therefore, in the absence of the passport being available with the authorities concerned, the only order which could have been passed in the given circumstances was of revocation. For the reasons given hereinabove, no merit in the petition - Writ dismissed.
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2013 (1) TMI 374 - HIGH COURT BOMBAY
Penalty imposed upon the partners of firm - Whether Tribunal was justified in deleting the penalty imposed upon the partners of the firm on the ground that the penalty against the firm has been confirmed - Held that:- Following the decision in case of Overseas Textiles Corporation (2012 (9) TMI 388 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT) that in absence of lapses/negligence/mala fides on the partners of the firm in realizing the export proceeds, imposition of penalty, against the partners is unjustified especially when the penalty imposed against the firm has been confirmed - In favour of assessee
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2013 (1) TMI 128 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Condonation of delay – 166 days - Period of limitation - Section 35 Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 - Section 5 of the Limitation Act – Order VIII Rule 1 CPC - Appellant is a resident outside Delhi and has limited means - Arrange necessary funds for the purpose of filing the appeal - Due to shifting of the Advocate’s office, the file of the writ petition could not be traced - Some delay in tracing out the file - Held that:- Following the decision in case of Kailash Versus Nanhku & Ors.(2005 (4) TMI 542 - SUPREME COURT) that the right of appeal is a substantive right whereas the law of limitation is a procedural law and thus the procedural law cannot override the substantive right. If there is sufficient cause for condoning the delay, this Court will exercise its powers and ensure that substantive justice is assured to the parties.
The grounds taken for condonation of delay are that after the dismissal of the writ petition, the Petitioner had to arrange for funds and thereafter file of the writ petition got misplaced in the office of the counsel. It may be noted that the Appellant was pursuing his remedies with due diligence as immediately after the order of the Tribunal dated 2nd February, 2007 he filed a writ petition before the High Court of Gujarat in May, 2007 and on the return of the said petition for want of territorial jurisdiction a writ petition was filed before this Court on 29th September, 2007. Thus, a party who has been all through pursuing his remedies cannot be non-suited on the count that the period of limitation prescribed under Section 35 of the FEMA is mandatory. Hence delay condoned. In favour of assessee
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2013 (1) TMI 58 - JHARKHAND HIGH COURT
Whether High Court, exercising the power u/s 407 of Cr.P.C. read with Article 227 and 235 of the Constitution of India is competent to take decision that cases under FERA/FEMA shall be tried by a Special Judge – Whether State Government has absolutely jurisdiction to authorize Special Judge to try cases under FERA Act 1973 - Petitioner argued that there was no necessity to transfer the case, filed under FERA before C.J.M., to the Special Judge –
Held that:- Having perused Section 407 Cr.P.C. and Article 227 and 235, I have no hesitation to hold that this Court either in the administration side or in the judicial side has absolute jurisdiction to transfer any criminal cases pending before the one competent court to be heard and decide by another court within the jurisdiction of this Court.
This Court has absolute jurisdiction in administration side as well as in judicial side to transfer any pending criminal case from one competent court to another competent court, therefore, merely because impugned notification dated 17.05.2002 got to be issued pursuant to the decision of Full court dated 25.04.2002 shall have no adverse effect on the jurisdiction of Special Judge hearing the Fodder Scam cases to try the present criminal complaint under the FERA. In favour of respondent
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2012 (12) TMI 1176 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed to delay the proceedings and initiated the proceedings one after another and even subsequently filed three petitions challenging the order of detention dated 11.06.1976 though the Special Civil Application No. 3716 of 1995 was dismissed. As stated hereinabove, even though the proceedings under the SAFEMA have been initiated as far as back in the year 1977 because of various proceedings initiated by the appellants one after another, the proceedings under the SAFEMA are not permitted to reach to its conclusion even after a period of 35 years. Under the circumstances, present Letters Patent Appeal is dismissed with aforesaid cost. Cost to be deposited with the Registry within four weeks from today and on such deposit the same be transmitted to Gujarat High Court Legal Aid Committee. CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 4547 OF 1997 In view of dismissal of main Letters Patent Appeal, no order is required to be passed in Civil Application No. 4547 of 1997 and same is disposed of accordingly.
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2012 (12) TMI 590 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Remittance out of India without having imported any goods on the basis of the forged bogus documents. - allegation based on statement - held that:- the Adjudicating authority has in her order very clearly rerecorded as a fact that there is no retraction on record. In case, there has been any retraction the appellant would have challenged the same and produced the retraction before the Tribunal or called upon the respondents to produce the retraction which according to him was in possession of the respondent. However, no such exercise or even an attempt to the same appears to have been carried out before the Tribunal.
Order of tribunal directing the appellant to pre deposit 50% of the penalty amount i.e. Rs. 25 lacs out of Rs. 50 lacs imposed by the Adjudicating authority sustained.
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2012 (12) TMI 557 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Whether the Tribunal was justified in directing the appellant to deposit 50% of the penalty Rs. 35 lacs imposed by the Adjudicating Authority for the purposes of hearing the appellant's appeal under the Foreign Exchange Regulation 1973 ('FERA 1973') on merits? - held that:- The emphasis before the Tribunal on the part of the appellant appears to have been financial hardship and for that purpose had filed an affidavit contending that he is in no position to deposit the penalty amount and in support thereof contends that he is even not an Income Tax assesee. This is difficult to accept in the light of the appellant's contention that he was an independent person and was carrying on import business on his own and in that regard had remitted and amount of US$ 29,91,100/- during the period January to April 1991 on his own.
The order of the Tribunal dated 25/1/2008 directing the appellant to deposit 50% of the penalty amount i.e. Rs.17.50lacs out of Rs.35lacs imposed upon him is reasonable.
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2012 (12) TMI 396 - SUPREME COURT
Master Circular on Wilful Defaulters - dis-closer of information by the Bank to RBI - Foreign Exchange Management (Foreign Exchange Derivative Contracts) Regulations, 2000 - held that:- no force in the submission that any information relating to a party who has defaulted in payment of its dues under derivative transactions cannot be disclosed by a bank to the RBI or any other bank because of an implied contract between the bank and its customer or by Section 45E of the 1934 Act. Sections 45C and 45E of the 1934 Act.
Information relating to a party who has defaulted in payment of its dues under derivative transactions to the bank is credit information within the meaning of Section 45A(c)(v) of the 1934 Act. Sub- section (1) of Section 45C of the 1934 Act provides that the RBI may at any time direct any banking company to submit to it such statements relating to such credit information and in such form and within such time as may be specified by the RBI from time to time. Hence, information relating to a party, who has defaulted in payment of its dues under derivative transactions being credit information may be called for from the banking company by the RBI under sub-section (1) of Section 45C of the 1934 Act.
No force in the submission that the Master Circular has penal consequences and, therefore, has to be literally and strictly construed.
Constitutional right of a person under Article 19(1)(g) - held that: - No challenge was made by the writ petitioners before the Bombay High Court to the constitutionality of the Master Circular and the challenge by the writ petitioners before the Calcutta High Court was to the constitutionality of only Paragraph 3 of the Master Circular relating to the Grievance Redressal Mechanism. Hence, we are not called upon to decide in these appeals whether the Master Circular violates the right of a person under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.
Master Circular covers not only wilful defaults of dues by a borrower to the bank but also covers wilful defaults of dues by a client of the bank under other banking transactions such as bank guarantees and derivative transactions.
Wilful defaults of parties of dues under a derivative transaction with a bank are covered by the Master Circular and this we hold not because the RBI wants us to take this view, because this is our judicial interpretation of the Master Circular.
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2012 (11) TMI 971 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Whether appeals before the Tribunal against the order of the adjudicating authority had to be treated by the Tribunal under the provisions of FERA or FEMA – Held that:- Order has been passed in the adjudication proceeding on 11th October, 2007 under the FERA after cognizance had been taken under the provisions of FERA. In view of this, the correctness, legality and proprietary of the order passed by the adjudicating authority has to be challenged in continuation of the proceeding under the FERA and has to be adjudicated under the provisions of FERA - cognizance having been taken within the sunset period and the adjudication proceeding carried out under the provisions of FERA, substantive provisions of FERA would alone be applicable - appeal filed before it was to be governed under the provisions of FERA
Whether Tribunal has power to condone the delay beyond the period of 90 days - provisions of Section 35 of the Central Excise Act - Held that:- Provision of law stipulates a period of 60 days for filing an appeal; under the proviso another 30 days can be added to this period; the delay in filing the appeal can be condoned after the expiry of the 60 days yet the period of delay could not be condoned beyond 90 days - there is a complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act - Tribunal has no power to condone the delay beyond the period of 90 days while dealing appeals under the FERA - appeals are dismissed
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2012 (11) TMI 921 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Writ petition – maintainability of appeal – penalty under Section 13 (1) of the FEMA - contravention of the provisions under Section 6 (3)(j) of the Act – alleged that petitioners offered personal guarantee for a loan amount of US$ 13.5 Million to a resident outside India without obtaining prior permission from the Reserve Bank of India – Held that:- Liability of the appellant is not created under any common law principle but, it is clearly a statutory liability and for which the statutory remedy is an appeal under Section 35 of FEMA, subject to the limitations contained therein - writ jurisdiction under Article 226 should not have been invoked without availing the alternative remedy provided under Section 128 and 129A of the Customs Act for the reason that the appellate authority under the statute is vested with the power to appreciate the factual aspects and the petitioner can very well establish his right before the said authority - in fiscal matters, there should not be short-circuiting of the statutory remedies- writ petition is not maintainable and accordingly, the same is dismissed
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2012 (11) TMI 879 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Waiver of pre-deposit – undue hardship – alleged that said to have received an amount from persons working in Kuwait in contravention of Section 9(1)(b) and are also said to have made payments in contravention of Section 9(1)(d) of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 – Held that:- For a hardship to be undue it must be shown that the particular burden to observe or perform the requirement is out of proportion to the nature of the requirement itself, and the benefit which the applicant would derive from compliance with it. - The word undue adds something more than just hardship. It means an excessive hardship or a hardship greater than the circumstances warrant.
The other aspect relates to imposition of conditions to safeguard the realisation of penalty. This is an aspect which the Tribunal has to bring into focus. It is for the Tribunal to impose such conditions as are deemed proper to safeguard the realisation of penalty. Therefore, the Tribunal while dealing with the application has to consider materials to be placed by the assessee relating to undue hardship and also to stipulate conditions as required to safeguard the realisation of penalty.
Undue hardship As per Section 50 of FERA, the penalty shall be upto five times of the alleged violation.
Even though the alleged contravention by the appellant is to the extent of more than Rs.5 Crores, the adjudicating authority/Additional Commissioner imposed only a penalty of Rs.1.25 Crores. The Appellate Tribunal has directed the appellant to deposit 5% of the penalty amount - there is no improper exercise of discretion to entertain this appeal. It cannot be said that the impugned order has caused undue hardship to the appellant warranting interference with the order
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2012 (11) TMI 831 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Pre-arrest bail – Purchase of land by Non resident - Violation of provisions of FEMA (Foreign Exchange Management Act) - William Singh Sandhu is a citizen of United States of America and is not an Indian citizen. There are restrictions in law on his right to purchase agricultural land in India. He has purchased agricultural land in India by giving the address of Gurvinder Singh as his address. William Singh Sandhu has already been arrested in the case and is said to have been released on regular bail. - While Gurvinder Singh is the attorney of the vendor who has no grouse in the matter, the other petitioner is the attesting witness of the sale deed - custodial interrogation of the petitioners is required in this case - case is based on documentary evidence for its proof. When William Singh Sandhu, the main accused has already been arrested and released on bail, the petitioners appear to be entitled to pre-arrest bail - interim anticipatory bail to petitioner allowed
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2012 (11) TMI 784 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Money transactions - whether offence under FEMA is made out or not – Held that:- Investigation is still at the initial stage, the FIR cannot be quashed at the threshold - allegations in the FIR itself are to the effect that the petitioner is indulging in hawala money transactions remitting the money from foreign country through illegal channels - Court cannot comment on the merits of the case at this stage without there being any clarification and the evidence on of record - no ground is made out at this stage for quashing of the impugned FIR.
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2012 (10) TMI 1186 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he date of commencement of the FEMA Act. The FEMA Act has come into force with effect from 1-6-2002 and since notice of the alleged contravention by the petitioner has been taken on 25-5- 2002 as asserted in the impugned order dated 8-9-2004 the proceedings initiated against the petitioner do not prima facie appear to be barred by the period of limitation specified in Section 49(3) of the Act. In any event we do not wish to record any conclusive decision on this point of the bar of limitation. The order (original) dated 8-9-2004 impugned herein. is admitted to have been served on the petitioner on 24-7-2012. The petitioner has an appellate remedy before the Appellate Tribunal, under Section 19 of the FEMA Act. In the totality of the facts and circumstances, we are of the considered view that the petitioner should be relegated to pursue the appellate remedy. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed with liberty to pursue the available statutory appellate remedies. No costs.
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2012 (10) TMI 506 - SUPREME COURT
SAFEMA - notice in respect of illegal flat to assessee and his wife holding 50 per cent share in the subject property - whether appellants who purchased the subject flat during pendency of forfeiture proceedings are entitled to an opportunity to prove that they are transferees in good faith for adequate consideration ? - Held that:- Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 (SAFEMA) came into effect from 05.11.1975 provides for forfeiture of illegally acquired properties of smugglers and foreign exchange manipulators. Where the competent authority is satisfied that some of the properties referred to in the show-cause notice are illegally acquired it shall declare that such property shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, stand forfeited to the Central Government free from all encumbrances. Section 8 provides that burden of proving that property specified in the notice served under Section 6 is not illegally acquired property shall be on the person affected.
Admittedly, SAFEMA was applicable to both vendors here. One of the vendors, a detenu, who was covered by Section 2(2)(b), was issued notice way back on 8.12.2003 under Section 6(1) of SAFEMA. The other vendor, wife of the detenu, was also issued notice under Section 6(1) in 2004 once it transpired that she held 50% share in the said flat. Both vendors were served with notices under Section 6(1) before transaction of sale in favour of the appellants. After the issuance of notices under Section 6(1) of SAFEMA to the vendors, the transaction of sale in favour of the appellants has to be ignored by virtue of Section 11 and on passing of the order of forfeiture under Section 7, the sale in favour of the appellants had become null and void. The order of forfeiture dated 23.06.2005 under Section 7 of SAFEMA relates back to the issuance of first notice under Section 6(1) to one of the vendors.
In respect of a transfer after issuance of notice under Section 6, the property referred to therein, the holder cannot set up plea that he is a transferee in good faith or a bona fide purchaser for adequate consideration. Such plea is not available to a transferee who has purchased the property during pendency of forfeiture proceedings - the protection given to a bona fide sale under Section 2(2)(e) would not extend to a sale made subsequent to the issuance of notice under Section 6 and in violation of Section 11 of SAFEMA. The title in the subject flat is deemed to have vested in the Central Government on or about 08.12.2003 when the first notice under Section 6(1) was issued and served on one of the vendors. The vendors ceased to have any title in the subject flat on the date of transfer i.e. 10.02.2005. They had no transferable right. The appellants cannot claim any right in the flat.
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2012 (10) TMI 197 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
FEMA - Writ petition - provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act for recovery of the amount - search in the house of the petitioner as per the provisions of Section 37 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 on 8-10-1993 - Tribunal directed the petitioner to deposit the penalty amount which is the pre-deposit - petitioner was unable to comply with the said order and ultimately, the second respondent has dismissed the appeal on 17-7-2007 - After dismissal of the appeal nearly 2˝ years, at the instance of the Department, the third respondent Tahsildar has initiated proceedings under the provisions of Revenue Recovery Act to recover the amount and that has been challenged by the petitioner on the ground that the same is opposed to the principles enunciated under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act - Held that:- It is certainly not open to the petitioner to quash the validity of such order of the Appellate Tribunal especially when the third respondent has proceeded to recover the amount under the Revenue Recovery Act - Tribunal’s order was on 17-3-2007 and the petitioner has chosen to challenge the same only in the year 2010 without resorting to the remedy of appeal to the High Court within 60 days and therefore, this writ petition is liable to be dismissed - writ petition fails and the same is dismissed
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2012 (10) TMI 44 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Interest on the seized foreign currency - applicability of Rule 8 – Held that:- Interest at the rate of 6% per annum under Rule 8 could have been awarded to the respondent on the seized Indian currency only - writ petition in the nature of enforcement of a civil liability that is claim for interest in the nature of compensation for wrongful retention of money is not maintainable. It is not as if payment of interest under Rule 8 (ii) was mandatory (as under Rule 8(i)) and which could be enforced by way of a writ petition - judgment awarding interest under Rule 8(i) qua Indian currency also can thus not be sustained
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