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2024 (1) TMI 628
Dishonour of Cheque - Seeking waiver of deposit of 20% amount of compensation - whether there exist exceptional circumstances to exempt the petitioner from depositing the 20% of the fine, as directed by the learned Trial Court by way of order on sentence, during the pendency of Criminal Appeal filed by the petitioner against his conviction under Section 138 of NI Act? - HELD THAT:- This Court notes that in the application filed before the learned Sessions Court by the petitioner under Section 148 of NI Act seeking waiver of deposit of 20% of fine amount, only two circumstances were raised before the learned Sessions Court, which were claimed as exceptional in nature. The first exceptional circumstance was the pendency of petition filed by the petitioner under the Provincial Insolvency Act, and the second exceptional circumstance was the medical condition of the petitioner. Before this Court, one additional circumstance has been claimed as exceptional i.e. the pendency of consumer complaints filed by the complainant before the NCDRC against the insurance company, allegedly seeking the same amount as the amount in question in the present case.
This Court also notes that in the impugned order dated 20.01.2020, though the learned Sessions Court has dealt with the argument regarding pendency of insolvency petition, it has not given any finding on the second exceptional circumstance i.e. the medical condition of the petitioner. However, it also appears from the perusal of impugned order that the arguments in this regard were not addressed before the learned Sessions Court by the counsel for petitioner, though this ground was mentioned in the application filed under Section 148 of NI Act.
This Court is of the opinion that the present case be remanded back to the learned Sessions Court/Appellate Court for deciding afresh, as to whether the three exceptional circumstances being raised by the petitioner herein fall within the category of exceptional circumstances so as to warrant waiver of condition to deposit 20% of fine amount during the pendency of appeal against conviction under Section 138 of NI Act. The petitioner shall also be at liberty to bring any other exceptional circumstance to the notice of the learned Sessions Court.
The present petition alongwith pending application is disposed of.
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2024 (1) TMI 438
Dishonour of Cheque - rejecting the petitioner's prayer under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for recalling of Prosecution Witness No. 1.
The Learned Metropolitan Magistrate concerned was pleased to reject the said application on the ground that by allowing the said application the petitioner herein could not be permitted to fill up the lacuna of the prosecution case to the disadvantage of the accused person in the said case, being the opposite party no. 2 herein.
HELD THAT:- In the present case, the documents sought to be brought on record by the petitioner by way of additional evidence are documents “essential” and thus relevant for arriving at a just decision in the case. The prayer under Section 311 Cr.P.C. has been made in this case as soon as the documents were made available to the petitioner and the same are essential to aid in the discovery of truth. The documents in this case are necessary only with the object of proper proof of relevant facts in order to meet the requirement of justice. The reason for not being able to bring the present materials on record at the relevant stage has been satisfactorily explained and as such the Trial Court should have allowed the prayer under Section 311 Cr.P.C., considering the materials on record, while carrying out its function of administration of criminal justice to meet the ends of justice.
The accused/opposite party herein shall have ample opportunity and the liberty to counter the materials to be brought on record by the petitioner.
The object underlying Section 311 of the Code is that there may not be failure of justice on account of mistake of either party in bringing the valuable evidence on record or leaving ambiguity in the statements of the witnesses examined from either side - In the present case, the documents sought to be brought on record are essential for arriving at a just decision and as such is to be allowed for the ends of justice.
Revision allowed.
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2024 (1) TMI 77
Cheating - petitioner company had not only syphoned the money from the banks but have also not paid the cane dues to the farmers, who had supplied the sugar cane to the petitioner-Company - Validity of impugned communication - direction to respondent no.1, State Bank of India to convene a meeting of the Joint Lenders’ Forum forthwith, in order to finalize the Settlement Proceedings, in accordance with the provisions of the RBI Circular dated 07.06.2019.
HELD THAT:- The RBI guidelines are absolutely clear that, if a fraud is committed by the unscrupulous borrower by removal of stocks/hypothecating and disposing of the stocks, inflating the value in the stock statement and drawing excess bank finance, diversion of funds outside the borrowing unit and also due to managerial failure leading to the unit becoming sick and due to laxity in effective supervision, the banks have to report to the CBI. The instant case clearly falls under the ambit of Clause 3.2.1 and 3.2.4 where the unscrupulous borrower enjoy credit facilities under valuable banking arrangement after defrauding one of the financial banks continue to enjoy facilities of other financial banks and in some cases availed even higher limit at those banks.
As per the RBI Guidelines it is mandatory for the banks before approval of the loan to carry out a proper due diligence, credit appraisal, to consider the risk report and follow all the norms laid down. It is clearly apparent from the way the loans were sanctioned and disbursed that the banks have failed to carry out regulatory compliances. Even adequate security was not taken before disbursing the loans. A number of loans were given on the personal guarantee of two promoters, whose net-worth was far less than the loans taken by them from the banks.
It is surprising that none of the banks while sanctioning or disbursing the funds have ever checked the background of the petitioner-company. The petitioner-company was already defaulting and was NPA in the other banks but still the other banks went ahead with sanctioning huge amount of loan to the petitioner without any proper collateral security or documentation.
This is a case, which shocks conscience of the Court as to how few of the bank officers in connivance of the petitioner had advanced almost Rs.900 crores, of public money and had allowed the petitioner to syphon away the funds and did nothing but were the mute spectators when the entire fund was syphoned off. Even after the entire amount was syphoned off, the banks did not take any effective steps to recover the said amount - The RBI Circular dated 01.07.2009 mandates all the banks for classification and reporting of fraud. The said Circular does not provide any exemption or relaxation to the banks not to report regarding fraud committed by unscrupulous borrowers. Even, Clause-6 of the Circular also mandates all the Public Sector Banks to report to the Fraud Cell of CBI in cases of fraud involving more than Rs.5 crores.
In case, the CBI finds that there is a case of money laundering as per the provisions of Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 they may also refer the matter to the Enforcement Directorate and take help to recover the said amount - It is further directed that the petitioner will join the investigation and cooperate with the investigation team and if they do not do so, it is open for the investigation agency to proceed against the petitioner in accordance with law. The authorities should endeavour to find out the money trail, where it has been syphoned off and parked.
Petition disposed off.
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2024 (1) TMI 3
Dishonour of Cheque - acquittal of accused - accused failed to make the payment despite the receipt of the notice - presumption of consideration under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act - burden lies upon the accused to rebut the presumption - HELD THAT:- The complainant filed an application to prove the Income Tax Returns submitted by him. The return for the year 2009-2010 was submitted on 16.03.2010 as per the endorsement made on the acknowledgement. He had filed the complaint on 11.03.2010, hence, the Income Tax Return came into existence after filing of the complaint during its pendency - The application has been filed under Section 311 of Cr.P.C. however, the application is in the nature of additional evidence to prove the additional record mainly the Income Tax Return and will properly fall within the definition of Section 391 of Cr.P.C.
It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in ASHOK TSHERING BHUTIA VERSUS STATE OF SIKKIM [2011 (2) TMI 1539 - SUPREME COURT] that the power to receive additional evidence must be exercised sparingly in those cases where the Court is satisfied that additional evidence would serve the interest of justice.
Since no plausible reason has been assigned for not producing the additional evidence before the learned Trial court; therefore, it is impermissible to lead the additional evidence in the appeal. Consequently, the present application fails and the same is dismissed.
The complainant did not examine these persons. Thus, the learned Trial Court had rightly doubted the financial capacity of the complainant and had rightly held that the presumption contained in Section 139 of the Negotiable Instrument Act was rebutted. This was a reasonable view taken by the learned Trial Court - the submission that the learned Trial Court had wrongly held that the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act was rebutted is not acceptable.
The judgment passed by the learned Trial Court was a reasonable one and no interference is required with the same - the present appeal fails and the same is dismissed.
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2024 (1) TMI 2
Dishonour of Cheque - need of new evidence - evidence sought to be led in under Section 311 is noted by the Court for a just decision of a case or not - HELD THAT:- The exercise of the widest discretionary power under Section 311 Code of Criminal Procedure should ensure that the judgment should not be rendered on inchoate, inconclusive speculative presentation of facts, as thereby the ends of justice would be defeated - The exercise of power under Section 311 Code of Criminal Procedure should be resorted to only with the object of finding out the truth or obtaining proper proof for such facts, which will lead to a just and correct decision of the case.
The power under Section 311 Code of Criminal Procedure must therefore, be invoked by the Court only in order to meet the ends of justice for strong and valid reasons and the same must be exercised with care, caution and circumspection. The Court should bear in mind that fair trial entails the interest of the accused, the victim and the society and, therefore, the grant of fair and proper opportunities to the persons concerned, must be ensured being a constitutional goal, as well as a human right.” - In present case, Trial Court, after going through statement Ex. DW-3/A and after taking into consideration evidence before it, including Ex.DW-3/A, and considering the rival contentions of the parties, concluded that it appeared to be just and important to allow the application for adjudication of the complaint and, therefore, after recording that though application was filed at a belated stage, in the interest of justice, allowed the application with further order to compensate the complainant with costs of ₹ 1,000/-.
The Trial Magistrate has not committed any irregularity, illegality or perversity in the impugned order, and, therefore, it is not a fit case to exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. - complainant-petitioner has failed to make out a case to rebut the satisfaction recorded by the Trial Magistrate with respect to necessity of allowing the application for just decision of the case.
The present petition is dismissed and disposed of.
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2024 (1) TMI 1
Dishonour of Cheque - acquitted of the charges - vicarious liability of Managing Director for the offence committed by the company - HELD THAT:- In the case on hand, the 1st accused-company owed amount to the complainant/1st respondent. Admittedly the revision petitioner was the Managing Director of that company and he issued that cheque in his capacity as its Managing Director. When the company is found not guilty of the offence alleged, the Managing Director cannot be held vicariously liable for the offence committed by the company. No appeal or revision has seen preferred by the complainant/1st respondent against the acquittal of the 1st accused-company. So, that verdict has become final. So much so, the revision petitioner Managing Director cannot be held liable as the company was acquitted, finding that no offence was committed by the company. The revision petitioner in his personal capacity did not owe any amount to the complainant/ 1st respondent and Ext.P2 cheque was issued not towards discharge of any personal liability of the revision petitioner.
The liability of persons referred to in Section 141 of the N.I Act is coextensive with that of the company, firm or association of individuals, in a prosecution under Section 138 of the N.I Act. When it is found that the company has not committed the offence, and it is acquitted, its directors are not liable to be convicted, for the offence for which the company has been acquitted.
The finding of the appellate court that, the revision petitioner/2nd accused has committed an offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I Act in spite of acquittal of the 1st accused-company, is liable to be set aside - the impugned judgment is set aside and the revision petitioner is found not guilty of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I Act and he is acquitted.
Revision petition allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1236
Recovery of dues - priority over charges - whether the different departments of the State including Excise and Revenue will have priority over the secured creditors’ debt? - HELD THAT:- It would be evident from the replies filed by the respondents that they have nowhere disputed the lien of the State Bank of India as per Section 26 D noted and entered in the CERSAI (Annexure P-2), dated 06.03.2013, which clearly establishes the fact that the petitioner-Bank is not only a secured creditor but has created the first charge over the property in question as far as back in the year, 2013. Whereas the charge of respondents No. 1 and 2 had been created and reflected in revenue record vide rapat No. 459, dated 09.07.2015 and that of respondent No. 3 only vide Rapat No. 173, dated 05.02.2018.
Once the petitioner is a secured creditor and has moreover created the first charge over the property, then obviously, it has the first right to realise its dues and this question is no longer res integra in view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Punjab National Bank Vs. Union of India & Ors. [2022 (2) TMI 1171 - SUPREME COURT].
The legal position has thereafter been reiterated in a recent judgment of this Court in Mankind Life Sciences Private Limited vs. The State of Himachal Pradesh & Anr., [2023 (10) TMI 867 - HIMACHAL PRADESH HIGH COURT], wherein it was held [2022 (2) TMI 1171 - SUPREME COURT].
This Court is left with no other option, but to allow the instant petition by directing respondents to remove the red entry qua the property in question made in the revenue record i.e. Rapat No. 459, dated 09.07.2015 and Rapat No. 173, dated 05.02.2018 forthwith.
The instant petition is allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1235
Dishonour of Cheque - rebuttal of presumption - main reason asserted both for dislodging execution of Ext.P1 and lack of consideration is that the similarity of handwriting in it with that in Ext.X1. PW1 has no case that Ext.P1 was in the handwriting of the petitioner - HELD THAT:- The petitioner did not adduce any evidence. It is true that in order to rebut the presumption in respect of a cheque, the accused can rely on the evidence and materials submitted by the complainant. The only thing is that the accused must be able to substantiate his case by preponderance of probabilities. The case set up by the petitioner during the cross-examination of PWs.1 to 3 and also in his answers to the question put to him under Section 313(1)(b) of the Code is that the cheque was issued as a security in respect of the transactions between himself and the 1st respondent - Lack of signature of PW1 in two pages of Ext.P6 does not assume much importance since its execution is proved by the evidence of PW3 and it is in favour of the 1st respondent. It was after considering the aforesaid evidence in detail the courts below concurrently held that the petitioner failed to rebut the presumption available under Section 139 of the N.I. Act in respect of Ext.P1.
The power of revision under Section 401 of the Code is not wide and exhaustive. The High Court in the exercise of the powers of revision cannot re-appreciate evidence to come to a different conclusion, but its consideration of the evidence is confined to find out the legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. When the findings rendered by the courts below are well supported by evidence on record and cannot be said to be perverse in any way, the High Court is not expected to interfere with the concurrent findings by the courts below while exercising revisional jurisdiction.
This Court is not expected to substitute the concurrent finding of the court below with a different view unless such findings are perverse and against the evidence - the revision lacks merits and liable to be dismissed - the revision petition is dismissed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1203
Dishonour of Cheque - restoration of complaint - whether the negligence either on the part of the petitioner or his counsel in prosecution of the complaint can be a ground for not restoring the complaint? - HELD THAT:- The present complaint pertains to cheques total amounting to Rs.89,00,000/- which were dishonoured due to insufficient funds. There is no dispute by the respondent regarding the fact that the said cheques were signed and issued by him and also regarding the dishonour of the cheques on the ground 'Funds Insufficient'. The petitioner is stated to be a qualified doctor. The petitioner was under the impression that he would be adequately represented by his previous counsel. The various orders passed by the trial court are reflecting that the petitioner and his counsel were not diligent in the prosecution of the complaint. However, mere negligence either on the part of the petitioner or his counsel in prosecution of the complaint should not be a ground for not restoring the complaint. The petitioner cannot be allowed to be suffer due to the negligence of his previous counsel.
The impugned order dated 07.12.2016 passed by the trial court is set aside - the complaint is ordered to be restored to its original number before the trial court subject to the cost of Rs.25,000/- to be paid by the petitioner to the respondent on the next date of hearing before the trial court.
The petitioner and the respondent are directed to appear in person before the trial court on 15.01.2024 at 2:30 p.m. for further directions.
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2023 (12) TMI 1202
Dishonour of Cheque - discharge of legal liability or not - Society is not a body corporate - applicability of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act - HELD THAT:- Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act deals with the liability of the Company and provides that where the offence is committed by a Company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the Company for the conduct of its business as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the commission of the offence. It is apparent from the bare perusal of the provisions that in the case of a Company, the Company as well as the office bearers are liable. Hence, the company is primarily liable and the office bearers are vicariously liable.
It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in ANEETA HADA VERSUS GODFATHER TRAVELS & TOURS (P.) LTD. [2012 (5) TMI 83 - SUPREME COURT] that it is not permissible to prosecute the Directors in the absence of the Company - in view of the binding precedents of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the submission that the prosecution of the Company is necessary before prosecuting its office bearers has to be accepted as correct.
It is an admitted position that the Himalayan Mahila Avam Jan Kalyan Sansthan is registered under the Societies Registration Act. Section 14 of the H.P. Societies Registration Act provides that every Society shall be a body corporate by the name under which it is registered having perpetual succession and a common seal - This Section specifically provides that the Society shall be a body; hence, the submission that the Society is not a body corporate is not acceptable.
The complainant could not have filed a complaint against the petitioner and respondent no. 3 without impleading the Company to an accused. The prosecution of the petitioner in the absence of the Company is bad - the complaint titled Mukesh Kumar vs Anjana Kumari and another quashed qua the petitioner pending before the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sarkaghat against the petitioner and the consequent proceedings arising out of the same are ordered to be quashed qua the petitioner.
Petition allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1056
Dishonour of Cheque - punishment to accused with jail sentence which may be extended to two years or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque or with both - HELD THAT:- It appears that under section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, there is a specific provision that court has empowered to punish the accused with jail sentence which may be extended to two years or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque or with both.
In view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex court in Surinder Singh Deswal [2019 (5) TMI 1626 - SUPREME COURT], the first appellate court is conferred with the power to direct the applicant to deposit such amount pending appeal which shall be minimum 20% of fine or compensation awarded by the trial court.
The impugned order dated 19.1.2023 passed by the first appellate court appears to be just and proper which does not suffer from any illegality or irregularity - this criminal revision petition is accordingly dismissed by affirming the order passed by the first appellate court. The applicant is directed to deposit the said amount before the trial court within a period of one month from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order.
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2023 (12) TMI 1055
Dishonour of Cheque - compounding of offence - CIRP proceedings have been initiated against the Accused company and its directors - whether the present case is an appropriate case where the consent of non-applicant no.2 for compounding the offence, could be ignored? - HELD THAT:- In the present case, the complaint has been filed on 29.03.2018, the summons is said to have been issued in April, 2018. Advocates appeared through counsel. On 11.12.2018 the applicants have filed an application seeking compounding of offence. Demand draft of the entire amount of cheque was also annexed. Strictly speaking, the applicants have not filed the application on 1st or 2nd hearing of the case but have filed the same on third hearing of the case which can be said to be an initial stage. This application has been filed in response to the summons issued by the Court making it clear that if the applicants would make an application for compounding of offence at the first or second hearing of the case, the compounding may be allowed.
The non-applicant no.2, thus, appears to have raised his claim for recovery of the amount on 03.01.2018 before the IRP. Admissible recovery, whether of Rs.3 crores or otherwise, will be considered before the IRP and in terms of the provisions of the IBC Code, 2016. In the circumstances, to not offer consent on the ground that the applicants owe dues to the non-applicant no.2 to the tune of Rs. 3 crores is, in my considered opinion, an abuse of process of law and, therefore, by invoking the jurisdiction u/s 482 of the Code, this attempt will have to be and stands nipped down.
Whether it will be permissible for six accused (the present applicants) out of twelve, to seek compounding of offence? - HELD THAT:- The applicants have referred to the judgment of the Allahabad High Court, in the case of GAGAN PAL SINGH AHUJA AND ORS VERSUS STATE OF U.P. AND ORS. [2023 (5) TMI 1280 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT], which was required to consider whether piecemeal compromise and compounding thereof is permissible and it was held that the scope and ambit of Section 482 Cr.P.C. is in much wider than that of Section 320 of Cr.P.C.
The non-applicant is getting adequate compensation. In the circumstances, having given my thoughtful consideration to the attending circumstances, the request to compound the offence will have to be allowed.
The present case appears to be a fit case where powers under Section 482 of the Code must be exercised, considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case - criminal application allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 948
Dishonour of Cheque - present complaint was filed without appreciating that the petitioner was not responsible for the conduct of the business of the Company at the relevant time - complaint does not contain any specific allegation against the petitioner to attract sections 138 and 141 of the NI Act - violation of principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- Section 141 of the NI Act provides for a constructive liability which is created by a legal fiction. Section 141 of the NI Act being a penal provision should receive strict construction and compliance. If the accused played insignificant role in the affairs of the company, it may not be sufficient to attract the constructive liability under section 141 of the NI Act. The petitioner is claiming that he was appointed as the Regional Sales Manager in the accused no. 1 with effect from 01.10.2015 vide offer letter dated 28.05.2015 at a monthly salary of Rs. 50,000/-. The accused nos. 2 and 3 are the first director of the accused no. 1 as per Memorandum of Association.
If the petitioner was not responsible for affairs of the accused no. 1 despite being promoted as Additional Director of the accused no. 1, it can only be established and proved in accordance with law during the trial of the complaint under section 138 of NI Act. The petitioner has not placed or submitted any document which can reflect that the petitioner has never participated in conduct of business of the accused no. 1. The petitioner cannot be absolved from his liability qua the cheques in question by merely pleading that he was not responsible for day to day affairs and conduct of the business of the accused no. 1. The arguments advanced by the counsel for the petitioner are without any legal support.
The present complaint cannot be dismissed qua the petitioner. The present petition alongwith pending application is accordingly dismissed.
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2023 (12) TMI 947
Dishonour of Cheque - Insufficient Funds - legality of judgment of acquittal - existence of legally enforceable debt or not - accused had issued the cheque in discharge of the liability of Surinder Singh and the learned Trial Court erred in ignoring this position - HELD THAT:- The absence of any agreement will not make the case of the complainant doubtful - the cross-examination of the complainant or his witness was insufficient to rebut the presumption and it was duly proved on record that the accused had issued a cheque in discharge of his liability. Learned Trial Court erred in holding otherwise.
Hem Chand (CW-1) stated that the cheque(Exhibit C-1) was deposited with the bank. The cheque was dishonoured due to insufficient funds. He admitted in his cross-examination that the account of the accused was closed. It is apparent from the statement of this witness that the cheque was dishonoured due to insufficient funds, was not challenged in the cross-examination and has to be accepted as correct.
Testimony of this witness will not make the case of the complainant suspect because the cheque was drawn on Oriental Bank of Commerce and the official of the said bank specifically stated that the cheque was dishonoured due to insufficient funds. Therefore, the next requirement that a cheque was dishonoured due to insufficient funds has been duly established - The complainant stated that he issued the legal notice (Ext. C-3) asking the accused to make the payment within 15 days. Postal receipts (C-4 and C-5) and acknowledgement (C-6) corroborates his testimony. The acknowledgement shows that the registered cover was returned after delivery; therefore, it is duly proved that legal notice was duly served.
It was duly proved that the cheque was issued in discharge of the legal liability, which was dishonoured due to insufficient funds and the accused had not made the payment despite receipt of a valid notice of demand - the complainant has proved all the ingredients for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
The learned Trial Court did not consider the presumption attached to the cheque and the suggestions made to the complainant and his witnesses. It had taken a view which could not have been taken by any reasonable person. The judgment of the learned Trial Court proceeds in ignorance of the settled position of law and the same is liable to be interfered with even in an appeal against the acquittal.
The present appeal is allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 946
Seeking immediate action in furtherance to the lock and seal notice and demolish the unauthorised construction of the building - HELD THAT:- When the matter is taken up for hearing, the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Chennai Corporation/3rd respondent would state that the building in question is now under lock and seal and to settle scores between the parties, they have to approach the appropriate Forum.
Seeking to contribute funds for completing the construction of the unfinished apartments and also to compensate the home buyers for the inordinate delay in completion of the construction and for other reliefs - HELD THAT:- It has been stated that though M/s. Vasavi Builders /25th respondent herein is a partnership firm, most of the financial transactions of Vasavi Builders with that of the Home Buyers were exercised in the Account of M/s.Vasavi Housing and Infrastructure Limited. Further, Section 60(3) of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 clearly states that any case relating to the Corporate Debtor pending in any Court or Tribunal shall be transferred to the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT Chennai) dealing with the Insolvency Resolution Process or Liquidation Proceedings of such Corporate debtor. In the present case, the connected proceedings are pending before National Company Law Tribunal, therefore, any further action can be settled before NCLT.
Petition closed.
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2023 (12) TMI 945
Professional misconduct - power of High Court to revise an order passed by the Council under Section 22 A of the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 - HELD THAT:- A reading of the case of RADHEY SHYAM & ANR & JAGDISH PRASAD VERSUS CHHABI NATH & ORS & IQBAL KAUR & ORS [2015 (7) TMI 376 - SUPREME COURT] would to a conclusion that all Courts and Tribunals which are functioning in the territorial jurisdiction of this Court are subordinate to it. The control and working of the Subordinate Court while exercising their statutory appellate or revisional authority are subject to the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Despite the curtailment of the power of this Court to revise an order pursuant to the amendment to Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure under Act 46 of 1999, the power of this Court to exercise superintendence and control over courts and tribunals and exercise revisional jurisdiction continues to be recognised by virtue of Article 227 of Constitution of India. Being a Constitutional Court, the power is inherent, as it were.
An adjudication implies that there is a lis before the Court of Tribunal and the Tribunal decides the same after hearing both the parties. The mere fact that the parties are heard does not make a body - a Tribunal. Principles of natural justice have grown to such an extent that even without a body being a Tribunal, it has been called upon to comply with the principles of natural justice. The basis of this principle is attributed to the Act of the Almighty. God did not punish Adam, banishing him from Paradise, without hearing him. If principles of natural justice applies to Almighty, all the more it applies to his frail creatures. Therefore, the test is not whether the parties are heard and examined, but, whether there is a transfer of judicial power from the State to a body and that body is clothed with the power of adjudication of a lis.
In case on hand, a professional misconduct not being a lis, the Board of Discipline cannot be held to be a Tribunal within the meaning of Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Consequently, it is not amenable to my revisional jurisdiction. Therefore, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed as not maintainable.
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2023 (12) TMI 896
Dishonour of Cheque - existence of debt/liability or not - rebuttal of presumption - it is argued that the cheques in question were stolen by the appellant and even signatures over the same are forged - HELD THAT:- In order to rebut the presumption, it was incumbent upon the accused to bring on record such facts and circumstances, upon consideration of which, the Court may either believe that consideration and debt did not exist or their non-existence was so probable that a prudent man would, under the circumstances of the case, act upon the plea that they did not exist. As already stated, nothing has been brought on record to rebut the presumption by the respondent No. 1. There is absolutely nothing in the evidence of respondent No. 1 to infer, even remotely, that neither the amount in question was lent by the appellant nor had she issued any cheques in discharge of the said debt. The reason for which respondent No. 1 is said to have borrowed the amount from the appellant viz. ailment of her husband (blood cancer) and the training of her daughter as an Air Hostess, she could have adduced some evidence in order to bolster the said aspect, which she did not. Respondent No. 1 also could have relied on the presumption of fact, for instance, those mentioned in section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act to rebut the presumptions under section 118 and 139 of the N.I. Act.
The statutory notice, complaint and evidence of the respective parties, if juxtaposed, would unerringly point out the fact that the respondent No. 1 did borrow an amount of Rs. 3,00,000/- from the appellant and issued cheques in question in discharge of a debt. Defences as raised by respondent No. 1 are unacceptable and unbelievable. Respondent No. 1 had failed to discharge the said onus.
A bare look at Section 269-SS of the Income Tax Act would reveal that the said bar is applicable to a person who accepts deposit by way of cash and not to a person who makes or offers any money to the payee and, therefore, even if the said bar is made applicable to the present case, the same shall apply to respondent No. 1 who had accepted the amount of Rs. 3,00,000/- from the appellant by way of cash for which punishment is contemplated under Section 271 of the Income Tax Act - It is thus clear that no person should accept any loan or deposit of a sum of Rs. 20,000/- or more otherwise than by an account payee cheque or account payee bank draft. The provision does not say that a person cannot advance more than Rs. 20,000/in cash to another person. Restriction on cash advances was, in fact, on the taker and not on the person who makes an advance. The penalty for taking such advance or deposit in contravention of provisions of Section 269-SS was to be suffered by the taker who accepts the advance.
The learned Magistrate had rendered the judgment in most cryptic and perfunctory manner, in the sense, neither the facts have been clearly stated nor the evidence has been properly discussed. The learned Magistrate has also misinterpreted and misread the legal position as envisaged not only under sections 138 and 139 of the N.I. Act but also the provisions of Section 269-SS of the Income Tax Act. The learned Magistrate has failed to appreciate vital admissions in the cross-examination of the appellant as well as D.W.2 – Moulik Shah in it’s correct perspective which have been elicited at the time of recording evidence - the findings arrived at by the Court below are patently illegal and perverse and, therefore, need to be set aside.
Appeal allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 837
Challenge to order directing the removal of the name of the Petitioner from the Register of Members maintained by the ICAI for a period of nine months - challenge to order passed by the Disciplinary Committee of the ICAI holding the Petitioner guilty of Professional Misconduct under the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 - violation of principles of natural justice or not.
The only argument, raised before the Appellate Authority was that the punishment imposed on the Petitioner is disproportionate to the misconduct committed by him and more so because the entire money has been returned back to the Society.
HELD THAT:- Material on record indicates that proper notices have been given to the Petitioner and the procedure as laid down in the Conduct Rules has been followed. The prima facie opinion of the Disciplinary Directorate, along with all the relied on documents were forwarded to the Petitioner and the Petitioner has been given full opportunity to defend his case. There is nothing on record which discloses that the Petitioner had asked for cross examination of witnesses and, in the absence of any material, this Court is not inclined to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the correct procedure had not been followed - Though it has been stated in the present Writ Petition that the composition of the members of the Committee changed, the same was not objected to in the hearing. In fact, the material on record discloses that the Petitioner was explicitly asked if he had any objections and the Petitioner did not raise any objection to the change in the composition of the Committee.
It is well settled that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Courts, while interfering with the decision of Disciplinary Committee, must only look into the decision-making process and not the decision as such. If the decision-making process is fair, then Writ Courts must not interfere with the findings of a Disciplinary Committee. In the instant case, the Petitioner has not been able to demonstrate as to how the procedure adopted by the Disciplinary Committee is not reasonable or fair or is violative of the principles of natural justice.
The Petitioner is guilty of a very serious misconduct that has the ability to shake the faith of persons in the profession of Chartered Accountancy and the larger Institute of Chartered Accounts. The Appellate Authority has been considerably lenient on the Petitioner by reducing the period of punishment from one year to nine months. This Court is of the opinion that no further reduction in the quantum of punishment is necessary.
Keeping in mind the seriousness of allegations against the Petitioner which have been proved in the proceedings, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the judgment passed by the Appellate Authority - Writ petition is dismissed.
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2023 (12) TMI 836
Dishonour of Cheque - time limit for payment of fine or compensation awarded - power of High Court to extend the time under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. - HELD THAT:- Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act provides that in an appeal by the drawer against conviction under Section 138, the Appellate Court may order the appellant to deposit such sum which shall be a minimum of twenty per cent of the fine or compensation awarded by the Trial Court. This amount shall be deposited within sixty days from the date of the order, or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the appellant.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Suridner Singh Deshwal vs Virender Gandhi & another [2019 (5) TMI 1626 - SUPREME COURT], that Section 148 of the N.I.Act was introduced to avoid the delaying tactics of the drawers due to easy filing of an appeal and obtaining the stay of the proceedings. This was frustrating the very purpose of enactment of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881; therefore, the Parliament decided to provide that 20% amount shall be deposited by the appellant.
In the present case, the words of the statutes are clear that the amounts shall be deposited within 60 days or within such further time not exceeding 30 days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown. These words are capable of only one interpretation that an initial time of 60 days can be granted which can be extended by 30 days on sufficient cause being shown. There is no ambiguity in the words of the statute, hence, the plain words are to be given effect - In the present case, the mischief was delay by the drawer in the payment of the compensation by filing an appeal; hence the interpretation to avoid the delay has to be preferred. By considering the provision as mandatory the mischief would be avoided whereas by considering the provision as directory the mischief will be perpetuated and the purpose of enacting the provision would be defeated.
It was submitted that provision of Section 148 of the N.I. Act, 1881 binds the Appellate Court and not this Court. This Court has inherent power vested under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to pass any order to do substantial justice. This submission cannot be accepted. Substantial justice has to be rendered to both the parties, namely, the complainant and the accused. The Court cannot do justice to the accused and injustice to the complainant. When the legislature has enacted a provision to ensure that the complainant should promptly get at least some of the amount, the Court cannot circumvent the intention of the legislature by holding that the time can be extended by the High Court.
Thus it is not permissible to exercise the power conferred under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to defeat the provisions of the law and extend the time beyond the period of 90 days. Doing so will amount to encroachment in the field of the legislation, which is impermissible - the submission that the power can be exercised to extend the time beyond that prescribed by the legislature is not acceptable.
Therefore, the learned First Appellate Court had rightly held that it had no power to extend the time beyond 90 days and this Court does not have the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to extend the time granted by the legislature under Section 148(2) of N.I.Act - Petition dismissed.
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2023 (12) TMI 670
Dishonour of Cheque - validity of judgement of acquittal - examination of evidence of DW1 and DW2 which is in the form of affidavit - application filed under Section 391 of Cr.P.C - HELD THAT:- The appellate Court has accepted the defence set up by the accused and acquitted the accused. The evidence of DW1 and DW2 which is in the form of affidavit instead of examination-in-chief is not permissible under law, the same cannot be looked into. However, the appellate Court has not observed the same and passed the impugned judgment of acquittal which is not sustainable under law. On these grounds, it is just and proper to remand the case to the trial Court with a direction to provide an opportunity to the accused to adduce his evidence in accordance with law.
Application filed under Section 391 of Cr.P.C - HELD THAT:- In the affidavit of the complainant he has stated that the appellate Court has allowed the appeal filed by the respondent solely on the ground that the report of the handwriting expert is not proved in accordance with law. In order to prove that particular handwriting expert report, the complainant has not examined the handwriting expert. As a matter of abundant caution, without prejudice to the appeal filed by the appellant before this Court for the purpose of proving the report of handwriting expert, the complainant had filed this present application - The respondent has not filed any objection to this application.
Considering the facts and circumstances of the case since, this Court has opined that the trial Court has committed an error in receiving the defence evidence by way of affidavit, it is just and proper to provide an opportunity to the complainant to examine the handwriting expert as sought for in this application.
Appeal allowed.
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