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- 1951 (5) TMI 9 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ..... belief in principles if you apply them to cases with which you have no sympathy at all.'' and as Mr. Justice Holmes of the United States Supreme Court said, speaking of the American Constitution, "If there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought--not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate.." I respectfully dissent from the majority view and consider that section 11 (1) is ultra vires. It follows, in my view, that the present detentions are bad. I am of opinion that the petitioners in these cases are entitled to immediate release. Petitions dismissed. Agent for the petitioner in Petition No. 303 Subrahman- yam. Agent for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos. 618, 619, 621,622 and 624 to 631 V.P.K. Nambiyar. Agent for the State of Madras P.A. Mehta. Agent for the State of Assam Naunit Lal. Agent for the Union of India P.A. Mehta.
- 1951 (5) TMI 5 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ..... ria Stevedoring and General Contracting Co. v. Dignan, 46 C.L.R. 73 at p. 99) that "it may be considered that the exigencies which must be dealt with under the defence powers are so many, so great and so urgent and so much the proper concern of the executive that from its very nature the power appears by necessary intendment to authorise delegation otherwise generally forbidden by the legislature." It may be mentioned here that the decision in In re Gray(57 S.C.R. 150.) was sought t6 be distinguished in a subsequent Canadian case on the ground that in case of emergency it was possible to pass legislation of this sort by taking recourse to the residuary powers conferred on the Dominion Parliament by section 91 of the North America Act (Vide-Credit Froncier v. Ross, (1987) 3 D.L.R. 365. (4) 1919 A.C. 935). In point of time, the case of In re The Initiative and Referendum Act(4) comes immediately after that of In re Gray(1). The dispute in this case related to an Act.
- 1951 (5) TMI 3 - SUPREME COURT
Whether there are sufficient grounds for declaring the whole Act [the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 (Bombay Act No. XXV of 1949)] to be invalid? Held that:- It is quite clear that the provisions held to be invalid are not inextricably bound up with the remaining provisions of the Act, and it is difficult to hold that the legislature would not have enacted the Act at all without including that part which is found to be ultra vires. The Act still remains substantially the Act as it was passed, i.e., an Act amending and consolidating the law relating to the promotion and enforcement of the policy of prohibition and also the Abkari law in the Province of Bombay. In the result, the following provisions of the Act declared only to be invalid :-- (1) Clause (c) of section 12, so far as it affects the possession of liquid medicinal and toilet prep....... + More
- 1951 (5) TMI 2 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the decrees were passed in "a suit to which this Act applies."? Whether the respondent as sub-mortgagee is an assignee within the meaning of sub-section (5) of section 36? Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The reference to the sub-mortgage containing an assignment of all the rights of the mortgagee must, in that context, be understood with reference to the sufficiency of the right assigned to enable the sub-mortgagee to sue the original mortgagor in his own right, so as to bring the relevant provisions of the Act into play as between them. The reservation made by their Lordships in the case of a sub-mortgage containing only a charge on the original mortgage is significant and supports this view
- 1951 (4) TMI 25 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ..... that the award was made without any jurisdiction. A question may be raised that as the hearing of the general issues before the Tribunal commenced at a time when Mr. Aiyar was absent and he had not the opportunity of being present all through the proceedings when arguments of both sides were advanced, there has been an irregularity or illegality in the procedure which vitiates the whole award. A decision on this point would require investigation of various matters which have not been placed before us at the present stage by the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants Banks; and I would refrain from expressing any opinion upon it. My conclusion is that the award dated the 31st of July is not void by reason of any lack of jurisdiction in the Tribunal which made it. I am, however, of the opinion that the other awards which were made during the absence of Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar or which were not signed by him must be held to be without jurisdiction. Awards declared void.
- 1951 (4) TMI 24 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ..... ls on which the detention order was made." It was further said "Ordinarily, the 'grounds' in the sense of conclusions drawn by the authorities will indicate the kind of prejudicial act the detenu is suspected of being engaged in and that will be sufficient to enable him to make a representation setting out his innocent activities to dispel the suspicion against him." This envisages cases in which that would not be enough. It is therefore sufficient for me to say that in a case of this kind, where the matter has to turn on the facts and circumstances of each case, no useful purpose can be served by examining the facts of some other case for use as an analogy. In my opinion, on the facts and circumstances of the present cases, the grounds supplied were insufficient and the gist of the offending passages should have been supplied. The omission to do so invalidates the detention and each of the detenus is entitled to immediate release. Petitions dismissed.
- 1951 (3) TMI 48 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ..... the returnable date the appellant contended that the sanction of the Central Government was void because it was not given by the Government of the State. On the decision going against him he appealed to the High Court and to the Privy Council. The appellant's contention having thus failed, the Magistrate proceeded with the trial on the 26th of November, 1949. The only question which is now presented for our decision therefore is whether there was any sanction granted by the Government before the Magistrate took cognizance of the offence and issued the notice under section 190 of the Criminal Procedure Code on the 25th March, 1949. To that the clear answer is that the Government had given its sanction for the prosecution of the appellant before that date. It seems to us therefore that the appellant's contention that the Magistrate had to take cognizance of the offences without the previous sanction of the Government is untenable and the appeal fails. Appeal dismissed.
- 1951 (3) TMI 36 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ..... exercised, when it is invoked by a private complainant against an order of acquittal, against which the Government has a right of appeal under section 417. It could be exercised only in exceptional cases where the interests of public justice require interference for the correction of a manifest illegality, or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. This jurisdiction is not ordinarily invoked or used merely because the lower court has taken a wrong view of the law or misappreciated the evidence on record. As already pointed out, there has been no such error in the present case; on the other hand, it seems to us that on both the previous occasions, the Chief Presidency Magistrate was right in holding that the accused was not guilty of any offence under sections 25 and 26 of the Indian Merchant Shipping Act. The order of the High Court is set aside and that of the Chief Presidency Magistrate is restored. The accused will stand acquitted of the charge. Order set aside.
- 1951 (3) TMI 30 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ..... rial being with- out jurisdiction, and a further point in his favour is that the fatal blow on which the charge of murder is based, is not attributed to him but to another person and no definite overt acts are ascribed to him. We have no doubt that these facts will receive due consideration at the hands of the executive authorities. As the points involved in the petitions for special leave to appeal to this Court against the order of the High Court refusing to grant relief under article 226 of the Constitution are the same as those involved in the petitions under article 32, all the six petitions are dismissed. It may however be observed that in this case we have not con- sidered it necessary to decide whether an application under article 32 is maintainable after a similar application under article 226 is dismissed by the High Court, and we reserve our opinion on that question. Petitions dismissed. Agent for the petitioners 1. N. Shroff. Agent for the respondents P.A. Mehta.
- 1951 (3) TMI 27 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ..... nce in equal shares. The District Judge was obviously wrong when he decreed the plaintiff's suit even with reference to the lands in Kadduwal conceded to be non-ancestral and the land in Khasra No. 2408 measuring 4 bighas and 16 biswas, which was not in the possession of the two sons Jodha Singh and Jai Singh. He was equally wrong in holding that the customary law which governed the parties did not permit the owner to will away any portion of the property, whether ancestral or self-acquired; this is contrary to section 7 of Punjab Act II of 1920, which is in these terms "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in section 5, Punjab Laws Act, 1872, no person shall contest any alienation of non-ancestral immovable property or any appointment of an heir to such property on the ground that such alienation or appointment is contrary to custom." No other point arises in this appeal which fails and is dismissed with costs in all the courts. Appeal dismissed.
- 1951 (3) TMI 26 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ..... returnable date the appellant contended that the sanction of the Central Government was void because it was not given by the Government of the State. On the decision going against him he appealed to the High Court and to the Privy Council. The appellant’s contention having thus failed, the Magistrate proceeded with the trial on the 26th of November, 1949. The only question which is now presented for our decision therefore is whether there was any sanction granted by the Government before the Magistrate took cognizance of the offence and issued the notice under section 190 of the Criminal Procedure Code On the 25th March, 1949. To that the clear answer is that the Government had given its sanction for the prosecution of the appellant before that date. It seems to us therefore that the appellant’s contention that the Magistrate had to take cognizance of the offences without the previous sanction of the Government is untenable and the appeal fails. Appeal dismissed
- 1951 (3) TMI 24 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ..... servant of a licensed victualler having knowingly supplied liquor to a constable on duty without the authority of his superior officer, it was held that the licensed victualler was liable to be convicted although he had no knowledge of the act of his servant. In dealing with the case, Blackburn J. observed thus - "If we hold that there must be a personal knowledge in the licensed person, we should make the enactment of no effect." There are many other cases in England in which the same view has been enunciated, and some of them have been collected and classified in the judgment of Wright J. in Sherras v. De Rutzen( 1895 IQB. 918,922), The principle laid down in these cases has been followed in several cases in this country also. In this view, the appeal is allowed in part, and while the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant on the first charge in both the cases are quashed, the conviction and sentence on the third charge in the second case are affirmed.
- 1951 (3) TMI 23 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ..... of their Lordships, the function of subsection(2) is merely an illustrative one; the rule-making power is conferred by sub-section (1), and "the rules" which are referred to in the opening sentence of subsection (2) are the rules which are authorised by, and made under, sub-section (1); the provisions of sub-section (2) are not restrictive of sub-section(1), as, indeed is expressly stated by the words "without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (1)". "There can be no doubt--as the learned Judge himself appears to have thought--that the general language of sub-section (1) amply justifies the terms of rule 26, and avoids any of the criticisms which the learned Judge expressed in relation to subsection (2)". This accords with our view of the effect of subsections (1) and (2) of section 3 of the Act. The appeal is dismissed. The appellant’s bail bond is cancelled and he is ordered to surrender. Appeal dismissed.
- 1951 (2) TMI 16 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ..... oughout been that he was given no particulars at all till the 5th August, 1950. As the petitioners were given only vague grounds which were not particularised or made specific so as to afford them the earliest opportunity of making representations against their detention orders, and their having been inex- cusable delay in acquainting them with particulars of what was alleged. the petitioners have to be released, the rules being made absolute. Ordered accordingly. PATANJALI SASTRI J.--I concur in the order proposed by my learned brother Chandrasekhara Aiyar J. DAS J.--In view of the majority decision in Case No. 22 of 1950 (The State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Acharya), I concur in the order proposed by my learned brother. Order accordingly. Petition No. 194 of 1950 Agent for the petitioner R.R. Biswas. Agent for the respondent P.A. Mehta. Agent for the intervener P.A. Mehta. Petition No. 167 of 1950 Agent for the petition R.S. Narula. Agent for the respondent P.A. Mehla.
- 1951 (2) TMI 15 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ..... in our opinion the plaintiff is entitled to some interest. The learned counsel appearing for both the parties, at the close of their arguments, left this question of interest to be deter- mined by us and we think that it would be quite fair if we allow interest on the sum of ₹ 30,000 at the rate of 4 per annum from the beginning of September, 1943. It is admitted that the plaintiff's possession of the house ceased by the end of August, 1943. The result is that we allow the appeal in part; the decree made by the High Court is affirmed in so far as it dismissed the claim for specific performance- The plaintiff, however, will be entitled to a money decree for the sum of ₹ 30,000 against the defendants second party with interest at 4 per annum from the 1st of September, 1943, to the date of reali- sation. Each party to this appeal will bear his own costs. Appeal allowed in part. Agent for the appellant R.C. Prasad. Agent for respondents Tarachand Brij Mohan Lal.
- 1951 (1) TMI 36 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ..... urt is defective in not taking into consideration the different detailed reasons given by the Sessions Judge for rejecting the rest of the evidence alleged to prove the guilt of the appellant. In our opinion the High Court was in error in convicting the appellant of murder and we have, therefore, reversed the decision of the High Court. The reasoning of the High Court that the accused had not made any attempt to show that the ornaments belonged to him is clearly fallacious. The failure or omission of the appellant to prove that fact does not in any way help the prosecution in proving the guilt of the appellant. In our opinion the observations of the Sessions Judge in the concluding para. 31 of his judgment deserve careful notice by the State authorities. 10. As the ornaments are not proved to be the ornaments of the deceased, no conviction under Section 404, I. P. C., can also be sustained. The ornaments which are lying in the lower court should be returned to the appellant.
- 1951 (1) TMI 33 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ..... of our Constitution or of the Preventive Detention Act. In Iswar Das v. The State(1) the question was not raised or argued as it was made clear in the judgment itself. In view of what I have stated above, I am of the opinion that as the grounds originally communicated to the detenu were relevant to the objects which the Act had in view and as there is no proof of mala fides the obligations cast upon the authorities under article 22 (5) which have been reproduced in section 7 of the Preventive Detention Act have been fully complied with. Even according to the views expressed by the majority of my colleagues I would be prepared to hold that the particulars subsequently supplied along with the grounds originally supplied fully enable the detenu to make his representation. In my opinion there has been no contravention of the fundamental rights of the detenu. I would, therefore, (1) Not reported. allow this appeal and reverse the decision of the Bombay High Court. Appeal allowed.
- 1951 (1) TMI 32 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ..... or repealed was by the force of the provisions of article 13 itself and did not result from the decision of the courts. It is also unnecessary to examine the further argument of the learned Attorney-General that in any case since 1868 in this country the rule of construction of statutes is the one laid down by section 6 of the General Clauses Act,1868, and that though in express terms that statute may not be applicable to the construction of article 13(1) of the Constitution, yet that rule is a rule of justice, equity and good conscience and has become a rule of common law in this country and should be applied even to cases where statutes become void by rea son of their being repugnant to the Constitution. For the reasons given above I see no force in this appeal and I would accordingly dismiss it. MUKHERJEA J.-I am in entire agreement with the view taken by my learned brother Fazl Ali J. in his judgment and I concur both in his reasons and his conclusion. Appeal dismissed.
- 1950 (12) TMI 34 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ..... the petitioner, in my opinion, may well claim to have discharged the onus of showing that this company and its shareholders have been singled out for discriminating treatment by showing that the Act, on the face of it, has adopted a basis of classification which, by its very nature, cannot be exclusively applicable to this company and its shareholders but which may be equally applicable to other companies and their shareholders and has penalised this particular company and its shareholders, leaving out other companies and their shareholders who may be equally guilty of the alleged vice of mismanagement and neglect of the type referred to in the preambles. In my opinion the legislation in question infringes the fundamental rights of the petitioner and offends against article 14 of our Constitution. 94. The result, therefore, is that this petition ought to succeed and the petitioner should have an order in terms of prayer (3) of the petition with costs. 95. Petition dismissed.
- 1950 (12) TMI 33 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ..... it for effective administration of justice which was made its special responsibility. Any argument as to deliberate encroachment that might have been founded on the Proviso to section 3 of the Act which enabled the Provincial Government to give to the City Court even Admiralty jurisdiction which was a matter in List I has been set at rest by the amendment of the Proviso by Bombay Act XXVI of 1950. The impugned Bombay Act may, in my judgment, be well supported as a law made by the Provincial Legislature under entry 2 read with entry 1 in List II and I hold accordingly. I, therefore, concur in the order that this appeal be allowed. 101. In the view I have taken, it is not necessary to discuss the contention of the learned Attorney-General that the Bombay City Civil Court Act may be supported as a piece of legislation made, by the Provincial Legislature of Bombay under entry 4 read with entry 15 in Part I of List III and I express no opinion on that point. 102. Appeal allowed.