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2009 (3) TMI 526

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..... ppellant. S/Shri S.G. Hussnain, Sr. Advocate, Mrs Ruchna Gupta, T.N. Singh, Manoj Dwivedi and Gunnam Venkateswara Rao, Advocates, for the Respondent. [ Judgment per : Arijit Pasayat, J.]. - Leave granted. 2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court allowing the Revision Petition filed by respondent no.2. Though various points were urged it is not necessary to go into those in detail as the revision petition was allowed even without issuing notice to the present appellants and to the other parties. 3. Learned Single Judge only heard the counsel for respondent No.2 and passed the impugned order. 4. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 submitted that the High Court has taken note of the applicable legal position and, therefore there is no scope for interference. 5. The crucial question that remains to be adjudicated is whether principles of natural justice have been violated; and if so, to what extent any prejudice has been caused. It may be noted at this juncture that in some cases it has been observed that where grant of opportunity in terms of principles of natural justice do not improve the situation, "us .....

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..... rinciple found its way into the "Magna Carta". The classic exposition of Sir Edward Coke of natural justice requires to "vocate, interrogate and adjudicate". In the celebrated case of Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works [(1863) 143 E R 414], the principle was thus stated: "Even God did not pass a sentence upon Adam, before he was called upon to make his defence. "Adam" says God, "where art thou? hast thou not eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat". 9. Since then the principle has been chiselled, honed and refined, enriching its content. Judicial treatment has added light and luminosity to the concept, like polishing of a diamond. 10. Principles of natural justice are those rules which have been laid down by the Courts as being the minimum protection of the rights of the individual against the arbitrary procedure that may be adopted by a judicial, quasi- judicial and administrative authority while making an order affecting those rights. These rules are intended to prevent such authority from doing injustice. 11. What is meant by the term `principles of natural justice' is not easy to determine. Lord Summer (then Hamilton, L.J.) in Ray v. Lo .....

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..... as follows: "No doubt, in the absence of special provisions as to how the person who is to decide is to proceed, law will imply no more than that the substantial requirements of justice shall not be violated. He is not a judge in the proper sense of the word; but he must give the parties an opportunity of being heard before him and stating their case and their view. He must give notice when he will proceed with the matter and he must act honestly and impartially and not under the dictation of some other person or persons to whom the authority is not given by law. There must be no malversation of any kind. There would be no decision within the meaning of the statute if there were anything of that sort done contrary to the essence of justice". 14. Lord Selbourne also added that the essence of justice consisted in requiring that all parties should have an opportunity of submitting to the person by whose decision they are to be bound, such considerations as in their judgment ought to be brought before him. All these cases lay down the very important rule of natural justice contained in the oft-quoted phrase `justice should not only be done, but should be seen to be done'. 15. C .....

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..... illowan somewhat picturesquely described natural justice as `a fair crack of the whip' while Geoffrey Lane, LJ. In Regina v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs Ex Parte Hosenball (1977 (1) WL R 766) preferred the homely phrase `common fairness'. 17. How then have the principles of natural justice been interpreted in the Courts and within what limits are they to be confined? Over the years by a process of judicial interpretation two rules have been evolved as representing the principles of natural justice in judicial process, including therein quasi- judicial and administrative process. They constitute the basic elements of a fair hearing, having their roots in the innate sense of man for fair- play and justice which is not the preserve of any particular race or country but is shared in common by all men. The first rule is `nemo judex in causa sua' or`nemo debet esse judex in propria causa sua' as stated in (1605) 12 Co.Rep.114 that is, `no man shall be a judge in his own cause'. Coke used the form aliquis non debet esse judex in propria causa quia non potest esse judex at pars' (Co.Litt. 1418), that is, `no man ought to be a judge in his own case, because he cannot act as Judge .....

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..... ifferent. Lord Woolf in Lloyd v. Mc Mohan (1987 (1) All E R 1118, CA) has also not disfavoured refusal of discretion in certain cases of breach of natural justice. The New Zealand Court in McCarthy v. Grant (1959 NZL R 1014) however goes halfway when it says that (as in the case of bias), it is sufficient for the applicant to show that there is `real likelihood-not certainty- of prejudice'. On the other hand, Garner Administrative Law (8 th Edn. 1996. pp.271-72) says that slight proof that the result would have been different is sufficient. On the other side of the argument, we have apart from Ridge v. Baldwin (1964 AC 40: (1963) 2 All E R 66, HL), Megarry, J. in John v. Rees ( 1969 (2) All E R 274) stating that there are always `open and shut cases' and no absolute rule of proof of prejudice can be laid down. Merits are not for the court but for the authority to consider. Ackner, J has said that the `useless formality theory' is a dangerous one and, however inconvenient, natural justice must be followed. His Lordship observed that `convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms'. More recently, Lord Bingham\ has deprecated the `useless formality theory' in R. v. Chief Con .....

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