TMI Blog1986 (2) TMI 253X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... bir Nath Mathur obtained an ex parte decree for eviction against M/s Om Prakash Company and Kusum Rani, a partner of M/s Om Prakash Company in respect of the ground floor of premises of No. 90, Sunder Nagar, New Delhi. Three of the partners of M/s Om Prakash Company, it must be mentioned at the outset, are the sister-in-law and the two minor daughters of Balbir Nath Mathur himself. When Balbir Nath Mathur sought to execute the decree for eviction, M/s Girdhari Lal Sons who are in occupation of the premises filed an objection petition before Rent Controller, purporting to do so under Section 25 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. The objection petition was rejected by the Rent Controller. The order of the Rent Controller was confirmed on appeal by the Rent Control Tribunal and, by the High Court, on further revision. M/s Girdhari Lal Sons have filed this appeal with the special leave of this Court. 2. The Rent Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal concurrently found that Balbir Nath Mathur was the owner of the premises, that Om Prakash Company was the tenant and that Girdhari Lal Sons were the subtenants under Om Prakash Company. The case of the appellants was ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he contention of the appellant it is necessary to set out Sections 17(1) and 18(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 17(1) Where, after the commencement of this Act, any premises are sublet either in whole or in part by the tenant with the previous consent in writing of the landlord, the tenant or the subtenant to whom the premises are sublet may, in the prescribed manner, give notice to the landlord of the creation of the subtenancy within one month of the date of such subletting and notify the termination of such subtenancy within one month of such termination. 18(1) Where an order for eviction in respect of any premises is made under Section 14 against a tenant but not against a subtenant referred to in Section 17 and a notice of the subtenancy has been given to the landlord, the subtenant shall, with effect from the date of the order, be deemed to become a tenant holding directly under the landlord in respect of the premises in his occupation on the same terms and conditions on which the tenant would have held from the landlord, if the tenancy had continued. 5. Rule 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Rules, 1959 provides that a notice of the creation or termination of subtena ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ey what is meant to be conveyed; the words may be ambiguous; they may be words capable of being differently understood by different persons. How are the courts to set about the task of resolving difficulties of interpretation of the laws ? The foremost task of a court, as we conceive it, in the interpretation of statutes, is to find out the intention of the legislature. Of course, where words are clear and unambiguous no question of construction may arise. Such words ordinarily speak for themselves. Since the words must have spoken as clearly to legislators as to judges, it may be safely presumed that the legislature intended what the words plainly say. This is the real basis of the so-called golden rule of construction that where the words of statutes are plain and unambiguous effect must be given to them. A court should give effect to plain words, not because there is any charm or magic in the plainness of such words but because plain words may be expected to convey plainly the intention of the legislature to others as well as judges. Intention of the legislature and not the words is paramount. Even where the words of statutes appear to be prima facie clear and unambiguous it may ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ustified in departing from the so-called golden rule of construction so as to give effect to the object and purpose of the enactment by supplementing the written word if necessary. 10. In an old English case, Hawkins v. Gathercole (43 ER 1129, 1135, 1136), Turner, C.J., referred to two earlier cases reported by Plowden. In the first case of Stradling v. Morgan (Plowden, p. 24), the Judges were reported to have said That the Judges of the law in all times past have so far pursued the intent of the makers of the statutes, that they have expounded Acts which were general in words to be but particular, where the intent was particular.. . . From which cases it appears that the sages of the law heretofore have construed statutes quite contrary to the letter in some appearance; and those statutes which comprehend all things in the letter, they have expounded to extend but to some things; and those which generally prohibit all people from doing such an act, they have interpreted to permit some people to do it; and those which include every person in the letter, they have adjudged to reach to some persons only; which expositions have always been founded upon the intent of the legislatur ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ust then do as they would have done. A judge should not alter the material of which the Act is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases. 13. In Rugby Joint Water Board v. Foottit ((1972) 1 All ER 1057, 1076, 1077), Lord Simon of Glaisdale said The task of the courts is to ascertain what was the intention of Parliament, actual or to be imputed, in relation to the facts as found by the court.... On scrutiny of a statutory provision, it will generally appear that a given situation was within the direct contemplation of the draftsman as the situation calling for statutory regulation this may be called 'the primary situation'. As to this, Parliament will certainly have manifested an intention - 'the primary statutory intention'. But situations other than the primary situation may present themselves for judicial decision - secondary situations. As regards these secondary situations, it may seem likely in some cases that the draftsman had them in contemplation; in others not. Where it seems likely that a secondary situation was not within the draftsman's contemplation, it will be necessary for the court to impute an intention to Parliament in the way I have described, that is ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... pparent that the Act is primarily devised to prevent unreasonable eviction of the tenants and subtenants from demised premises and unreasonable enhancement of rent. In particular, the purpose of Sections 17 and 18 is clearly to protect the subtenants from eviction where a landlord obtains a decree for eviction against the principal tenant. In an action for eviction by a landlord against the principal tenant, the subtenant has no defence of his own under the ordinary law, even if he has been inducted into possession with the consent of the landlord. He has to go with the tenant. He can claim no right to sit in the premises apart and distinct from the right of the tenant. Showing an awareness of the problems of subtenants, the legislature enacted Sections 17 and 18 for their protection. The protection was afforded to subtenants who had been inducted into possession with the consent of the landlord. While so extending a protecting hand to the subtenant the legislature wanted to make sure that subtenants who had genuinely obtained the consent of the landlord alone should be entitled to that protection. The legislature wanted to prevent persons who had somehow managed to get into posses ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... bdul Gaffar (ILR (1974) 1 Del 45). 18. During the pendency of the appeal in this Court, an order was made to the effect that from January 1, 1985 onwards, the appellant should deposit a sum of Rs 3600 every month out of which the respondent would be entitled to draw out a sum of Rs 1800 only. On behalf of the appellants, it was also undertaken that the suit filed by them against the respondents for fixation of fair rent would be withdrawn by them. We are informed that the suit has not yet been withdrawn. We declare that the suit filed by the appellant for the fixation of fair rent shall stand dismissed as withdrawn. We further direct that with effect from January 1, 1985 onwards, the rent for the premises shall be Rs 3600 per month and it will be so paid and adjusted. The amount now in deposit may be drawn out by the respondents. The appeal is allowed in the manner indicated above. There will be no order as to costs. KHALID, J. (supplementing) - I have gone through the judgment prepared by my learned brother. I agree with the conclusion that the appeal has to be allowed. 20. We have before us two parties, both affluent. No tears need be shed either for the one or the other. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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