TMI Blog2004 (10) TMI 328X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cial Court constituted under The Special Courts (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ) has power to condone the delay in filing a petition under section 4(2) of the Act. 2. The object of the Act as stated in the Statement of Objects and Reasons is to deal with the situation created by large scale irregularities and malpractices in transactions in securities indulged in by some brokers in collusion with the employees of various banks and financial institutions. In particular, the Act seeks to ensure speedy recovery of the funds which have been diverted from banks and financial institutions to the individual accounts of brokers. The other objectives of the Act are to punish the guilty and to restore confidence in and maintain the basic integrity and credibility of the banks and financial institutions. With these objectives in view the Act provides for the appointment of one or more Custodians to take action against any person involved in any offence relating to transactions in securities for the period after 1-4-1991 upto and including 6-6-1992. In terms of sub-section (3) of section 3 of the Act, the Custodia ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... th effect from the date of the notification. The appellant was requested to furnish the Custodian the details of its properties as on the date of the notification. In answer to the Custodian s letter, the appellant asked for the reasons and circumstances which formed the basis of the Custodian s decision to notify the appellant. The appellant also stated that it was in the process of submitting details of its properties. On 8-10-2002, the appellant filed a petition of objection to the notification under section 4(2) of the Act. The Special Court rejected the application solely on the ground that it was filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed by sub-section (2) of section 4. 6. The appellant has contended that the Custodian had issued the notification under section 3(2) of the Act almost 10 years after coming into force of the Act. It is submitted that the notification was also otherwise invalid. According to the appellant the right of notified persons to object to a notification under section 4(2) was a valuable right, since the consequences of being notified were drastic viz., the attachment of all properties both immovable and movable. It is submitted that the noti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ynthetics Ltd. v. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd. 2004 (7) SCALE 427 held that the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the Act. However, it is submitted that irrespective of the wide language in which the conclusion of the Court had been stated in that case, the reasoning showed that it was limited to the question whether the periods prescribed under the Limitation Act applied to section 11 of the Act. It is submitted that the decision in L.S. Synthetics Ltd. s case ( supra ) must be narrowly construed, as otherwise the conclusion would be based on a factual error. Our attention was drawn to paragraphs 38 and 39 of the decision as reported where this Court has held that the provisions of the Limitation Act were excluded because the Act did not provide for any period of Limitation. It is pointed out that the Act was not a complete code since sections 4(2) and 10(3) did provide for a period of Limitation. 7. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Custodian has stated that the period of limitation prescribed under section 4(2) could not be said to be merely directory. The decision in Topline Shoes Ltd s case ( supra ) was said to be distinguishable an ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... fication. The words are unequivocal and unqualified and there is no scope for reading in a power of Court to dispense with the time limit on the basis of any principle of interpretation of statutory provisions. In R. Rudraiah v. State of Karnataka [1998] 3 SCC 23 it was contended on behalf of the appellants that section 48A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 which provided for the making of an application within a particular period should be construed liberally in favour of tenants so that the period was to be read as extendable. The submission was rejected on the ground that the language of section 48A was unambiguous and could not be interpreted differently only on the ground of hardship to the tenants. 10. The mere fact that the Special Court may have been imbued with the same status of a High Court would not alter the situation. We are of the view that it was not necessary for section 4(2) of the Act to use additional peremptory language such as but not thereafter or shall to mandate that an objection had to be made within 30 days. The mere use of the word may in sections 4(2) of the Act does not indicate that the period prescribed under the section is merely ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... utory attachment of the property of the notified party under section 3, sub-section (3), of the Act, is subject to a final decision on the matter by the Special Court under section 9A and section 11 of the Act. It is, in that sense just an interim measure. 14. The three decisions relied upon by the appellant, namely, Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, Bhurey Lal Baya [1955] 2 SCR 1, Syndicate Bank s case ( supra ) and C. Beepathumma s case ( supra ) do not deal with statutes which could be said to be in pari materia with the Act. In Sangram Singh s case ( supra ) this Court had to consider whether the Election Tribunal was justified in refusing to recall an order directing that an election petition should be disposed of ex parte . It was noted that section 19(2) of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951 directed the Tribunal to follow the procedure prescribed for trials under the Civil Procedure Code. It was found on a construction of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as they then stood, that the Court had the power to allow a defendant to participate in the proceedings even after the passing of an order that the trial should be proceeded with ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... that the statute itself does not provide for it. A possible source of the power could be section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, provided it applies to the Act. Section 29(2) of Limitation Act, 1963 provides for the application of the provisions of section 4 to section 24 of the 1963 Act including section 5, to any special or local law which prescribes a period of limitation in respect of any suit, appeal or application different from the period prescribed under the Limitation Act. In other words, the general rule as far as Special and Local Acts are concerned, is that the specified provisions including section 5 of the Limitation Act will apply provided the Special or Local Act provides a period of limitation different from that prescribed under the Limitation Act. There is an additional requirement viz., that the Special/Local Act does not expressly exclude the application of the Limitation Act. 1 It has been held in Union of India v. Popular Construction Co. [2001] 8 SCC 470 that the word exclusion also includes exclusion by necessary implication . This proposition of law is not in dispute. The only question is - does the Act expressly or necessarily exclude the provis ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... v. Vijay Gupta [1991] Suppl. (2) SCC 631 no doubt held that the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Ceiling of Agricultural Holdings Act, 1960 will not exclude the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. However, there is no reference to the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Act which persuaded the Court to arrive at such conclusion. 19. Reliance on the decision in Vidya Charan Shukla s case ( supra ) by the appellant is equally misplaced.One of the issues raised in that case related to the question whether section 116A of the Representation of People Act, 1951 could be construed as expressly or impliedly excluding the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1908 as would otherwise be applicable under section 29(2)( a ) of that Act. The argument was that sub-section (3) of section 116A of the 1951 Act not only provided for a period of 30 days to prefer an appeal from the date of an order of the Tribunal to the High Court, but also provided that the High Court could entertain an appeal after the expiry of the period only if it was satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring an appeal within such period. The sub-section under consideration in Vidya Cha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the Limitation Act if not included would lead to an incongruous result. For example an appeal would be barred by time even though a copy of the order of the Special Court was not made available to the appellant, because section 12(2) of the Limitation Act would not be available. The argument is unacceptable. The time taken by the appellant for obtaining a copy of the order appealed against may be a factor relevant to the exercise of discretion by this Court under section 10(3) of the Act. The exclusion of sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act would only mean that the appellant could not claim the exclusion of time as provided under those sections as a matter of right but could raise pleas on grounds available under those sections to establish sufficient cause under section 10(3). 21. The decision by a larger Bench in L.S. Synthetics Ltd. s case ( supra ) holding that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 do not apply to the Act may not have, by itself, concluded the question formulated by us at the outset. That case was, as has been rightly contended by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, limited to a consideration of section 11 of the Act and the p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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