TMI Blog2009 (7) TMI 773X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ondent. JUDGMENT 1. The miscellaneous application is filed under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, praying this court to condone the delay of 43 days in filing the appeal under section 10F of the Companies Act, 1956. 2. This court ordered notice to the respondents, namely, Union of India and Satyam Computer Services Ltd. (hereafter called Satyam ). After receiving notice the Union of India appeared through the Solicitor General and Additional Solicitor General. A formal counter affidavit is not filed, but the learned Solicitor General made submissions opposing the application. 3. The brief fact of the matter, necessary for appreciating the controversy is as follows. On an application filed by the Union of India under sections 388B, 397, 398, 402 and 408 of the Companies Act, being Union of India v. Satyam Computer Services Ltd. [2009] 148 Comp. Cas. 252 1 (CLB - New Delhi), suspended the board of directors of Satyam and authorised the Government of India to constitute a fresh board with not more than ten persons as directors. It appears, pursuant thereto, the Central Government constituted a fresh board of directors with six persons as directors to mana ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ccording to him, applying section 5 read with section 14 of the Limitation Act, the period during which the matter was pending in the Delhi High Court must be excluded. 5. Learned Solicitor General orally brought to the notice of this court the following facts and events. The applicant moved the Supreme Court by filing a writ petition being W.P.(C). No. 35 of 2009 against the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), which was dismissed as withdrawn. Thereafter, he unsuccessfully moved a public interest writ petition being W.P.(C). No. 7416 of 2009, which, as noticed supra , was dismissed on 12-3-2009. He then filed a company appeal under section 10F of the Companies Act before the Delhi High Court, which was also dismissed on 27-5-2009, for want of territorial jurisdiction. It is thus pointed out by the learned Solicitor General that when the order was passed on 19-2-2009, the appeal filed with delay without showing sufficient cause cannot be entertained. His next submission is that the Limitation Act has no application to appeals filed under section 10F of the Companies Act. 6. Whether this court in exercise of its powers under second proviso to section 10F of the C ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n sub-section (4) of section 417 by reason of section 29(2)( b ) of that Act, which provided in so many terms that for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the remaining provisions of this Act that is sections other than sections 4, 9 to 18 and 22 shall not apply . Now, there can be no doubt that if the present case were governed by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, this decision would wholly apply and the Municipal Corporation of Delhi would not be entitled to invoke the aid of section 5 of that Act for the purpose of extending the period of limitation of sixty days prescribed in sub-section (4) of section 417 for an application by a complainant for special leave to appeal against an order of acquittal. But the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, has clearly no application in the present case, since that Act is repealed by the Limitation Act, 1963, which came into force with effect from January 1, 1964 and the present case must, therefore, be decided by reference to the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963. 9. In Union of India v. Popular Construction Co. [2001] 8 SCC 470, the question ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d Principal Bench, New Delhi, pending company petition under sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, passed an interim order on 24-11-2006. Pawan Goel filed an appeal before the Delhi High Court, with an application to condone the delay. The same was dismissed (as withdrawn) on 16-4-2007, for want of jurisdiction with liberty to move the jurisdictional court. The appeal was then filed before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana with an application to condone the delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay of 140 days in filing the appeal. Another application was moved under section 14 of the Limitation Act seeking exclusion of time during which the appellant was pursuing the appeal before the Delhi High Court. The question before the Punjab and Haryana High Court was whether the period spent in pursuing the appeal before the Delhi High Court could be excluded under section 14 of the Limitation Act. After elaborate consideration of the matter, it was held (page 452 of 142 Comp. Cas.) : As a matter of fact, the appellant seems to have pursued his remedy before the hon ble Delhi High Court in a callous and negligent manner. It was not that the quest ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion of period of limitation beyond sixty days apart from the period of limitation of sixty days prescribed under section 10F. The expression not exceeding does not permit any further extension and it seems that the true import, purport and construction of the proviso is to restrict the total period of limitation to 120 days, i.e., sixty days principal and sixty days by extension subject to existence of sufficient cause in a given case. Any other interpretation would amount to committing violence to the statute itself which is impermissible under law. Yet again, the court ruled (page 456 of 142 Comp. Cas.) : . . . it is abundantly clear that where particular statute does not apply to section 5 of the Limitation Act expressly or even impliedly in a special or local law itself, it shall be presumed that the exclusion is express. Section 29(2) of the Act not only excludes the application of section 5 of the Limitation Act but also other sections from sections 4 to 24 (inclusive). Thus, section 14 also stands excluded from its application for purposes of either condoning the delay or exclusion of the period on the ground envisaged therein notwithstanding existence of sufficie ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|
