TMI Blog2004 (12) TMI 610X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ence the Writ Petition may have to be remitted back to the learned Single Judge to decide the matter afresh on merits. Strong reliance was placed on Dinesh Chandra Gahtori v. Chief of Army Staff, (2001) 9 SCC 525 and the learned Counsel also made an attempt to distinguish the decision in Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India, 2004 (168) E.L.T. 3 (S.C.) = AIR 2004 SC 2321 on facts. 3.On the contrary, the learned Central Government Standing Counsel while controverting the same however would maintain that there is no factual foundation even relating to the part of the cause of action. The Counsel also would maintain that in the light of the specific stand taken in the counter affidavit the learned Judge arrived at the correct conclusion relating to the maintainability of the Writ Petition and dismissed the Writ Petition as not maintainable. The Counsel also pointed out that neither the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition nor the reply affidavit had explained anything in this regard on the aspect of want of jurisdiction though the same was specifically pleaded in the counter affidavit filed by the respondents. The learned Counsel further submitted that as far as ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... oned by way of Appeal which appears to have ended in dismissal. The competency of the Appellate Authority to entertain the Appeal also had been raised as a ground of attack. 6.It is pertinent to note that at para-16 of the counter affidavit on the aspect of jurisdiction it was specifically averred : .......As regards jurisdiction of the Court it is stated that the official records of the case are available with Group Centre, C.R.P.F., Shivpuri but the jurisdiction of this case does not fall within the Hon ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad. The petitioner had committed an offence as a member of the Armed Force while functioning as Constable (GD) in Group Centre, C.R.P.F., Shivpuri located in Madhya Pradesh. Hence the jurisdiction of the Court comes in the region of Madhya Pradesh where cause of action occurred. It is brought to the kind notice of Hon ble Court that a Writ Petition No. 18045/2000 filed by Shri Firoj Ahmed of Group Centre, C.R.P.F., Bhopal (M.P.) in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad on the grounds that the petitioner is a resident of Uttar Pradesh but the order of dismissal was passed by the ADIGP, GC, C.R.P.F., Bhopal (M.P.) has been dismissed ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. Clause (1A) which had been inserted by Constitution (15th Amendment) Act, 1963 had been renumbered as Clause (2) by the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976. The very Clause (1A) was inserted by the Constitution (15th Amendment) Act, 1963 in the light of the view expressed by the Apex Court in Election Commission v. Saka Venkata - 1953 SCR 1145, Rashid v. I.T. Commissioner - 1954 SCR 738, Khajoor Singh v. Union of India - AIR 1961 SC 532 and Collector of Customs v. E.I. Commercial Co. - AIR 1963 SC 1124 wherein it was held that it was location or residence of the respondent which gave territorial jurisdiction to a High Court under Article 226, the situs of the cause of action being immaterial for this purpose. The object of introducing Clause (1A) by Constitution (15th Amendment) Act, 1963 was to provide tha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the petitioner at Ullasnagar where he resides. It is also not in dispute that the proceedings that would be taken against the petitioner in consequence of the impugned order would be by officers located within the territories in relation to which this Court exercises jurisdiction. Though in different context, the question arose as to the place where the cause of action would arise, the question was considered by a Division Bench of which I was a member in W.W. Joshi v. State of Bombay, 61 Bombay L.R. 829 (AIR 1959 Bom. 363). A civil servant as removed from service and the question arose as to where the cause of action to get quashed the order of the removal from service arose, and it was held that the cause of action would arise at the place where the order of termination of service was made and also at the place where the consequences fell on the servant. In view of this decision, there can hardly be any doubt that the place where the consequences of the order fell on the petitioner would be a place where at least the cause of action in part would arise. No good ground is shown to us by Mr. Vaidya to differ from the view taken by the Division Bench in the aforesaid case. The seco ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mpact of that motion is felt by the petitioners within the territorial limits of this State. We have therefore no hesitation in holding that a part of the cause of action has arisen in the State of Tamil Nadu. In Industrial Fuel Marketing Co. v. Union of India - AIR 1983 Cal. 253, a learned single Judge of Calcutta High Court at para-15 observed : Before proceeding to decide upon the merits of the contentions raised on behalf of the parties it is necessary to deal with and dispose of the preliminary objections raised on behalf of the respondents as to the maintainability of the instant writ petition in this forum. In deciding this question it is apposite to refer to the provisions of Article 226(1) and (2) of the Constitution which run as follows : (1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction to issue any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of an ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on of those questions by this writ Court. For determining these questions it is not necessary to launch into a detail investigation of facts though, of course some investigation into facts are necessary for this purpose. But merely on this plea it will be unjust and unfair to dismiss this application on this preliminary ground. I therefore, cannot uphold the contention made on behalf of the respondent No. 3 on this score and in my view this writ application is maintainable. As regards the question whether the respondent No. 3 against whom the writs have been prayed for is located within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court as required under sub- article (1) of Article 226, it has been contended on behalf of the petitioners that the respondent No. 3 has got its office at 15, Park Street within the jurisdiction of this Court and as such this writ application is maintainable. It has been stated in para 7 of the affidavit in reply sworn on behalf of the petitioner on 12th Feb., 1982 that the administrative office of the Finance Department as well as office of the Managing Director of the respondent No. 3 are situated at 15, Park St. Calcutta. It has also been stated that the law ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Nagaland itself and on the basis of the order the petitioner received the amount in Kerala. By the receipt of the amount it cannot be said that part of the cause of action has arisen in Kerala. The cause of action as the Madras High Court pointed out in the decision referred to, has always been understood as referable to the bundle of facts in a legal proceeding and if a limb of that bundle of facts is available, seen or discernible in one particular place which is within the jurisdiction of the High Court, then the High Court has the power to exercise all the powers conferred on it under Art. 226(1A) notwithstanding the fact that the authority against whom the ultimate rule has to be issued and whose act has created a cause of action as a whole or in part, is situate outside its territorial limits. Can it be said on the basis of this principle that the receipt of the amount due to the petitioner as per the impugned order is a limb of the bundle of facts constituting the cause of action? According to me it cannot be so said; because the order of termination became complete with the service of the order on the petitioner in Nagaland. In questioning that order of termination the peti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ection (6) thereof. The expression cause of action is tersely defined in Mulla s Code of Civil Procedure : The cause of action means every fact which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the Court. In other words, it is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the accused. The mere service of notice under Section 52(2) of the Act on the respondents at their registered office at 18-B, Brabourne Road, Calcutta i.e., within the territorial limits of the State of West Bengal, could not give rise to a cause of action within that territory unless the service of such notice was an integral part of the cause of action. The entire cause of action culminating in the acquisition of the land under Section 52(1) of the Act arose within the State of Rajasthan i.e., within the territorial jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court at the Jaipur Bench. The answer to the question whether service of notice is an integral part of the cause of action within the meaning of Article 226(2) of the Constitution must depend upon the nature of the impugned ord ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... arh Muslim University v. Vinay Engineering Enterprises Private Limited - (1994) 4 SCC 710, Union of India v. Adani Exports Limited - 2001 (134) E.L.T. 596 (S.C.) = (2002) 1 SCC 567, and National Textile Corporation Limited v. Haribox Swalram - JT 2004 (4) SC 508. The Counsel for appellant placed strong reliance on the decision referred (1) supra on the ground that this is a decision of a three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court involving service matter and make an attempt to distinguish yet another decision of three-Judge Bench referred (2) supra. The three-Judge Bench in the decision referred (1) supra decided on 19-1-2001 made the following order : (1) Leave granted. (2) The notice on the Special Leave Petition stated that the matter might be dispose of at this stage by an order setting aside the order under challenge and restoring the writ petition to the file of the High Court to be heard and disposed of on merits. (3) The appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court at Allahabad to quash a communication sent to his wife which stated that the appellant had been tried by a Summary Court Martial and had been found guilty of using criminal force against his s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d confer jurisdiction on the Court. We must, however, remind ourselves that even if a small part of cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the same by itself may not be considered to be a determinative factor compelling the High Court to decide the matter on merit. In appropriate cases, the Court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum convenience [See Bhagar Singh Bagga v. Dewan Jagbir Sawhany - AIR 424 1941 Cal. 670; Mandal Jalal v. Madanlal - (1945) 49 CWN 357; Bharat Coking Coal Limited v. M/s. Jharia Talkies and Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd. - (1997) CWN 122; S.S.Jain and Co. and another v. Union of India and others - (1994) CHN 445; M/s. New Horizon Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1994 Delhi 126]. 9.On a careful analysis of the decisions of the Apex Court in general referred to supra and also the three-Judge Bench decisions referred (1) and (2) supra, it is needless to say that the decision referred (2) supra is later in point of time. Under Article 141 of the Constitution of India the law declared by the Supreme Court of India is binding on all Courts. Not only the three Judge Bench d ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... concept of just precedent and unjust precedent. This is a very delicate area where the Courts are expected to be more careful and cautious while following the binding decisions of the Apex Court. It is no doubt true that a later decisions of the co-ordinate Bench normally may have to be followed but however there may be cases where the later decision might not have considered the relevant statutory provisions or the binding prior precedents on the point and would have decided the question without proper supporting reasons. It is no doubt true that the judicial propriety and judicial discipline requires that binding precedent shall be necessarily followed, but however, while adopting cautious approach in case of conflicting Judgments of the Apex Court of co-ordinate Benches cited before the Courts, Courts may have to carefully scrutinize whether reasons had been recorded while laying down the ratio and whether the concerned statutory provisions had been considered and whether the other prior decisions or the binding decisions also had been referred to, if any available on the point by the Court while rendering such judgments. These principles at any rate cannot be said to be exhaust ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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