TMI Blog1959 (9) TMI 33X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e assessee. The Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, relying on the decision in Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar[1955] 6 S.T.C. 446., held that the assessment in regard to the turnover representing the price of cotton purchased outside the State of Madras would come within the ban of Article 286(2) of the Constitution, and, therefore, it would not be liable to be taxed. It is not disputed before us that the decision of the Tribunal was correct, having regard to the law prevailing on the date when it made the order. But the learned Government Pleader relied for the validity of the assessments on the provisions contained in Ordinance III of 1956, which was subsequently replaced by the Sales Tax Validation Act VII of 1956. The Ordinance and the enactment were passed subsequent to the decision of the Tribunal and had the effect of validating the assessments like those concerned in the disputed transactions. The sales in the instant case were inter-State ones, under which the goods were delivered within this State for the purpose of consumption in this State and were assessable under the provisions of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939, having regard to the definition of the wo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d been an enactment-authorising a tax on such sales by the concerned State Legislature. Therefore, in order that a levy of sales tax on inter-State sales could be validated by its provisions, there must have been some legislation in the State concerned levying such a tax. Under section 22 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act read with section 2(h) such sales were liable to be included in the taxable turnover. The question whether in respect of the sales of the nature specified in the Explanation to Article 286(1)(a) of the Constitution, more compendiously referred to as "Explanation sales" (which could not be taxed by any State Legislature), there had been a levy which was validated subsequently, was considered with reference to the effect of section 2 of Ordinance III of 1956 in Mettur Industries Ltd. v. State of Madras[1956] 7 S.T.C. 691. It was held that section 2 of the Ordinance would have the effect of removing the ban on the legislative powers of the State, and that the levy of the taxes on sales between the two dates specified thereunder would be valid. This view was accepted and affirmed in Sundararama Iyer v. State of Andhra Pradesh[1958] 9 S.T.C. 298. by the Supreme Cou ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s or otherwise of the view expressed in that decision, it will be necessary to consider the powers of a court exercising revisional jurisdiction with particular reference to the powers under section 12-B of the Madras General Sales Tax Act. Mr. Rajah Iyer's contention is that generally a revision petition does not involve a re-hearing of the matter, and the powers of the superior court entertaining the revision should be confined to or analogous to the exercise of jurisdiction by the King's Bench in England over the inferior courts by the issue of a writ known as a writ of error. In former times the King's Bench in England had jurisdiction to call for a judgment from the inferior courts by the issue of a writ of error. The writ was issued either on the ground of a mere fact which affected the validity of the action, as for example, that the unsuccessful party was an infant or not properly represented or that there was some error in point of law apparent on the face of the proceedings, or, in other words error apparent on the face of the record. In such proceedings the superior court had no jurisdiction to go beyond the record to set aside or alter the judgment of the inferior cou ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... stood at the date of hearing the appeal. The learned judges of the court of appeal in so deciding relied on the provisions of Order 58, rule 1, of the Rules of Supreme Court, where it was stated that appeals would be by way of re-hearing. From this it was contended that, where there were no powers expressly conferred on the appellate court like those in Order 59, rule 1, of the Rules of the English Procedure or Order 41, rule 33, of the Civil Procedure Code, there would be no authority even in an appellate court to do more than merely decide whether order of the inferior court or tribunal was in accordance with the law which prevailed then. Relying on that argument it was further contended that a court of revision would have no jurisdiction to take note of any subsequent enactment or change in the law to afford relief to the aggrieved party. This contention cannot, however, be accepted. The principle that an appellate court had authority to take note of change in the law subsequent to the original court's decision and mould the relief in accordance therewith does not rest merely on the provisions like Order 41, rule 33, of the Civil Procedure Code. Such power is inherent in the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s under Article 226 of the Constitution, there was an amendment in the statute. A question arose whether the High Court, while seized of the matter under Article 226 was bound to apply the statute as amended, or decide the case on the basis of the law, as it stood on the date of the order of the inferior tribunal. The learned Judges held that the proceedings under Article 226 were not in continuation of the application before the inferior tribunal or an appeal therefrom, and that the High Court could only decide the matter according to the law in force at the time of the decision of the inferior court. As the learned Judges in that case pointed out, proceedings under Article 226 are original in their nature and the powers of the superior court would not be those of an appellate court. The decision in that case however is opposed to the decision of this Court in Satyanarayana v. Venkataratnamma[1951] 2 M.L.J. 477. In that case the facts were similar. There was a statutory amendment of the law pending the application under Article 226 to quash the order of the inferior tribunal. The learned judges held that, after the issue of the rule nisi, the decision of the inferior tribunal was ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ad. 616. Venkatasubba Rao, J., delivering the judgment of the Full Bench, held that the remedy by way of revision did not differ from the right of appeal (the only difference being in the mode, in which the power was exercised). The learned judge referred to the several decisions on the subject and held that there was no essential difference between proceedings by way of appeal and by way of revision, except in regard to condition for the exercise of the powers. It follows that a court of revision would have all the powers of an appellate court except that the conditions of interference would have to be in accord with the relevant statutory provision. Therefore it will be open to a revisional court to take note of a subsequent change in the law, and grant reliefs to the parties on the basis of such law. It is needless to point out that it has been an almost invariable practice of this Court to take note of subsequent events, while disposing of civil revision petitions under section 115, Civil Procedure Code, and grant reliefs-to the parties in accordance with the altered circumstances. The nature of the jurisdiction is appellate and all the powers inherent in an appellate court wo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... assessee was entitled to interest on the advance tax paid under section 18-A. Subsequently there was an amendment of the enactment, under which the assessee would be entitled to interest not on the whole of the advance tax paid by him, but only on the difference between payment made and the amount assessed. The amending Act provided that it was to have retrospective operation from 1st of April, 1952, which was prior to the date of the assessment. The Income-tax Officer, proceeding to act under section 35 of the Act, rectified the assessment order holding that the assessee was entitled only to the amount sanctioned by the amending Act. Before the Supreme Court, it was contended that the retrospective operation of the statute could not affect the completed assessment. At page 711 the Supreme Court observed: "Prima facie it may appear somewhat strange that an order which was good and valid when it was made should be treated as patently invalid and wrong by virtue of the retrospective operation of the Amendment Act. But such a result is necessarily involved in the legal fiction about the retrospective operation of the Amendment Act. If, as a result of the said fiction we must read t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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