TMI Blog2012 (11) TMI 327X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o resort to that extreme contingent. - CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 8845-8850 OF 2003 - - - Dated:- 6-11-2012 - Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN AND FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA JJ. JUDGMENT Dr. B. S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. These appeals have been preferred against the judgments and orders dated 18.9.2002, passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Civil Writ Petition Nos.13985 to 13990 of 2001, by way of which, the High Court has dismissed the said writ petitions, concurring with the judgment and order of the Financial Commissioner dated 29.11.2000, by which while allowing the Revision Petition filed by the respondent-Gram Panchayat, claims of the appellants for occupancy rights in the land in dispute were rejected. 2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to these appeals are as follows: A. The appellants/their predecessors-in-interest had been in cultivatory possession of the land in dispute, measuring 78 kanal 5 marlas situated in the village of Jhupa Khurd, Tehsil Loharu Distt. Bhiwani, prior to 1935-36. Until the year 1954, the said land was recorded as Shamilat deh in the revenue records. In the cultivation column, the appellants/their predecessors-in-interest w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... al rent of 34 paise, however, the disputed land was always shown as shamilat deh , and all revenue records showed the status of the appellants/their predecessors-in-interest as co-sharers, owing to which, they could not be termed as tenants. To create a relationship of tenancy, there must be an agreement between the parties, which was not in existence in the instant case. The possession of the appellants as regards the land in dispute, remained unauthorised and illegal and thus, they could not claim occupancy rights. In the event that the land was in illegal possession of any person, prior to the commencement of the Act, 1961, the same would be deemed to be illegal, and no occupancy rights over it would be allowed. E. The appellants/their predecessors-in-interest filed an appeal against the said order, before the Divisional Commissioner, Hisar. The Divisional Commissioner, while deciding further appeals vide judgment and order dated 22.8.1996, held that the predecessors-in interest of the appellants, had been in cultivatory possession of the land before 1935-1936 as share holders/joint owners, upon the payment of nominal rent. As the appellants had been in cultivatory posses ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Sharan, learned Senior counsel appearing for the appellants, has submitted that the suit was filed under Sections 5 and 8 of the Tenancy Act and that, as the appellants were tenants, they were entitled to declaration of their occupancy rights as regards the land in dispute. Even otherwise, Section 8 of the Tenancy Act enables the appellants to attain the said declaration. The statutory authorities committed a grave error in holding that the appellants were joint owners in the shamilat deh, and not tenants. Therefore, the present appeals deserve to be allowed. 4. Per contra, Shri Manjit Singh, learned AAG appearing for the respondents, has vehemently opposed the appeals contending that the appellants/their predecessors-in-interest were in cultivatory possession of the land as joint-owners/ hisedars (village proprietors), prior to 1935-36, and continued to be so, as per the revenue records even after the year 1954. Moreover, the appellants have claimed occupancy rights as provided under Section 2(f) of the Punjab Occupancy Tenants (Vesting of Proprietary Rights) Act, 1952, (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1952) and therefore, they cannot be allowed to claim any benefit under ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t (including the contingent interest, if any, recognised by any law, custom or usage for the time being in force and including the share in the Shamilat with respect to the land concerned) of the landlord in the land held under him by an occupancy tenant, shall be extinguished, and such rights, title and interest shall be deemed to vest in the occupancy tenant free from all encumbrances, if any, created by the landlord. (c) Act 1961 : Section 4 -Vesting of rights in Panchayats and Non- Proprietors: xx xx xx xx (3)(ii) rights of persons in cultivating possession of Shamilat deh, for more than twelve years [immediately preceding the commencement of this Act] [Inserted by the Punjab Act No.19 of 1976, Section 3] without payment of rent or by payment of charges not exceeding the land revenue and cesses payable thereon. xx xx xx 7. Power to put panchayat in possession of Shamilat deh- (1) The collector shall, on an application made to him by a panchayat, or by an officer, duly authorised in this behalf by the state government by a general or special order, after making such enquiry, as he may think fit and in accordance with such procedure as may be prescrib ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... eful in its choice of language. Thus, if a statutory provision is enacted by the legislature in a certain manner, the only reasonable interpretation which can be resorted to by the courts is that such was the intention of the legislature and that the provision was consciously enacted in that manner. 9. In Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, Bombay AIR 2002 SC 1706, this court observed : That different expressions like 'similar' and 'other' have not been used without any basis. No words or expressions used in any statute can be said to be redundant or superfluous. Every provision and every word must be looked at generally and in the context in which it is used. It is said that every statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting any word while considering a statute is to gather the mens or sentential legis of the legislature. Where the words arc clear and there is no obscurity, and there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the Court to take upon itself the task of amending or alternating the statutory provisions. Wherever the language is clear the intention of the le ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s intended to give a restricted meaning to the phrase, any person , then it is not open to the court to give a wide or un-restricted meaning to the words, any person . (Vide: Sita Ram v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1962 SC 1146; Sri Vedagiri Lakshmi Narasimha Swami Temple v. Induru Pattabhirami Reddi, AIR 1967 SC 781; New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Asha Rani Ors., AIR 2003 SC 607; and National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur Ors., (2004) 2 SCC 1). 13. In Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bhubaneshwar Anr. v. Parmeshwari Devi Sultania Ors., AIR 1998 SC 1276, while interpreting the provisions of Section 132(11) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, this Court interpreted the expression, any person , as not confined to a person searched, or against whom an order is passed, but such expression would include, even a third party giving reasons for its objections to an order and, hence, seeking appropriate relief in the matter. 14. A similar view was re-iterated in Balkrishna Chhaganlal Soni v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1974 SC 120, by this Court, interpreting the provisions of Sections 107 and 135 (b) of the Customs Act, 1962, observing that the words, any person as contained in Se ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... venue records immediately before the commencement of the Proprietary Rights Act, nor did they obtain a right of occupancy in respect of the said land either by agreement with the landlord or through a court of competent jurisdiction or otherwise after the commencement of the Act. The appellants, therefore, do not answer the definition of occupancy tenant under the Proprietary Rights Act. Consequently, they cannot derive any benefit under Section 3 of the said Act. If Section 3 of the Proprietary Rights Act is inapplicable, the question that remains for consideration is whether they are entitled to the relief sought merely because the names of Sarjeet and Jivan Lal (father of Appellants 1 to 3 and father of Appellants 4 and 5 respectively) were shown as cultivating the lands for some years from 1966-67. To get excluded from the vesting under Section 4(1) of the Common Lands Act, by relying on Section 4(3)(ii), the appellants should prove that they and their ancestors were cultivating such land for a period of at least 12 years prior to the commencement of the Common Lands Act . . 16. If the aforesaid test laid down by this Court, is applied to the case at hand, then undoubtedl ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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