TMI Blog2013 (2) TMI 173X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d of the month in which the return was filed. In the present case, return was filed on July 31, 2007, and limitation for issuance of notice under section 143(2) of the Act was up to July 31, 2008. However, by virtue of amendment by the Finance Act, 2008, with effect from April 1, 2008, limitation stood extended up to six months from the end of the financial year in which the return was furnished, i.e., up to September 30 2008. It is well settled that a statute of limitation is a procedural statute and is applicable to pending proceedings. However, limitation law is prospective as it does not revive an action which may have become time barred on the date of enforcement of the changed law nor the changed law extinguishes a subsequent cause of action Even though the order under section 143(1) of the Act was after notification dated September 28, 2007, under section 120 of the Act, the said order cannot be held to be nullity. It is well settled that objection as to territorial jurisdiction has to be raised at the earliest and is otherwise deemed to have been waived. On the same analogy, notice under section 143(2) cannot be held to be void for want of jurisdiction. Reference may ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ect Taxes authorized the officers specified therein to exercise powers of Assessing Officers and other authorities. In spite of the said notification, power has been exercised by respondent No. 2, i.e., Joint Commissioner of Income-tax (International Taxation). It is submitted that notice under sec-tion 143(2) of the Act issued by respondent No. 2 was barred by limitation and that the authority at Jalandhar had no jurisdiction to issue notice under section 143(2) of the Act after issuance of notification dated September 28, 2007. 5. In the reply filed, the stand of the Revenue is that notice dated September 30, 2008, was within limitation in view of the amended pro-vision of section 143(2)(ii) of the Act. The limitation was available up to a period of six months from the end of the financial year in which return was filed, i.e., up to September 30, 2008, whereas notice was in fact issued on September 17, 2008. As regards the notification, transferring jurisdiction from Jalandhar to Chandigarh under section 120 of the Act, the stand taken is that notwithstanding the said notification, the files were actually transferred to Chandigarh only on October 29, 2009. There-after, notice ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... P. Singh, tenth edition : ". . . Statutes of limitation are thus retrospective in so far as they apply to all legal proceedings brought after their operation for enforcing causes of action accrued earlier, but they are prospective in the sense that they neither have the effect of reviving a right of action which is already barred on the date of their coming into operation, nor do they have the effect of extinguishing a right of action subsisting on that date. But a statute may, expressly or impliedly by retrospectively extending limitation, revive a barred claim . . ." 11. The judgments relied upon do not take any contrary view and are not to the effect that limitation law will not apply to pending proceedings. In Mahi Valley Hotels [2006] 287 ITR 360 (Guj) notice issued after limitation was held to be void. Similar is the position in M. Chellappan [2006] 281 ITR 444 (Mad) ; Brij Mohan [1979] 120 ITR 1 (SC) is not a case dealing with amendment to law of limitation and does not hold that the changed limi-tation law does not apply to pending proceedings. S. S. Gadgil [1964] 53 ITR 231 (SC) deals with the principle that an amendment has to be pro-spective and does not have the e ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... liest and is otherwise deemed to have been waived. On the same analogy, notice under section 143(2) cannot be held to be void for want of jurisdiction. Reference may be made not only to section 21 of the Code of Civil Proce-dure but also to section 124(3) of the Act. In the objection raised by the petitioner, annexure P-5, the only plea raised was that the notice was beyond limitation and there was no objection to the jurisdiction. On being asked, learned counsel for the petitioner was unable to show the question of territorial jurisdiction having been raised at any time prior to December 2, 2009, when such objection was put forward for the first time in reply of the petitioner, annexure P-12 put forward to Chandigarh authority. By the time objection was raised for the first time, notice had already been issued by the Chandigarh authority. The Chandigarh authority while issuing notice under section 142(1) of the Act, was acting in continuation of the notice already issued by the adjudicating authority. This being the factual position, the plea of lack of territorial jurisdiction did not vitiate notice under section 143(2) of the Act. No prejudice is shown to have been caused to the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 1) of section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it was, therefore, obligatory on the part of the appellate court to pose unto itself the right question, viz., whether the first respondent has been able to show sufferance of any prejudice. If it has not suffered any or otherwise no failure of justice had occurred, the High Court should not have entertained the appeal on that ground alone. We, however, while taking that factor into consideration must place on record that we are not oblivious of the fact that a decision rendered without jurisdiction would be coram non juris. Objection in regard to jurisdiction may be taken at any stage (See Chief Engineer, Hydel Project v. Ravinder Nath [2008] 2 SCC 350 wherein, inter alia, the decision of this court in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340) was followed, stating : '26. The court also relied upon the decision in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Pawan, AIR 1954 SC 340 and quoted (in Harshad Chiman Lal's case [2005] 7 SCC 791, SCC pages 804-805, paragraph 33 there-from : Kiran Singh case, AIR page 342, paragraph 6) "6. . . . It is a fundamental principle well established that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a n ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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