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TMI Blog2013 (9) TMI 73X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rried one Debanti Devi during the subsistence of his earlier marriage with Nurmani Devi. The petitioner is the son of the said Mithu Singh born out of the second marriage with Debanti Devi. The fact of second marriage of Mithu Singh was noted in his service record. Mithu Singh died on 06.10.2000 while in service. Upon death of Mithu Singh, the petitioner made an application requesting for compassionate appointment. Pursuant to such representation, the petitioner appeared before the Screening Committee and after initial medical examination, his case was forwarded to the Deputy CME/Agent, Kumaradhubi Colliery, Eastern Coalfields Limited, respondent no. 6 herein. By impugned order bearing Memo No. ECL/AGENT/KDC/2011/514 dated 30th May/2nd June, 2011, the respondent no. 6 rejected the claim of the petitioner on the ground that he was born out of the second marriage of Late Mithu Singh. The petitioner challenged such decision before this Court in W.P. No. 1015 of 2011. The learned Single Judge set aside the impugned order rejecting the prayer for compassionate appointment of the petitioner by holding that the word "son" in the category of "dependants" in Clause 9.3.3 of the National ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... aughter/widowed daughter-in-law or son-in-law residing with the deceased and almost wholly dependant on the earnings of the deceased may be considered to be the dependant of the deceased." A plain reading of clause 9.3.3 would show that dependant of a deceased/disabled employee for the purpose of compassionate appointment would mean wife/husband (as the case may), unmarried daughter, son and legally adopted son and in the absence of the aforesaid categories, employment may be provided to brother/widowed daughter/widowed daughter-in-law or son-in law residing with the deceased and wholly dependant on the earnings of the deceased. The learned Single Judge applied provisions of Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 to hold that word "son" in the aforesaid paragraph would include a son born out of second marriage which is void in law. Second 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 reads as follows : "16. Legitimacy of children of void and voidable marriages. - (1) Notwithstanding that a marriage is null and void under section 11, any child of such marriage who would have been legitimate if the marriage had been valid, shall be legitimate, whether such child is born before or after ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mpassionate ground is an exception to the constitutional scheme of equality as adumbrated under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India." For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the opinion that the provisions of Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 cannot come to the aid of the petitioner. Legal presumption of legitimacy in such provision is restricted only to the property of the deceased and not to other things. Hence, such provision of law cannot be pressed into service to expand the privilege of compassionate appointment extended by an employee under the scheme as the same can by no stretch of imagination be held to be the property of the deceased employee. The appellant has relied on decision reported in 2000 (2) SCC 431 wherein the Apex Court had upheld the decision of the High Court that illegitimate children were entitled to share in the family pension and gratuity of the deceased employee until they attained majority. In the said decision, the Apex Court had referred to Section 16 of the Act and held as follows : "It cannot be disputed that the marriage between Narain Lal and Yogmaya Devi was in contravention of clause (i) of Section 5 of Hindu Marriage Act ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... . The scheme of compassionate appointment is neither property of the deceased nor a heritable right. It cannot be equated with a right to pension of the employee or his dependants upon his death. Hence, the ratio of the Madras High Court does not appear to be based on sound logic. Reliance on the Apex Court decision is also faulty as a judgement is an authority for what it decides and not what logically follows therefrom. On the other hand, the decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in 2004 (100) FLR 111 (Ramesh Chand Vs. Executive Engineer, Electricity Distribution Division - II, U.P. Power Corporation Ltd., Allahabad and others) has rightly interpreted the restricted import of the legal presumption in Section 16 of the Act and rejected its applicability to matters relating to compassionate appointment. Right to compassionate appointment is an exception to the general rule of recruitment by public competition. Such privilege therefore is to be strictly construed according to the terms and conditions of the scheme and the same cannot be rewritten by the Courts. In Bhawani Prasad Sonkar Vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in (2011) 4 SCC 209 THE Apex Court, inter alia, held ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t wherever the legislature wanted to extend any right or privilege to illegitimate children, it expressly provided for the same. The scheme for compassionate appointment has not expressly provided such privilege to illegitimate children born out of a void marriage. When the employer in its wisdom has not extended such privilege to an illegitimate son born out of a void marriage, such privilege cannot be imported by resorting to other statutory instruments which have no manner of application to the matter of compassionate appointment of a deceased employee. The matter can also be viewed from another angle. A bare reading of clause 9.3.3 which defines dependants would show that the word "son" is accompanied by the words "legally adopted son". It is settled law that the meaning of a word is to be judged by the company it keeps. When two or more words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled together, they are understood to be used in their cognate sense. They take as it were their colour from each other, that is, the more general is restricted to a sense analogous to a less general (MAXWELL : Interpretation of Statute, 11th Edition, p. 321). Applying such principle, wh ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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