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TMI Blog1962 (4) TMI 89X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t concerned with the merits of the case put forward by the respondent, for the matter has not yet been heard on the merits. When the petition came up before a learned Single Judge a question was raised as to the jurisdiction of the High Court to hear the petition in view of the decision of this Court in Election Commission India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao.( (1953) S.C.R. 1144,) As the learned Single Judge considered the point important, he referred the matter to a larger bench; and eventually the question was considered by a Full-Bench if the High Court. The Full-Bench addressed itself two questions in that connection, namely, (i) whether any writ could issue against the Central Board of Revenue which was a party to the writ petition and which was permanently located outside the jurisdiction of the High Court, and (ii) whether if no writ could issue, against the Central Board of Revenue any writ could be issued against the appellant, which was the original authority to pass the order under challenge, when the appellate authority (namely, the Central Board of Revenue) had merely dismissed the appeal. The Full-Bench held on the first question. that the High Court, had no jurisdiction ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... merely dismissed, the order of the original authority merged in the order of the appellate authority, and if the appellate authority was beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, no writ could issue even to the original authority. It may be mentioned that the Rajasthan High Court had occasion to reconsider the matter after the decision of this Court in A. Thangal Kunju Mudaliar v. M. Venkita-chalam Potti (1955 2 S. C. R. 1196) and held that in view of that decision, itsearlier decision in Barkatali's case (A.I.R. (1954) Raj. 214) was no longer good law. The High Court has however not noticed this later decision of the Rajasthan High Court to which the learned Chief Justice who was party to the earlier Rajasthan case was also a party. The main reason which impelled the High Courts, which held otherwise, was that the order of the original authority got merged in the order of the Appellate authority when the appeal was disposed of and therefore if the High Court had no territorial jurisdiction to issue a writ against the appellate authority it could not issue a writ against the original authority, even though the appellate authority had merely dismissed the appeal withou ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rial jurisdiction to issue any writ to the appellate authority. We therefore feel that on principle when once an order of an original authority is taken in appeal to the appellate authority which is located beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, it is the order after the appeal is disposed of; and as the High Court cannot issue a writ against the appellate authority for want of territorial jurisdiction it would not be open to it at issue a writ to the original authority which may be within its territorial jurisdiction once the appeal is disposed of, though it may be that the appellate authority has merely confirmed the order of the original authority and dismissed the appeal. It is this principle, viz., that the appellate order is the operative order after the appeal is disposed of, which is in our opinion the basis of the rule that the decree of the lower court merges in the decree of the appellate court, and on the same principle it would not be incorrect to say that the order of the original authority is merged in the order of the appellate authority whatsoever its decision-whether of reversal or modification or mere confirmation. This matter has been considered ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ough it was pointed out in view of r.60 of the Mineral Concession Rules that it is the Central Government's order in review which is the effective and final order. Learned counsel for the respondent sought to distinguish Madan Gopal Rungla's case ((1962) (Supp.) 3 S.C.R. 906) on the ground that it was based mainly on an interpretation of r. 60 of the Mineral Concession Rules 1949, though he did not pursue this further when s. 188 of the Sea Customs Act was pointed out to him. The main reliance however of the respondent both in the High Court and before us is on the decision in the State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohmmed Nooh ((1958) S.C.R. 595). That was a case where a public servant was dismissed on April 20, 1948 before the Constitution had come into force. His appeal from the order of dismissal was dismissed in May 1949 which was also before the Constitution came into force. His revision against the order in the appeal was dismissed on April 22, 1950, when the Constitution had come into force, and the question that arose in that case was whether the dismissed public servant could take advantage of the provisions of the Constitution because the revisional order had been passed after t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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