TMI Blog2001 (3) TMI 976X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... any part of its fund in the share of the federal society before the commencement of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Act, 2000 dated 20th August, 2000. The aforesaid Ordinance also has been given a retrospective effect, to be effective from 23rd August, 2000. The Ordinance having been held to be valid by us as stated above, the so-called prohibition contained in the first proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 27 will not apply to all those societies which have already become members of the federal society prior to 23rd August, 2000. On the wake of the aforesaid the Appeal thus fails: Each party, however, to pay and bear its own costs. - Appeal (civil) 2298 of 2001 - - - Dated:- 22-3-2001 - G. B. Pattanaik, Umesh C. Banerjee B. N. Agrawal,JJ. JUDGMENT Banerjee,J. Leave granted. Urgency of the situation has prompted this Court to dispose of the present Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution even at the stage of admission: Urgency being initiation of election process of Kolhapur District Central Co-operative Bank in the State of Maharashtra. Incidentally, Bombay High Court has negatived the petitioners contention of restrictive ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f the same, however, is set out as below:- 1. Short title and Commencement (1) This Ordinance may be called the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies (Second Amendment) Ordinance, 2001. (2) It shall be deemed to have come into force on the 23rd August, 2000 2. Amendment of Section 27 of Mah.XXIV of 1961 In Section 27 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960- (a) in sub-section (3)- (i) after the first proviso, the following proviso shall be inserted as the second proviso, namely:- Provided further that nothing in the first proviso shall apply to the member society, which has invested any part of its fund in the shares of the federal society, before the commencement of the Maharashtra Co- operative Societies (Amendment) Act, 2000. (ii) In the existing second proviso, for the words provided further that the words provided also that shall be substituted: (b) to sub-section (3A), the following proviso shall be added, namely, Provided that, nothing in sub-section (3A) shall apply to an individual member of a society, who has been enrolled as a member of that society, before the commencement of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Act, 2000. Mr. V.A. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in the Act that the societies and the members who have already obtained the membership before the 23rd August, 2000, that is, the date of coming into force of the said amendment Act. 2. As both Houses of the State Legislature are not in session and the Governor of Maharashtra is satisfied that the circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action further to amend the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (Mah. XXIV of 1961), for the purpose of aforesaid, this Ordinance is promulgated. On an analysis of the statement as noticed in the preceding paragraph Mr. Bobde contended that the whole purpose of promulgation of the Ordinance has been purposive and to scruttle a free and fair election. It has been contended that legislation cannot be a tool to satisfy a political end and the conclusion is irresistible in the contextual facts on this count only if English words are given ordinary common English parlance. The factum of having a confusion while preparing the voters list as stated in the statement of objects and reasons, negates the basis of the High Court judgment to wit: the voter list stands prepared and concluded by 30th June, 2000. Mr. Bobde ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... case is to be decided on the given facts. In this context the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Liyanage and others v. Reginam (1966 1 All ER 650) ought also to be noticed wherein, Their Lordships of the Privy Council introduced the concept of legislation ad hominem and struck down a legislation by reason therefor. Lord Pearce in his inimitable style observed as below: Do the Acts of 1962, however, otherwise than in respect of the Ministers nomination, usurp or infringe that power? It goes without saying that the legislature may legislature, for the generality of its subjects, by the creation of crimes and penalties or by enacting rules relating to evidence. But the Acts of 1962 had no such general intention. They were clearly aimed at particular known individuals who had been named in a White Paper and were in prison awaiting their fate. The fact that the learned judges declined to convict some of the prisoners is not to the point. That the alterations in the law were not intended for the generality of the citizens or designed as any improvement of the general law, is shown by the fact that the effect of those alterations was to be limited to the participants in the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... an Act. It is true, as contended by Shri Tarkunde, that if the question as regards the justiciability of the Presidents satisfaction is not to be considered for the reason that the ordinance has become an Act, the occasion will hardly ever arise for considering that question because, by the time the challenge made to an ordinance comes up for consideration before the court, the ordinance almost invariably shall have been replaced by an Act. All the same, the position is firmly established in the field of constitutional adjudication that the court will decide no more than needs to be decided in any particular case. Abstract questions present interesting challenges, but it is for scholar and textbook writers to unravel their mystique. It is not for the courts to decide questions which are but of academic importance. 29. The other reason why we are not inclined to go into the question as regards the justiciability of the Presidents satisfaction under Article 123 (1) is that on the material which is placed before us, it is impossible for us to arrive at a conclusion one way or the other. We are not sure whether a question like the one before us would be governed by the rule of burde ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ture and not the Executive and it is possible that circumstances may arise which render it necessary to take immediate action when the Legislature is not in session, in such a case and in order that public interest may not suffer by reason of the failure of the legislature to deal with the emergent situation, the Governor is vested with the power to promulgate the Ordinance. This Court further observed that the power to promulgate Ordinance is essentially a power to be used to meet an extra- ordinary situation though it cannot be allowed to be perverse to serve political ends. It is on this count of judicial ad-negation Mr. Bobde found fault with the judgment under appeal since the instant Ordinance, as appears from the Statement of objects and reasons, cannot but be so declared. The law thus remains clarified that judicial reluctance cannot be faulted in any way unless of course an element of constitutionality of the legislation comes up for consideration The issue of political question as argued before this Court in the matter and noticed above, pertains however to the judicial review of legislation. A large number of decisions have been cited though not noticed above, since the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t too on the constitutionality aspect and not beyond the same. We may thus note here that though a definite motive has been ascribed, we are not in a position to lend concurrence to Mr. Bobdes submission that there is any legislative malice. Legislative malice is beyond the pale of jurisdiction of the law courts and since there is no constitutional invalidity neither the same has been contended before us, question of interference with the matter pertaining to the first proviso or even the ordinance does not and cannot arise. In any event, the Ordinance, strictly speaking, may be ascribed to be totally irrelevant in the present context, but if the executive in its wisdom thought it fit to promulgate such an ordinance, it is no part of our duty to describe it as otherwise not required even as and by way of a clarification since the administrative expediency permitted the legislative function on to the executive. Needless to repeat the factual score that the High Court hadnt had the opportunity to consider the Ordinance which stands promulgated only after the disposal of the appeal and during the pendency of the matter before this court: The Ordinance, however, has a retrospective o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e organs of the State functioning within its restrictive sphere. There is existing sufficient constitutional safeguard and rigour and a plain reading of the language used therein depicts the same. Article 213 authorises promulgation of an Ordinance and confers a power of legislation on to the Governor only in the event of recording a satisfaction that the circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action and he may thus promulgate such an Ordinance as the circumstances appear to him to require and the Ordinance so promulgated can be laid before the Legislative Assembly of the State at the expiry of six weeks from the re-assembly of the Legislature. It is in this perspective it be noted that the power of the Executive is only an emergent power to meet the emergency. Mr. Bobde posed a question as a part of his submission as regards the nature of the emergency since the statement of objects records the Ordinance to be a mere clarificatory Ordinance, there seems to be some substance since what was implicit has been stated to be made explicit by way of clarification according to the plain English meaning of the words used in the statement. This is however ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sed it into law. The Bill may have undergone radical changes during its passage through the House or Houses, and there is no guarantee that the reasons which led to its introduction and the objects thereby sought to be achieved have remained the same throughout till the Bill emerges from the House as an Act of the Legislature, for they do not form part of the Bill and are not voted upon by the members. We, therefore, consider that the Statement of objects and reasons appended to the Bill should be ruled out as an aid to the construction of a statute. Further, after introduction of the Bill and during the debates thereon before the Parliament, if a particular provision is inserted by reason of such a debate, question of indication of any object in the objects and reasons of the Bill does not and cannot arise. The statements of objects and reasons need to looked into though not by itself a necessary aid as an aid to construction only if necessary. To assess the intent of the Legislature in the event of there being any confusion, statement of objects and reasons may be looked into and no exception can be taken therefor this is not an indispensable requirement but when faced with an ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the amendment. While the statements of objects and reasons in the normal course of event cannot be termed to be the main or principal aid to construction but in the event it is required to discern the reasonableness of the classification as in the case of Shashikant Laxman Kale and Anr. v. Union of India Anr. [AIR 1990 SC 2114] statement of objects and reasons can be usefully looked into for appreciating the background of legislatures classification. This Court in para 16 of the judgment last noticed had the following to state: For determining the purpose or object of the legislation, it is permissible to look into the circumstances which prevailed at the time when the law was passed and which necessitated the passing of that law. For the limited purpose of appreciating the background and the antecedent factual matrix leading to the legislation, it is permissible to look into the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Bill which actuated the step to provide a remedy for the then existing malady. In a. Thangal Kunju Musaliar v. M. Venkitachalam Potti, [1955 (2) SCR 1196 : AIR 1956 SC 246], the Statement of Objects and Reasons was used for judging the reasonableness of a class ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ad in the light of the mischief which the statute was designed to overcome and of the objects of the legislation, they may wear a very different appearance. Further, inconvenience or improbability of result may assist the court in preferring to the literal meaning an alternative construction which, by the steps identified above, is reasonably open and more closely conforms to the legislative intent (Cooper Brookes (Wollomgong) Pty Ltd. v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation.: 1981 (147) CLR 297 at 320-321). Another decision of the Australian High Court in the case of Newcastle City Council v. GIO General Limited [1998 (72) ALJR 97 (Aust.) may also be noticed at this juncture wherein the observations and elucidation of cannons of construction and interpretation by Brennan, CJ seem to be very apposite and we do record our unhesitant concurrence therewith. The observations however runs as below: Moreover, as the extrinsic material reveals, s.40(3) was intended to be remedial. As far as practicable, s.40(1) and (3) should be construed to promote the objects of the Act. Nevertheless, as I pointed out in Kingston v. Keprose Pty Ltd. [1987 (11) NSWLR 404 at 423], in applying a purposive ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... obde. Further we wish to clarify that it is a cardinal principle of interpretation of statute that the words of a statute must be understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless such construction leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context or in the object of the statute to suggest to the contrary. The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. It is yet another rule of construction that when the words of the statute are clear, plain and unambiguous, then the Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning, irrespective of the consequences. It is said that the words themselves best declare the intention of the law giver. The Courts have adhered to the principle that efforts should be made to give meaning to each and every word used by the legislature and it is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surpluses, if they can have a proper application in circumstances conceivable within the contemplation of the statute. Bearing in mind, the aforesaid principle of construction, if the expressio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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