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TMI Blog2002 (9) TMI 799X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... an application under Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act? 2. Whether a person who has received the compensation without protest pursuant to the award of the Land Acquisition Collector and has not filed an application seeking reference under Section 18 is" a person aggrieved" within the meaning of Section 28-A? According to the learned Judges, the three Judges Bench decision of this Court in Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Redriguese and Anr. v. Land Acquisition Collector and Anr., [1996] 6 SCC 746 requires reconsideration. At the outset, it may be stated that the Constitution Bench in Pradip Chandra Parija and Ors. v. Pramod Chandra Patnaik and Ors., [2002] 1 SCC 1, held that judicial discipline and propriety demands that a Bench of two learned Judges should follow a decision of a Bench of three learned Judges. But if a Bench of two learned judges concludes that an earlier Judgment of three learned Judges is so very incorrect that in no circumstances can it be followed, the proper course for it to adopt is, to refer the matter before it to a Bench of three Learned Judges setting out the reasons why it could not agree with the earlier judgment and then the Bench of three learned jud ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ndment by Act 68 of 1984, which came into force w.e.f. 14.9.1984. Prior to the present reference in Jose Antonio Cruz. Dos. R. Rodriguese and Anr. v. Land Acquisition Collector and Anr., [1996] 1 SCC 88 two learned judges of this Court had referred the following two questions for being answered by a Larger Bench of five Judges. The said questions being:- "1. Whether the award of the Court i.e. civil court made under Section 26 on reference under Section 18 would also include judgment and decree of the appellate; court under Section 54? 2. Whether each successive award or judgment and decree (if answer on Question No. 1 is positive) would give cause of action to file application under Section 28-A, if so construed, does not such a construction violate the language used in Section 28-A when Parliament advisedly did not use such expressions?" The aforesaid order of the learned Judges indicate that they did not agree with the ratio of this Court in the case of Union of India and Anr. \. Pradeep Kumari and Ors., [1995] 2 SCC 736. But the said two points stood answered by the three judges Bench in the case of Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodriguese and Am: v. Land Acquisition Collector and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sion would be confined to redetermination of compensation on the basis of lesser amount of compensation awarded under the first award that is made after the coming into force of Section 28-A. There is nothing in the wordings of Section 28-A to indicate that the legislature intended to confer such a limited benefit under Section 28-A." The Court enumerated the conditions to be satisfied, where-after an application under Section 28-A can be moved. The said conditions being: "(i) An award has been made by the court under Part III after the coming into force of Section 28-A; (ii) By the said award the amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11 has been allowed to the applicant in that reference; (iii) The person moving the application under Section 28-A is interested in other land covered by the same notification under Section 4(1) to which the said award relates; (iv) The person moving the application did not make an application to the Collector under Section 18; (v) The application is moved within three months from the date of the award on the basis of which the re-determination of amount of compensation is sought; and (vi) Only on ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ourt and not the order passed by the High Court in appeal or any other order in further appeal therefrom. The Ld. Solicitor General also urged that looking at the purpose for which Section 28-A was brought on the statute book, it would be reasonable to construe that the date of the first award of the reference court when it comes to the knowledge of the person who had not earlier availed of making a reference under Section 18 and to that extent, the decision of the court in Pradeep Kumari's case is not correct. This contention of the learned Solicitor General was reiterated by Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, the learned senior counsel, appearing for some of the states and several other counsels. Mr. S.K. Gambhir, the learned senior counsel, appearing for the land owners, on the other hand contended that the legislative intent in bringing forth the amendment and inserting Section 28-A being to confer some benefits on the poor illiterate land owners, the court must not only liberally construe the provisions but also should construe the provisions in such a manner, even at the cost of doing violence to the language, so that the purpose for which the amendment was brought, can be achieved. Accord ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ri, CJ in the case of Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose, [1953] SCR 1, had held that it is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surplusage, if they can have appropriate application in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute. In Quebec Railway, Light Heat and Power Co. v. Vandray, AIR (1920) PC 181, it had been observed that the Legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain and a construction which attributes redundancy to the legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons. Similarly, it is not permissible to add words to a statute which are not there unless on a literal construction being given a part of the statute becomes meaningless. But before any words are read to repair an omission in the Act, it should be possible to state with certainty that these words would have been inserted by the draftsman and approved by the legislature had their attention been drawn to the omission before the Bill had passed into a law. At times, the intention of the legislature is found to be clear but the unskilfulness of the draftsman in introducing certain words in the stat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... er Section 18 on the ground of delay would tantamount to not filing an application within the meaning of Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. So far as question l(b) is concerned, this is really the same question, as in question l(a) and, therefore, we reiterate that when an application of a land owner under Section 18 is dismissed on the ground of delay, then the said land owner is entitled to make an application under Section 28-A, if other conditions prescribed therein are fulfilled. Coming to the second question for reference the receipt of compensation with or without protest pursuant to the award of the Land Acquisition Collector is of no consequence for the purpose of making a fresh application under Section 28-A. If a person has not filed an application under Section 18 of the Act to make a reference, then irrespective of the fact whether he has received the compensation awarded by the Collectors with or without protest, he would be a person aggrieved within the meaning of Section 28-A and would be entitled to make an application when some other land owner's application for reference is answered by the reference Court. It is apparent on the plain language of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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