9911796707
TMI Blog1997 (8) TMI 508X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Pursuant to that order, a refund voucher was prepared on March 14, 1996, which was issued by the respondent on June 15, 1996. As a voucher is valid only for a period of 60 days under rule 99 of the U.P. Trade Tax Rules, the voucher dated March 14, 1996, was dishonoured by the bank, as that was presented much beyond the period of validity. The respondent then prepared another voucher on August 29, 1996, which is said to have been despatched on November 13, 1996, and that, according to the petitioner, was received on November 16, 1996. The second voucher dated August 29, 1996, also suffered from the same infirmity and, therefore, that too was dishonoured by the bank. 4.. Counsel for the petitioner states before us that the amount was refu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... me entitled to refund thereunder. We have gone through the counter-affidavit, filed by the respondent. No averment has been made in the counter-affidavit anywhere that the order of the Appellate Tribunal was received by the respondent in the year 1996 when the order to refund was passed. Therefore, we will be fully justified in assuming that the order of the Appellate Tribunal was received by the respondent, who passed the order for refund, within a reasonable time. As a consequence of the order of the Appellate Tribunal, the respondent should have refunded the amount within three months from the date of the order. In the counteraffidavit, it is averred that there was no deliberate delay on the part of the respondent, but whatever delay was ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the U.P. Trade Tax Rules (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules") submits that the interest liability cannot arise before the refund is claimed and, in this case, the petitioner made an application for claiming refund only on December 13, 1995. We see no force in the submission of the Standing Counsel. Refund becomes due under section 29 of the Act immediately after a final order is passed and, in this case, the order of the Appellate Tribunal came to be passed on February 22, 1993. The respondent became liable to refund the amount as a result of the Tribunal's order and it is wrong to say that the liability will arise only from the date of the application made by the petitioner for refund. Even if no application is made for refund by t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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