TMI Blog1961 (1) TMI 70X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... The main question for determination in this appeal is whether these Salt Works come within the definition of the word factory under cl. (m) of s. 2 of the Act. The answer to this question depends on the meaning of the word premises in the definition of the word factory and on the determination whether what is done at this Salt Works in connection with the conversion of sea water into crystals of salt comes within the definition of the expression manufacturing process in cl. (k) of s. 2 of the Act. The Salt Works extend over an area of about two hundred and fifty acres. Some of the other salt works, however, have even larger areas. The only buildings on this land consist of temporary shelters constructed for the resident labour and for an office. At a few places, pucca platforms exist for fixing the water pump when required to pump water from the sea. When not required, this pump is kept in the office. With the exception of the constructions already mentioned, the entire area of the Salt Works is open. On the sea side, it has bunds in order to prevent sea water flooding the salt pans. Clause (m) of s. 2 of the Act reads: factory' means any premises including ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ments and in Acts of Parliament as meaning land or houses, e.g., the Public Health Act, 1875, s. 4, where premises includes messuages, buildings, lands, easements, tenements and hereditaments of any tenure...... (e) Ballentine, J.A., Law Dictionary with Pronunciation, II Edition: Premises -as applied to land, Webster's New International Dictionary defines the word as follows: The property conveyed in a deed; hence, in general, a piece of land or, real estate ; sometimes, especially in fire insurance papers, a building or buildings on land; the premises insured. It is therefore clear that the word premises is a; generic term meaning open land or land with buildings or buildings alone. The expression premises including precincts it has been urged, clearly indicates that in the context of the definition of the word factory , premises meant only buildings as buildings alone can have precints and there can be no precincts of any open land. This expression premises including precincts does not necessarily mean that the premises must always have precincts. Even buildings need not have any precincts. The word including is not a term restricting the meani ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... h a process on open land. It is contended for the appellant that the various provisions of the Act cannot be applicable to salt works where the process of converting sea water into salt is carried on in the open. This is true as regards some of the provisions, but then there is nothing in the Act which makes it uniformly compulsory for every occupier of a factory to comply with every requirement of the Act, An occupier is to comply with such provisions of the Act which apply to the factory he is working. It is admitted that the workers have at times to work at night; that some women workers are employed; that workers have to take rest; that they have to take food at about mid-day; that they do require drinking water and that first-aid 'things are kept in the office room. It may be that the occupier has made adequate arrangements for such purposes but this does not mean that the provisions of the Act concerning such amenities shall not be applicable to salt works. Further, the Act has sufficient provisions empowering the State to exempt the occupiers from complying with certain I provisions as a special case. Section 6 of the Act empowers the State Government to make rules re ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... are employed in them: if the legislature intended to apply the Factory Acts to them, it would have been done by special enactment. Hannen, J., said: I agree with my Brother Mellor, that if the legislature had intended to apply the Factory Acts to quarries, they would have been expressly mentioned, and this omission leads strongly to the conclusion that it was not intended to interfere with persons employed in quarries. It is not clear from these observations alone why the slate quarries where work was carried on in the open air and not in building, was not held to be a factory on that account. This is, however, apparent when one considers that the Factory Act of 1833 was enacted to regulate the labour of children and young persons in the mills and factories of the United Kingdom and applied only to cotton, woollen, worsted, hemp, flax, tow, linen or silk mill or factory wherein steam or water or any other mechanical power was used to propel or work the machinery in such mill or factory. The other subsequent Acts simply extended the scope of the Factory Act of 1833. The Act of 1844 was to amend the law relating to labour in ,,factories and provided by s. LXXIII that ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... One Trade Establishment, in, on or within the Precincts of which Fifty or more Persons are employed in any manufacturing Process; ........................................... It is clear from the series of legislation up to the decision in Kent's case that the Parliament specifically enacted with respect to the places which were to be controlled by the respective Factory Acts and that it was therefore that it was said that if the legislature had intended to apply the Factory Act to the slate quarries, it would have extended the Act to them. As the various Factories and Mills which were covered by the Factory Act of 1833 were such which could function only in buildings, the conception grew that nothing would come within the expression factory unless it had a building and unless the Factory Act definitely provided for the application of the Act to it. The next case relied on is Redgrave v. Lee ((1874) 9 Q.B. 363). The earlier decision was just followed in this. The next case cited for the appellant is Nash v. Hollin shead ([1901] 1 K.B. 700). This case too is distinguishable as the farm on which the workman was employed to drive a movable steam engine for the purpose o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... The High Court, however, did not agree with it and stated: In our opinion it is a travesty of language to say that although 47 workmen are working on these works, salt is made without the assistance of human agency............ Now, in this case there is no doubt that the workmen employed on these salt works are dealing with the sea water in a particular manner and but for the dealing with it in that manner, salt as made on these works would not be made. We agree with the High Court that the conversion of sea water into salt is not due merely to natural forces, but is due to human efforts aided by natural forces. The sea water in the sea never becomes salt merely on account of the play of sun's rays on it. The natural force of gravity is utilised for carrying sea water from the sea to the reservoirs, thence to the tapavanis and from there to the crystallizing pans which are specially prepared by thumping the mud and making the layer of tile ground hard and water- tight. The solar energy is utilised in evaporating the water in the brine. The human agency is employed for other processes carried on in the Salt Works. The process of making salt is described in the letter dated J ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... out in the Salt Works and described above, come within the definition of manufacturing process inasmuch as salt can be said to have been manufactured from sea water by the process of treatment and adaptation of sea water into salt. The sea water, a non-commercial article, has been adapted to salt, a commercial article. The observations in Sedgwick v. Watney Combe, Reid Company, Limited ([1931] A.C. 446) at page 463, support the view that the process undergone at the Salt Works is the process of treatment 'of sea water for the purpose of converting it into salt. The hereditament, the subject of controversy in the case, was used in connection with the manufacture of bottled beer by the respondent. Brewed beer, which was not in a drinkable condition, and therefore not saleable as draught' beer, was brought to the premises in tank wagons and pumped into large tanks. Carbonic acid gas was put into it. It was then filtered and put into bottles which were corked and labelled. The bottles were then packed and removed for delivery. The question for decision was whether the hereditament was occupied and used for the purpose of distributive wholesale business. In that connec ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... process or not and what was stated was in connection with the word I( manufacture in general and not with reference to manufacturing process. Similarly the case reported as Paterson v. Hunt is not of much help. It simply held that mere sorting of rags will not amount to adapting for sale. In this case reference was made to it being held in Law v. Graham (4) that washing the bottles before the beer was put into them was not adapting the beer, or adapting the bottles or adapting the bottled beer for the purpose of sale and in Hoare v. Truman, Hanbury, Buxton Co. ((1902) 86 L.T.R. 417) that it was a case of adapting for sale when gas was used to force carbonic acid at high pressure into the beer for charging it with the acid and mixing it and so aerating the beer. The case is distinguishable as sorting of rags brought about no change in particular rags sorted out. They were just separated from other things with which they were mixed and therefore the rags were in no way adapted to some different article. This cannot be said in connection with the conversion of sea water into salt. The decisions in McNicol v. Pinch ([1906] 2 K.B. 352.), State v. Chrestien Mica Industries Ltd. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... vernment of India, Department of Industries Supply, did not raise the contention that the salt works did not come within the definition of the word factory and merely represented that the provisions of the Act be not applied to the salt works in view of the matters mentioned in that representation. Even the reply by the appellant's firm to the Inspector of Factories dated April 9, 1952, did not state that the salt works did not come within the definition of the word factory and simply stated that the provisions of the Indian Factories Act were considered redundant for which their Bombay Salt Association had already made a suitable representation to the Government of India. It was for the first time, in the written statement filed by the appellant in the trial Court, that it was contended that the Salt Works would not come within the word factory in the Act. Omission of the accused or the Association of salt merchants to contend, at an earlier stage, that the salt works do not come within the definition of the word factory is also not of any relevance for our considering the questions before us. We have made reference to it only in view of the reference made by ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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