TMI Blog1990 (10) TMI 362X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hen in force which constitutes the ground for eviction contained in clause (f) of Sub-section 1 of Section 21 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961. There is, thus, no ground to differ with the conclusion reached by the High Court that the ground of sub-letting has been made out, even though our reasons are different. the ground of sub-letting also was rightly held proved by the High Court in addition to the ground of landlord's reasonable and bona fide requirement, the question of applicability of Sub-section 4 of Section 21 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 does not arise and, therefore, it is not necessary to examine the question of comparative hardship. In that view of the matter, the appeals must fail. Appeal dismissed. Grant to the appellants time till 31.3.1991 for vacating the suit premises - C.A. 4701 and 4702 of 1985 - - - Dated:- 10-10-1990 - VERMA, JAGDISH SARAN AND REDDY, K. JAYACHANDRA, JJ. For the Appellant : Dr. Y.S. Chitale Rameshwar Nath, Ravinder Nath and Sukumar Ghosh For the Respondent : P. chidambram, S.S. Javali, H.R. Anantha Krishna Murthy and Ranjit Kumar in C.A. Nos. 4701 and 4702 of 1985. VERMA, J. JUDGMENT These ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Hindu Undivided Family of Mudaliar brothers, the original lessor and the suit premises fell to the share of Narendranath Mudaliar. M/s. Bhoolchand Chandiram continued in the premises as the tenant with Super Dry Cleaners as the sub-tenant in one shop from 1.4. 1948. The original lessor (including Narendranath Mudaliar after partition in the HUF of Mudaliar brothers) continued to take rent from the tenant M/s. Bhoolchand Chandiram of the entire premises i.e. two shops and the house adjoining the shops till May, 1974. On 28.6.1974, the said Narendranath Mudaliar executed a registered sale deed in favour of respondent No. 1, M/s. Kay Pee Cee Investments, a registered partnership firm comprising of three ladies of one family as partners, for the sale consideration of Rs. 1,40,000. It may be mentioned that in a proceeding for fixation of standard rent between the original lessor and the tenant, monthly rent of Rs.325 was fixed for the entire premises i.e. two shops and the house and the rent due upto May, 1974 was paid by the tenant to the original lessor. After execution of the said sale deed in favour of respondent No. 1, the tenant attorned in favour of respondent No. 1 and paid ren ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s ground while the High Court reversing that conclusion has held it to be proved. The question before us is whether there is any infirmity in the High Court's reversal of this finding justifying interference in these appeals. Against the decision of the Trial Court, the provision made in Section 50 of the Act is of a revision and not an appeal to the High Court. However, the power of revision is not narrow as in s. 115 CPC but wider requiring the High Court to examine the impugned order for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or correctness of such order or proceeding' which enables the High Court to 'pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit'. It is clear that the High Court in a revision under Section 50 of the Act is required to satisfy itself not only as to the legality of the impugned order or proceeding but also of its correctness. The power of the High Court, therefore, extends to correcting not merely errors of law but also errors of fact. In other words, the High Court in a revision under Section 50 of the Act is required to examine the correctness of not only findings on questions of law but also on questions of fact. It is s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e of the premises being taken on rent by respondent No. 1. The question, therefore, is whether on these undisputed facts and circumstances the ,landlord's reasonable and bona..fide need has been proved. The Trial Court in deciding against the landlord was influenced considerably by the fact that in support of the landlord's case 'no piece of documentary evidence is produced'. The Trial Court accepted that the family of the respondent No. 1 carries on textile business but held it not proved that partition in the family has taken place to give rise to the requirement of respondent No. 1 firm for the suit premises when the joint family owns other premises in Bangalore. According to the Trial Court, the respondent No. 1 firm is not a separate entity detached from the family. The Trial Court was obviously in error in being influenced by the absence of any documentary evidence to support the need set up by respondent No. 1. There is no finding recorded by the Trial Court of the existence of any document which was material for deciding the question and it being in possession of the respondent No. 1 had not been produced at the trial. In the absence of any such finding, the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... pation is proved does not suffer from any infirmity which can justify interference therewith in these appeals. This alone is sufficient to affirm the decree for eviction passed against the appellants in these appeals. We shall now consider the other question relating to sub-letting which is a ground for eviction specified in clause (f) of the proviso to sub-section 1 of Section 21 of the Act. The basic point for decision is whether the subletting made by M/s. Bhoolchand Chandiram to M/s. Super Dry Cleaners of one shop which is a part of the suit premises w.e.f. 1.4, 1948 was unlawful being contrary to any provision of law then in force. Considerable argument was advanced from both sides relating to the law then in force. We may here indicate that existence of the ground of sub-letting loses much of its significance on our above conclusion that the landlord's reasonable and bona fide need was rightly held proved by the High Court with the consequence that the decree for eviction can be sustained on that ground alone. The ground of sub-letting, however, remains of practical significance only for the purpose of applicability of sub-section 4 of Section 21 of the Act since that ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the consent which was given by the original lessor in the present case is to be found only in the said letter dated 4.10.1943. We must, therefore, see the consent given therein. The aforesaid letter dated 4.10.1943 of the original lessor confirming the creation of the tenancy with effect from 4.10.1943 stated that two shops were let out on a monthly rent of Rs.430 for two years with the option of sub-letting one of the shops; and the house adjoining the shops was let out on a monthly rent of Rs.50 for eleven months with the option of sub-letting the house also. There is no dispute that subsequently in a proceeding for fixation of the standard rent, the entire premises comprising of the two shops and the houses, was treated as one premises and the monthly rent of Rs.325 was fixed for the entire premises and this is how the tenancy was treated by both sides as one tenancy instead of two separate tenancies appearing in the letter dated 4.10.1943. The letter dated 4.10.1943 created contractual tenancy for a period of two years in respect of the two shops and for a period of eleven months for the adjoining houses. Obviously, the consent of the landlord for sub-letting mentioned ther ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t sub-letting in 1946 to Arts Palace of the same shop which was later sublet w.e.f. 1.4. 1948 to M/s Super Dry Cleaners was also after expiry of the period of two years of the contractual tenancy. This fact, however, is not material in the present case since the first sub-letting ended before commencement of the second sub-letting on 1.4. 1948 and it is only the validity of the subsisting subletting w.e.f. 1.4. 1948 which is in question in the present proceedings. Dr. Chitale relied on a number of decisions of this court in support of his contention' that the written consent of the landlord for sub-letting during the period of contractual tenancy continued as one of the terms and conditions of the statutory tenancy when the sub-letting was made w.e.f. 1.4.1948. In reply, Shri Chidambram contended that the written consent of the landlord for sub-letting is not one of the terms which ensures to the benefit of the tenant during subsistence of the statutory tenancy after expiry of the contractual tenancy. The decisions cited at the Bar on this point are Damadilal and Others v. Parashram and Others, [1976] Supp. SCR 645; Y. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal, [1980] 1 SCR 334; Smt. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... otection against eviction given by the Rent Acts. There is no rationale for inferring or extending the landlord's written consent for sub-letting beyond the period of contractual tenancy for which alone it is given. No separate discussion of the later decisions in the same line is necessary because of the same distinction in all of them. One decision which. requires specific mention and is obviously nearest on facts to the present case is Mahabir Prasad Verma v. Dr. Surinder Kaur, [1982] 3 SCR 607. In that case, the contractual tenancy was for a period of one month from 1.4. 1974 to 30.4.1974 with the landlord's consent for sub-letting. The tenant continued to occupy the premises even after expiry of the contractual tenancy on 30,4.1974 and inducted therein a sub-tenant. The landlord sued for eviction of the tenant on the ground of unlawful sub-letting of the premises which was a ground for eviction under the relevant Rent Act. There was some dispute about the time of induction of the sub-tenant, it being claimed by the tenant that the induction of the sub-tenant was in the month of April, 1974 during subsistence of the contractual tenancy while the landlord contended th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... admittedly, nearest on facts to the present case with the only difference that the sub-letting in the present case was after expiry of the contractual tenancy and after the commencement of the Act prohibiting subletting without the written consent of the landlord when it was made on 1.4.1948, while the sub-letting in Mahabir Prasad's case (supra) was during the period of contractual tenancy when the express written consent of the landlord for sub-letting was available. The principle for application, however, is the same with the only difference in the result since in Mahabir Prasad's case (supra) the sub-letting was made during subsistence of the contractual tenancy with the written consent of the landlord. It is significant that the judgment in Mahabir Prasad's case (supra) was by A.N. Sen, J. who also wrote the opinion in Gian Devi's case (supra) relied on by Dr Chitale as one of the decisions in line with Damadilal's case (supra). It is clear that A.N. Sen, J., who wrote the opinion of the Bench in Mahabir Prasad's case (supra) as well as in Gian Devi's case (supra) did not construe the earlier decisions starting with Damadilal's case (supra) in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... bsection 2 specifies the grounds on which a landlord was entitled to seek eviction of his tenant. One such ground in Sub-section 2 is of sub-letting and the relevant portion reads as under: (iii) that the tenant has after the commencement of this Law without the written consent of this landlord--. (a) sub-let the entire building or any portion thereof; or ,, It is, therefore, clear that the written consent of the landlord for sub-letting was necessary under the relevant statute applicable on 1.4. 1948 when the sub-letting was made in the present case. In fact. this requirement of written consent of the landlord was the basis on which both sides argued the case and the main thrust of Dr. Chitale's argument was that such a written consent was to be found in the letter dated 4.10.1943 of the original lessor. We have, earlier, indicated that the landlord's consent in the aforesaid letter dated 4.10.1943 was not available on 1.4.1948 after expiry of the contractual tenancy. The rest is only a logical corollary to this conclusion leading to the inevitable result that induction of the sub-tenant M/s. Super Dry Cleaners w.e.f. 1.4.1948 by the tenant M/s. Bhoolchand Chandiram ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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