TMI Blog2014 (5) TMI 224X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in which the search is initiated u/s 158BC - surcharge is payable by the assessee – Decided in favour of Revenue. Condonation of delay of three months – Charging of interest u/s 158BFA(1) of the Act – Held that:- Following CIT v. K.L. Srihari [2009 (7) TMI 858 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT] - the Tribunal is clearly in error in directing the deletion of the interest part on the tax amount as ultimately determined but for the period during which there is a delay in filing the return – Decided in favour of Revenue. - IT Appeal Nos. 362 & 363 of 2007 - - - Dated:- 27-1-2014 - DILIP B. BHOSALE AND B. MANOHAR, JJ. K.V. Aravind for the Appellant Smt. Vani H. with A. Rama for the Respondent JUDGMENT Dilip B. Bhosale, J. These two Income Tax Appeals are directed against the order dated 22.09.2006 rendered by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore, 'B' Bench (for short 'the Tribunal') in IT(SS)A No.10/PANJ/2002 and 8/PANJ/2002, whereby both these appeals were partly allowed. The appeals before the Tribunal were filed by the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax against the order dated 30.4.2002 rendered by the Commissioner of Income Tax (App ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... inate Bench in CIT v. K.C. Puttaswamy Gowda [2011] 202 Taxman 661/14 taxmann.com 67 (Kar.) and submitted that, since the issue is now pending before the larger Bench, the orders passed by the Assessing Officer be restored with a direction to the Assessing Officer to await the decision of the larger Bench of the Supreme Court and to give effect to the order only after the decision of the larger Bench of the Supreme Court. These facts itself demonstrate that question No.2, arises repeatedly, and therefore, these appeals cannot be disposed of as not maintainable. 6. It would be relevant to reproduce the order passed by this Court in similar circumstances and answer the second question in terms thereof. It is not in dispute that this question is covered by this judgment. The order passed in K.C. Puttaswamy Gowda (supra) reads thus: The Revenue has preferred this appeal challenging the order passed by the Income Tax Tribunal which held that proviso to Section 113 which was inserted by Finance Act, 2002 with effect from 1-6-2002 does not have retrospective application, therefore, the surcharge levied on the assessee is not leviable and therefore, it preferred to delet ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a larger Bench and accordingly, a direction was issued by the Registry to place the matter before the larger Bench. It was submitted that, now the matter is before the larger Bench. 4. Under these circumstances, as the law stands today surcharge is payable by the assessee. In the event of the larger Bench of the Supreme Court reversing the aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court and holding surcharge is not leviable, the assessee is absolved of the liability to pay surcharge. Therefore, in our view the proper order to be passed is to set aside the order of the Tribunal and remit the matter to the Assessing Authority with the direction to await the judgment of the Apex Court and consequent to the order passed by the larger Bench to give effect to our order. Hence, the following order: 1. Appeal is allowed. 2. The impugned order passed by the Tribunal is hereby set aside. 3. The orders passed by the Assessing Authority and the Appellate Commissioner is restored. 4. However, the Assessing Officer shall await the decision of the larger Bench of the Apex Court and depending on the decision to be rendered by the Apex Court to give effect to the order. Matter remanded.' ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the Supreme Court in T.R.F. Ltd., v. CIT [2010] 323 ITR 397/190 Taxman 391. He submitted that even the Assessing Officer ought to have decided the case in conformity with the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the said judgment. In support of this contention he invited our attention to the observations made by the Appellate Authority in paragraph 8 thereof and submitted that the authorities below committed grave error of law in allowing writing off of the bad debts on percentage basis. 10. The Supreme Court in T.R.F. Ltd. (supra) dealt with the provisions containing Section 36(1)(vii). Relevant observations made by the Supreme Court in the said judgment reads thus: This position in law is well-settled. After April 1, 1989, it is not necessary for the assessee to establish that the debt, in fact, has become irrecoverable. It is enough if the bad debt is written off as irrecoverable in the accounts of the assessee. However, in the present case, the Assessing Officer has not examined whether the debt has, in fact, been written off in the accounts of the assessee. When a bad debt occurs, the bad debt account is debited and the customer's account is credited, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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